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Accounting-policy choice and firm characteristics in
the Asia Pacific region: An international empirical
test of Costly Contracting Theory
Emita W. Astami ^'*, Greg Tower ^'^
^ School ofAccounting, Faculty of Economics. Universitas Tehwlogi "Yogyakartd", Yogyakarta, Indonesia
School ofAccounting, Curtin University of Technology, Perth. Australia
Abstract
This study provides evidence on the cross-sectional relationship between firm-specific variables
and management's choice ofaccounting policies by examining four key accounting-poUcy disclosures
in the 2000/2001 annual reports of 442 listed companies in the Asia Pacific region. The dependent
variable is the composite measure for the income increasing (decreasing) accounting-policy choice
tendency.
The results show that firm-specific variables linked to Costly Contracting Theory partially
explain management's choice of accounting policies. Companies that pursue income-increasing
accounting techniques are characterized by lower financial leverage, lower level of ownership
concentration, and higher investment opportunity sets. This finding holds true when country and
industry control variables are not considered. When the control variables are included, the CCT
variables are less a factor and instead country of reporting provides the strongest explanation for
company managers' choice of accounting policies. Indonesian companies utilize the most income-
decreasing accounting technique.
© 2006 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This study hypothesizes that a set of firm-specific characteristics Hnked to Costly
Contracting Theory explains management's choice of accounting policies of listed
companies in the Asia Pacific region including Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore,
and Malaysia. It focuses on the income-increasing (decreasing) aspects of accounting-policy
choice. Four key accounting policies examined in this study are: (1) Inventory methods, (2)
Depreciation methods, (3) Goodwill treatments and (4) Property, plant, and equipment
(PPE) valuations. A threefold criterion is applied in the selection of the four key accounting
policies. First, these four issues are chosen because they are observable accounting-policy
choices with a high degree ofaccounting discretion within GAAP. Second, these accounting
choices also have potentially large, systematic effects on assets and expenses reported on
firms' financial statements. Finally, these policies incorporate accounting methods that can
be identified as income-increasing (decreasing) techniques.
The subject matter is especially important in this era of international convergence
(GAAP, 2002). Many countries have converged or intended to converge with International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).~ Little research has examined a firm's portfolio of
accounting choices in a cross-boundary context. Prior studies (for example, Bowen,
DuCharme, «fe Shore, 1995; Dhaliwal, Heninger, & Hughes, 1999; Skinner, 1993) have
concentrated on accounting choices in a single country. This study fills this gap in the
extant literature. The strength of Costly Contracting Theory is in its explanation of
economic drivers as predictors of managerial choice. Past studies have shown these
variables are useful predictors of companies' accounting-policy choices in single-country
domestic settings. This study provides an important extension by the exploration of Costly
Contracting Theory in a multi-country setting. This is valuable to test whether these
managerial incentives hold in the Asia Pacific region. This focus allows for the
examination of Costly Contracting Theory variables in a broader context including
country effects as well as industry differences.
The results show that firm-specific variables linked to Costly Contracting Theory
partially explain management's choice of accounting policies. Companies that pursue
income-increasing accounting techniques are characterized by lower financial leverage,
lower level of ownership concentration, and higher investment opportunity sets. However,
these results are not found when the control variables are introduced. The country of
reporting as a control variable also provides additional important explanations regarding
company managers' choice of accounting policies. Indonesian companies ufilize the most
income-decreasing accounting techniques compared to the other companies from
Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore.
The term International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has both a narrow and a broad meaning.
Narrowly, IFRS refers to the new numbered series of pronouncements issued by the International Accounting
Standard Board (lASB), as distinct from the series issued by its predecessor, the International Accounting
Standards (IAS). More broadly, IFRS refers to the entire body of lASB pronouncements, including standards and
interpretations approved by the lASB and IAS as well as the interpretations approved by the Standing
Interpretation Committee (SIC) and its predecessor the International Accounting Standards Committee—lASC
(http://www.iasplus.com/standard/slandard.htm (accessed on 25/05/2004)).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the accounting
regulations in the five countries studied followed by Sections 3 and 4 which provide the
theoretical fi-amework and developing the hypotheses, respectively. Section 5 describes the
research approach followed by Section 6 which discusses the empirical findings and their
implications. Section 7 concludes the paper by addressing the contributions and limitations
of the study and ideas for future research.
2. Accounting regulations in the five countries studied
Before and up until 31 December 2001, when the data of this study was collected, the
rule makers for each of these five countries resided within the country's political
regulatory system. Each country has historically shown different levels of autonomy. For
instance, Malaysia prides itself on prompt adoption of international rules whereas
Australia has tended to be more individualistic. Over the last few years each of these
countries in the Asia Pacific region has pledged commitment to the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) rules.
In Australia, since 2002, the AASB has been implementing the strategic direction from
the Financial Reporting Council to adopt International Accounting Standards Board
(lASB) Standards for application to periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005.
The Hong Kong Society of Accountants (HKSA) that sets Hong Kong Statements of
Standard Accounting Practice (HK SSAP) has moved away from its historical British roots
towards conforming to IFRS.
In Indonesia, the standard-setting body is Komite Standar Akuntansi Keuangan
(Committee on Financial Accounting Standards). Under Indonesian law, both public and
private companies must comply with those accounting standards. Since 1994, it has been
the policy of the committee to use International Accounting Standards as the basis for
developing Indonesian standards." For listed companies, there are additional disclosure
requirements imposed by the Capital Market Supervisory Board (Bapepam).
In Malaysia, the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) is established under
the Financial Reporting Act 1997 (the Act) as an independent authority to develop and
issue accounting and financial reporting standards. One of MASB's aims is to pursue a
policy of internationalization and harmonization of MASB standards to be compatible, in
all significant respects, with standards and concepts of other national and international
standard setters, primarily the LASB.
In 2002, the Singapore govemment created the Council on Corporate Disclosure and
Governance (CCDG) to replace the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Singapore
as the accounting standard setter for all companies incorporated in Singapore. The CCDG
has now issued a set of accounting standards and interpretations that are almost identical to
the current set of IFRS, with the exception of effective dates.
Each of the five countries has financial-reporting regimes separate from their tax rules.
Indonesia has a Dutch colonial history and the other four have British roots with Hong
Kong in a unique link with the Peoples Republic of China. Thus, the five countries studied
http://www.iasplus.com/country/indonesi.htm (accessed on 24 May 2004).
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are expected to provide diversity for the sample yet all these countries have been moving
towards IFRS.
3. Theoretical framework—Costly Contracting Theory
The presence of contracting cost leads researchers to generate testable hypotheses that
explain and predict accounting choice. Issues pertaining to the separation of ownership and
control are closely associated with general problems of the agency relationship. Jensen and
Meckling (1976, p. 308) define an agency relationship as "a contract under which one or
more persons (the principal/s) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on
their behalfwhich involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent." Within
the context of the firm, agency theory provides the basis for a framework pertaining to a
conflict of interest between managers, shareholders, and debt holders. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) argue that written contractual arrangements can reduce agency costs. Within this
structure, two forms of contractual relationship are dealt with: those between the company
manager, as an agent, and the company's shareholders; and those between shareholders and
bondholders. However, Klein (1983) contends that these contracts are incomplete for two
reasons. First, there is the uncertainty of a large number of possible contingencies which
makes it extremely costly for transacting parties to detail all responses in advance to these
possibilities. Second, it may be prohibitively costly to measure and specify contractual
issues. Because of these problems, a general agency problem is likely to remain.
Managers have the discretion to select accounting procedures Irom an accepted set.
Skinner (1993) argues that it will not be efficient to contractually restrict managerial
choice entirely because it is thought that company managers are most likely to know best
which particular accounting policies would maximize the value of the firm. He believes
that even though ex post choice, accounting choice can be efficient. Managers select
accounting methods that provide the best way of motivating employees. They will also
employ accounting methods that can minimize the company's potential costs in regard to
political visibility or process. Demski, Patell, and Wolfson (1984, p. 17) argue that "the
delegation to managers of the choice fi"om among the set of acceptable (accounting)
alternatives can best be understood as efficient, equilibrium behavior."
Costly Contracting Theory has been employed most extensively in the accounting
literature to explain management's choice of accounting policies. It hypothesizes that
managers utilize the opportunity available in both the contracts and accepted accounting
procedures in their self-interest. This study predicts particular circumstances in which firm
characteristics linked to Costly Contracting Theory lead company managers to utilize
income-increasing or income-decreasing techniques.
4. Hypotheses development
The general hypotheses addressed in this study are whether there exist systematic
explanations between the adoption of income-increasing (decreasing) accounting methods
and firm-specific characteristics linked to Costly Contracting Theory.
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4.1. Profitability
Company profitability has been used in compensation contracts both explicitly and
implicitly. Bushman and Smith (2001) further note that there is widespread evidence of
explicit usage of annual bonus plans in corporate executive's long-term performance plans.
The implicit use of profitability measures to evaluate the board of directors and
compensate top officers also exists in the relationship between profitability measure and
various measures of executive pay.
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) believe that, ceteris paribus, managers of firms with
bonus plans are more likely to choose accounting procedures that shift reported earnings
fi-om fiiture periods to the current period. Accordingly, if part of a manager's remu-
neration is derived from incentive plans which are related to accounting earnings, then
management has an incentive to use accounting methods that increase accounting
earnings (Hagerman & Zmijewski, 1979). As the vast majority of the sample companies
in this study do not disclose the presence or otherwise of a bonus plan, the current year's
profitability is used as a proxy measure. This concept can be directly linked to the
examination of four key accounting policies in this study. Thus, the following hypothesis
is tested:
HI. A firm's profitability is positively associated with the use of income-increasing
techniques for the aggregated accounting-policy choices.
4.2. Financial leverage
Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith (1982) argue that accounting methods are associated
with financial leverage because restrictive covenants in the firm's credit agreements exist.
Debt agreements usually include covenants restricting the level of financial ratios such as
leverage, liquidity, and profitability. It is believed that the closer a business is to breaching
an accounting-based debt constraint, the more likely it is for management to adopt
accounting methods that increase income (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Then, company
managers are expected to use income-increasing accounting methods in order to reduce the
possibility of covenant violations and avoid the possible costs of renegotiation of debt
agreements. Hence, managers of firms with high leverage ratios are more likely to choose
accounting methods that increase reported income. The following hypothesis is tested:
H2. A firm's financial-leverage position is positively associated with the use of income-
increasing techniques for the aggregated accounting-policy choices.
4.3. Political visibility (measured by size)
The size hypothesis is based on the assumption that large firms are more politically
sensitive and have relatively larger wealth transfers imposed on them (polifical costs) than
smaller firms (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). The hypothesized relationship between firm
size and income effect of the firm's accounting methods has been supported by empirical
evidence such as Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey (1981); Dhaliwal et al. (1999); Hagerman
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and Zmijewski (1979); Skinner (1993); and Watts and Zimmerman (1978). Linking this
concept to the study focus, the following hypothesis is tested.
H3. A firm's size is negatively associated with the use of income-increasing techniques for
the aggregated accounting-policy choices.
4.4. Ownership concentration
Lemmon and Lins (2003) suggest that differences in firm-ownership structure explain
variations in firm performance. This indicates that ownership characteristics matter
because they influence the desired rate of return and may also influence diversification
strategy (McGee & Thomas, 1986). Fan and Wong (2002) contend that the share-
ownership structure delineates a firm's agency problem and has an effect on the firm's
reporting. They suggest that when there is a high level of ownership concentration these
shareholders will also control the production of the firm's accounting information and
financial-reporting policies.
Studies such as Dhaliwal et al. (1982) document that a firm's ownership structure is a
determinant factor of management's choice of accounting methods. Niehaus (1989)
hypothesizes that when ownership is diffuse, managers exercise considerable discretion
over the choice of accounting methods. Dhaliwal et al. (1982) argue that Watts and
Zimmerman's (1978) positive theory leads to the prediction that management controlled
firms are more likely than owner controlled firms to adopt accounting methods that
increase reported earnings. Therefore, the following hypothesis is examined:
H4. A firm's level of ownership concentration is negatively associated with the use of
income-increasing techniques for the aggregated accounting-policy choices.
4.5. Investment opportunity set and assets-in-place
The term investment opportunity set (lOS) refers to the extent to which firm value
depends on ftiture discretionary expenditures by the firm. Assets-in-place (AIP) refers
to those assets whose ultimate value does not principally depend on discretionary
investment by managers (Skinner, 1993). Smith and Watts (1992) believe that
accounting choice as a corporate policy varies across firms as a function of the lOS.
Additionally, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that the assets of growth firms are
mainly represented by future investment, hence are more difficult to observe. Therefore,
Skinner (1993) argues that contracts, based on the less readily observed values of
future investments, provide managers with greater flexibility to act opportunistically ex
post.
It is argued that the greater the assets-in-place and investment opportunity set the more
likely the company will use earnings-based bonus plans (because accounting numbers are
relatively good measures of performance). Therefore, it is more likely to use income-
increasing accounting procedures. Similarly, if there is a greater level of AIP and lOS, the
company will be more likely to use accounting-based debt covenants (again because
accounting numbers are relatively good measures of performance). Therefore, the
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companies will be more likely to use income-increasing accounting procedures (Dopuch &
Pincus, 1988; Skinner, 1993; Smith & Warner, 1979).
Based on the above discussion the following hypotheses are tested:
H5. A firm's investment opportunity set is positively associated with the use of income-
increasing techniques for the aggregated accounting-policy choices.
H6. A firm's assets-in-place is positively associated with the use of income-increasing
techniques for the aggregated accounting-policy choices.
5. Research approach
5.1. Data
Data were collected from a random sample of 442 listed companies' annual reports
for fiscal year-ends ranging from December 2000 to September 2001. The reports
include 83, 102, 84, 93, and 80 annual reports of companies listed in the stock
exchanges of Ausfralia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, respectively
(see Table 1).
Table 1 shows that this study incorporates a sample of 13% of the population of listed
companies in the five countries studied.
5.2. Independent and control variables
The independent variables are measured as follow. Prof is a proxy measure for bonus
plan measuring profitability by the ratio of operating profit divided by operating
revenues. Lev is leverage proxied by total book value of long-term debt divided by total
book value of equity. Size is measured by total assets at the end of the financial year in
US$ and logged to reduce skewness (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Owncon or the
ownership concentration is the percentage of the sum of all the ownership representing
10% or more of the total issued share capital. lOS or the investment opportunity set
measures gross property, plant, and equipment (at historic cost) divided by the market
value of the firm where market value of the firm is equal to market value of equity plus
Table 1
Number of companies listed in the main stock exchange in the five countries as of 3 1 December 200
1
Number of listed companies SampleCountries Source l
Australia Australian Stock Exchange 1410
Hong Kong Hong Kong Stock Exchange 746
Indonesia Jakarta Stock Exchange 316
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange'' 529
Singapore Singapore Stock Exchange 386
Total 3387
83 6
102 14
84 27
93 18
80 21
442 13
Source: Corresponding web site of Stock Exchange Ixom each country.
^ Is now known as Bursa Malaysia.
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Table 2
The descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables
Variables // Mean Min Max SD Skewness
Profitability (Prof)^' 442 -.02 -3.32 .88 .48 -3.953
Leverage (Lev) 442 .14 .00 .92 .16 1 .465
Total assets (million US$) 442 379.493 2.52 13,902 112/1 6.948
LogTA (Size) 442 7.98 6.4 10.14 .65 .570
Ownership concentration (OwnCon) 437 .33 .00 .99 .29 .242
Investment opportunity set (lOS) 383 .47 .0014 2.55 .40 1.401
Assets-in-place (AIP) 442 .33 .00 .96 .21 .422
;; : sample size and excluded samples that have any missing values.
" Median of profitability: .0630.
book value of debt. AIP or assets-in-place is the ratio of the book value of total property,
plant, and equipment (PPE) to total assets.
Table 2 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables.
From the total sample of 442 companies, 437 provided information for ownership and 383
for lOS.
The Profitability (Prof) variable indicates that in the year of study the average
company profitability is negative 2.34% with the median a positive 6.3%. This suggests
that some companies are experiencing severe loss while more companies are enjoying
profit. There are 110 (25%)) loss companies and 332 (75%)) profit companies.
Financial leverage (Lev variable) is proxied by total book value of long-term debt
divided by total book value of equity. The mean of the companies' financial leverage is
14% which is relatively low compared to other international studies. There are 26
companies with no leverage. Those include 2, 11, 5, 2, and 6 companies from Australia,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, respectively.
Total assets'* of the sample companies range from US$2.5 million to US$13,902 million
and the average is US$379.5 million. The mean of total assets of Australia, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore is US$510.21 million, US$536.36 million,
US$182.16 million, US$487.58 million, and US$125.43 million, respectively. Firm size
across the five nations varies greatly.^ The smallest company is listed on the Singapore
Stock Exchange while the largest company is a company listed on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange.
Ownership concentration is thought to be an effective monitoring mechanism, reducing
opportunistic conduct in respect to management's choice of accounting policies. The mean
of companies' ownership concentration for the overall sample companies is 33%) with the
" A large majority of the sample companies present their financial statements using local currency. For analysis
purposes, total assets of each companies that are not presented in US$ are converted into US$ at the exchange rate
as of fiscal year-end. This study uses the conversion rate online facilities provided by the Bank of Canada
available on httpV/www.bankofcanada.ca/en/exchange-convert.htm.
^ The nature of the variations of firm size is consistent with the finding of Zarzeski (1996) who investigates 256
companies from seven nations: France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, United Kingdom, and United
Stales. The average of firm total assets of each country ranges from the minimum US$24 million to the maximum
US$192,876 million and the average is US$6853 million.
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Table 3
The four key accounting policies stated in companies' annual report for the year-ends 2000/2001
Country Inventory
n %
Depreciat
n
ion
%
Goodwill PPE Total sample
n % II % n
Australia 62 75 82 98 55 66 83 100 83
Hong Kong 87 85 102 100 88 86 102 100 102
Indonesia 83 99 84 100 17 20 83 100 84
Malaysia 93 100 93 100 49 53 93 100 93
Singapore 77 96 80 100 60 75 80 100 80
Total 402 90 441 99.8 269 60.9 442 100 442
Standard deviation of 29%. All countries except for Indonesia have very similar ownership
structures ranging only between 30% and 32%. The mean of ownership concentration is
the highest (62%) for Indonesian companies and the lowest (30%) for Australian
companies.
The investment opportunity set (lOS) variable measures gross property, plant, and
equipment (at historic cost) divided by the market value of the firm where market value
of the firm is equal to market value of equity plus book value of debt. The overall mean
of the lOS is 47%. There are only 383 companies whose market-value data as of the end
of the financial year are available from Datasream. Among those, eight companies have
a very small^ figure for the lOS. The mean for the lOS of Australian companies is the
lowest (40%); that of Malaysian companies is the highest (58%). Assets-in-place (AIP
variable) is the ratio of the book value of total property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to total
assets. The mean ofAIP is 33% with a minimum of and a maximum of 99%. Among the
five countries studied, the mean of AIP of Hong Kong companies is the lowest (24%); that
of Malaysian companies is the highest (41%)).
5.3. Management's selection of the four key accounting policies
Table 3 provides an overview of the usage of accounting policies used by the
companies in our sample sorted by country. It summarizes the availability of the four
key accounting policies and the frequency of use for each accounting method being
studied.
Table 3 shows that the lowest rate of policy use stated in the annual report is for the
treatment of goodwill. The highest is for the PPE valuation base. However, it is
important to note that management's choice for the PPE valuation base for Indonesian
companies is different in nature from the other four counfries. Indonesia is the only
country in our study where companies do not actually have an absolute choice regarding
the PPE valuation base. Indonesian companies report their PPE based on historical cost
but they are allowed to revaluate certain assets only if required to do so by the
Government. They disclose information of the PPE valuation base used, but do not
Some of the values presented as zero (0) are a rounding of the very tiny actual number calculated by using
SP55. For example, a company from Hong Kong had an lOS of .00148250 which was rounded to zero.
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provide details of PPE revaluation. For this reason, the effect of individual PPE choice is
not examined for Indonesian companies.^
5.4. Classification scheme for each of the four accounting policies
For the measurement of the dependent variable, key accounting issues are ordinally
categorized according to their effect on net income (more income increasing or income
decreasing). Key accounting policies examined are inventory methods, depreciation
methods, goodwill treatment, and valuation base of property, plant and equipment (PPE).
These policies incorporate accounting methods that can be identified as income-
increasing (decreasing) techniques. In line with Skinner (1993) and Bowen et al. (1995),
each of the four key accounting polices is classified into income-increasing (decreasing)
tendency, as a measure of their impact on the reported income. Based on the accounting
policies used, each company was assigned a value ranging from zero (the most income-
decreasing technique) to two (the most income-increasing technique). After assigning a
value for each accounting policy, a composite measure for the choices of the four
accounting policies is then calculated for each company. The composite-measure score
for each company is calculated based on the number of accounting policies disclosed by
the company.
First is the classification scheme" for inventory measurement. Management's inventory-
method choices include FIFO, average cost, and other methods (e.g., specific
identification, retail prices). An inventory method is assigned a value range from zero
(the most income-decreasing technique) to two (the most income-increasing technique).
Skinner (1993) assumes in a given year that input prices are rising, the FIFO results in
higher reported income than other methods. Thus, the use of FIFO as the most income-
increasing method choice is given an assigned value of two.
Second is the use of the straight-line method which will have an income-increasing
effect relative to an accelerated method (Rahman & Scapens, 1988). This study codes the
use of its straight-line depreciation method as an income-increasing method with a value
of two, the use of a combination of sfraight-line and accelerated methods as an
^ The PPE valuation policy in Indonesia is mandated by the government. In accordance with PSAK No. 16
Paragraph 66 (lAI 1999), Indonesian listed companies report fixed assets based on their historical cost.
Revaluation is used only under special circumstances as prescribed by the Indonesian government. In the year of
our study, Indonesian companies sampled stated their PPE at historical costs or revaluations in accordance with
existing government regulations (Ministry of Finance Decree No. 384/KMK/04/1998). Since the PPE policy
choice for Indonesian companies is not voluntary, it is not relevant to the issue investigated in the paper and is
therefore excluded.
In the period of study, inflation rates in all countries were positive except for Hong Kong. There was negative
inflation in Hong Kong with -6.6% in 2000 and it became -1.0% in 2001 (http://devdata.worldbank.org/
extemal/CPProfile.asp?SeIectedCountry=HKG&CCODE, accessed on 31 January 2003). However, the Hong
Kong Composite Consumer Price Index in 1998 (based on 1994-1995) was 1 17.9 and the inflation rate through
the 1990s was positive (http://www.info.gov.hk/hk2000/eng/ appendices/indexcontent.htm, accessed on 16 June
2002). Thus, during the year of study, the use of FIFO for inventory will result in a higher reported income
compared to other measurement techniques such as LIFO. Historically, Hong Kong has experienced positive
albeit low inflation rates. This indicates that the negative inflation was only a temporary phenomenon.
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intermediate with a value of one, and the use of accelerated methods as an income-
decreasing approach with a value of zero.
Third is the classification scheme for goodwill. Goodwill, at acquisition, is the
difference between the price paid for a corporate acquisition and the fair value of the net
assets acquired. The treatment methods of goodwill are categorized and assigned values
ranging from zero (the most income-decreasing technique) to two (the most income-
increasing technique). This study codes the use of write-off against the balance sheet as
income increasing,'^ the use of the amortized method as income decreasing, and the write-
off of goodwill to the income statement as the most income decreasing.
Fourth is the classification scheme for the PPE valuation base. The selection for the
PPE valuation base by management includes historical cost-valuation and revaluation-
based methods (modified historical cost). A revaluation of depreciable assets affects
profit calculation since depreciation reflects the most recent carrying amount.
Specifically, the net increase in tangible assets will be followed by lower periodic
income figures. Finally, depending on companies' selection of the PPE valuation bases,
in this study the sample companies are assigned values ranging from zero (the most
income-decreasing technique) to two (the most income-increasing technique). This
study codes the use of historical cost-valuation base as income increasing and the use
of revaluation-based methods as more income decreasing. In addition, it classifies the
use of a combination of historical cost and revaluation as either an income-decreasing
method or an intermediate, based on the magnitude of the revaluation.
Table 4 summarizes the classification scheme of management's choice for the four key
accounting policies.
Table 5 summarizes utilization for the various methods of each of the four accounting
policies scrutinized in this study. As shown in this table, there are considerable variations
in accounting practices for the four key accounting policies in listed companies in the Asia
Pacific region.'' There are no companies that use the LIFO method for their inventory
valuation. For each of the four key accounting policies, the most popular technique is
FIFO, then the straight-line method, write-off to reserve, historical cost for inventory,
depreciation, goodwill, and PPE, respectively.
Table 5 classifies the sample companies based on their selections of accounting
techniques ranging from the most income increasing to the most income decreasing for
each accounting policy. We find that 43% of companies use the FIFO cost-flow
assumption. The straight-line depreciation method is applied by most companies from
all five countries. In fact, 378 companies, 85.7% of the sample, use the straight-line
Bowen et al. (1995), Rahman and Scapens (1988), and Skinner (1993) use the scheme outlined above for
classifying particular depreciation methods as income-increasing or income-decreasing methods.
Direct write-off of goodwill to a reserve is income increasing in the sense tha it completely eliminates any
goodwill expense from impacting on the Income Statement. Thus, it will never decrease profit.
Most accounting policies were available to all sampled companies in the five countries. There were a few
exceptions. LIFO was allowed in Indonesia but none of the sampled companies used it. Finally, Australia and
Indonesia did not allow the unusual use of direct write-off to reserve but it was allowed in Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Malaysia. Overall, it is felt that the sampled companies still had a wide range of accounting policies to choose
from.
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Table 4
Assigned value for each accounting method for the four accounting policies
Description Assigned value
A. Assigned value of individual method score (IMS) for inventoiy methods
First-in-first-out (FIFO) inventory cost flow assumption 2
A combination of FIFO cost flow assumption and other methods 1.5
other than average method
A combination of average cost and FIFO cost flow assumption 1
A combination of average cost and other methods other than FIFO .5
Average cost method
B. Assigned value of individual method score (IMS) for depreciation methods
Straight-line methods 2
A combination of accelerated and straight-line methods, 1
or straight-line and units-of-production depreciation methods,
or accelerated, straight-line, and units-of-production depreciation methods
Accelerated methods
C. Assigned value of individual method score (IMS) for goodwill treatments
Write-off all to reserves 2
Amortize for 20 years or more 1.5
Amortize for 10 to 19 years 1
Amortize for fewer then 10 years • .5
Write-off all to the income statement
D. Assigned value of individual method score (IMS) for PPE valuation bases
For historical cost valuation base 2
For historical cost valuation base and revaluation of less than 33.33% of the PPE 1.5
For historical cost valuation base and revaluation of 33.34% to 66.67% of the PPE 1
For historical cost valuation base and revaluation of 66.68% to 99.9% of the PPE .5
For revaluation base
depreciation method. Of the 269 companies in the sample with a stated goodwill
approach, 117 (43.5%) write goodwill off totally in the year of acquisition. The other
half of the transaction is against equity reserves in the balance sheet. More than half
(186 or 52%) of sample companies use the historical cost (HC) valuation base, only
two companies (both from Hong Kong) use solely the revaluation base (Rev), and
47.5%) of the companies apply mixed-valuation bases. However, the majority of
companies that use the mixed-valuation base revalue relatively small portions of their
PPE, 33.3% or less.
This variation of accounting policies across companies might be driven by a variety of
company-specific characteristics. Statistical tests are performed to analyze whether
management's accounting-policy choices differ between the respective countries and
industries.
5.5. Measurement for a composite dependent variable
Our sample choice criteria include the requirement that a company use at least two of
the four applicable accounting-policy choices. These are: inventory measurement.
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Table 5
Various methods of the four accounting policies in the companies' annual reports for year-ends 2000/2001
Inventory Depreciation Goodwill PPE
Method IMS n % Method IMS n % Method IMS n % Method IMS n %
1) 2) 3) 4)
FIFO 2 174 43 SL 2 378 85.7 WR 2 117 43.5 HC 2 186 52.0
Mixl 1.5 4 1 Al 1.5 96 35.7 Mixl 1.5 121 33.8
Mix2 1 56 14 Mix 1 35 8.0 A2 1 13 4.8 Mix2 1 29 8.1
Mix3 .5 9 2 A3 .5 37 13.8 Mix3 .5 20 5.6
Ave 159 40 Ace 35 6.3 WI 6 2.2 Rev 2 .6
Total 402 100 Total 441 100 Total 269 100 Total 258 100
Definition of acronyms:
IMS: Individual Method Score, see Table 4 for fiirther details.
n: Number of companies.
Method 1 ): Accounting methods for inventory:
FIFO: first-in-first-out inventory cost flow assumption; Mixl: a combination of FIFO cost flow assumption and
other methods; Mix2: a combination of average cost and FIFO cost flow assumption; Mix3: a combination of
average cost and other methods other than FIFO; Ave: average cost method.
Method 2): Accounting methods for depreciation:
SL: Straight-line method; Mix: a combination of accelerated and straight-line methods, or straight-line and units-
of-production depreciation methods, or accelerated, straight-line, and units-of-production depreciation methods;
Ace: Accelerated method.
Method 3): Accounting methods for Goodwill:
WR: write-off to reserves; Al : amortize for 20 years or more; A2: amortize for 10 to 19 years; A3: amortize for
fewer then 10 years; Wl: write-off to the income statement.
Method 4): Accounting methods PPE valuation:
HC: 2 for historical cost valuation base; Mixl: 1.5 for historical cost valuation base and revaluation of less than
33.33% of the PPE; Mix2: 1 for historical cost valuation base and revaluation of 33.34% to 66.67% of the PPE;
Mix3: .5 for historical cost valuation base and revaluation of 66.68% to 99.9% of the PPE; Rev: for revaluation
base.
depreciation methods, goodwill treatments, and PPE valuation bases. '^ This criterion leads
to a set of possible combinations of key accounting methods available in each company
where the minimum available choices is two and the maximum is four.
In most situations, company managers can choose accounting policies singly or jointly
to accomplish one or several goals in respect to their contractual arrangements. Since there
are potential conflicts among multiple goals in the choice of accounting methods,
managers will consider the combinations of policies that make up the accounting-policy
strategy. The values of companies' composite-measure scores allow this study to
determine whether a company tends to select income-increasing or -decreasing techniques.
This approach assumes that the accounting choices made by firms are part of a larger,
overall strategy rather than single choices made independently (Meyer, Karim, & Gara,
2000). Therefore, in this study, the dependent variable is the income-increasing
(decreasing) accounting-policy choice tendency. In line with approaches used by Skinner
'' Of the 442 sample companies, the majority of them (229 or 52%) have the four key policies stated in their
annual reports. There are 85 (19%) companies that have two of the policies stated, and 128 (29%) companies have
three key policies. More than half of the companies from each of four countries of study, including Australia,
Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, have the four key accounting choices.
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(1993) and Bowen et al. (1995), this study calculates a composite-measure score via the
following formula:
n
Where,
CMS Composite measure score
/ Company specific
/ Individual method score (IMS) for inventory methods
D Individual method score (IMS) for depreciation methods
G Individual method score (IMS) for goodwill treatments
P Individual method score (IMS) for PPE valuation bases
n The appropriate number of the four accounting policies disclosed in the
company's annual report.
5.6. Control variables
This study includes two control variables. These are industry grouping (IndS) and
country of reporting (Country). Sample companies from the five countries are grouped into
eight industry groups based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of all
Economic Activities (ISIC Rev. 3.1, 2003). In line with the procedure adopted by Williams
(1999), this study produces industry classifications as follows: Core, Resources, Diverse,
Food, Chemicals, Services, Retail, and Property groups, respectively.
Country as a control variable is the categorical variable to represent country of reporting.
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics ofCMS across the five countries studied. The table
shows that among the five countries. Hong Kong companies, on average, select the most
income-increasing accounting techniques (CMS score of 1.64 out of 2). Conversely,
Indonesian companies, on average, select the most income-decreasing accounting
techniques, with the mean of CMS being 1.25.
Table 7 shows the mean of CMS for accounting policies across industry groups.
Companies in the property-industry group tend to use income-increasing accounting
techniques with a mean of CMS being 1.66. Companies in the chemicals group use the
most income-decreasing accounting techniques (CMS of 1.39) compared to companies
from other industry groups. However, as shown in Section 6, these differences are not
statistically significant.
Table 6
Descriptive statistics of the CMS across the five countries
Country n Min Max Mean St Dev
Australia 83 .33 2.00 1.51 .40
Hong Kong 102 1.00 2.00 1.64 .32
Indonesia 84 .50 2.00 1.25 .44
Malaysia 93 .67 2.00 1.60 .32
Singapore 80 .63 2.00 1.57 .39
Total 442 .33 2.00 1.51 .39
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Table 7
Descriptive statistics of CMS across eight industry groups
Industry n Min Max Mean Stdev
Property 37 1.00 2.00 1.66 .30
Services 34 1.00 2.00 1.60 .30
Food 49 .50 2.00 1.58 .39
Core 80 .50 2.00 1.52 .37
Retail 78 .67 2.00 1.52 .36
Resources 68 .33 2.00 1.44 .45
Diverse 47 .50 2.00 1.44 .45
Chemicals 49 .50 2.00 1.39 .42
Total 442 .33 2.00 1.51 .39
In summary, the tendency of management to select income-increasing (decreasing)
accounting techniques varies among countries. This study further examines statistically
whether this variation of management's choice of accounting policies is driven by firm-
specific variables linked to Costly Contracting Theory.
6. Statistical results and implications
This study utilizes the General Linear Model (GLM) that provides regression analysis
and analysis of variance for one dependent variable by one or more factors and/or
variables. The relationships between CMS and the explanatory variables are presented in
Eq. (2).
CMS, = fl + /?iProf/ + />2Lev, + Zj^Size, + Z740wnCon, + Z^sIOS, + Z^eAIP/
+ Cilnd8, + C2Country + e (2)
where explanatory variables are as defined above, and
CMS Composite measure score
/ Company specific
a Constant
b Coefficients on continuous variables
e Error term
C Coefficients on categorical (control) variables
Table 8 presents the correlation matrix for the six firm-specific variables including the
two control variables. This table shows that the highest correlation exists between the lOS
and AIP with a correlation value of .586. This lessens concerns about multicollinearity in
the regression analysis. Two sets of regressions were run using GLM. Regression 1
examines the effect of a set of six firm-specific variables on accounting choices.
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Table 8
Correlation matrix for the independent and control variables
Variables Prof Lev Size (Log;TA) OwnCon lOS AIP Country
Prof 1.000
Leverage .098* 1.000
Size (LogTA) .173** .345** 1.000
OwnCon .134** .080 -.066 1.000
lOS .150** -.030 -.036 -.001 1.000
AIP .071 .207 -.074 .043 .586** 1.000
Country .024 -.169** -.095** .209** .159* .124** 1.000
IndS -.169** .065 .073 .057 -.172** -.104* .066
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Regression 2 examines the effect of six firm-specific variables and control variables on
accounting choices. The multiple regression results^^ are presented in Table 9.
The predictability power of regression 2, which includes all predictor as well as control
variables, is .138, which is higher than that of regression 1, which includes only the CCT
variables, which is .116. This finding suggests that the control variables help explain
management's selection of accounting policies. As shown in Table 9, country of reporting
is a highly significant factor for management's selection of accounting policies with a p
value of .001. Moreover, regression 1 reveals that five variables help explain
management's choice of accounting policies with different levels of significance.
Profitability was the only variable that did not help explain management's selection of
accounting policies. The lOS is a highly significant predictor with a p value of 004. The
Lev, OwnCon, and AIP variables are significant predictors withp values of .031, .041, and
.021, respectively. The directionality signs for the relationships are consistent between
those two regressions.
The results of regression 2 (all explanatory and the control variables) show that only the
lOS variable has a highly significant coefficient, with ap value of 0.008, as well as the
country of reporting, with ap value of 0.001. The other firm-specific variables-industry
group as a control variable and the interaction between country and industry group-do not
provide significant results. This is an important finding. These statistical results suggest
that country of reporting is the strongest control variable.
These results indicate that accounting-policy choices in listed companies across five
countries in the Asia Pacific region are influenced by firm-specific factors linked to
Costly Contracting Theory. This finding holds when the control variables (country and
industry) are not considered. When these additional variables are added, the lOS position
' As the dependent variable can also be viewed as a categorical variable, to test the robustness of simple- and
multiple-regression results further, additional tests were conducted by using ordinal regression statistical analysis
which were then compared to the statistical analysis results from those two sets of analyses. Due to space
limitations, the statistical results from the ordinal regressions are not reported here since the key finding is that
both forms of analyses give virtually the same results as those reported in Table 9. Moreover, simple bivariate
regressions were also conducted to ensure that even moderate levels of correlations (see Table 8) did not influence
the hypotheses testing. The bivariate results (not shown for brevity) were the same.
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Table 9
Multiple regression results
Predictors Predicted sign Regression 1 Regression 2
Actual sign andp value Actual sign and p value
Profitability (Prof) + (+) n.s (+) n.s
Leverage (Lev)^^ + (-) .031** (-) n.s.
LogTA (Size) - (+) .090*** (+) n.s
Ownership concentration (Owncon)"^"^^ - (-) .041** (-) n.s.
Investment opportunity set (lOS) + (+) .004* (+) .008*
Assets-in-place (AIP) + (-) .021** (-) n.s.
IndS n.s
Country .001*
IndS * Country n.s
n 378 378
Adjusted R~ .116 .138
*Highly significant at/7<.01 level, **Significant at/7<.05 level, *** Moderately significant at/7<.10 level, n.s.:
not significant. **Lev is highly significant at p value .003 in the simple regression. ^^^Owncon is moderately
significant at/? value .054 in the simple regression.
of the company and the country of reporting are the key predictors. The major findings
of this statistical analysis and their implications are summarized below.
• The regression analysis shows that the profitability variable is an insignificant
predictor of management's selection of accounting policies. Thus, HI is not supported.
A plausible explanation is that companies with a low profitability figure or in a loss
situation have little or no incentive to increase the income number. Therefore,
accounting-policy choices are less important. As suggested by Healy (1985), the upper
and lower bounds in compensation contracts provide manager's an incentive toward
"bath-taking" behavior, that is, when earnings are already below expectation or are
negative for a certain period, managers may expense as many costs as possible in that
period in order to have a much better performance in the following period. Moreover,
profitability was used as a proxy variable for the (undisclosed) effect of a bonus plan
and is thus an imperfect measure.
• Although the leverage variable significantly helps explain management's selection of
accounting policies, it is negatively associated with the use of the income-increasing
tendency. H2 is, therefore, not supported due to the opposite directions of its signs. A
plausible explanation for this finding is that managers of companies are concerned more
about their balance-sheet attributes than the income statement. For this, some companies
might prefer to select accounting techniques based on their favorable balance-sheet
effects (Aboody, Kasznik, & Williams, 2000). For instance, a company may select to
revaluate its fixed assets. Although asset revaluations may decrease reported accounting
income they definitely increase assets (hence reducing the leverage). Thus, company
managers might also try to reduce the leverage ratio by increasing asset value. Moreover,
the average-leverage figure for the sample companies was a low 14%; therefore, many
companies may be a long way from debt-covenant restrictions.
• This study finds that the Size variable is not a significant predictor for management's
selection of accounting policies. Thus, H3 is not supported. Many positivist accounting
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researchers such as Watts and Zimmerman (1990) utihze size to proxy for a firm's pohtical
sensitivity and thus the incentive of managers to select income-decreasing accounting
choices. Skinner (1993) fmds that larger firms are more likely to select income-decreasing
accounting policies. The finding of this study implies that in the Asia Pacific context a
firm's political sensitivity does not affect a firm's selection of accounting policies.
• The level of ownership concentration helps us understand the companies accounting
choices. It negatively affects the income-increasing tendency. Thus, H4 is supported.
This finding suggests that company managers select accounting policies in accordance
with companies' constraints inherent to the principal-agent relationships in a company.
hi this study, managers of a more diffused ownership company tend to select income-
increasing accounting techniques. Thus, differing levels of ownership concentration
may allow for different levels of managerial discretion. However, this result does not
hold true when country and industry are included in the statistical analysis. The country
of reporting is an especially strong predictor.
• The lOS variable is another important predictor. It positively affects the income-
increasing tendency with a p value of .004 (fi"om regression 1) and .008 (fi*om
regression 2). Thus, H5 is supported. A company with a higher level of lOS faces
constraints that are different firom one with a lower level of lOS. The former tends to
select income-increasing accounting techniques since naturally managers of this
company have less discretion on managing its assets compared to the latter. This
suggests that low-growth firms''^ tend to make income-increasing accounting choices as
their strategy for the aggregate of the four accounting policies. The plausible
explanation for this is that low-growth firms have less variable earnings, ^^ therefore,
management has a greater incentive to pursue income-increasing accounting policies.
Regression 1 , as shown in Table 9, indicates that the AIP variable is significant with a
p value of .021. This suggests that the lower the level of assets-in-place of a company,
the more likely the company is to select an income-increasing technique. However, the
direction of the relationship is again the opposite as predicted by Costly Contracting
Theory. Thus, H6 is not supported. This study finds that AIP and the lOS affect
accounting choices differently. This suggests that ratios based on book values and market
values have different impacts on management's choice of accounting policies. This is
because book values refer to assets already in place, while Myers ( 1 977) suggests that
many firms' market values are accounted for by assets not yet in place such as the present
value of future growth opportunities.
Overall, these findings support Thomas's (1991) suggestion that management's choice
of corporate financial-reporting practices is affected by the differing constraints on
companies. The economic focus of the Costly Contracting Theory variable offers
important insights. Some of the company-specific variables related to the theory explain
company manager's motivation for accounting choice.
'^
In line with Skinner (1993) and Dhaliwal et al. (1999), this study refers to firms with relatively high levels of
assets-in-place as low-growth firms, and those with lower levels as high-growth firms.
'^ Dhaliwal et al. (1999) argues that high-growth firms have more variable earnings, which therefore create
greater incentives to reduce earnings variability.
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7. Conclusion
Research presented in this paper focuses on an empirical analysis of the effects of
firms-specific variables linked to Costly Contracting Theory on management's selection
of accounting policies in the Asia Pacific region. A sample of 442 listed companies in
five countries in the Asia Pacific region was surveyed to measure the relationship of
firm-specific characteristics to the selection of income-increasing (decreasing) account-
ing techniques. Results of this study provide empirical evidence that the variation of
management's choice of accounting policies is explained by country of reporting as
well as certain firm-specific variables linked to Costly Contracting Theory.
This study provides evidence of the circumstances under which a company selects a
particular accounting method. Companies that pursue income-increasing accounting
techniques in their aggregated accounting policies are characterized by lower financial
leverage, lower ownership concentration, and higher investment opportunity sets.
Industry-group categories also help explain aggregated accounting choices.
Country of reporting demonstrates a very strong effect on accounting-policy choices.
Indonesian companies reveal a unique pattern that is significantly different from the other
four countries. They use income-decreasing accounting techniques more than any of the
other countries studied. Understanding the nature of differences in accounting numbers
across companies and especially across nations helps the users of financial accounting
information in valuing the companies' performances. Specific accounting rules/regulations
can affect the valuation of the firms' performances. Therefore, the findings of this study
have important implications for anyone related to the production of financial accounting
information such as preparers, financial analysts, other users, and standard setters.
The primary contributions of this study are the important insights it gives about factors
that influence management's selection of accounting policies and whether these selections
are income-increasing (decreasing) tendencies. The findings of this study provide evidence
that since company managers have the discretion to select an accounting method from
among a set of acceptable methods, preferences occur for specific reasons. The
international movement towards official convergence of financial reporting practices
toward IFRS does not necessarily mean that the comparability of the financial statements
of companies in the Asia Pacific region will be totally achieved.
Additionally, this study finds that there is a certain pattem of accounting policies used
in each industry group. Although not statistically significant these phenomena might lead
the standard setters in each country and the lASB to consider narrowing the alternative
allowable policies in certain issues. This helps to reduce market inefficiencies (Roberts &
Salter, 1999). If companies use a range of different accounting methods, stock market
participants may have to devote considerably more resources to analyzing and comparing
the companies' financial statements. As with most research, this study has limitations. This
study classifies each policy as either income increasing or income decreasing. Several
studies have utilized this rating scheme (for example: Bowen et al., 1995; Skinner, 1993).
The rationale for using such a rating scheme is that it is impossible to measure the exact
effects of the various accounting choices on the financial statement figures.
Various future investigations are possible. Future research could explore more and
broader possible motivations of preparers in selecting accounting policies, especially to
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explain the strong country effect. Country of reporting could be further examined in
future research to explain national accounting differences in the selection of accounting
policies among allowable alternatives. These factors could include cultures, legal system,
tax law, inflation level, level of economic development, and relationship between
business enterprises and providers of capital (Doupnik & Salter, 1995). This study
focuses on accounting policies used in the companies' annual reports for a single period.
Finally, a longitudinal study will help determine if associations hold over time for firm-
specific variables linked to Costly Contracting Theory and management's choice of
accounting techniques.
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Abstract
This paper examines the value relevance of earnings and book value in four Asian countries,
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, in the period surrounding the Asian financial
crisis. Specifically, we examine the impact of the economic environment on the value relevance
of book value and earnings. We also examine the effects of corporate-governance mechanisms
and the type of accounting system together with the economic environment on the value
relevance of accounting numbers. Our results indicate that the value relevance of earnings in
Indonesia and Thailand was significantly reduced during the Asian fmancial crisis while the
value relevance of book value increased. In Malaysia, the value relevance of both earnings and
book value decreased during the crisis. In Korea, neither book value nor earnings was
significantly impacted by the crisis. Our results indicate that the level of corporate-governance
mechanisms has an impact on the extent of changes in the value relevance of book values, but
not earnings. Specifically, the value relevance of book value declines when corporate
governance is weak. Finally, our results indicate that accounting systems (i.e., IAS or tax-
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based) also affect the extent of changes in the value relevance of book value resulting from the
crisis.
© 2006 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper examines the effect of the Asian financial crisis on the value relevance of
earnings and book value in four Asian countries, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and
Thailand. Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998) find evidence that the relative value
relevance of equity book value and net income shifts as the financial health of the firm
decreases. First, we extend their analysis of bankrupt firms to examine the value
relevance of equity book value and net income in a setting where the overall economy is
in financial crisis. Second, we examine the role of corporate-governance mechanisms,
interacting with the effect of the economic crisis, on the valuation of equity book value
and earnings. Finally, we examine the effect of the interaction between accounting
systems and the economic crisis on the valuation of equity book value and earnings.
Bushman and Smith (2001, 240) suggest that cross-country designs represent a powerful
setting for investigating issues relating to the economic effects of financial accounting
information and corporate governance because of significant cross-country differences in
both financial accounting regimes and economic performance. In addition, vast cross-
country differences in the legal protection of investors' rights, communication networks,
and other institutional characteristics enable researchers to explore how the economic
effects of financial accounting information vary with other factors (Bushman & Smith,
2001, 240). Bushman and Smith (2001, 241) argue that fiiture research on the connection
between governance use and capital markets use of financial accounting information is
important for developing a more complete understanding of the effects of financial
accounting information on economic performance. While governance research typically
focuses on a particular govemance mechanism in isolation, a more complete understanding
requires an explicit recognition of the interactions across govemance mechanisms
(Bushman & Smith, 2001, 286). Therefore, we identify several country-specific
institutional factors that influence the total economic effects of financial accounting
information, as well as factors that influence the economic effects of financial reporting
through its govemance role. Since corporate govemance is the means by which minority
shareholders are protected from expropriation by managers or controlling shareholders
(Mitton, 2002), we investigate the mitigating effects of shareholder rights, creditor rights,
the mle of law, ownership concentration and audit-report quality on the relation between
stock prices and eamings and book value during a financial crisis.
Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (2001, 88-89) state that value-relevance research provides
evidence about how accounting amounts are reflected in share prices and thus, can be
informative for accounting standards. Three of our sample countries, Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Thailand, are classified as IAS (Intemational Accounting Standards) countries while
Korea's accounting standards are classified as tax-based. Because IAS are geared toward
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investors, whereas tax-code standards are geared toward regulators; we investigate whether
the valuation of equity book value and earnings in an economic crisis differs across these
two types of accounting systems. We base our research on a sample of 158 firms from
Indonesia, 217 firms from Korea, 271 firms from Malaysia, and 389 firms from Thailand.
We examine the value relevance of equity book value and earnings one year prior to the
crisis (1996) and during the crisis (1997). The financial statement and stock price data are
collected from Datastream International. We include measures of the levels of investor
protection from LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and assessments of
the quality of financial reporting from Saudagaran and Diga (1997). Our results indicate
that the value relevance of earnings in Indonesia and Thailand was significantly reduced
during the Asian financial crisis while the value relevance of their book value increased. In
Malaysia, the value relevance of both earnings and book value decreased during the crisis.
In Korea, neither book value nor earnings was significantly impacted by the crisis. The
level of corporate-govemance mechanisms and the nature of the accounting system
influence the extent of the effect of the crisis on the value relevance of equity book value.
Specifically, the value relevance of book value appears to decrease when corporate
governance is weak. Further, the decrease in the value relevance ofbook value is greater for
countries whose accounting standards are based on International Accounting Standards
(IAS) than countries whose accounting standards are based on the tax code. However,
neither the level of corporate governance nor the accounting system appears to influence the
value relevance of earnings during the Asian financial crisis in the countries we examine.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related
prior research and accounting and corporate-govemance characteristics in the countries
in our sample. The third section contains the hypotheses. The fourth section describes
the research design and sample, and the fifth section discusses the results. The final
section draws conclusions and summarizes the paper's contribution.
2. Background and prior research
Barth et al. (1998) examine the relative value relevance of equity book value and
earnings in a set of firms that are facing bankruptcy. They argue that a firm's equity
book value reflects liquidation value and net income reflects unrecognized net assets. As
the financial health of a company decreases, liquidation-value effects dominate
unrecognized net-asset-valuation effects. Hence, the value relevance of a firm's equity
book value increases and the value relevance of net income decreases when the financial
health of the firm deteriorates. The Asian financial crisis resulted in the deterioration of
the financial health of affected companies. For example, the incidence of negative
earnings in the four Asian countries increased because of the financial crisis, and
negative earnings are normally perceived to contain large transitory components. We
investigate whether the results from the Barth et al. (1998) analysis of bankrupt firms
extend to a setting where firms are operating in a financial crisis.
Two studies examine the firm-specific effects of the Asian financial crisis in two
countries severely affected by currency devaluations and stock market declines. Graham,
King, and Bailes (2000) document a decline in the value relevance of earnings in
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Thailand following the devaluation of the Thai Baht, but an increase in the incremental
value relevance of book value. Ho, Liu, and Sohn (2001) find evidence that the value
relevance of Korean earnings declines during the crisis and its importance is replaced by
cash flows from operations as opposed to the book value of equity. Their results hold for
a sample of firms that report positive earnings throughout their sample period ( 1 995-
1998), and also after controlling for the amount of foreign exchange translation gains
and losses included in earnings and book value. These studies suggest that countries
may be affected differentially by an economic crisis resulting from currency devaluations
and stock market declines.'
Differences in the value relevance of accounting measures between countries found in
prior research may be attributed to differences in accounting systems. Harris, Lang, and
Moeller ( 1 994) find that the earnings coefficient in Germany is larger than that in the United
States, consistent with a more conservative measurement approach in Germany. In
examining the relation between stock prices and accounting information in six Asian
countries, Graham and King (2000) find systematic differences in the value relevance of
accounting numbers as well as in the relative explanatory power ofbook value and earnings
that appear to be the result of the degree of conservatism across the countries. Ali and
Hwang (2000) find that the value relevance of accounting data is lower for Continental
model countries than for British-American model countries, and also when tax rules
influence financial accounting measurements. In contrast. Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) find
no differences in the property of timeliness of accounting income between countries that
have code-law or common-law origins. They demonstrate that the preparers' incentives in
each country, which are a function of the extent of political versus market influences,
dominate accounting standards as a determinant of financial reporting quality.
2.1. Domestic financial reporting environments
We now provide some background information regarding the accounting environment of
the countries in this study. The development of domestic accounting standards in Indonesia,
South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand has been influenced in part by their historical
allegiances. Indonesia was a Dutch colony, and early Indonesian Accounting Principles
(PAI) were based on Grady's (1965) Inventory of GAAP for Business Enterprises . In the
late 1980s, Indonesia issued several statements of accounting principles that were based on
U.S. GAAP. In September 1994, Indonesia adopted 21 International Accounting Standards
(IAS) that were renamed "Indonesian Financial Accounting Standards" and made
mandatory for all publicly listed companies (Saudagaran & Diga, 2000, 8).
The regulatory framework of Korean accounting and financial reporting has been
influenced by U.S. laws and practices since the Second World War. Korean accounting
standards also take account of IAS. However, they are strongly influenced by tax laws
(Nobes & Parker, 1995, 316). Accounting in Korea has a continental European influence
modified by a U.S. influence (Nobes & Parker, 1995, 319).
Mitton (2002) defines the crisis period as July 1997 through August 1998. He reports that the countries in our
sample experienced stock returns ranging from -52.1% in Thailand to -79.0% in Malaysia and currency
depreciation ranging from —34.5% in Korea to —78.0% in Indonesia during the crisis.
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Malaysia was a British colony and has historically looked to the United Kingdom in
setting its domestic accounting standards. After the International Accounting Standards
Committee's (lASC) formation in 1973, Malaysia was one of the earliest countries in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to adopt lASC standards. In Malaysia,
most IAS are adopted as "Approved Accounting Standards" (Saudagaran & Diga, 2000, 8).
Accounting standards in Thailand are based generally on U.S. GAAP but also
incorporate concepts from the United Kingdom and Germany (especially the concept of
prudence). More recently, Thailand gradually began to adopt IAS promulgated by the
LASC. Presently, 17 of 23 Thai accounting standards are based on IAS (Saudagaran &
Diga, 2000, 8).
We examine the value relevance of book value and earnings in these four Asian
countries that are moving towards harmonized accounting practices through the adoption
of IAS, but yet still have differences in the enforcement of these standards. Prior studies
show that there are significant differences in the information content and timeliness of
earnings between countries (e.g., Alford, Jones, Leflwich, & Zmijewski, 1993; Ball et al.,
2003). However, a proper valuation model can greatly mitigate accounting-diversity
problems in international valuations (Frankel & Lee, 1996). Frankel and Lee (1996) fmd
that the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) model is useful in explaining cross-sectional stock
prices in different countries. The model that we use in our paper is based on Barth et al.
(1998), which is an adaptation of the EBO model.
2.2. Corporate governance
The countries also differ with respect to their corporate-governance mechanisms.
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) classify Indonesia and South
Korea as civil-law countries, and Malaysia and Thailand as common-law countries.
Minority-shareholder rights are highest in Malaysia and lowest in Indonesia (Johnson,
Boone, Breach & Friedman, 2000). Anti-director rights are similar in Indonesia, Korea,
and Thailand and higher in Malaysia (Johnson et al. 2000; LaPorta et al. 1998). There
is clearly a link between corporate governance and financial reporting (Sloan, 2001;
Ball et al., 2003). Bushman and Smith (2001) propose that research should exploit
cross-country differences in financial reporting and governance regimes. Hence, we
examine whether differences in corporate governance influence the relative value
relevance of the book value of equity and earnings of firms in these counfries during
the financial crisis.
3. Hypotheses
We hypothesize that the Asian crisis, which led to deterioration in Asian economies,
will differentially impact the value relevance of book values and net income in Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Our first hypothesis regarding the overall impact of the
crisis on the value relevance of book value and earnings relates to the results from Barth et
al. (1998) who document that the relative explanatory power ofbook value and net income
is a frmction of financial health. That is, as financial health decreases, the explanatory
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power of book value increases while the explanatory power of net income decreases. Our
first hypothesis, stated in alternative form is:
Hla. The value relevance of equity book value increases while the value relevance of net
income decreases as the economic environment deteriorates.
Second, we examine whether the impact of the crisis on the value relevance of
accounting numbers is a function of the corporate governance mechanisms within the
country. Bushman and Smith (2001) suggest that we may expect to see firms shift towards
the use of more costly performance measures when accounting information has limited
useftilness. For example, in countries where the accounting and legal systems provide
relatively poor investor protection from managerial opportimism, there is a substitution
toward costly monitoring by large shareholders. Corporate governance could become
more critical in a financial crisis if managers are led to expropriate more as the expected
return on investment falls or if the crisis causes investors to recognize and react to
weakness in corporate governance that existed all along (Mitton, 2002). Therefore, we
examine the effect of the interaction between corporate governance and the economic
situation on the value relevance of equity book value and earnings. When corporate
govemance is weak, we expect the accounting numbers to have relatively less useftilness
during the crisis. Hence, we expect the value relevance of accounting numbers to be lower
when corporate govemance is weaker. This leads to our second hypothesis:
H2a. In a financial crisis, the value relevance of book value and eamings decreases when
corporate govemance (shareholder rights, creditor rights, rule of law, ownership and audit-
report quality) is weak.
Value-relevance research provides evidence about how accounting amounts are reflected
in share prices, and, thus, can be informative about accounting standards (Barth et al., 2001).
Differences in the value relevance of accounting measures between countries may be
attributed to differences in accounting systems (Harris et al., 1994; Graham & King, 2000;
AH & Hwang, 2000). Accounting standards in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are based
on IAS while those in Korea are tax-based. IAS are market-based while the tax code is
politically based (Ball et al, 2003). Therefore, we might expect the accounting system to
affect the extent ofchanges in the value relevance of accounting information during a crisis.
Ali and Hwang (2000) find that the value relevance of accounting data is lower when tax
rules influence accounting measurements. Following evidence in Ali and Hwang (2000), we
would expect value relevance to be relatively higher during the crisis in countries that base
financial reporting and disclosure on IAS (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) than in
countries that observe the tax code (Korea). However, Ho et al. (200 1 , 207) report that Korea
allows asset revaluations. Since this practice results in book value ofnet assets that are closer
to market value, Korea's accounting may help the book value fare better during the crisis.
Therefore, our last hypothesis is non-directional and is stated in the altemative form:
H3a. The value relevance of book value and eamings generated from lAS-based
accounting differs from the value relevance of accounting information generated by a tax-
based accounting system during a financial crisis.
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4, Research design and methodology
4. J. Corporate governance and accounting systems
LaPorta et al. (1998) assess investors' protections using various corporate-governance
mechanisms. The mechanisms include shareholder rights, creditor rights, the rule of law,
and ownership (by the three largest shareholders). Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand have
similar scores for shareholder rights while Malaysia has relatively higher levels of
shareholder rights' protections. Creditor rights include the existence of restrictions for
going into reorganization and the level of legal reserve required as a percentage of capital.
The rule of law captures the level of enforcement of investor-protection laws. This variable
includes factors like the efficiency of the judicial system, the risk of appropriation, and the
level of perceived corruption in the country. The final governance variable is the level of
ownership concentration of public companies. Ownership measures the ownership stake of
the three largest shareholders in the ten largest (market capitalization) publicly traded
companies in the country. LaPorta et al. (1998) report that companies in countries with
Table 1
Corporate governance and financial reporting measures
Panel A: corporate governance measures
Raw scores
Country Shareholder
rights
Creditor
rights
Rule of law
(enforcement)
Mean ownership
(3 largest shareholders)
Audit-report
quality
Indonesia 3.10 4.00 21.88 0.58
Korea 4.20 3.50 33.55 0.23
Malaysia 8.10 4.00 38.54 0.54
Thailand 4.05 3.10 29.67 0.47
Panel B: country rankings by governance measure
Rank scores
Country Shareholder Creditor Rule of law Mean ownership Audit-report
rights rights (enforcement) (3 largest shareholders) quality
3
1
3
1
Indonesia 4 1 4 4
Korea 2 3 2 1
Malaysia
Thailand
1
3
1
4
1
3
3
2
Composite
govemance
score
Panel C: empirical values of govemance and financial reporting measures
Country
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysia
Thailand
Corporate govemance
4
1
1
3
Accounting standards (IAS vs. tax)
1
1
1
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poor investor protection usually have more concentrated ownership. Table 1, panel A
reports the raw scores for these corporate governance mechanisms by our sample countries
as obtained in LaPorta et al. (1998). The score on audit-report quality is obtained from
Saudagaran and Diga (1997). This measure captures the means for outsiders to monitor
financial reporting by the firms.
Because it is not clear how the absolute values of the variables relate to capital market
valuations, we rank-transform these measures. Panel B provides the country ranks of each
of these governance measures. In terms of shareholder rights, Malaysia has the highest raw
score (8.10) and is ranked number 1, Korea number 2, Thailand number 3 and Indonesia
number 4. This ranking procedure is repeated for creditor rights, rule of law, ownership,
and audit-report quality. For each country, we add the rankings thus obtained for each
governance measure to derive a composite govemance score. Korea and Malaysia have a
composite govemance score of 9, Thailand 13, and Indonesia 16. A lower score indicates
better corporate govemance. Thus, Korea and Malaysia have better corporate govemance
(assigned an empirical value of one) than Thailand (assigned an empirical value of three),
which has better corporate govemance than Indonesia (assigned an empirical value of
four). One limitation of our study is that the financial statement and market data, on the
one hand, and the corporate govemance data, on the other hand, are probably fi^om
different years. We concede that this limitation may result in less powerfiil tests of
corporate govemance effects on value relevance.
Notes to Table 1
:
The shareholder rights variable is from LaPorta et al. (1998, 1 1 30). It is the composite score from the following six
discrete measures which take on a value ofone if the protection is in the law and zero otherwise: ( 1 ) one share-one
vote; (2) shareholders are allowed to mail their proxy vote to the firm; (3) shareholders are not required to deposit
their shares prior to the general shareholders' meeting; (4) cumulative voting or proportional representation of
minorities on the board of directors is allowed; (5) an oppressed-minorities mechanism is in place; (6) there is a
preemptive right to new issues. Additionally, the variable includes two continuous measures: the minimum
percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting, plus an
anti-director rights index. The total score ranges from zero to 12 (most rights).
The creditor rights variable is from LaPorta et al. (1998, 1 136). It is the composite score from the following four
discrete measures which take on a value ofone if the protection is in the Law and zero otherwise: (1) no automatic
stay on assets; (2) secured creditors are paid first; (3) restrictions for going into reorganization; (4) management
does not stay in reorganization. Additionally, there is one continuous measure: the level of legal reserve required
as a percentage of capital.
The rule of law variable is from LaPorta et al. (1998, 1142). It is the composite score from the following five
measures which take on values ranging from one to ten: ( 1 ) efficiency of the judicial system; (2) an assessment of
the law and order tradition in the country produced by the country risk-rating agency International Country Risk;
(3) corruption; (4) risk of appropriation; and (5) risk of contract repudiation.
The ownership variable is from LaPorta et al. (1998). It consists of the combined ownership stake of the three
largest shareholders in the ten largest (market capitalization) nonfinancial, domestic, totally private, publicly
traded companies in each country in the sample.
The audit-report quality variable is from Saudagaran and Diga (1997). It indicates that Korea and Thailand have
audit reports of above average quality and those from Indonesia and Malaysia are average or below.
The composite govemance score is the sum of the rank-transformed values from the five corporate govemance
measures described above. The ranks measure the relative strength of govemance and values range from one
(strong govemance) to four (weak govemance).
The accounting standards variable is from Saudagaran and Diga (1997). It is an indicator variable taking on the
value of one for countries with accounting standards based on Intemational Accounting Standards (Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand) and zero for those based on the tax code (Korea).
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We also examine the role of the aecounting systems in mitigating the etTeets of the
economic crisis on the \akiation of equity book vakie and earnings. The objective of IAS
is to generate financial information that is usefiil in determining a fum's vaUie, i.e.,
transparent financial information (International Accounting Standards Committee, 1999).
Accounting standards that are primarily based on the ta.\ code are not geared toward
in\estors, but regulator. Therefore, countiies" whose accounting standards are more
aligned with IAS, are more likely to communicate the underlying economic value of firms
to inxestors. Three of our sample countries, hidonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are
classified as IAS countries while Korea's accounting standards are classified as tax based.
Table 1, panel C presents the empirical values of governance and financial-reporting
measures that we use in our analyses.
4.2. Methoiiolog}'
We employ a methodology similar to that in Barth et al. (1998) to examine the value
relevance of book value of equity and net income. The market \alue of equity is regressed
on book value of equity and net income. Model (i) includes an indicator variable to
examine the effect of tlie economic environment (the effect of the crisis) on the valuation
of earnings and book \alue. Initially, we estimate the following regression to ascertain the
effect of the crisis on the earnings and book \alue coefficients:
MVS,7 = a,) + oti / + a:BVS/, + a?/* BVS/, + aaEPS,-, + xj* EPS,-, + <:,, ( 1
)
where MVS,, is the market Nalue of equity per share ofcompany / on March 3 1 at year / + 1
;
/ is an indicator variable equal to zero in 1996 and one in 1997 (tlie year of tlie Asian
financial crisis); BVS,, is book \ alue per share of company / at December 3 1 in year /; and
EPS,, is earnings per share of company / over the period ending on December 3 1 in year t.~
Hayn ( 1 995) finds that the return-earnings relation for firms reporting losses is weaker
than that for firms reporting profits. The price-earnings relation is also not homogeneous
across loss and profit firms. To investigate the ditTerential effects of losses and profits on
value relevance, we next classify the observations according to whether net income was
positive or negative, and whether book value of equity was positive or negative. NEGNI is
an indicator variable taking the \alue of one if the firm had ncgatixc net income, and zero
otherwise. NEGBVS is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm had
negative book value of equity, and zero otherwise. Table 2 presents the incidences of
negative earnings and book \alue in our sample. In 1996, the year before the crisis, the
percentages of firms reporting negative net income were Indonesia at 3.80, Korea at 19.82,
Malaysia at 7.38, and Thailand at 17.48. The financial crisis of 1997 resulted in more
incidences of negative earnings. The percentages in 1997 were Indonesia at 33.54, Korea
at 36.87, Malaysia at 25.09, and Thailand at 47.81. The incidences of negative book value
also increased af^er the crisis. The percentages for 1997 were Indonesia at 3.16, Korea at
6.45, Malaysia at 1.11, and Thailand al 1 1.83, compared with 0.63, 2.30, 0.00 and 0.77,
respectively, in 1996.
" We also cslimalc Ihc regressions using ihe year-end \ allies for the nuukel \ alue ofeiiuiiy per siiare. llie results
are essentially the same as those reporteii.
r.y l)(Hi.\ h'liiliiv cl III - /'/;<• Inlfiiidliniuil Juiininl <>/ .liniiiiiliiii; 11 (.UlOd) JJ III
lal)li' .'
Incutciicc (li negative ciiiiiiiigs aikl hiuik value
Vuriubic CouiUry Number oC 1996 1997
NiimiIhi willj % of firms witli Number with % of lirim with
negative valucN negalivc viilnos negative values iioyutive values
NI-CINI Indonesia \5H 6 IKO 53 33,54
K.wva ?\1 n l'>,K2 KO U),K7
Malaysia .'71 .'() 7. »K 68 2fiS)')
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7
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I
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Wc iK'.xt cstiiiiali- tin.' iinpai.1 ol (Ik- sliviij'lli ol a lotmliy's (.'oipoiak' I'.ovi'iiianci'
incchuni.sins on IIk- (.'xk-nl o I changes in llic value ivlcvaiuc ol carninj's and book value
diirin)' llie A.siaii rinaiKial eri.sis in Model (<).
Mv.s,, //„ I /;,/ I /;,nvs„ I /;,/+nvs„ i //,,(•( ;*/*uvs„ i il.i'vs,,
I
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I
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wlieie ( '( i i.s oiii einpiiiial nieasiiie oreoipoiale I'oveinanee llial lepiesenls shaielioldei
iij'Jils, eiediloi ii)!,lils, rule of law, owneisliip eoneenlialion, and atidil repoil (|iialily, and
all olliei vaiiables arc as pieviotisly di'llned. ()iii loeiis is on //,| and /// if weak
corporate governance conlribiites lo llie deeline in vaiiK- lekvanee lot ai ( oiinlin)'
inroiinalion then //.) and /// will be sij^niru anily iie)',alive
( )iii litial analysis invesligales wlielliei IIk- use ol IAS oi llie lax (ode as a basis lot
accounting standards had any iinpai I on the exieiil ol llie i li,iii)'i- in the value lelevanee ol
earnings and book value- diiiin)' the eiisis:
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where AC is an indicator variable taking on the value of one for countries with accounting
standards based on International Accounting Standards (Indonesia, Malaysia and
Thailand) and zero for those based on the tax code (Korea); and all other variables are
as previously defined.
4.3. Sample
The sample consists of firms fi-om Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand for which
all required data are available. The market value of equity, book value of equity, and net
income data are obtained from Datastream Research Service. Datastream is a database of
economic, company, and financial data. The sample period is 1996 and 1997. The sample
consists of 1035 finns (across two years): 158 from Indonesia, 217 from Korea, 271 from
Malaysia, and 389 from Thailand.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the market value of equity, book value of
equity, and earnings per share of the sample firms across countries. The values are all in
U.S. dollars per share. The Korean sample has the highest average market value of equity
($26.27) and book value of equity ($21.93) in 1996. The sample from Thailand has the
second highest book value of equity ($3.67) but it has a lower market value ($1.90). This
would seem to indicate that the book value of the Thailand sample is overstated. The
Korean sample has the highest earnings per share in 1996 ($0.58) and the Indonesian
sample has the lowest ($0.08).
In 1997, as the Asian financial crisis took hold of the economies of the countries
included in the sample, all four countries suffered reduced profitability and lower market
and book values. Korea continues to have the highest average market value and book
value of equity per share ($8.73 and $10.30, respectively), but the amounts are less than
half their values in 1996. Three of the four countries (Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand)
Table 3
Descriptive statistics
Variable Country N 1 996 1997 Paired /-test Wilcoxon rank
sum test
Mean SD Median Mean SD Median / (/'-value) Z (/j-value)
MVS (US$) Indonesia 158 0.940 1,383 0.582 0.350 0.861 0.135 4,54 (0,00) 11,47 (0,00)
Korea 217 26.270 26,427 19.891 8.729 12.218 4.768 8,87 (0.00) 11,82 (0,00)
Malaysia 271 3.704 3.296 2.968 0.889 2.125 0.512 11.82 (0.00) 17,97(0,00)
Thailand 3X9 1,901 2.690 1 .004 0.715 1.266 0.303 7.86 (0.00) 12,68(0,00)
BVS (US$) Indonesia I5S 0.796 2.004 0.366 0.670 2.127 0.149 0.542 (0.59) 8,34 (0.00)
Korea 217 21,929 24, 1 06 16,559 10.295 14.314 8.437 6. 1 1 (0.00) 8.66 (0.00)
Malaysia 271 0.808 0.429 0,732 0.593 0,387 0.526 6.10(0.00) 7.69 (0.00)
Thailand 3X9 3.673 10.406 1.124 1.190 4.302 0,374 4.35 (0.00) 10.42 (0.00)
EPS (USS) Indonesia I5X 0.076 0.135 0.044 -0.003 0.084 0,009 6.28 (0,00) 9.74 (0.00)
Korea 217 0.5X4 3.875 0.648 -0.613 3.607 0,116 3,33 (0,00) 6,60 (0,00)
Malaysia 271 0. 1 04 O.IOI 0,091 0.021 0.216 0,039 5,73 (0,00) 8,95 (0,00)
Thailand 3X9 0.147 0,353 0,104 - 0.079 0.575 0,003 6.59 (0,00) 10,12 (0,00)
Variable definitions: MVS is market value of equity per share; BVS is book value per share; EPS is earnings per
share.
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move from profitability to losses in 1997. The mean and median values of all of the
variables, except for the average book value per share in Indonesia, are statistically
significantly lower in 1997 than in 1996.
5. Results
In Table 4, we present the effect of the Asian financial crisis on the relative value
relevance of book value of equity and net income. The increment to the intercept, ai,
which captures the effect of the crisis year, is negative and significant for all country
estimations except Indonesia. In the case of Indonesia, the coefficient is positive, but it
is not significantly different from zero. The coefficients on book value per share (a^)
and earnings per share (a4) are positive and significant in all cases, except for the book
value of equity in the Indonesia estimation. It appears that in Indonesia, book value is
not related to market values before the crisis, but the value relevance of book value
increases marginally during the crisis (a3).
Table 4
Pooled regression of market value of equity on book value of equity and net income, using fixed-efFects
estimation with fixed-year effects
MVS„ =
-A, + y.J + 3::BVS„ + aJ*BVS„ + XjEPS,, + a5/*EPS„ + £„ (1)
y.i, y.] y.i y^ 74 a^ Adj. R~ Obs.
0.70 316
0.38 434
0.31 542
0.46 778
0.42 2070
Variable definitions: MVS„ is market value of equity per share of company / at time /; / is an indicator variable
equal to zero in 1996 and one in 1997; BVS„ is book value per share of company / at time /; EPS,, is earnings per
share of company / over the period ending at time t.
Indonesia
Coefficient 0.22 0.08 0.01 0.07 9,25 -4,44
(/-statistic) (3.81) (1.06) (0.41) (1.68) (17.31) (-5,45)
p-value 0.00 0.29 0.68 0.09 0.00 0,00
Korea
Coefficient 14.96 -10.22 0.49 -0.07 0.99 -0,54
(/-statistic) (9.14) (-4.47) (9.09) (-0.71) (2.96) (-1.09)
p -value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 0,28
Malaysia
Coefficient 1.20 -0.98 2.59 -1.46 3.96 -4,04
(/-statistic) (3.57) (-2.13) (5.73) (-2.24) (2.07) (-1.93)
p -value 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 0,05
Thailand
Coefficient 1.09 -0.42 0.02 0.06 5.13 -4,52
(/-statistic) (11.88) (-3.36) (2.10) (3.15) (21.90) (-16,46)
p -value 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pooled
Coefficient 3.32 -2.33 0.60 -0.10 1.03 -0.83
(/-statistic) (10.47) (-5.20) (29.11) (-2,45) (5,94) (-3,35)
p-value 0.00 0,00 0.00 0,01 0,00 0.00
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Table 5
Pooled regression of market value of equity on book value and net income, controlling for negative book value
and negative net income
MVS„ -= /?„ + /?, NEGBVS,,
+ ^(,NEGNI*EPS„
+ i^.NEGNI
+ £,/
„ + /?3BVS„ + /?4NEGBVS*BVS„ + /?,EPS,-
(2)
/?() P^ P2 h /?4 P, P. Adj. R- Obs.
Coefficient
(/-statistic)
/7-value
1.46
(6.12)
0.00
-1.13
(-1.00)
0.32
-0.86
(-1.79)
0.07
0.45
(22.66)
0.00
-0.39
(-5.17)
0.00
5.00
(19.26)
0.00
-5.54
(-18.34)
0.00
0.51 2070
Variable definitions: MVS,, is market value of equity per share of company / at time t; NEGBVS,, is an
indicator variable taking on the value of one for firms with negative book value and zero otherwise; NEGNI,,
is an indicator variable taking on the value of one for firms with negative net income and zero otherwise;
BVS/, is book value per share of company / at time t; EPS,, is earnings per share of company / over the period
ending at time t.
Following Barth et al. (1998), we hypothesize that the value relevance of equity
book value increases and the value relevance of net income decreases as the economic
environment deteriorates. That is, we predict dj, to be positive and a^ to be negative.
The results for the increase in the value relevance of book value hold for Thailand
(a3 = 0.06, ^ = 3.15) and marginally for Indonesia (a3 = 0.07, ^=1.68). Contrary to Hla,
the value relevance of book value declined for Malaysia (as = —1.46, /= — 2.24). The
results for the deterioration in the value relevance of income hold for Indonesia
(a5 = -4.44, / = -5.45), Malaysia (a5=-4.04, / = -1.93), and Thailand (a5 = -4.52,
?=— 16.46). This implies that the value relevance of income has dechned for
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand from 1996 to 1997. Table 2 shows that Malaysia
has the lowest incidence of negative earnings and book value. The returns-earnings and
price-earnings relations are expected to be stronger for firms reporting profits (Hayn,
1995). Based on the data in Tables 1 and 2, there is no reason to believe that the
valuation of both book value and earnings in Malaysia should significantly decrease
during the crisis. The only evidence we can find is in Mitton (2002), which indicates
that Malaysia had more negative stock returns during the crisis and larger market-to-
book ratios prior to the crisis than the other countries included in our sample. This
would suggest that the Malaysian stock market was relatively overvalued prior to the
crisis.
Both coefficients for Korea are negative, but insignificant. Ho et al. (2001) also
document negative coefficients. However, both coefficients are significant in their
estimation (Table 6, regression 7). A different sample composition and power of the tests
may contribute to the difference in results.'* Our evidence suggests that the economic
crisis had no effect on the value relevance of book value of equity and net income of firms
in Korea.
* Ho et a). (2001) use data for 429 sample firms collected directly from the Korean Stock Exchange over four
sample years. The larger sample size increases the power of their test and makes it easier to find significant
results.
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The pooled results indicate that the crisis reduced market values across all four
countries. Additionally, the pooled results suggest that the valuation of earnings declined
during the crisis as well as the valuation of book value. However, the pooled results mask
the variation across countries, which we hypothesize to be related to the differing levels of
corporate govemance and different accounting systems in the sample countries.^
Overall, our results are consistent with the findings by Graham et al. (2000) regarding
the effect of the Asian financial crisis on Thailand. Our results also support Barth et al.
(1998) in the case of Indonesia and Thailand in that the valuation of book value increases
when firms are in financial crisis. Our results from Korea and Malaysia, however, are
inconsistent with the results in Barth et al. (1998). Therefore, the results from the
examination of U.S. firms in financial distress do not appear to generalize to firms in all
countries experiencing an economy-wide financial crisis.
Table 5 presents the results of the effects of negative book value and negative income on
the relative value relevance of book value of equity and net income. The estimation is
pooled across the countries with indicator variables for negative book value and negative
income, and interaction of these indicator variables with book value of equity and net
income. Negative net income has a marginally significant impact on valuation (^2 = ^ 0.86,
t = — 1.79). The coefficients on book value per share {(ij) and earnings per share (^5) are
positive and significant. The coefficient on the interaction between negative book value and
book value is negative and significant (/^4= — 0.39, t = — 5.\l). Firms with negative net
income have less value-relevant earnings; the coefficient on the interaction between
negative income and earnings is negative and significant (^6^ ~ 5.54, t = — 18.34).
The results thus far indicate that the financial crisis (Table 4) and negative book value
and negative income (Table 5) are associated with lower value relevance ofbook value and
earnings. We combine the models in Tables 4 and 5 to include a financial crisis indicator
variable, interactions of financial crisis with book value and earnings, interaction of a
negative book value indicator with book value, and interaction of a negative income
indicator with earnings in examining the value relevance of book value and earnings. '' The
results (not reported) indicate that the coefficients on the interactions between negative
book value and book value, and negative net income and earnings, are still significantly
negative. However, the coefficients on the interactions between the financial-crisis
indicator and book value and earnings are no longer significant. It would be expected that
the incidence of negative book value and negative income is correlated with the financial
crisis. Hence, the following analyses do not include financial-crisis indicator and negative
" We also perform an F-test to examine whether BVS and EPS are significant in 1997. The results indicate that
BVS is significant in Malaysia at the 0.02 level and in the other countries and pooled results at the 0.00 level. EPS
is significant in Indonesia and Thailand at the 0.00 level, but insignificant in the Korea, Malaysia, and pooled
results.
F-tests also reveal that negative book value and earnings are not significantly associated with market value of
equity.
The model is as follows:
MVS„ = /?,, + /5|/ + /^zBVS,, + ^,/*BVS„ + /J4NEGBVS*BVS„ + ^jEPS,, + /?„/*EPS„
+ iS7NEGNI*EPS„ + £„.
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book value and negative income in the same models. Since the paper focuses on the
impact of financial crisis on the value relevance of book value and earnings, we choose to
include the financial-indicator variable in the models.
Descriptive data on the degree to which the very existence and operation of control
mechanisms vary across countries hold enormous potential. Not only would such data
provide useful insights into how financial accounting mechanisms, which can serve a
governance role, vary around the world, but it could also be used for testing
complementarities between high-quality financial-accounting regimes and high-quality
control mechanisms in promoting economic efficiency (Bushman & Smith, 2001, 289).
In Table 6, panel A, we examine the impact of the interaction between the economic
environment and corporate governance on the value relevance of book value and earnings.
The estimation is pooled across the countries with indicator and interaction variables
capturing the effects of the economic crisis and governance on the value relevance of book
value and earnings.^ The results indicate that the crisis reduced market values overall
(/?i = — 2.25, t^ — 5.05). The crisis had an impact on the valuation of book value. The
coefficient on the interaction between the crisis and book value is significant (^3 = 0.45,
t = 3.4l). Further, the level of corporate governance influences the effect of the financial
crisis on the value relevance of book value. The coefficient on the interaction between
corporate governance, crisis, and book value is significantly negative (^4= — 0.25,
r = — 4.46). In a financial crisis, the value relevance ofbook value decreases when corporate
govemance is v/eak.^ The value relevance ofearnings decreases marginally during the crisis.
The coefficient on the interaction between the crisis and earnings is negative and significant
at the 10 percent level (^7=— 1.50, t = — 1.66). The level of corporate govemance has no
impact on earnings given that the crisis occurred (jSy is insignificant). We find partial support
for H2a; there is evidence that the value relevance of book value decreases when corporate
govemance is weaker in a financial crisis. These results demonstrate that the cross-country
differences in the effect of the crisis on the value relevance of book value and eamings are
linked to the underlying differences in corporate-govemance systems.
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results of our analysis of the effect of accounting
systems on the valuation of equity book value and eamings during a crisis. The results
here indicate that the valuation of book value (^3 = — 0.05, r = — 1.23) is not
significantly different during the crisis. However, the valuation of eamings
(jS6= — 0.89, t = — 3.54) is significantly lower during the crisis. Additionally, countries
with accounting standards based on IAS saw a greater decline in the value relevance of
book value (^4 = — 0.51, / = — 4.66) during the financial crisis than countries that
observe accounting standards based on the tax code. The type of accounting system did
not affect the value relevance of eamings given that the crisis occurred {ftj is
insignificant). An explanation for this resuh may be found in Ho et al. (2001, 207) who
report that Korea allows asset revaluations. This practice results in book value of net
assets that are closer to market value and helps the book value to fare better during the
crisis. Specifically, Korea's market-adjusted book value fare better during the crisis than
those in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. - '. -fi
We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this estimation and explanation.
'' Note that our measure ofcorporate govemance ranges from one (strong govemance) to four (weak govemance).
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Table 6
Pooled regression of market value of equity on book value and net income, controlling for financial crisis and
corporate governance (or accounting standards)
Panel A: corporate governance
MVS„ = /?„ + jS,/ + p.BVSi, + p,I*BVS„ + P^CG*I*BVS„ + P,EPS„ + p(J*EPSi,
+ pjCG*I*EPS„ + E„ (3)
Po Pi P2 p, Pa P5 P. Pi Adj. R" Obs.
Coefficient 3.32 -2.25 0.60 0.45 -0.25 1.03 -1.50 0.30 0.42 2070
(r-statistic) (10.52) (-5.05) (29.23) (3.41) (-4.46) (5.97) (-1.66) (0.73)
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.47
Panel B; accounting standards
MVS„ = p„ + p^I + p,BVS„ + P,I*BVS„ + p^AC*I*BVS, + p^EPS, + PJ*EPS„
+ pjAC*I*EPS„ + £,, (4)
Po /i, P2 P, P4 P^ p. Pi Adj. R- Obs.
Coefficient
(/-statistic)
/?-value
3.32 -2.10 0.60
(10.52) (-4.69) (29.25)
0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.05
(-1.23)
0.22
-0.51
(-4.66)
0.00
1.03
(5.97)
0.00
-0.89
(-3.54)
0.00
0.66
(0.82)
0.41
0.42 2070
Variable definitions: MVS„ is market value of equity per share of company / at time t; I is an indicator variable
equal to zero in 1996 and one in 1997; BVS„ is book value per share of company / at time /; EPS,, is earnings per
share of company i over the period ending at time t; CG is an empirical value of corporate governance. We
construct a composite corporate governance score that is the sum of the transformed values from the following
corporate governance measures: shareholder rights, creditor rights, rules of law, ownership concentration in
LaPorta et al. (1998); and audit-report quality in Saudagaran and Diga (1997). The empirical values for the
countries in our sample range from one (strong governance) to four (weak governance); AC is an indicator
variable taking on the value of one for countries with accounting standards based on International Accounting
Standards (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand) and zero for those based on the tax code (Korea). More
information about the measurement of the corporate governance and accounting variables is provided in Table 1
.
Overall, the Table 6 results are consistent with Barth et al. (1998) in that the value
relevance of the book value of equity increases during the crisis while that of earnings
declines. However, book values do decline during a crisis when corporate-governance
mechanisms are weak, or when accounting standards are based on IAS.
5.7. Additional analyses^^
We re-estimate the regression in Table 6 and add four control variables in each
equation: NEGBVS*/*BVS, NEGBVS*/*BVS*CG (or AC), NEGNI*/*NI and
NEGNI*/*NI*CG (or AC). The pattern of results is unaltered.
We further examine whether the observed differences in the value relevance of
accounting information between 1996 and 1997 are attributable to the Asian financial
We are gratefiil to a reviewer for suggesting these analyses.
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crisis and not some other factors. We run the basic earnings and book value model (Model
(1) without year indicators) from 1995 to 2000 for our sample.
MVS„ = ao + asBVS,, + a4EPS,v + £„ (5)
The coefficients for BVS and EPS are listed below. The only significant year-to-year
changes observed are for 1996-1997 and 1997-1998. The decline in the value relevance of
EPS in 1996-1997 is reversed in 1997-1998. However, there is a decline in the valuation of
BVS in 1 998 and the decrease in the coefficient does not reverse. These results lend further
support to our findings that the decline in the value relevance of earnings resulted from the
deteriorating economic environment caused by the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The
evidence indicates that the value relevance of earnings increases after the crisis period. '
'
We also examine whether there is multicollinearity among the variables, and the effect,
if any, on our results. We calculate the condition indices for each regression (see Belsley,
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
BVS 0.58 0.60 0.49 0.22 0.23 0.25
EPS 1.05 1.03 0.20 1.09 0.86 0.71
Kuh & Welsch, 1980). These indices measure the degree of collinearity among regression
variables. Belsley et al. (1980) suggest that severe collinearity is diagnosed for a
maximum-condition index over 30. The maximum-condition index in all the regressions is
12.99, and most are well below this level.
6. Summary and conclusion
The purpose of this research is to assess the changes in the value relevance of
earnings and book value in the four countries most affected by the Asian financial crisis:
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. We investigate the role of the countries'
corporate-governance mechanisms and accounting systems in determining the extent of
the effect of the crisis on the value relevance of earnings and book value. Consistent
with prior research, we find that the value relevance of earnings and book value changes
during the Asian financial crisis in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Overall, the
evidence is consistent with the results from a sample of U.S. firms facing bankruptcy.
Generally, the value relevance of the book value of equity increases while the value
relevance of earnings declines depending on the corporate-governance mechanisms and
the accounting system in the country. Our findings provide partial support for our
hypotheses that the extent of the change in value relevance is related to the countries'
corporate-governance mechanisms and accounting system. Overall, we provide evidence
that the extent of shifts in the value relevance of book value is not just a function of
firm-specific financial health and macroeconomic environment. We demonsfrate that
accounting systems and corporate-governance mechanisms also play a role in
" All coefficients are significant at less than the 1% level except for EPS in 1997, which is insignificant.
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determining the relation between stock prices and accounting information during an
economy-wide financial crisis.
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The objective of the study on which Davis-Friday, Eng, and Liu (henceforth DFEL)
report in their paper "The Effects of Crisis, Corporate Governance and Accounting System
on the Valuation of Book Value and Earnings" is twofold. The first objective is to examine
the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the value relevance of equity book value and net
income. The authors expect that the value relevance of book value of equity will increase,
while the value relevance of net income will decrease. The second aim is to study the
effect of cross-country differences in corporate governance and accounting systems on
changes in the value relevance of equity book value and net income caused by the Asian
financial crisis.
The authors examine the impact of the Asian financial crisis in four countries:
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and South Korea. They use firm-level financial and market
data fi"om Datastream, country-level governance data from LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Schleifer and Vishny (1998) and country-level proxies of reporting and audit quality from
Saudagaran and Diga (1997). DFEL use the govemance data from LaPorta et al. (1998),
and the proxy for audit quality firom Saudagaran and Diga (1997) to create a composite
govemance score. The authors assess the impact of reporting quality separately. The data
are fi^om 1996 (the year prior to the financial crisis) and 1997 (the year of the financial
crisis).
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The authors find some evidence that the value relevance of equity book value and net
income has changed during the crisis. However, they find evidence of changes in the value
relevance of accounting information in only some countries and the observed changes are
not always in the expected direction (see Table 4 in DFEL this issue). As concems the
authors' second research question, i.e., whether cross-country differences in corporate
govemance and accounting systems can explain cross-country differences in the impact of
the Asian financial crisis on the value relevance ofbook value and earnings, the results are,
in my opinion, not clear-cut. In the remainder of this discussion, I elaborate on why we
should be careful in interpreting the results as evidence that cross-country differences in
corporate govemance and accounting systems can explain cross-country differences in the
impact of the Asian financial crisis on the value relevance of equity book value and
earnings.
The remainder of this discussion is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
research hypotheses. In Section 2, I take a critical look at the results. And in Section 3 I
provide some potential explanations for the puzzling results regarding the second research
question. Section 4 discusses some further issues and Section 5 concludes.
1. A critical look at the research questions and hypotheses
1.1. The first research question: hypothesis 1
Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998) examined how the value relevance of equity book
value and earnings changes when the financial health of the firm deteriorates. They find that
the value relevance of equity book value increases and the value relevance of net income
declines. DFEL expand this question to whether a macro-economic shock, like the Asian
financial crisis, can cause similar shifts in the value relevance of equity book value and net
income. They formulate Hypothesis 1 accordingly. In my opinion, however, an extension of
the Barth et al. (1998) hypothesis from a firm-level setting (firm-level financial health) to a
macro-economic setting (Asian financial crisis) and fi^om an American context to an Asian
cross-country context is not that straightforward. I see two reasons for this. The first reason is
that one would expect a shift in the value relevance of equity book value and net income
similar to the one observed by Barth et al. (1998) only when the Asian financial crisis has
deteriorated the firms' financial health as defined by Barth et al. (1998). The second reason is
that various studies have shown that pre-crisis properties ofaccounting information (such as,
for example, value relevance of accounting figures) already differ across countries (see, for
example, Ali & Hwang, 2000). Therefore, it remains to be seen whether any shifts in the
value relevance of accounting information in Asian countries will be similar to those
observed in the United States. The mixed results reported in Table 4 (see DFEL this issue) are
less surprising when viewed fi"om this perspective.
1.2. The second research question: hypotheses 2 and 3
The second objective of the paper is to examine whether cross-country differences in
govemance and accounting systems can explain the mixed results on the impact of the
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Asian financial crisis on the value relevance of equity book value and net income across
countries (see Section 2). Since some prior studies have already investigated hypotheses
similar to Hypothesis 1 in some individual countries (see, for example, Graham, King, &
Bailes, 2000, for Thailand), the main potential of the paper lies, in my opinion, in this
second research question. However, in the hypothesis section, the authors leave the
readers in the dark as to how exactly they expect governance and accounting systems to
influence shifts in the value relevance of equity book value and earnings caused by the
Asian financial crisis. For example, in their Hypothesis 3, the authors only formulate
expectations as to how the value relevance of equity book value and net income
generated from an lAS-based accounting system compares to the value relevance of
accounting info generated from a tax-based accounting system during a crisis.
Hypothesis 3 does not indicate how the type of accounting system can impact the
expected shifts in the value relevance of equity book value and net income induced by
the crisis.
2. A critical look at the results
To test whether the Asian financial crisis increases the value relevance of book value
and decreases the value relevance of net income (Hypothesis 1) DFEL estimate a
multiple linear-regression model with the market value of equity per share (MVS) as the
dependent variable, and as independent variables, the book value per share (BVS),
earnings per share (EPS), an indicator variable (/) for whether the data are from 1997
(the year of the crisis) or 1996 (the year prior to the crisis), and two interaction
variables, i.e., an interaction of the book value per share with the indicator variable
(/*BVS), and an interaction of the earnings per share with the indicator variable
(/*EPS). The authors run the regression on the individual-country samples (Malaysia,
Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea), and on the pooled sample. Table 4 (see DFEL this
issue) shows the results of these estimations. The table shows that DFEL find support
for Hypothesis 1 in Indonesia and Thailand. However, in contrast to expectations, they
find a decrease in the value relevance of both equity book value and earnings in
Malaysia. Their results ftirther indicate that the crisis had no impact on the value
relevance of book value of equity and net income in Korea. Malaysia seems to dominate
the pooled results. The value relevance of both equity book value and net income
decreases.
Table 1, panel C, provides information on the strength of the govemance system and
the properties of the accounting system in the four countries under study. The
govemance proxy (a composite govemance score) takes a value ft-om 1 to 4, with four
indicating a weak govemance system and one indicating a strong govemance system.
Table 1 shows that Indonesia and Thailand are the countries with the weaker
govemance systems. Malaysia and Korea are the countries with the stronger govemance
systems. The proxy for the accounting system takes a one if the accounting standards
are based on IAS, and zero if the accounting standards are based on the tax code. Table
1 indicates that Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia are classified as having lAS-based
accounting standards.
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Taken together. Table 4 and Table 1, panel C, give a first indication on whether
governance and accounting systems can explain cross-country differences in the
impact of the Asian financial crisis on the value relevance of equity book value and
net income. More specifically. Hypothesis 1 is supported in countries with the
weakest governance systems (Indonesia and Thailand), while the results are mixed for
the two countries with a stronger governance system (Malaysia and Korea). Using the
accounting system as a classification variable also gives mixed results. More
specifically, the value relevance of equity book value increases in two of the three
lAS-based countries (Indonesia and Thailand), but decreases in the third country with
lAS-based accounting standards (Malaysia). This already suggests that the two factors
which are hypothesized to mediate the effect of the Asian financial crisis on the
value relevance of equity book value and net income across countries will only have
moderate (if any) explanatory power.
Another noteworthy observation is that the Asian financial crisis seems to have a
similar effect on the value relevance of equity book value in the countries with the weakest
govemance systems, i.e., Indonesia and Thailand, as a deteriorating financial health has in
the United States, a country known to have a relatively strong govemance system (see, for
example, the values for the corporate govemance measures for the United States as
reported in LaPorta et al., 1998).
To formally test their Hypotheses 2 and 3, DFEL expand their first model with
three-way interactions between ( 1 ) the proxy for the strength of the govemance system
or type of accounting system, the year indicator, and book value per share
(CG*/*BVS or AC*/*BVS), and (2) the proxy for the strength of the govemance
system or type of accounting system, the year indicator, and eamings per share
(CG*/*EPS or AC*/* EPS). Table 6, panels A and B, show the results of the
estimation of these regressions. The table indicates that the three-way interactions with
eamings per share are never significant, which suggests that the effect of the Asian
financial crisis on the value relevance of net income is similar across countries.
However, the results in Table 4 suggest otherwise. There is a significant negative
impact of the crisis on the value relevance of net income in Indonesia, Thailand, and
Malaysia, but no significant impact in Korea.
Table 6 fiirther shows that the three-way interactions with book value per share
are significantly negative. Also, in the regression where DFEL examine the
mediating impact of the strength of the govemance system, the coefficient on the
interaction between the year-indicator and book value per share (/*BVS) is positive.
Given these two observations, and given that Indonesia and Thailand have the
weakest govemance systems (values of 4 and 3 on the composite govemance score,
respectively), the Asian financial crisis tums out to have a negative impact on the
value relevance of equity book value for these two countries. This sharply contrasts
the estimation results of the country regressions reported in Table 4. Table 4 reports
a significant positive impact of the Asian financial crisis on the value relevance of
equity book value in Indonesia and Thailand. Similarly, Panel B of Table 6 shows
that the coefficient on /*BVS is negative and not significant. The three-way
interaction AC*/*BVS is significantly negative. Since AC takes a one for
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand (i.e., the countries with lAS-based accounting
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Standards), the results suggest that the Asian financial crisis has a negative impact
on the value relevance of equity book value in these three countries. We know from
Table 4 that this is indeed the case for Malaysia. However, given the results of the
country regressions in Table 4, we would expect a positive impact in Indonesia and
Thailand. In summary, some of the results reported in Table 6 seem to conflict with
the country results reported in Table 4. This suggests that we should be careful in
interpreting the results as evidence that cross-country differences in governance and
accounting systems can explain cross-country differences in the impact of the Asian
financial crisis on the value relevance of equity book value and net income.
3. Potential explanations for the results
I see various possible explanations for the puzzling results reported in Tables 4
and 6.
A first set of explanations relates to the choice and measurement of the variables
according to which we classify countries. It is clear from the discussion in Section 2 that
governance and accounting system proxies never partition the countries into the three
different groups we expect to see, given the results in Table 4 (i.e., countries whose
value relevance of equity book value does not change, (increase or decrease) due to
the Asian financial crisis). One possible reason is that there are other properties of
accounting and governance systems or other institutional variables that were not
considered in this paper, which could better explain the different impact of the
Asian financial crisis on the value relevance of equity book value and net income
across countries. As mentioned in Section 1, the paper does not explain why cross-
country variation in governance and accounting systems would affect the impact of
the Asian financial crisis on the value relevance of equity book value and earnings.
There is even less support to expect that the specific govemance and accounting
system proxies used (i.e., shareholder rights, creditor rights, rule of law, ownership,
audit report quality and accounting standards) could explain the cross-country
differences in the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the value relevance of
equity book value and earnings.
Even assuming that there is a clear theoretical basis for using the govemance and
accounting proxies, there are still some other problems with using these measures in the
study. First, although the measures were used in various prior studies (see, for example,
LaPorta et al., 1998) they remain crude proxies of the underlying constructs. This does not
help in classifying countries correctly. Also, the variation in the govemance and
accounting-system proxies is limited. This is not very surprising considering that the
govemance and accounting-system proxies used are country-level (instead of firm-level)
measures, and that there are only four different countries in the sample. Expanding the
number of countries in the sample (Saudagaran & Diga, 1997, for example, used data from
47 countries with emerging capital markets, and Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman,
2000 used data from 25 emerging markets), and/or using firm-level corporate govemance
and accounting-system attributes could help to increase the variation in the govemance
and accounting-system measures.
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Also a research design issue may to some extent explain the puzzling results in Tables 4
and 6. More specifically, the interaction terms between the corporate governance or
accounting-system proxy, on the one hand, and the year-indicator, on the other hand, (i.e.,
CG */ or AC* I) are missing from the models estimated to test Hypotheses 2 and 3, which
clouds the interpretation of the results.
4. Some further issues
To examine the impact of the Asian financial crisis, DFEL use a year-indicator variable
(/). To investigate whether they can really attribute the effect to the Asian financial crisis,
and prove that the effect is not a simple year effect, DFEL also test whether the value
relevance of equity book value and net income changes in the years prior to and after the
Asian financial crisis. Replacing the year-dummy with another proxy for the Asian
financial crisis, e.g., the extent of exchange-rate depreciation or stock market decline (see
Johnson et al., 2000) might have been an alternative and more direct test of whether they
can attribute the results to the Asian financial crisis.
5. Summary
DFEL investigate the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the value relevance of
book value of equity and net income in four Asian countries. In addition, DFEL examine
whether cross-country differences in governance and accounting systems can explain the
different effects of the crisis across the four countries. These are very interesting research
questions. However, some of the results of their investigation are puzzling. I propose that
these puzzling results may stem fi^om the choice of the mediating factors and/or some data,
measurement, and methodological problems, such as a small number of countries in the
sample, crude proxies for the strength of the governance system and the properties of the
accounting system, and a lack of variation in these proxies, and a model specification
issue. Further exploration of the factors affecting changes in the value relevance of equity
book value and net income induced by a macro-economic shock seems an interesting
avenue for future research.
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1. Introduction
We thank the discussant for her comments and we respond to her comments and
suggestions herein. The comments focus on our research questions, hypotheses, and the results
from our tests of the second research question. We provide responses to them in that order.
2. Research questions, hypotheses and results
Our first research question examines whether the Asian financial crisis caused shifts in
the value relevance of equity book value and net income. The discussant opines that an
extension of Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998) from a firm-level setting (firm-level
financial health) to a macro-economic setting (Asian financial crisis), and from an American
context to an Asian cross-country context is not that straightforward. We agree with the
discussant's observation that value relevance ofaccounting numbers differs across counfries
(e.g., Ali & Hwang, 2000). In our paper we provide frirther evidence on the value relevance
of book value of equity and net income in four Asian countries, before and after the Asian
financial crisis. Our evidence confirms prior findings that value relevance of book value of
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equity and net income differs across countries in our sample. Our paper then investigates
factors that may account for these differences. The factors examined in our paper are
corporate governance and accounting systems. The discussant considers this to be the main
contribution of our paper.
However, the discussant observes that we have not indicated in Hypothesis 3 how the
type of accounting system can impact the expected shifts in the value relevance of equity
book value and net income induced by the crisis. The countries in our sample have either
lAS-based or tax-based accounting systems. Prior research (Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003)
shows that accounting properties are not strictly determined by the type of accounting
system. Hence, we choose to state Hypothesis 3 in a non-directional form as there is no
conclusive evidence ft^om prior research that an lAS-based or tax-based accounting system
is a clear determinant of value relevance of accounting numbers.
In Table 4, we report regression results by countries. In Table 6, we report results that
include corporate governance and accounting systems as moderating factors. The discussant
observes that some ofthe results reported in Table 6 seem to conflict with the country results
reported in Table 4 and she provides explanations for the puzzling results.
We agree that our country-level measures for govemance and accounting system are
crude proxies at best, and are limited in their variation across the sample. The discussant's
suggestion that expanding the number of countries in the sample and/or using firm-level
corporate govemance and accounting-system attributes to increase the variation in the
govemance and accounting-system measures is certainly worth exploring in future
research. It would be beneficial to future research if such firm-level data could be obtained.
The discussant suggests that a research-design issue may also explain the puzzling
results in Tables 4 and 6. She notes that the interaction term (CG I or AC I) is missing
from the models estimated to test Hypotheses 2 and 3. In untabulated tests, we find that the
results do not change when these terms are included in the estimation.
The discussant suggests replacing the year-indicator variable for the Asian fmancial crisis
with exchange rate depreciation or stock market decline (e.g., Johnson, Boone, Breach, &
Friedman, 2000) for a more direct test of whether the results can be attributed to the Asian
financial crisis. The Asian financial crisis certainly affected the four countries in our sample to
varying extents. We agree that these altemative measures may provide a clearer understanding
of the extent of the differential impact of the Asian fmancial crisis on the sample firms.
3. Conclusion
We appreciate the discussant's comment that our paper raises some very interesting
research questions. We also think that some of the issues raised by the discussant provide
avenues for future research of other factors that may explain changes in the value
relevance of equity book value and net income induced by a macro-economic shock.
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Abstract
We empirically investigate three questions: (i) whether analysts and investors mis-estimate the
persistence of operating cash flows, (ii) if so, is the cash flow effect distinct from the accrual effect in
the sense that one effect holds after controlling for the other, and (iii) if these are distinct effects,
which effect is stronger in magnitude? We find that prior period operating cash flows have a
significant positive effect on forecast errors and stock returns consistent with analysts and investors
underestimating the persistence of operating cash flows. Further, we find that not only is the
operating cash flow effect distinct from the accrual (more specifically the working capital accrual)
effect but it is also considerably larger in magnitude. To our knowledge, this is the first study that
documents the relative magnitude of prior period cash flow and working capital accrual effects on
forecast errors and stock returns. Our findings have several implications for friture research and
practice. First, the consistency of results across the two sets of users (analysts and investors) suggests
that analyst-forecast inefficiencies are less likely to be driven by their incentives to promote stocks
and more likely to be a manifestation of a broader phenomenon that has not been thoroughly
investigated in prior studies. Second, for practitioners, our results suggest that a trading strategy
based on prior period working capital accruals and cash flows would earn higher abnormal returns
than a trading strategy based on accruals alone.
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1. Introduction
We empirically investigate three questions: (i) whether analysts and investors mis-
estimate (or misweight) the persistence of operating cash flows, i.e., is there an effect of
prior period operating cash flows on forecast errors and on stock returns, (ii) if so, is the
cash flow effect distinct from the accrual (or working capital accrual) effect in the sense
that, one effect holds after controlling for the other, and (iii) if these are distinct effects,
which effect is stronger in magnitude? We find that prior period operating cash flows have
a significant positive effect on forecast errors and stock returns consistent with analysts
and investors underestimating the persistence of operating cash flows. Further, we find that
not only is the operating cash flow effect distinct from the accrual (more specifically the
working capital accrual) effect, but it is also considerably larger in magnitude.
These questions are important because, since Sloan (1996), prior research has focused
almost exclusively on investigating analyst-forecast and stock-price inefficiencies with respect
to prior period accruals and generally ignored operating cash flows. ' The focus on accruals in
prior work is motivated by the expectation that accruals contain transitory components
(potentially because of managerial discretion or estimation error), which are not correctly
perceived by analysts or investors. However, if financial statement users over-estimate the
persistence of accruals because they are fixated on earnings, they are also likely to
underestimate the persistence of cash flows. We examine two different sets of users,
analysts and investors, and provide evidence on the potential misweighting of cash flows.
A recent paper, Desai et al., (2004), also examines cash flow and accrual inefficiencies
with respect to stock prices. Our work differs from Desai et al. (2004) in two important ways.
First, Desai et al. study only investor behavior (stock returns), whereas we examine both
investors and analysts. A limitation of Desai et al. is that the relation between accruals, cash
flows, and subsequent stock returns could be attributable to unidentified risk factors or
unknown research-design flaws (e.g., Kothari, 2001). The analysis on professional sell-side
analysts provides strong evidence to the market-efficiency debate. Second, Desai et al. focus
on total accrual mispricing whereas we examine mispricing ofboth total and working-capital
accruals. Given the evidence in Bradshaw et al. (2001), that the mean reversion in earnings is
driven to a greater extent by working-capital accruals rather than long-term accruals, their
focus on total accruals is likely to reduce the power of their tests. As we show later in the
paper, we find that cash flows subsume total accruals but not working-capital accruals in
predicting ftiture stock returns.^
' Sloan's (1996) work has been extended by a number of studies including Collins and Hribar (2000), Hribar
(2001), Xie (2001), Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2001), Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2001),
Thomas and Zhang (2002), Fairfield, Whisenant. and Yohn (2003), Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2004),
Barth and Hutton (2004), and Desai, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2004).
" Another key difference between Desai et al. (2004) and our work is that we use total assets and Desai et al.
(2004) use stock price as the deflator, which serves different purposes. Desai et al. (2004) use cash flows scaled
by price in order to subsume the effect of book-to-market and other value-glamour variables. Because stock price
itself can predict future stock returns, using stock price as the deflator would confound the effect of accruals and
cash flows persistence. It is unclear whether the predictive power of cash flows scaled by price is from the
persistence of cash flows or stock price. As we focus on the relative persistence of accruals vs. cash flows, we use
total assets as the deflator.
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To study the effects of cash flows and accruals on forecast errors, we use two
approaches. First, we perform univariate and multivariate regressions of forecast errors
on prior period operating cash flows, accruals, and stock returns. A positive (negative)
coefficient on any of the independent variables suggests underweighting (over-
weighting). The multivariate regression allows us to examine the effect of accruals
after conditioning on cash flows and vice versa. Second, we adopt a portfolio approach
that allows for a non-linear relation among variables of interest and diversifles away any
idiosyncratic noise through aggregation. Specifically, we examine average forecast errors
for portfolios constructed on (i) operating cash flows and accruals, respectively, (ii)
operating cash flows conditional on accruals, and (iii) accruals conditional on operating
cash flows. The conditional portfolios, based on a double-sorting procedure described in
Section 3, help us assess the extent to which the two effects are independent and their
relative magnitudes.
We use a similar portfolio approach to examine the relative effects of operating cash
flows and accruals on subsequent stock returns. In addition, we perform four-factor model
regressions, as in Carhart (1997), for portfolios constructed on operating cash flows and
accruals to examine whether any observed returns associated with operating cash flows or
accruals can be explained by common risk factors documented in empirical finance
literature. As Fama and French (1996) argue, many of the CAPM anomalies are related. A
four-factor model provides a relatively cleaner test of whether the accrual and cash flow
effects are real anomalies or just a manifestation of some other previously documented
common risk factors.
Based on a sample of 26,700 firm-year observations over 1989-2000, we find that
forecast errors are significantly and positively related to past cash flows suggesting that
analysts underweight prior period cash flows. Furthermore, the analyst underweighting of
prior period cash flows is distinct from analyst overweighting of past accruals (or working
capital accruals) in the sense that after controlling for one effect, the other effect holds.
However, the cash flow effect on forecast errors is stronger in magnitude than the accrual
effect on forecast errors. With respect to stock-return tests, we find that similar patterns
apply to investors' behavior. Investors also underweight operating cash flows and
overweight accruals. The accrual and cash flow effects are distinct from each other,
supporting Sloan (1996) in the sense that the (working capital) accrual effect is still evident
after conditioning on cash flows. But the cash flow effect is considerably stronger in
magnitude than the accrual effect after controlling for four common risk factors used in the
empirical finance literature.
Our paper contributes to the literature examining the efficiency of stock prices and
analyst forecasts to prior period accounting information in several ways. First, prior
studies have not examined analyst-forecast inefficiencies with respect to prior period
operating cash flows after controlling for the negative correlation between accruals and
cash flows. Second, with the exception of Desai et al. (2004) prior studies have not
examined investor mispricing of cash flows after controlling for mispricing of accruals.
We not only provide evidence on mispricing of cash flows after controlling for the
negative accrual-cash flow correlation, but specifically extend Desai et al. (2004) by
examining working-capital accruals and using the four-factor model of expected returns.
Finally, we show that cash flows not only have an effect on forecast errors and
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subsequent stock returns distinct from the accrual or working-capital-accrual effect but
that the cash flow effect is considerably greater in magnitude. This point is not well-
recognized in the literature.
Our findings have implications for ftiture research and practice. First, the consistency
of results across the two different sets of users (analysts and investors) suggests that
analyst-forecast inefficiencies are less likely to be driven by their incentives to promote
stocks and more likely to be a manifestation of a broader phenomenon that has not been
thoroughly investigated in archival studies. Second, for practitioners, our results suggest
that a frading sfrategy based on prior period working capital accruals and cash flows
would earn higher abnormal returns than a trading strategy based on total or working-
capital accruals alone.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief
review of terminology, discussion of related literature, and our hypotheses. Section 3
describes our sample, discusses our research design, and presents our results. The
conclusion is presented in Section 4.
2. Prior research and motivation for examining cash flows
Prior work documents that analysts underweight the information in prior period
earnings and stock returns. For example, Mendenhall (1991), Abarbanell and Bernard
(1992), and Ali, Klein, and Rosenfeld (1992) document evidence of analysts under-
weighting the information in prior-period earnings. Consistent with their results, Elliott,
Philbrick, and Wiedman (1995) show that analysts do not revise their forecasts sufficiently
to incorporate prior information. Lys and Sohn (1990), Abarbanell (1991), and Ali et al.
(1992) also document evidence of analysts' underweighting the information in prior-
period returns.
More recently, a number of studies document that analysts overweight the information
in prior-period accruals. Specifically, Bradshaw et al. (2001) document evidence that
analysts earnings forecasts do not incorporate the predictable future-earnings declines
associated with high-accrual firms and that this effect is driven primarily by working-
capital accruals. Consistent with Bradshaw et al. (2001), Barth and Hutton (2004) find that
high accruals are associated with over optimism in analysts' forecasts.
Sloan (1996) documents that investors underestimate the persistence of cash flows
and overestimate the persistence of accruals. Furthermore, he shows that a trading
strategy with a long position in low-accrual firms and a short position in high-accrual
firms generates significant abnormal stock returns in the subsequent two years. Sloan's
work has been extended in a number of ways. In one line of work, studies attempt to
identify the source of the abnormal returns to the accrual-based trading sfrategy. For
example, Xie (2001) shows that the abnormal returns seem to be driven by the
abnormal (potentially discretionaiy) components of accruals. Thomas and Zhang (2002)
show that the abnormal returns are driven primarily by the inventory component of
accruals.
Another line of work building on Sloan (1996) examines whether the accrual anomaly
is separate or distinct from other anomalies. For example, Collins and Hribar (2000)
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examine whether or not the accrual anomaly is distinct from the post-eamings-
announcement drift. Desai et al. (2004) examine the effect of operating cash flows and
accruals on subsequent abnormal returns and conclude that operating cash flows
parsimoniously capture the value-glamour anomalies including the accrual anomaly.
Prior studies have generally not examined whether analysts misweight prior period cash
flows, and whether cash flows have a stronger effect on forecast errors and future stock
returns relative to accruals. The only study that examines the efficiency of stock prices (but
not analyst forecasts) with respect to both cash flows and total accruals, Desai et al. (2004),
concludes that total accruals do not have any incremental effect on subsequent returns after
controlling for cash flows. This is in contrast with Sloan (1996). We fill these gaps in the
literature by investigating analyst-forecast and stock-price inefficiencies with respect to
cash flows and accruals.
2.1. Motivation for examining cash flows
The main motivation to examine the effects of operating cash flows on forecast errors
and ftjture stock returns is the finding in Sloan (1996) that investors underweight cash
flows and overweight accruals because they seem to be fixated on earnings. More
specifically, Sloan's (1996) Table 5 shows that investors attach a lower weight to operating
cash flows (0.826) than the weight implied by the earnings process (0.855). The under-
weighting is greater when decile rankings are used (0.747 versus 0.838).
Building on Sloan (1996), Bradshaw et al. (2001) investigate whether analysts
overweight (or overestimate the persistence of) accruals. The intuition for analysts over-
weighting accruals is similar to investors overweighting of accruals in Sloan (1996).
Specifically, if analysts fixate on earnings, they are likely to attach a higher weight to those
earnings components that have lower than average (across all earnings components)
persistence. Because accruals are expected to have below-average persistence, analysts are
expected to overweight past accruals.
We expect analysts to underweight cash flows for the same reason that they are
expected to overweight accruals. In other words, if analysts fixate on earnings and
therefore incorrectly assume that all components of earnings are equally persistent, they
will tend to underweight cash flows because the persistence of the cash flow component of
earnings is higher than the average persistence of earnings components.
A second motivation for studying the effects of operating cash flows on forecast errors
is that prior studies investigating analyst misweighting of accruals do not consider the
potential impact of operating cash flows on forecast errors in light of the negative
correlation between accruals and cash flows documented in prior work (Dechow, Kothari,
& Watts, 1998). If, as we expect, analysts underweight operating cash flows, and operating
cash flows are omitted in studying the relation between forecast errors and accruals, a
spurious negative relation between forecast errors and accruals can result from omitting
operating cash flows. Thus, it is useful to investigate whether conditioning on operating
cash flows affects the relation between accruals and forecast errors. Moreover, the fact that
the correlation coefficient between cash flows and accruals is far away from — 1 leaves the
possibility open that cash flows and accruals may have distinct effects on analysts'
forecasts and stock returns.
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3. Empirical analysis
5.1. Sample and variable measurement
The sample data include all NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq firms excluding financial
institutions (SIC 6000-6999) from 1989 to 2000 with data available from three sources.
Cash flows, accruals, and other financial data are from Compustat; returns are from CRSP
monthly file; and analyst-forecast data are from I/B/E/S summary files. We restrict our
sample to post- 1987 data in order to measure cash flow and accrual data consistently,
using the statement of cash flows required by Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 95, which took effect in 1988. We exclude financial firms because it is
difficult to define cash flows and accruals meaningfiilly for these firms because of the
nature of their business. Furthermore, this industry has extremely high leverage and is
highly regulated.
To be included in the sample, each firm-year observation must have: non-missing data
on stock returns in the CRSP monthly file, and nonmissing data on total assets, total
accruals, operating cash flows, and working-capital accruals in the Compustat files. In
examining the effects of cash flows and accruals on analyst-forecast behavior, we fiirther
require that none of data items-analyst-eamings forecasts, actual earnings, and related data
in the I/B/E/S database-be missing. Essentially, we impose minimum data requirements
and only require necessary data to run multivariate regressions in each analysis. To avoid
potentially confounding effects of structural changes in firms due to merger and
acquisition events, we exclude firms with a change in total assets exceeding 50% in a
fiscal year.
Analyst forecast (F) is the consensus (median) forecast made eight months before a
firm's fiscal year-end multiplied by outstanding shares and then scaled by average total
assets. Actual earnings {X) is actual earnings per share (reported in I/B/E/S) mulfiplied by
outstanding shares and then scaled by average total assets. Forecast error (FE) is the
difference between actual earnings and analyst forecast. Stock returns (RET) are annual
buy-and-hold returns including dividends from CRSP. Operating cash flows, accruals, and
other financial statement data are from Compustat. Operating cash flow (CF) is cash flow
from operations (#308). Total accrual (TACC) is the difference between earnings before
extraordinary items (#123) and operating cash flow (#308). Working-capital accrual
(WCACC) is the sum of increase in accounts receivable (#302), increase in inventory
(#303), decrease in accounts payable and accrued liabilifies (#304), decrease in accrued
income taxes (#305), and increase/decrease in other assets/liabilities (#307). Long-term
accrual (LTACC) is the difference between total accruals and working-capital accruals.
These data definifions are consistent with those in Bradshaw et al. (2001).
To facilitate comparison across firms, we scale all variables except for stock returns by
average total assets (TA) (#6)."^ We choose average total assets as the deflator for three
reasons. First, we define the variables in the same way as in Sloan (1996) and Bradshaw et
We acknowledge that there is a mechanically positive relation between earnings and TA because earnings
directly affect the ending balance of total assets, although this correlation is small. As a robustness check, we use
total assets and stock price at the prior year-end as the deflator and the tenor of our results are unchanged.
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al. (2001) in order to compare our results with their results. Second, average total assets
match other financial statement items in the sense that total assets and other financial
statement items are based on the historical-cost principle. Third, we scale forecast errors
by average total assets in order to make sure that the dependent and independent variable
have the same deflator in our regressions.
3.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our sample of firms over 1989—2000. The
mean and median forecast errors as a percentage of average total assets are —2.2% and
— 0.5%, respectively. Consistent with prior studies, the negative forecast errors suggest
that, on-average, analyst forecasts are optimistic. The mean and median total accruals are
— 4.9% and —4.6% of average total assets, respectively, whereas the mean and median
working capital accruals are 2.0%) and 1.1%) of average total assets, respectively. Total
accruals are negative because of depreciation. These magnitudes are similar to those
reported in Bradshaw et al. (2001).
Table 1, panel B, presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations between forecast
errors, prior earnings, prior returns, and prior-earnings components. Forecast errors are
positively correlated with operating cash flows (Pearson = 0.239, Spearman = 0.161), but
negatively correlated with working-capital accruals (Pearson = — 0.103, Spearman =
— 0.124). Consistent with prior literature (for example, Dechow, 1994), cash flows are
negatively correlated with accruals and working-capital accruals, respectively
(Pearson = -0.301, -0.328, Spearman = -0.478, -0.388). This implies that the relation
between forecast errors and accruals may be contaminated by the negative relation
between cash flows and accruals.
3.3. Analysts' weighting ofprior period information in cash flows and accruals
In this section, we first run regressions of forecast errors on prior-period earnings or its
components to draw conclusions about the association between forecast errors and
earnings components. To control for cross-sectional correlation and heterogeneity in
regression residuals, we estimate the regressions separately for each year in the sample and
then construct Fama and MacBeth (1973) ^-statistics using the resulting sets of annual
coefficient estimates. Table 2 reports the mean-coefficient estimates and the Fama-
MacBeth /-statistics."^
Panel A shows the results for univariate regressions of forecast errors on prior-period
earnings or earnings components.^ Prior-period earnings, operating cash flows, total
* The Fama-MacBeth approach does not control for the temporal correlation in annual coefficient estimates, but
the autocorrelation is usually small in magnitude and only significant in the first lag. In our case, none of the first-
order autocorrelation coefficients on our variables of interest is larger than 0.2. Given the small magnitude of
autocorrelation and that we only have 12 years' of data, we only report Fama-MacBeth /-statistics.
In both univariate and multivariate regressions, we perform sensitivity tests by symmetrically truncating the
sample by 1%, 5%, or 10%. The results are similar in each case, suggesting that outliers discussed in Abamanell
and Lehavy (2003) do not have a significant effect on the explanatory power of accruals and cash flows.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for 26,700 firm-year observations from 1989 to 2000 with the
required data on Compustat, CRSP, and I/B/E/S
Panel A. Descriptive statistics
Mean Stdev Min Ql Median Q3 Max
X, 0.040 0.138 -0.937 0.016 0.050 0.097 0.371
F, 0.063 0.112 -0.782 0.033 0.062 0.107 0.360
FE, -0.022 0.070 -0.565 -0.027 -0.005 0.004 0.196
^,-1 0.034 0.136 -1.111 0.019 0.050 0.089 0.294
CF,_, 0.078 0.125 -0.670 0.039 0.090 0.142 0.370
ACC,_, -0.049 0.088 -0.461 -0.087 -0.046 -0.007 0.225
WCACC,_, 0.020 0.063 -0.190 -0.011 0.011 0.045 0.282
LTACC,_, -0.069 0.058 -0.401 -0.084 -0.056 -0.037 0.099
RET,_, 0.156 0.610 -0.924 -0.190 0.065 0.354 6.042
Panel B. Correlation matrix. Pearson correlations are shown above the diagonal with Spearman correlation below
X, F, FE, X,_i CF,_| ACC,_, WCACC,_| LTACC,_| RET,_,
X, 1 0.820 0.537 0.815 0.687 0.141 0.087 0.115 0.161
F, 0.818 1 0.015 0.830 0.664 0.186 0.173 0.089 0.121
FE, 0.450 0.021 1 0.217 0.239 -0.019 -0.103 0.080 0.128
X,-^ 0.779 0.866 0.072 1 0.763 0.249 0.165 0.189 0.041
CF,_, 0.541 0.512 0.161 0.589 1 -0.301 -0.328 -0.085 0.077
ACQ
,
0.109 0.183 -0.085 a.214 -0.478 1 0.729 0.662 -0.008
WCACC,_| 0.111 0.216 -0.124 0.212 -0.388 0.730 1 -0.003 -0.030
LTACC,_| 0.032 0.019 0.015 0.073 -0.270 0.593 0.008 1 0.020
RET,_, 0.331 0.230 0.286 0.170 0.174 -0.018 -0.051 0.027 1
Variables are defined as follows.
X: Actual earnings per share from I/B/E/S multiplied by outstanding shares and then scaled by average total assets
(TA).
F: Consensus (median) forecast multiplied by outstanding shares and then scaled by TA, where the forecast is
made eight months before the fiscal year-end.
FE: Forecast error defined as the difference between actual earnings and consensus (median) forecast multiplied
by outstanding shares and then scaled by TA.
RET: Annual buy-and-hold returns including dividends from CRSP up to the forecast date.
WCACC: Working capital accrual measured as the sum of increase in accounts receivable, increase in inventory,
decrease in accounts payable and accrued liabilities, decrease in accrued income taxes, and increase/decrease in
other assets/liabilities scaled by TA.
CF: Cash flow from operations scaled by TA.
ACC: Total accruals measured as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items and operating cash
flow scaled by TA.
LTACC: Long-term accruals measured as the difference between total accrual and working-capital accrual scaled
by TA.
The top and bottom 1% observations are winsorized to avoid the effect of outliers.
accruals, and working-capital accruals are all significant in univariate tests with expected
signs. The coefficient of operating cash flows is 0.125, with a /-statistic of 8.46. The
coefficient of working-capital accruals is —0.116, with a /-statistic of —10.32. Total
accruals have a weaker relation with forecast errors, with a coefficient of — 0.024 and t-
statistic of — 1.99. This panel suggests that both cash flows and accruals perform well in
predicting forecast errors.
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Table 2
Regressions of forecast errors on prior period earnings components and stock returns
FE, FE, FE, FE,
Panel A: univariate regressions
Intercept -0.025 **(- 19.29) -0.031** (- 16.48) -0.023** (-20.96) -0.019** (- 19.20)
X,_^ 0.102** (6.46)
CF,_i 0.125** (8.46)
ACC,_, -0.024** (-1.99)
WCACC,_, -0.116** (-10.32)
Average adj_R- 0.043 0.053 0.004 0.015
Panel B: multivariate regressions
Intercept -0.030**(-21.27) -0.032** (- 18.40) -0.023** (- 16.99) -0.025** (- 15.56)
CF,_, 0.133** (7.82) 0.121** (6.88) 0.124** (7.31) 0.112** (6.36)
ACC,_, 0.036* (2.30) 0.031 (1.95)
WCACC,_, -0.035* (-1.98) -0.038* (-2.13)
LTACC,_, 0.113** (7.44) 0.105** (6.90)
RET,_| 0.018** (8.59) 0.018** (8.55)
Average adj^- 0.058 0.081 0.068 0.089
* and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
All variables are as defined in Table 1 . The coefficient estimate is the time-series average ofthe annual cross-section
regression slopes from 1 989 to 2000, and the ^-statistics, shown in parentheses, are the Fama-MacBeth ^-statistics.
There are 2225 observations in annual regressions, on average. The top and bottom 1% of FE„ X,_|, CF,_i,
ACC,_i, WCACC,_i, LTACC,_| and RET,_i are winsorized to avoid the effect of outliers.
However, these univariate tests may suffer from a correlated omitted-variables problem.
To statistically examine the incremental association between forecast errors and each
earnings component, we run the following multivariate regressions.
FE, = i?o + i5iCF,_, + /?2ACC,_i + 8,
FE, = /5o + /?iCF,_, + /32ACC,_i + /?3RET,_i + e,
FE, = /?o + /?iCF,_i + i^.LTACC-i + ^jWCACC^i + e,
FE, = /?o + /?iCF,_i + /?2LTACC,_i + /?3WCACC,_i + /?4RET,^, -f e.
We include prior-period returns as an explanatory variable in addition to prior-period
earnings components to proxy for other information not captured in prior-period earnings
components that may affect analyst forecasts based on the evidence in Abarbanell (1991)
and Ah et al. (1992).
Table 2, panel B, shows the results of these regressions. Cash flows have
significantly positive effects on forecast errors in all four regressions, with coefficients
around 1.2 and /-statistics over 6.0. The coefficients of cash flows in the multivariate
tests do not differ much from the coefficient in the univariate test. Total accruals have
a marginally positive effect on forecast errors, contrary to the expected overweighting
of accruals. The fact that the inclusion of cash flows in the regression model flips
around the sign of the coefficient on total accruals suggests that total accruals capture
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the cash flow effect in the univariate test. The coefficient on working-capital accruals
remains significantly negative in the multivariate tests but its magnitude drops
dramatically fi^om —0.116 in the univariate test to —0.035 and —0.038, respectively, in
the multivariate tests.
The coefficient on prior-period stock returns is 0.018, with a /-statistic of 8.6 in both
regressions. Additionally, the inclusion of stock returns does not significantly change the
explanatory power of cash flows, accruals, and working-capital accruals. The
significance of cash flows and working-capital accruals in the multivariate regression
suggests that both components capture some incremental information that is not fully
utilized by analysts.
A potential explanation for the low significance of the coefficient on total accruals or
other accrual measures is that accruals have higher times-series variability. Prior
literature demonstrates that cash flows are more persistent than accruals (see Fig. 1 in
Sloan, 1996). Higher persistence suggests lower times-series variability. In our sample
period, the lag-1 autocorrelation is 0.602 for cash flow from operations, 0.311 for total
accruals, and 0.153 for working-capital accruals. The high time-series variability of
accruals makes an innovation in earnings less valuable and thus reduces its coefficient
estimates.
To address potential non-linear relationships between forecast errors and earnings
components as well as the effects of noise in accruals, we use a portfolio approach to
examine the impact of earnings components on analysts' forecasts. The portfolio approach
also has the advantage that it makes it easier to gauge the economic significance of the
results.
We sort firms into ten deciles based on prior-year earnings or earnings components, and
calculate average forecast errors as the average of annual means of each decile from 1989
to 2000.^ Table 3, panel A, reports these averages. Surprisingly, the forecast errors for all
sorts provide an inverted U-shaped distribution. The bottom cash flow decile has an
average forecast error (FE) of —6.87%, while that of the top decile is — 1.36%. Earnings
exhibit a similar pattern, with average FEs of — 6.35% and — 2.07% in the bottom and top
deciles, respectively. The average FEs for ten total-accrual or working-capital-accrual
deciles exhibit a strong inverted U-shape, with more negative ones for extreme deciles.
Once we pass the bottom three deciles, working-capital accruals have a monotonically
negative relation with forecast errors, with a decreasing average FE from -1.13% for
decile 4 to —5.06% for decile ten. Again, the negative elation between cash flows and
accruals may play a role here.
To summarize, the one-variable-sorted portfolio approach confirms the regression
results in the sense that each earnings component is related to forecast errors with expected
signs and cash flows perform the best. However, the inverted U-shaped distribution of
forecast errors calls into question the reliability of the linear regressions commonly used in
prior literature. In the remainder of the discussion, we focus on comparing cash flows and
'' The results of the pooled means, by pooling all portfolio observations across years, are almost identical. We
choose to report the mean of annual portfolio means and calculate time-series standard errors (panel C) in the
spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973).
A.S. Ahmed et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 51-74 61
Table 3
Average forecast errors across various portfolios based on prior year's cash flow and working-capital accruals
Panel A: average forecast errors (FE,) for ten deciles based onX,_ ,CF,_,, ACQ_ ,orWCACC,_,
Ten deciles Ten deciles Ten deciles Ten deciles
onX,_\ on CF,_| on ACC,_| on WCACC,_,
Decile 1 -6.35% -6.87% -3.30% -2.93%
(low)
Decile 2 -3.10% -3.25% -2.03% -1.74%
Decile 3 -1.78% -2.08% -1.67% -1.15%
Decile 4 -1.31% -1.60% -1.35% -1.13%
Deciles -1.35% -1.36% -1.21% -1.31%
Decile 6 -1.21% -1.23% -1.43% -1.42%
Decile? -1.27% -1.22% -1.60% -1.71%
Deciles -1.45% -1.14% -1.84% -2.04%
Decile 9 -1.62% -1.41% -2.62% -3.02%
Decile 10 -2.07% -1.36% -4.45% -5.06%
(high)
Panel B: average forecast errors and selected firm characteristics for ten conditional deciles based on CF,_
and WCACC,
I
FE, CF,_, WC ACC,_ LTACC,_| a; A',-, RET,
1
Ten working capital acciual deciles conditional on cash flows
Decile 1 -3.20% 7.94% -7.51% -6.44% -1.49% -4.36% 14.12%
(low)
Decile 2 -1.65% 7.77% -2.77% -6.10% 0.51% -0.44% 14.94%
Decile 3 -1.41% 7.85% -1.09% -6.18% 1.63% 0.79% 14.40%
Decile 4 -1.58% 7.85% 0.06% -6.35% 2.39% 1.80% 13.41%
Decile 5 -1.60% 8.08% 1.09% -6.69% 3.33% 2.77% 12.40%
Decile 6 -1.88% 8.04% 2.18% -6.88% 3.99% 3.61% 13.03%
Decile 7 -2.14% 8.19% 3.45% -7.08% 4.85% 4.76% 14.07%
Decile 8 -2.08% 8.23% 4.90% -6.87% 6.59% 6.58% 15.73%
Decile 9 -2.50% 8.05% 7.02% -7.02% 8.03% 8.39% 16.13%
Decile 10 -3.52% 7.63% 11.80% -8.48% 11.19% 11.78% 18.73%
(high)
Ten cash flow deciles conditional on working-capital accruals
Decile 1 -6.00% -15.14% 2.32% -6.88% -16.82% -20.13% 7.86%
(low)
Decile 2 -2.99% 0.63% 2.26% -5.42% -0.44% -1.01% 3.94%
Decile 3 -1.93% 4.11% 2.12% -5.27% 2.34% 2.07% 9.74%
Decile 4 -1.61% 6.19% 2.01% -5.57% 3.43% 3.39% 10.26%
Decile 5 -1.49% 7.91% 1.95% -5.89% 4.49% 4.58% 13.09%
Decile 6 -1.46% 9.61% 1.86% -6.42% 5.50% 5.59% 15.23%
Decile 7 -1.42% 11.52% 1.78% -6.81% 6.80% 6.85% 15.90%
Decile 8 -1.42% 13.77% 1.70% -7.31% 8.63% 8.48% 19.13%
Decile 9 -1.61% 16.85% 1.60% -8.21% 10.81% 10.52% 23.48%
Decile 10 -1.66% 23.98% 1.56% -10.36% 16.01% 15.05% 28.46%
(high)
(continued on next page)
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Table 3 {continued)
Panel C: average forecast errors (FE,) for 25 portfolios based on CF,_| and WCACC,_|
CFl CF2 CF3 CF4 CF5 (high) CF1-CF5
(Low)
WCACCl -5.72% -2.22% -1.55% -1.33% -1.16% -4.57%**
(low) (-6.04)
WCACC2 -4.20% -1.10% -0.55% -0.64% -1.34% -2.86%**
(-4.02)
WCACC3 -4.41% -1.24% -0.75% -0.78% -1.09% -3.32%**
(-6.56)
WCACC4 -4.69% -1.72% -1.18% -1.21% -1.42% -3.27%**
(-10.87)
WCACC5 -6.27% -2.92% -2.46% -1.92% -1.91% -4.36%**
(high) (-9.35)
WCACC5
-
-0.54% -0.71%** -0.91%** -0.59%** -0.75%**
WCACCl (-0.91) (-2.64) (-2.73) (-2.64) (-2.69)
* and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Portfolios are formed based onX,_i, CF,_|, ACC,_|, or WCACC,_i, which are defined as in Table 1. In Panel A,
firms are sorted into ten equal-size deciles. In Panel B, a two-way sorting technique is used to control cash flow
(CF) or working-capital accruals (WCACC). To form ten WCACC deciles conditional on CF, all firms are sorted
into ten CF groups and each CF group is fiirther sorted into ten WCACC portfolios. Finally, all ten WCACC
portfolios of each CF group are pooled together into one decile. A similar method is applied to the ten CF deciles
conditional on WCACC. In Panel C, firms are first sorted into five CF groups and then each CF group is further
sorted into five WCACC portfolios. All financial fums (6000<=DNUM<=6999) are excluded fi^om the sample.
The average forecast errors are the average of annual means of forecast errors for each portfolio. The r-statistics,
shown in parentheses, are the average forecast error divided by its time-series standard error adjusted by the
number of annual means. There are 26,700 firm-year observations from 1989 to 2000, and therefore each
portfolio has an average of 223, 223, and 89 firms each year in Panel A, B, and C, respectively. The top and
bottom 1% of FE„ X„ X,_u CF,.,, ACC,_|, WCACC,_i, LTACC,_i and RET,_, are winsorized to avoid the
effect of outliers.
working-capital accruals because, based on the above results, working-capital accruals are
driving the accrual effects.
To control for the negative correlation between cash flows and accruals in portfolio
formation, we use a two-variable sorting technique as follows. We form ten working-
capital-accrual deciles conditional on cash flows, by first sorting all firms into ten
groups based on operating cash flows. Next, for each cash flow group, we sort firms
into ten working-capital-accrual portfolios. Finally, we pool ten working-capital-accrual
portfolios from each cash flow group together into one working-capital-accrual
(WCACC) decile. In this way, cash flows should be similar for the ten resulting
WCACC deciles. We use a similar technique to construct ten operating cash flow (CF)
deciles conditional on WCACC. Table 3, panel B, shows the average forecast errors
and firm characteristics for the ten conditional working-capital and cash-flow deciles,
respectively. Conditional on operating cash flows, WCACC is negatively related to
forecast errors, once we pass the lowest decile. From decile two to decile ten, the
average forecast errors decrease from —1.65% to —3.52%. WCACC increases from
-7.51%) to 11.80%) from decile one to decile ten, while operating cash flows remain
stable around 8%, suggesting the double-sorting procedure has been effective in
controlling for operating cash flows.
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Conditional on WCACC, the effect of operating cash flows on forecast errors are
considerably larger. The average forecast errors increase from —6.00% in decile one to
— 1.66% in decile ten when operating cash flows increase from —15.14% to 23.98%.
WCACC slightly decreases from decile 1 to decile 10 but the change is very small in
magnitude.
In Table 3, panel C, we show average forecast errors for 25 portfolios constructed using
a double-sorting procedure based on operating cash flows and working-capital accruals.
Specifically, firms are first sorted into five operating cash flow groups and then each CF
group is further sorted into five WCACC portfolios.^ In this way, we have 25 resulting
portfolios. A few points are worth mentioning. First, forecast errors are positively related
with cash flows and negatively related with working-capital accruals. On the one hand, the
difference of forecast errors in bottom and top CF portfolios (CF1-CF5) is significantly
negative in every WCACC group. On the other hand, the top WCACC portfolio has more
negative forecast errors than the bottom one in every CF group. The average forecast
errors are the lowest for low-CF and high-WCACC portfolios and the highest for high-CF
and low-WCACC portfolios.
Second, cash flows have a relatively bigger effect on forecast errors than working-
capital accruals. The CF1-CF5 difference is highly significant across five WCACC
groups, with an average magnitude of — 3.68%. The WCACC5 — WCACC 1 difference is
significant in four CF groups, with an average magnitude of —0.70%. Such results are
consistent with the regression results that both cash flows and working capital accruals are
significant but cash flows have higher explanatory (or predictive) power.
Fig. 1 provides descriptive, graphic evidence of forecast errors for combinations of
firms based on operating cash flows and working-capital accruals over different forecast
horizons. This sheds light on the relative magnitude (and importance) of operating cash
flow and working-capital accrual effects. The bottom two lines are for low cash flows (the
first quintile) while the top two lines are for high cash flows (the fifth quintile). The lowest
(most negative) forecast errors are observed for firms that have both low operating cash
flows and high working-capital accruals while the least negative forecast errors are
observed for firms with high operating cash flows and low working-capital accruals,
indicating both cash flows and working-capital accruals affect forecast errors.
If we focus on the middle two lines in Fig. 1 , the portfolio with low operating cash
flows and low working-capital accruals has more negative forecast errors than the portfolio
with high operating cash flow and high working-capital accruals, suggesting that cash
flows have a bigger effect on forecast errors than accruals. Furthermore, the difference
between the top/bottom two lines is relatively small, while there is a big distance between
the top two lines and bottom two lines. These results also suggest that both operating cash
flows and working-capital accruals have an incremental impact on analysts' forecast errors
The sorting order does not play a significant role here. Similar results are obtained when we first sort stocks by
working-capital accruals and then by cash flows or when we choose independent sorting. We choose not to use
independent sorting because some portfolios would be very thin, which leads to unreliable results. In panel C,
quintiles rather than deciles are used because we double sort by cash flows and working-capital accruals, which
generates 25 portfolios (as opposed to ten portfolios in Panels A and B).
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Fig. 1. Analyst forecast errors for interacted quintiles of cash flow and working capital accrual portfolios over
different forecast horizons. This figure presents average forecast errors for low cash flow and low working-
capital-accrual quintiles (LCLW), low cash flow and high working-capital accrual quintiles (LCHW), high cash
flow and low working-capital accrual quintiles (HCLW), and high cash flow and high working-capital-accrual
quintiles (HCHW) over 12 different forecast horizons. Forecast horizon 1 is the first month following the prior
year's earnings announcement, forecast horizon 2 is the second month following the prior year's earnings
announcement, and so on. Monthly forecast errors are defined as actual earnings minus forecasted earnings in that
month scaled by average total assets. Firm-year observations are first sorted annually into five quintiles by prior
year's cash flow, and then each cash flow decile is sorted into five quintiles based on working-capital accruals.
This kind of sorting guarantees a similar number of observations in each interacted quintile. There are about 675
observations for each interacted quintile in each month. The sample constitutes those observations for which
analyst forecasts are available in month 1 in the IBES database.
but that operating cash flows have a larger effect than working-capital accruals. This
conclusion is independent of the choice of the forecast horizon.
3.4. Investors' use of information in cash flows and accruals
In this section, we report average annual market-adjusted and size-adjusted returns and
other characteristics for portfolios based on prior-year cash flows and working-capital
accruals in order to draw conclusions about investors' use of information in cash flows and
accruals. If investors underestimate the persistence of cash flows, we would expect that
high cash flow portfolios will earn high stock returns. If investors do not anticipate the
more rapid mean reversion in earnings associated with extreme accruals, then we would
expect poor stock performance for high accrual firms. Following Jegadeesh and Titman
(2001), we exclude stocks with a share price below five dollars to make sure that the
results are not driven by small, illiquid stocks or by bid-ask bounce.
3.5. Annual returns based on prior-period earnings and earnings components
To ensure that the accounting information would have been available to investors,
return measurement begins fi^om the fifth month after the end of the fiscal year in which
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Table 4
Regressions of stock returns on prior period cash flows and accruals12 3 45 6 789
Intercept 0.103** 0.118** 0.138** 0.148* 0.134* 0.154** 0.139* 0.144* 0.146*
(2.85) (3.83) (3.93) (2.27) (2.09) (2.37) (2.18) (2.19) (2.24)
CF,_, 0.388** 0.385** 0.329** 0.382** 0.280**
(4.25) (5.09) (3.11) (4.97) (2.97)
ACC,„, -0.36** -0.39** -0.198
(-4.40) (-5.41) (-1.70)
WCACC,_i -0.47** -0.44** -0.28**
(-6.47) (-6.29) (-2.29)
DACC,_, 0.004
(1.29)
SIZE,_, -0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002
(-0.68) (0.07) (0.15) (-0.59) (-0.60) (-0.31)
BM,_, 0.018 0.022 0.024 0.019 0.018 0.019
(0.85) (0.99) (1.11) (0.92) (0.83) (0.98)
RET12,_| 0.017 0.023 0.029 0.017 0.016 0.023
(1.05) (1.47) (1.78) (1.05) (1.00) (1.39)
Average 0.015 0.004 0.004 0.039 0.032 0.030 0.042 0.040 0.039
adj^'
* and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The dependent variable is annual returns (RET,) calculated from the start of the fifth month subsequent to the end
of the fiscal year in which cash flows and accruals are measured. DACC is discretionary accruals estimated from
the modified Jones model. RET 12 is the past 12-month buy-and-hold returns up to the third month afiter fiscal
year-end. Other variables are as defined in Table 1 . Stocks with prices less than five dollars at the time of portfolio
formation are excluded, so are all financial firms (6000 < =DNUM< = 6999). The coefficient estimate is the time-
series average of the annual cross-section regression slopes from 1989 to 2000, and the /-statistics, shown in
parentheses, are Fama-MacBeth /-statistics. The top and bottom 1% of all variables are winsorized to avoid the
effect of outliers.
cash flows and accruals are measured. To avoid the survival bias, market returns are
assumed if a stock has missing return data in any month during the return measurement
period after portfolio formation.^
We first use Fama-MacBeth regressions to document the relative predictive power
of cash flows and accruals on future stock returns. Table 4 reports the results.
Consistent with prior literature. Models (l)-(6) show that ftiture stock returns are
negatively related to total accruals and working capital accruals but are positively
related to cash flows regardless of whether size, book-to-market, and other common
factors are controlled for or not. Models (7)-(8) suggest that, once controlling for the
cash flow effect, total accruals or discretionary accruals have no explanatory power for
future stock returns, which is consistent with Desai et al. (2004). However, Model (9)
documents a significant working capital accrual effect even after controlling for cash
flows. That is, both cash flows and working capital accruals explain ftiture stock
retums.
We make robustness checks by replacing missing retums with 0%, - 1 00%, or portfolio return, or by
excluding observations with missing retums from our analyses. The tenor of our results is unchanged in any case.
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In Table 5, we use the portfolio approach. Panel A reports the results when stocks are
sorted into ten deciles based on prior-period earnings, operating cash flows, total accruals,
or working-capital accruals. Overall, each variable has some explanatory power in
explaining future annual returns, but cash flows and working-capital accruals perform
slightly better than the other two variables. Annual returns almost monotonically increase
from 4.15% for the lowest CF decile to 20.85% for the highest CF decile. When working-
capital accruals are used as the sorting variable, the returns decrease from 21.56% for the
lowest WCACC decile to 6.93%) for the highest WCACC decile. Similar patterns can be
observed to market-adjusted returns and size-adjusted returns. The return differential
between the top and bottom deciles is significant for each earnings component, suggesting
each component has strong predictive power in univariate tests.
In panel B, we form ten conditional deciles based on a two-way sorting technique as in
Section 3.3. To form ten working-capital accrual deciles conditional on cash flows, we sort
all stocks into ten groups by cash flows, and then for each cash flow group we fiirther sort
firms into ten working capital accrual portfolios. Finally, we pool ten working-capital
accrual portfolios from each of the ten cash flow groups into one working-capital accrual
decile.
Table 5, panel B, shows that, after controlling for the cash flow effect, we still observe a
negative relation between annual returns and working-capital accruals. The bottom
WCACC decile has an annual return of 16.72%o while the top decile has an annual retum
of 12.19%). But the magnitude of the retum differential between two extreme deciles
decreases dramatically from 14.63%) in unconditional sorting (panel A) to 4.53%) in
conditional sorting (panel B). On the other hand, the cash flow effect is still strong after
controlling for working capital accruals. The annual retum increases from 6.29% in decile
1 to 16.82%o in decile ten. The retum differential is about 10% regardless of whether the
raw retum, market-adjusted retum, or size-adjusted retum is used. This indicates that
investors systematically underestimate the persistence of cash flows after confrolling for
working-capital accmals while the explanatory power of working-capital accmals in
univariate tests are partially due to the negative correlation between cash flows and
accmals.
Next we sort stocks into five quintiles based on prior-year operating cash flows and
then fiarther sort each CF quintile into five portfolios based on prior-year working-capital
accmals. In this way, we obtain 25 portfolios each year from 1989 to 2000. Each portfolio
has an average of 122 stocks.^ The portfolio retum is calculated as the equal-weighted
average of the retums of all stocks in that portfolio.
Table 5, panel C, presents average portfolio retums for these 25 portfolios. A few
regularities are evident regardless of whether retums are measured as the raw, market-
adjusted or size-adjusted retums. First, retums increase almost monotonically as we move
from low-CF to high-CF portfolios in each WCACC group. On the other dimension,
retums decrease from low-WCACC to high-WCACC portfolios. A trading strategy with a
long position in high-CF and low-WCACC portfolios and a short position in low-CF and
Again, the sorting order does not play a significant role here. Similar results are obtained when we first sort
stocks by working-capital accruals and then by cash flows or when we choose independent sorting.
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Table 5
Average annual reUims for portfolios based on prior year's cash flow and working capital accruals
Panel A: annual reUims (RET,) for ten deciles based on X,_| , CF, ,, ACC, ,,orWCACQ'-I
Sorting Decile Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile
variable 1 (low) 10 (high)
Raw returns
X,_, 9.92% 13.98% 10.90% 13.42% 14.14%, 12.14% 14.20%, 13.57% 15.90% 14.90%
CF,_, 4.15% 10.76% 10.64% 13.34% 12.90%. 14.01% 15.01%, 15.65%, 15.77% 20.85%
ACC,_| 17.15% 18.20% 15.56% 14.22% 12.87% 13.18% 13.35% 11.82% 9.91% 6.82%,
WC 21.56% 15.13% 13.46% 12.47% 12.64% 12.31% 12.53%, 13.96% 12.11% 6.93%
ACC,_,
Market-adjusted returns
X,_| 0.36% 4.27% 1.35% 3.40% 4.12% 2.42% 4.42%, 3.68% 5.68% 5.17%
CF,_| -4.62% 1.27% 1.07% 3.47% 3.03% 4.13% 5.03%o 5.29% 5.88% 10.31%
ACC,_, 7.01% 7.64% 5.58% 4.17% 2.93% 3.38% 3.40%, 2.21% 0.36% -1.81%
WC 10.73% 4.91% 3.51% 2.51% 2.75% 2.63%, 2.62%, 4.19% 2.66% -1.62%o
ACC,_,
Size-adjusted returns
X,_| 0.63% 3.57% 0.31% 2.24% 2.71% 1.20% 3.00% 2.81% 4.83% 4.42%
CF,_, -4.59% 0.43% 0.03% 2.60% 1.75%, 3.01% 4.03% 4.07% 5.07% 9.33%
ACC,_| 6.77% 6.92% 4.57% 3.06% 1.88% 2.28% 2.57% 0.94% -0.68%, -2.57%
WC 10.07% 3.96% 2.36% 1.57% 1.71% 1.75% 1.68% 3.14% 1.77% -2.25%
ACC,_i
Panel B: annual returns and selected firm characteristics for ten conditional deciles based on CF,,^,andWCACC,_i
Variable Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile
(low) 10 (high)
Ten working-capital-accrual deciles conditional on cash flows
RET, 16.72% 15.83% 13.84% 11.20% 13.35% 13.48% 10.57% 14.08% 11.94% 12.19%
RET,- 6.28% 5.35% 3.83% 1.40% 3.53% 3.77% 1.03% 4.25% 2.52% 3.01%
RET,- 5.75% 4.21% 2.92% 0.54% 2.49% 2.70% 0.16% 2.96% 1.61% 2.50%
CF,_, 7.71% 7.71% 7.89% 7.94% 8.06% 8.00% 8.37% 8.30% 8.11% 7.77%
WC -7.82% -3.04% -1.35% -0.16% 0.93% 2.11% 3.34% 4.81% 6.88% 11.75%
ACC,_,
Ten cash flow deciles conditional on working-capital accruals
RET, 6.29% 9.44% 12.00% 13.82% 13.46%, 13.42% 14.91% 17.21% 15.69% 16.82%
RET,- -3.00% 0.08% 2.14% 3.85% 3.62% 3.61% 5.32% 6.92%o 5.53% 6.76%
RET,- -3.00% -0.76% 1.08% 2.69% 2.42% 2.45% 4.28%o 5.90% 4.63% 6.01%
^size
CF,_, -15.3% 0.68% 4.06% 6.14% 7.83% 9.52% 11.50% 13.77% 17.01% 24.51%,
WC 2.05% 2.11% 1.97% 1.88% 1.77% 1.70%, 1.61% 1.53% 1.49% 1.39%
ACC,_,
(continued on next page)
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Table 5 (continued)
Panel C: mean portfolio returns for 25 portfolios sorted on CF,
_, andWCACC,^,
CFl (low;1 CF2 CF3 CF4 CF5 (high) CF5-CF1
Raw returns
WCACCl (low) 8.03% 13.18% 14.59% 18.49% 27.06% 19.03%** (5.87)
WCACC2 8.71% 9.72% 15.04% 15.04% 17.74% 9.03% (1.69)
WCACC3 7.82% 13.48% 11.57% 14.30% 17.09% 9.27%** (2.45)
WCACC4 6.47% 13.28% 12.19% 13.90% 14.28% 7.81%** (2.66)
WCACC5 (high) 6.27% 10.29% 13.90% 14.93% 15.41% 9.14%** (2.37)
WCACCl 1.76% 2.89% 0.69% 3.56% 11.66%**
WCACC5 (0.41) (0.66) 0.27) (1.20) (2.49)
Market-adjusted returns
WCACCl (low) -1.39% 2.77% 4.33% 7.61% 15.70% 17.09%** (5.36)
WCACC2 -0.99% 0.23% 4.98% 5.19% 7.56% 8.55% (1.66)
WCACC3 -1.74% 3.52% 1.77% 4.39% 6.82% 8.56%** (2.41)
WCACC4 -2.15% 3.73% 2.72% 3.91% 4.24% 6.39%* (2.18)
WCACC5 (high) -2.08% 1.11% 4.12% 4.71% 6.21% 8.29%* (2.25)
WCACCl 0.69% 1.66% 0.21% 2.90% 9.49%*
WCACC5 (0.17) (0.38) (0.09) (1.11) (2.11)
Size-adjusted returns
WCACCl (low) -1.28% 2.00% 3.15% 6.31% 14.83% 16.11%** (4.74)
WCACC2 -0.77% -0.88% 3.52% 3.72% 6.47% 7.23% (1.36)
WCACC3 -2.34% 2.88% 0.27% 3.11% 5.92% 8.26%** (2.37)
WCACC4 -3.24% 2.30% 1.85% 2.98% 3.53% 6.77%** (2.98)
WCACC5 (high) -2.76% 0.30% 3.13% 4.15% 5.29% 8.04%** (2.40)
WCACCl- 1.48% 1.70% 0.02% 2.17% 9.55%*
WCACC5 (0.36) (0.43) (0.01) (0.79) (2.10)
* and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Portfolios are formed based on X,_i, CF,^|, ACC,_i, or WCACC,_|, which are defined as in Table 1. In Panel A,
stocks are sorted into ten equal-size deciles. In Panel B, a two-way sorting technique is used to control cash flow (CF) or
working-capital accruals (WCACC). To form ten WCACC deciles conditional on CF, all stocks are sorted into ten CF
groups and each CF group is fiorther sorted into ten WCACC portfolios. Finally, all ten WCACC portfolios of each CF
group are pooled together into one decile. A similar method is applied to the ten CF deciles conditional on WCACC. In
Panel C, stocks are first sorted into five CF groups and then each CF group is further sorted into fiveWCACC portfolios.
Stocks with prices less than five dollars at the time of portfolio formation are excluded, so are all financial firms
(6000<=DNUM<=6999). Annual returns (RET,) are calculated from the start ofthe fifth month subsequent to the end
ofthe fiscal year in which cash flows and accruals are measured. Missing retums after portfolio formation are replaced
with market retums in order to avoid the survival bias. Market-adjusted retums are calculated by deducting the value-
weighted market-portfolio return from the raw retums. Size-adjusted retums are calculated by deducting the equal-
weighted retums ofmatched size decile from the raw retums, where size is measured as market capitalization. There are
36,628 firm-year observations from 1989 to 2000, and therefore each portfolio has an average of 305, 305, and 122
firms each year in Panel A, B, and C, respectively. The top and bottom 1% of CF,_ | and WCACC, _ i are winsorized.
high-WCACC portfoHo generates an average of 20.79% annual retums. ^° As shown in
Fig. 2, retums from this trading strategy are uniformly positive in every year in our sample,
suggesting that it is unlikely to be explained by a risk factor.
'" We do not take into account transaction costs, which could be substantial. Additionally, the trading strategy is
not implementable because we include firms with non-December fiscal year-ends. Unreported analysis on firms
with December fiscal year-ends shows similar results.
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Fig. 2. Returns to a trading strategy with a long position in high cash flow and low working capital-accrual
quintiles and a short position in low cash flow and high working capital-accrual quintiles. Stocks are first
sorted into five quintiles based on prior year cash flows and then each cash flow quintile is fiirther sorted
into five working capital accrual quintiles. Cash flows and working-capital accruals are as defined in Table
1 . Stocks with prices less than five dollars at the time of portfolio formation are excluded. Annual returns
are calculated from the start of the fifth month subsequent to the end of the fiscal year in which cash
flows and accruals are measured. Market-adjusted returns are calculated by deducting the value-weighted
market-portfolio return fi'om the raw returns. Size-adjusted returns are calculated by deducting the equal-
weighted returns of matched-size decile fiom the raw return, where size is measured as market
capitalization.
Second, the cash flow effect is significant in four out of five WCACC groups while the
working-capital accrual effect has the predicted sign in each CF group but it is only
significant in one case.
Third, cash flows have the biggest effect in the lowest WCACC group while the
working-capital accrual effect is most evident in the highest CF group. Given that earnings
equal cash flows plus working-capital accruals and long-term accruals, and that long-term
accruals are quite stable over time, this suggests that investors are more likely to
underestimate the persistence of cash flows and overestimate the persistence of working-
capital accruals when earnings are of "high quality."' ' Taken together, these results
indicate that cash flows and working-capital accruals have an incremental effect beyond
each other but the cash flow effect is stronger.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the investor community believes that the cash flow component is of higher
quality than the accrual component.
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3. 6. Cash flow and working capital accrual portfolio returns based on the fi)ur-fiictor
model
In this subsection, we test whether the cash flow and working-capital accrual effects
can be explained by common risk factors documented in empirical finance literature
and to examine the relative magnitude of the cash flow and accrual effects. Fama and
French (1996) show that their three-factor model (R^-Rf, SMB, and HML) can explain
most commonly documented CAPM anomalies except for the continuation of short-
term returns. They argue that the three-factor model works like an equilibrium-pricing
model in the spirit of Merton's (1973) inter-temporal CAPM or Ross's (1976) arbitrage
pricing theory and that SMB and HML mimic combinations of two underlying risk
factors or state variables of special hedging concern to investors. Empirically, SMB
represents the size premium and equals the return differential between small stocks and
large stocks. Similarly, HML represents the value premium and equals the return
differential between stocks with high book-to-market ratios and stocks with low book-
to-market ratios.
Since the momentum effect is the only commonly documented anomaly that is
unexplained by the Fama-French three-factor model, we use a four-factor model (e.g.,
Carhart, 1997) to test portfolio returns. If the four-factor model captures the variation in
stock returns, the intercept fi"om the following regression should be close to zero.
/?,., -Rf^^ a + biuiRui - Rft) + :y/SMB, + hjUML, + m,UMD, + £,-,
where /?„—/? f, is the return of portfolio / in excess of the risk-fi-ee rate in month t,
RMr~Rft is the market-excess return, SMB is small-minus-big, HML is high-minus-low,
and UMD is up-minus-down and equals the return difference between a portfolio of top
30% stocks and a portfolio of bottom 30% stocks based on past returns fi^om month t—ll
tot-L'^
We use two-way sorting to form portfolios based on cash flows and working-capital
accruals. For any given firm-year, cash flows and working-capital accruals act as the
sorting variables for 12 months starting fi"om the fifth month subsequent to the fiscal year.
Each month, we assign stocks into five quintiles based on prior-year cash flows, and each
cash flow quintile is fiirther sorted into five portfolios based on prior-year working-capital
accruals. After assigning stocks into portfolios, stocks are held for one month. We
calculate the monthly portfolio return as the equal-weighted average of the returns of all
the stocks in the portfolio. Each of the 25 resulting portfolios contains an average of 108
stocks.'^
Table 6, panel A, presents the intercept estimates of the four-factor model on 25
portfolios. A striking pattern emerges. The intercepts from the four-factor model almost
decrease monotonically from low-WCACC to high-WCACC portfolios in each CF
'" The Fama-French three factors are downloaded from Ken French's website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/facuhy/ken.french/datalibrary.html. UMD is constructed in the same way as in Carhart (1997).
' The number of stocks in each portfolio is slightly smaller than that in Table 4 because here we use monthly
returns and accordingly exclude all observations with missing returns.
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Table 6
A four-factor model on portfolio returns based on prior period cash flows and working-capital accruals
CFl (low) CF2 CF3 CF4 CF5 (high)
Panel A: intercepts of the four-factor model when stocks are first sorted by CF and then by WCACC
WCACCl
(low)
WCACC2
0.031 (0.10) 0.028 (0.18) 0.381** (2.65) 0.404** (3.09) 0.966** (6.07)
-0.260 (-0.94) -0.212 (-1.38) 0.202 (1.51) 0.194(1.48) 0.461** (2.71)
WCACC3 -0.381 (-1.73) -0.020 (-0.15) -0.032 (-0.25) 0.213(1.59) 0.462** (3.09)
WCACC4 -0.404* (-2.01) -0.128 (-0.81) -0.015 (-0.11) 0.163 (1.05) 0.352* (2.24)
WCACC5 -0.619** (-3.23) -0.137 (-0.70) 0.089 (0.52) 0.188 (1.04) 0.225 (1.19)
(high)
Panel B: intercepts of the four-factor model when stocks are first sorted by WCACC and then by CF
WCACCl -0.011 (-0.04) 0.497** (3.04) 0.325* (2.30) 0.457** (2.84) 1.002** (6.15)
(low)
WCACC2 -0.032 (-0.14) -0.051 (-0.36) 0.172 (1.62) 0.247 (1.85) 0.378** (2.55)
WCACC3 -0.227 (-1.24) 0.008 (0.06) 0.031 (0.24) 0.118 (0.79) 0.446** (2.65)
WCACC4 -0.415* (-2.10) -0.008 (-0.05) -0.008 (-0.05) 0.111 (0.72) 0.237 (1.32)
WCACC5 -0.768** (-2.95) -0.185 (-1.20) -0.434** (-2.77) 0.095 (0.49) 0.187(0.97)
(high)
* and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
This table reports the intercept estimates of a four-factor model for monthly excess returns on the equal-weighted
cash flow and working-capital-accrual portfolios.
^,7 - Rf, = a + biuiRMt - Rfi) + s,SMB, + /z/HML^ + m,UMD, + e,-,
The monthly excess return (/?,,— /?f,) is the return for portfolio / in excess of the risk-free rate in month /. The
market premium (RMt^Rft), size premium (SMB), and value premium (HML) are from Kenneth French's
website. The momentum premium (UMD) is created using the same methodology as Carhart (1997) and is the
return difference between a portfolio of the top 30% stocks and a portfolio of the bottom 30% stocks based on
past returns from month / - 1 1 to month / - 1
.
Cash flow (CF) and working-capital accruals (WCACC) act as sorting variables for 12 months starting from the
fifth month subsequent to the fiscal year. In Panel A, each month stocks are first sorted into five groups by CF and
then, for each CF group, stocks are sorted into five WCACC portfolios. In Panel B, stocks are first sorted into five
WCACC groups and then each WCACC group is flirther sorted into five CF portfolios. Stocks with prices less
than five dollar at the beginning of the month are excluded, so are all financial firms (6000< =DNUM< = 6999).
Stocks are held for one month, and portfolio returns are equal-weighted. The sample period is from May 1 989 to
April 2001 (r-statistics in parentheses).
quintile. On the other hand, the intercepts increase monotonically from low-CF to high-CF
portfoho in each WCACC quintile. The intercepts are significantly negative for two low-
CF and high-WCACC portfolios but highly positive for six high-CF and low-WCACC
portfolios, and reach the minimum and maximum values in two comer portfolios, with
-0.619 for the lowest-CF and highest-WCACC portfolio and 0.966 for the highest-CF
and lowest-WCACC portfolio, respectively.
These significant intercepts suggest that low-CF and high-WCACC firms earn negative
abnormal returns while high-CF and low-WCACC stocks have positive abnormal return in
a four-factor world. The positive intercepts for high-CF portfolios and negative ones for
high-WCACC portfolios suggest that investors underestimate the persistence of cash flows
but overestimate the persistence of working-capital accruals after confrolling for other
72 A.S. Ahmed et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 51-74
factors. As a result, investors adjust the price up for high-CF stocks and down for high-
WCACC firms as more information becomes available later.
To gauge the economic significance of these effects, consider a trading strategy with a
long position in the highest-CF and lowest-WCACC portfolio and a short position in the
lowest-CF and highest-WCACC portfolio. This trading strategy yields average abnormal
returns of 1.585% (=0.966 + 0.619) per month, of which cash flows contribute 60.95%
(=0.966/1.585) and working capital accruals contribute 39.05%. For the remaining 17
portfohos, the intercepts are insignificantly different from zero, indicating that the four-
factor model explains these portfolio returns reasonably well.
The risk loadings on risk factors (not tabulated) are generally as expected. The market-
factor loadings are uniformly close to one, with ^statistics close to 20. Low-CF portfolios
typically have higher loadings on SMB, suggesting that these portfolios may have more
small stocks. The risk loadings on HML and UMD do not have a monotonic pattern,
which indicates that cash flows and working-capital accruals are not highly correlated with
book-to-market ratios and past returns. The average adjusted R~ is about 88%, suggesting
a reasonable explanatory power of the four-factor model for portfolio returns.
In the above analyses, we first sort stocks by operating cash flows and then by working-
capital accruals. One concem with this sorting technique is that the sorting order might play a
role in explaining the relative effects of cash flow and working-capital accruals on abnormal
stock returns. To mitigate this concem, we repeat the analyses after first sorting stocks by
working-capital accruals and then by cash flows. Panel B shows that our results are robust to
changing the sorting order. We observe similar monotonically increasing pattem of
intercepts from low-CF to high-CF and from high-WCACC to low-WCACC portfolios. The
same trading strategy generates 1.77% monthly abnormal returns, among which 56.61% are
attributed to cash flow and 43.39% are attributed to working-capital accruals.
Overall, these results suggest that investors underestimate the persistence ofoperating cash
flows and overestimate the persistence ofworking-capital accruals. As a result, high operating
cash flows predict high future returns while high working-capital accruals predict low future
returns. Operating cash flow and working-capital accruals have distinct effects, but the cash
flow effect is approximately 40% larger than the working-capital accruals effect.'"^ The
distinct effects of cash flows and accruals support Sloan (1996) and Bradshaw et al.
(2001), in the sense that the accrual anomaly still exists even after controlling for cash
flows and commonly documented risk factors, and is inconsistent with the Desai et al.
(2004) conclusion that the mispricing attributed to accruals is just a manifestation of the
mis-pricing related to the cash flow-to-price proxy of the value-glamour phenomenon.
4. Conclusion
We study two groups of market participants—financial analysts and investors—in their
assessment of the persistence of accruals and cash. We expect that both sets of analysts and
'"*
Ttie average contribution of cash flows on the trading strategy of abnormal returns is 58.78%
[=(60.95%+56.61%)/2], while that of working capital accruals is 41.22% [(39.05%+43.39%)/2], which
implies the cash flow effect is 42.6% larger than the working-capital accruals.
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investors will tend to overweight accruals and underweight cash flows. Further, we
provide evidence on the relative strength of the two effects after controlling for the well-
known negative correlation between accruals and cash flows.
We use a regression approach and a portfolio approach to address our research
questions. Both approaches provide consistent evidence that financial analysts and
investors overestimate the persistence of (working capital) accruals but underestimate the
persistence of cash flows. The working-capital accrual and cash flow effects are distinct
from each other in the sense that, when we control for one effect, the other effect still
holds. In terms of magnitude, we find that the cash flow effect on forecast errors and
subsequent returns is much stronger than the working-capital accrual effect.
Our paper contributes to the literatures examining the efficiency of stock prices and
analyst forecasts to prior-period accounting information in several ways. First, prior
studies have not examined analyst-forecast inefficiencies with respect to prior-period
operating cash flows after controlling for the negative correlation between accruals and
cash flows. Second, with the exception of Desai et al. (2004), prior studies have not
examined investor mispricing of cash flows after controlling for mispricing of accruals.
We provide evidence on mispricing of cash flows after controlling for the negative
accrual-cash flow correlation and extend Desai et al. (2004) by documenting that cash flows
subsume total accruals or discretionary accruals but not working-capital accruals.
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worldwide, the G4+1 issued a discussion paper which proposes that all leases should be recognized
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difficulty faced by standard setters lies in overcoming the preparer/user lobbying imbalance and
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1. Introduction
In many countries, operating leases represent a significant source of finance for many
companies, far exceeding the significance of finance leases. For example, it has recently
been estimated that, for the top 100 listed U.K. companies, the median ratio of operating-
lease liability to debt is 0.11 and the median ratio of operating-lease liability to finance-
lease liability is 6.2 (Beattie, Goodacre, & Thomson, 2004).' Internationally, key leasing
standards distinguish finance leases from operating leases, finance leases being defined as
those which transfer substantially all the risks and rewards of ownership to the lessee. The
accounting treatment depends on the lease classification, with only finance leases being
capitalized.
Concems regarding the off-balance-sheet nature of operating leases, the different
treatment of similar transactions and the "all or nothing" approach have led many standard-
setting bodies to consider treating all leases consistently. This culminated in a G4+1
discussion paper "Leases: implementation of a new approach" (ASB, 1999), which adopts
a "property rights" perspective and proposes that all leases should be recognized on the
balance sheet, rather than just finance leases.^ Leasing is now on the active agenda of the
lASB and the U.K. accounting standard-setting body was asked to undertake a project to
inform the lASB, which expects to take action in 2006/07 (lASB, 2005). The lASB has
tentatively agreed with the G4+1 approach of analyzing the contractual rights and
obligations arising from lease contracts (ASB, 2004).
The different accounting treatments have important implications for reported levels of
indebtedness and for standard performance measures. Profit margins, return on assets, and
gearing measures would all be significantly affected if operating leases were required to be
recognized on the lessee's balance sheet rather than merely disclosed in a footnote
(Beattie, Edwards, & Goodacre, 1998; Goodacre, 2003; Imhoff, Lipe, & Wright, 1991). It
is not surprising, therefore, that the G4+1 proposals are controversial and have already
generated a significant negative response from groups, in particular lessors and high-use
operating-lease lessees, who fear that they would cause major adverse economic
consequences.
Certain major interested parties, such as preparers, audit firms and other groups (here,
for example, the lessor group), are well organized to lobby the standard setters to ensure
that their group's views are heard. However, users are generally a wider, more diverse, less
organized group with less focus and often less technical knowledge for lobbying activities.
It is widely recognized that a major difficulty faced by accounting standard setters world-
wide lies in obtaining the views of users of financial statements (Collins, Davie, &
Weetman, 1996; Herz, 2003; Jonas & Young, 1998).
This paper contributes to the ongoing international debate concerning lease-accounting
reform by reporting the results of a questionnaire survey sent to users (investment analysts)
and preparers (finance directors). The objectives of the research are to elicit and compare
' This relates to 2002/03 year-ends. Mean figures are even higher: 0.70 and 95.3, respectively.
" The G4+1 group of standard setters (now a defunct body) comprised the standard-setting bodies of Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S., as well as the lASC.
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the views ofboth groups on a comprehensive range of issues surrounding lease-accounting
reform. The issues are: views on accounting standards generally; deficiencies in the current
U.K. standard; the general principles underlying the G4+1 proposals; the specific
proposals regarding complex features of lease contracts; economic consequences;
alternative proposals; and implementation. The impact on views of three background
characteristics is also examined: respondents' declared familiarity with the proposals (for
both users and preparers); level of lease usage (preparers only); and company size
(preparers only). The study represents policy-relevant ex ante research in support of the
standard-setting process of the type advocated by Schipper (1994).
To provide some context for the present study, it should be noted that institutional
differences are believed to affect corporate financing decisions. As leasing decisions are
part of the overall financing decision, it is to be expected that these differences would also
impact leasing decisions and hence interested parties' views about lease-accounting
reform. The United Kingdom can be characterized as having a broadly similar financial
and legal environment to the United States. It has a common law legal system with good
investor protection and well-developed, liquid financial markets. Bank finance and inter-
company ownership relationships play relatively smaller roles than in some countries. The
most obvious differences between the United Kingdom and United States (apart from
the relatively great size of the U.S. market in terms of number of companies and market
capitalization) relate to tax and bankruptcy codes and the size of the corporate bond
market (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1997, 1998) consider that a country's legal system is the main determinant of external
finance availability.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 first provides a brief
discussion of the current and proposed methods of accounting for leases. It then reviews
three strands of literature relevant to the debate on lease-accounting reform: the preparer/
user lobbying imbalance; the quality of accounting standards; and various approaches to
the assessment of economic consequences. The section ends with the presentation of the
specific research questions addressed in the current study. Section 3 outlines the methods
employed, including sampling and data collection procedures. Resuhs are presented in
Section 4. A final section summarizes and concludes.
2. Literature
2.1. Lease accounting: extant regulations and proposals
The international leasing standard (IAS 17 "Leases") is typical ofmany extant standards
worldwide. It makes a ftindamental distinction between finance leases and operating
leases, defining 2ifinance lease as one that transfers to the lessee substantially all the risks
and rewards of ownership (lASB, 2003). It is treated as an "in substance" purchase by the
lessee and sale by the lessor. An asset is shown on the lessee's balance sheet at the present
value of the minimum lease payments and a corresponding liability is recognized. An
operating lease is any other lease. The underlying asset appears in the balance sheet of the
lessor and the lessee simply recognizes the rental payments as an expense, with additional
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footnote disclosure regarding total minimum future lease-rental commitments, with this
commitment being classified into time-horizon categories (less than one year, two to five
years and more than five years).
The equivalent U.S. standard (SFAS 13), which uses the term "capital lease" rather than
"finance lease," introduces "bright lines" into lease classification. It defines a capital lease
as one under which any one of the following four conditions is met: (i) the present value at
the beginning of the lease term of the payments not representing executory costs paid by
the lessor equals or exceeds 90% of the fair value of the leased asset; (ii) the lease transfers
ownership of the asset to the lessee by the end of the lease term; (iii) the lease contains a
bargain purchase price; (iv) the lease is equal to 75% or more of the estimated economic
life of the leased asset (FASB, 1976). The U.K. standard (SSAP 21) also includes a bright
line classification test. Under SSAP 21, a lease is presumed to be a fmance lease if the
present value of the minimum lease payments at the inception of the lease amount to
substantially all (normally 90%) or more) of the fair value of the leased asset (ASC, 1984)."^
Bright-line rules such as these found in the U.S. and U.K. standards carry the danger of
creative compliance (i.e., the use of rules to escape control without actually violating those
rules). "Formalism" in standard setting implies a narrow approach to control (i.e., the use
of clearly defined rules), whereas "anti-formalism" involves the use of principles
(McBamet & Whelan, 1991, 1992, 1999).
In 1996, the G4+1 pubhshed a special report entitled "Accounting for leases: A new
approach" (McGregor, 1996). Three. fundamental deficiencies in existing lease-accounting
standards were identified. First, material assets and liabilities arising firom "off-balance-
sheef ' operating-lease contracts are omitted. Second, similar transactions do not receive the
same accounting treatment since marginal differences in contractual terms can result in one
lease being claimed as a finance lease and another as an operating lease. This illustrates the
weakness of so-called "bright line" standards. Third, the "all or nothing" approach to the
capitalization of leased assets does not adequately reflect modem complex transactions. A
conceptual approach to lease accounting is advocated, whereby the distinction between
finance leases and operating leases is removed. Lessees would recognize as assets and
liabilities all material rights and obligations arising under lease contracts.
Three years later, the 04+ 1 organizations published a discussion paper "Leases:
implementation of a new approach," which develops the approach recommended in the
special report (ASB, 1999). It reiterates the view that all leases should be reflected in
financial statements in a consistent manner and it explores the principles that should
determine the extent of the assets and liabilities to be recognized by lessees and lessors.
The discussion paper recommends that, at the beginning of a lease, the lessee recognizes
an asset and a liability equivalent to the fair value of the rights and obligations that are
conveyed by the lease. This is usually the present value of the minimum payments
required by the lease. Subsequently, the lease asset and liability would be treated as fixed
^ Under SFAS 13, the total minimum future operating-lease rentals are shown separately for each of the first
five years and combined thereafter Under SSAP 21, it is only the next year's (rather than total) minimum fiiture
operating-lease rentals that must be disclosed, analyzed according to the period in which the annual commitment
expires (less than one year, two to five years, and more than five years). This is fiirther analyzed by asset category
("land and buildings" and "other assets").
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assets and debt. The other party to the transaction, the lessor, would report financial assets
(representing amounts receivable from the lessee) and residual interests (if any) as separate
assets. Although lease contracts often include features such as renewal options, contingent
rentals, and residual value guarantees, the discussion paper considers ways of dealing with
these and other features. Essentially, the paper calls for the capitalization of the measurable
future benefits and obligations for all lease transactions.
Looking forward, it seems clear that the international convergence of accounting
standards is going to happen. A change in one standard is likely to impact on the standards
for other jurisdictions. The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) for listed companies in the European Union occurred in 2005 (with limited
exceptions). In the United Kingdom, the ASB has stated, in its consultation paper on U.K.
convergence, that it will not replace SSAP 21 with a standard based on IFRS requirements
until the lASB completes its leasing project (although in the short term it does propose to
adopt IAS 17 disclosure requirements). In the US, FASB agreed with the lASB to work
towards the convergence of United States GAAP and IFRS at a joint meeting in 2002
(Schipper, 2005).
2.2. The preparer/user lobbying imbalance
In recent years, there has been increasing recognition that users' views regarding
accounting standards are seriously under-represented. Collins et al. (1996) report that only
14 of the 104 letters of comment to the U.K. ASB regarding the OFR discussion paper
were from users, and suggest that this imbalance must be remedied by seeking out users'
views explicitly. Jonas and Young (1998) argue that quality in business reporting is being
undermined by the systemic problem of insufficient user focus in the process of setting
reporting standards. One of the explanations they offer for the under-representation is that
the professional background of standard setters tends to be as preparers/auditors rather
than users, making it difficult for them to "bridge the gap." More recently, the chairman of
the U.S. standard-setting body (FASB) has suggested that it may be overly influenced by
the preparer and auditor communities, identifying the low level of involvement by users as
a challenge for the FASB (Herz, 2003).
Academic studies that survey attitudes to accounting standards have generally targeted
preparers as the respondent group and have been conducted ex post. For example, Hooks
and van Staden (2004) survey preparers in New Zealand to elicit their views on FRS 1
5
"Provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets." Joshi and Ramadhan (2002)
survey Bahrainian preparers on issues surrounding lASs. Nixon (1997) surveys U.K.
preparers' views on SSAP 13 (revised) "Accounting for research and developmenf and an
alternative suggested treatment whereby more expenditure would be capitalized. It is
notable that views are also elicited regarding the economic consequences of expensing
R&D. Reither (1998) surveys participants at the 1996 AAA/FASB Financial Reporting
Issues Conference to establish which standards were viewed as the best and the worst."^
The pre-conference questionnaire was completed by 57 participants (33 academics, 12 FASB employees,
seven public accountants, three analysts, and two regulators).
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User surveys have tended to address user needs in terms of the importance of specific
information items, whether currently reported or not (for a recent example, see Beattie &
Pratt, 2002). Yap (1997) is one of the few studies to investigate users' attitudes to a
particular extant standard, specifically the Australian standard on cash flow statements.
Dunne et al. (2003) interview users and preparers about FRS 13 "Derivatives and other
financial instruments— disclosures." There is, however, a dearth of academic research that
surveys users' views on specific proposals for regulatory reform.
The need for such research is fiirther indicated by the fact that, of the 59 formal
responses to the G4+1 discussion paper received by the ASB, just three (5%) were from
users or user groups. Based on another simple measure (number of pages of response),
users contributed just 7% of the overall response. Since recent research suggests that the
level of other forms of lobbying is highly correlated with the use of formal comment letters
(Georgiou, 2004), the absolute differential between the overall level of preparers and users
lobbying could be huge.
2.3. Quality of accounting standards
The former chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has identified
high quality standards as critical to financial reporting, going on to explain that "they must
result in comparability and transparency, and they must provide for full disclosure" (Levitt,
1998, p. 81). Following this, Accounting Horizons published six commentaries, from
senior representatives of a range of constituencies, on the attributes of high quality
accounting standards (Imhoff, 1998). Interestingly, in Reither's (1998) survey, SPAS 13
"Leases" was voted the worst standard. Explanations given included the following: many
obligations that, in substance, are capital, sales-type, or direct financing leases are shown
as operating leases; conceptually and operationally an accounting nightmare; bright-line
rules for lease capitalization result in abuse; and too complicated.
Collins, Pasewark, and Strawser (2002) link empirically the normative qualities
reflected in the commentaries with the actual judgments of constituents. Using content
analysis, they identify 16 unique characteristics. The particular characteristics of SFAS 13
that led it to be considered the worst standard were found to be lack of economic reality,
lack of clarity, lack of implementation guidance, and the need for frequent amendment.
2.4. Economic consequences
For over two decades, economic-consequence arguments have been used by lobbying
groups. Economic consequences arise when changes in the information set reported affects
a company's cash flows or its distribution (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983). This can occur
in two ways. First, there may be changes in either the behavior of users or the behavior of
managers. The latter includes actions to mitigate the expected impact on users, a situation
known as "information inductance" (Prakash & Rappaport, 1977). Second, the company's
formal or informal contracts may be affected. The identification and measurement of
economic consequences are, however, problematic. Researchers have used four different
empirical methods: the analysis of archival accounting data; market-based studies;
experimental studies, and surveys.
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First, the archival method either compares the accounting numbers before and after a
change in the accounting rules (an ex post study) or constructs pro-forma accounting
statements based on proposed rule changes and compares these with the statements
under extant rules (an ex ante study). In an early ex post study, Abdel-khalik (1981)
found that company management responded to the introduction of SFAS 13 by
structuring new lease contracts, and renegotiating existing lease contracts, to avoid
capitalization of leases. There was evidence that more assets were bought, or
constructed, instead of being leased and also evidence of changes in capital structure.
Imhoff and Thomas (1988) also examined capital-structure changes in response to SFAS
13, documenting a systematic substitution from finance (capital) leases to operating
leases and non-lease sources of finance. In an Australian study, Godfrey and Warren
(1995) found a similar substitution effect. However, in contrast with the United States,
companies did not appear to have renegotiated finance-lease contracts to operating
leases. In the United Kingdom, Garrod (1989) found that managers reacted to the
introduction of SSAP 21 by reducing their non-lease debt prior to first disclosure of their
lease information.
There are also several ex ante studies based on accounting numbers, specifically
accounting ratios that are used as key performance indicators. Nelson (1963) examined
the impact of lease capitalization on the debt-equity ratio of 11 U.S. companies, finding
a significant change in the rankings. Ashton (1985) estimated the effect of finance-lease
capitalization on six ratios for 23 U.K. companies, finding a significant impact only on
the gearing ratio. More recent studies focus on the impact of operating-lease
capitalization. Imhoff et al. (1991) develop a method for the constructive capitalization
of operating leases, using this to estimate the impact on two ratios (return on assets and
debt-equity ratio) for 14 U.S. companies. Material differences are found for both high-
and low-use operating-lease companies. A subsequent paper found the income effects to
be substantial and unpredictable in direction (Imhoff, Lipe, & Wright, 1997). Beattie et
al. (1998) and Goodacre (2003) analyze U.K. data using the Imhoff et al. (1991)
method, adapted to suit the U.K. setting. Both studies examine nine ratios: profit margin,
three return ratios, asset turnover and four gearing measures. Beattie et al.'s (1998)
findings, based on 1994 data for 232 industrial and commercial companies, show a
significant impact for all ratios except retum on capital employed and interest cover. One
gearing measure showed a massive 260% change following capitalization. The findings
for the 102 companies in the retail sector were even more marked, with all nine ratios
showing a significant change (Goodacre, 2003). Dresdner Kleinwort Benson (1998)
examine the impact of operating-lease capitalization on 27 large U.K. retail companies,
using a simple multiple of annual operating-lease rental obligations. It is reported that
"net debt would be in excess of 100% of equity market capitalization in many cases."
With the exception of Ashton (1985), which may be subject to sample-selection bias, all
studies reported significant impacts on ratios. However the major impact is upon risk
measures, rather than performance measures.
Second, market-based studies are confined to the ex post study of rule changes,
although it can be difficult to separate the impact of the event of interest from that of
other confounding events. There is mixed evidence of market-price reaction to lease-
accounting information, and this derives from tests using rather old data (El-Gazzar,
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1993; Garrod, 1989; Ro, 1978). There is also little evidence of an impact on market-
based risk measures (Abdel-khalik, 1981; Finnerty, Fitzsimmons, & Oliver, 1980). Other
market-based studies report quite strong evidence that the market already incorporates
footnote operating-lease disclosures in its assessment of equity risk in both the U.K.
(Beattie, Goodacre, & Thomson, 2000) and the U.S. (Bowman, 1980; Ely, 1995; Imhoff,
Lipe, & Wright, 1993).^
Third, experimental studies explore how individual users process lease-accounting
information, in particular, whether they appear to be influenced by whether the
information is recognized in the financial statements or merely disclosed in the footnotes
to the accounts. The evidence is, however, very mixed (Breton & Taffler, 1995; Hartman
& Sami, 1989; Gopalakrishnan & Parkash, 1996; Munter & Ratcliffe, 1983; Wilkins,
1984; Wilkins & Zimmer, 1983a,b).
Survey research may also be used to evaluate the impact of rule changes. Surveys can
investigate, both ex post and ex ante, the perceptions of a range of interested groups and
explore the attitudes and views that underpin changes in behavior. We are aware of only
two other surveys of lease-accounting rules. Taylor and Turley (1985) investigated the
opinions of U.K. preparers on lease accounting following ED29, the exposure draft that
preceded SSAP 21. They found that only a minority of managers believed that intemal
financing or investment decisions would be significantly affected by the proposed
accounting standard. However, managers believed that users' decisions, including risk
assessment, were likely to be affected, suggesting that managers' behavior could be
influenced by information inductance. Managers also anticipated that fiiture lease
contracts would be structured as operating leases to avoid capitalization.^ Blake, Salas,
and Clarke (1995) surveyed a sample comprising participants attending a management-
development course in Spain (including preparers of accounts and bank analysts). Spanish
accounting rules have a more restrictive definition of a finance lease than found elsewhere,
requiring that a purchase option exist. The brief questionnaire was limited to several yes/
no questions. Preparers generally felt that the finance lease-accounting rules would result
in operating leases becoming more attractive and that all leases should be accounted for as
rental agreements. Bank analysts, however, did not feel that leasing activity would
diminish, and a third felt that the definition of a finance lease should be expanded to
include some agreements currently classified as operating.
2.5. Research questions
The accounting-standards-quality literature suggests three broad issues to explore with
interested parties: (i) views on the current accounting standard and on the G4+1 proposals
for change; (ii) views regarding a range of potential economic consequences; and (iii)
factors that may explain the views held.
^ Further, there is evidence that at least some investment analysts and credit-rating agencies recast financial
statements by calculating the assets and liabilities implicit in off-balance-sheet operating leases (e.g., Dresdner
Kleinwort Benson, 1998).
'' A similar response was reported by Drury and Braund (1990) in their (post-SSAP 21) general survey of the
leasing decision.
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3. Methods
3.1. Sample selection
The sample of account preparers was based on the population of industrial and
commercial U.K. listed companies. Industrial and commercial companies were selected
on the basis that the majority of their leasing activity is conducted as lessees (financial
companies were excluded on the basis that the majority of their leasing activity is
conducted as lessors). Listed companies were selected on the basis of their economic
significance. The sampling frame used was the UKQI (U.K. quoted industrials) list on
Datastream in June 2000. The questionnaire was sent to finance directors of a
systematic sample of one-third (415) of this population. The survey of users was
designed to focus on expert users (equity analysts) and to cover both sell-side and buy-
side analysts. The user sample was drawn from two sources. First, a systematic sample
of 400 financial analysts was selected from a mailing list of the London-based associate
members (totaling 1640) of the U.K. Society of Investment Professionals. A further
sample of 72 was taken from a listing of leading frind-management firms published in
CA Magazine (1999).
3.2. Questionnaire design and administration procedures
The first stage in designing the questionnaire was to review the (fairly limited)
theoretical and empirical literature in the area, including previous surveys. This, together
with the ASB (1999) discussion paper, was used to produce a draft questionnaire that was
sent out for pilot testing. The draft questionnaire, accompanied by a covering letter, a set of
pilot-testing questions and a summary of the new proposals for lease accounting, was
mailed to 13 preparers and key contacts. The pilot questions asked about subject matter,
length, layout, instructions for completion, and question ordering. Usefiil comments were
received from several finance directors, the ASB, and the Finance and Leasing Association
and the questionnaire content and terminology was revised accordingly. The questionnaire
generally used closed-form questions and adopted a five-point Likert scale with verbal
anchors. In total, the questionnaire was eight pages long (including covers) and asked for
responses to 76 question elements. It was mailed out in 2000 (preparers) and 2001 (users),
accompanied by an explanatory covering letter that assured the confidentiality of
responses and a one-page summary of the G4+1 proposals. Many standard response-
enhancing techniques were adopted: clear questionnaire layout; piloting; covering letter
addressed to a specific, named individual (all finance director details were individually
checked by telephone); covering letters signed individually by researchers; follow-up
letters sent approximately 10 and 20 days after the initial request;^ stamped reply
envelopes (rather than reply-paid envelopes); non-respondents asked to return the
questionnaire.
^ Each questionnaire contained an identifying number to allow non-respondents to be followed up; thus the
responses were confidential but not anonymous.
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3.3. Background characteristics affecting respondents ' views
In most circumstances, more weight is attached to opinions expressed by knowledge-
able individuals. Given the technical, somewhat specialized, nature of lease accounting, it
was considered important to check whether the mean response reflects the opinions of
those who understand the technicalities. The impact of respondents' self-reported
familiarity with the lease-accounting proposals on views held was investigated for both
groups, by splitting them into "familiar^' and "less-familiar" sub-groups.^
It could be argued that companies with high levels of lease usage will anticipate a greater
impact on their financial statements and more significant economic consequences under the
G4+1 proposals. To investigate this, the companies of preparer respondents were split into
high and low operating-lease usage groups based on whether the ratio of operating-lease
rentals/sales fell above and below the median level, respectively.
Preparer responses might also be associated with company size, since large and small
companies typically have different financing mixes (Bevan & Danbolt, 2002; Lasfer &
Levis, 1998), different negotiating power, and different administrative capabilities.
Responding companies were split into large and small sub-groups based on median total-
asset value.^
4. Results
After describing response rates and tests for bias, respondents' views are described
under seven headings: accounting standards generally; deficiencies in the current lease-
accounting standard; general principles of the new proposals; specific issues; economic
consequences; lease-accounting alternatives; and implementation. In some instances, we
posed the same basic question in different ways, to guard against sensitivity to question
wording. Where essentially the same responses were obtained, only one form of the
question is reported here. Some tables are presented using the logical question order
appearing in the questionnaire, while others are ranked based on users' responses.
Significant differences (at the 5% level) in response associated with the three background
characteristics identified as being of potential relevance (familiarity with the proposals,
lease usage, and company size) are reported at the end of each sub-section.'^
4.1. Response rates and tests for bias
For the preparer group, 78 usable responses were received representing a response rate
of 19%. An additional 13 responses were received fi^om those who requested a copy of the
Respondents were asked to self-assess their level of familiarity with the new lease-accounting proposals by
selecting one of four categories. The categories "very familiar" and "moderately familiar" were subsequently
combined to form the "familiar" sub-group, while the categories "slightly familiar" and "not at all familiar" were
combined to form the "less-familiar" sub-group.
Data for these additional tests were all extracted from Datastream.
'" Selected key findings are summarized in a practitioner-oriented report published by the ICAEW that
overviews a range of studies in the area of leasing (Beattie et al., 2004).
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questionnaire when replying to a questionnaire on a related topic' \ giving a total of 91
usable responses. For the user group, 41 usable replies were received representing a
response rate of 9%. These rates are in line with other recent studies involving similar
groups (see Beattie & Pratt, 2003, note 13, for a discussion). Given that non-response is a
significant, and increasing, problem in the survey method, relatively large initial samples
were used to provide a satisfactory absolute number of responses to support meaningful
statistical analysis. The reasons given for non-completion suggest that the technical
complexity of the lease-accounting issue was a significant factor for the user group.'"
Three tests for response bias were performed, two relating only to the preparer group
and the third relating to both respondent groups.'^ First, responding preparer companies
were compared with the population of UKQI companies on the basis of size (measured as
total assets); a 2-tail /-test confirmed no difference between the sample and population
means, even at the 10% significance level. Second, responding companies were formed
into seven broad industrial groups and a chi-squared test, goodness-of-fit, confirmed that
the sample companies were distributed similarly to companies in the UKQI population
(chi-squared = 5.92; /? = 0.4321).
Finally, the responses of early responders were compared to those of late responders for
both groups, on the assumption that late responders are similar to non-responders
(Oppenheim, 1966).''* As there were no particularly "key" questions in the questionnaire, a
series of tests (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney) was conducted for each of the 74 closed-form
question elements. For the preparer group, no significant differences were observed. For
the user group, only six differences were observed out of 74, which is not indicative of any
systematic difference between the early and late respondents.
A further factor that can affect the validity of responses is the suitability of individual
respondents, in terms of knowledge about the issues under investigation. For the preparer
group, virtually all of the respondents were senior financial personnel likely to be
knowledgeable about the lease-accounting issue. All of the investment analysts were either
active professionally qualified (IIMR members) or active senior fund management
personnel, so are likely to be representative of expert investment professional users. There
were, however, significant differences between the groups' declared familiarity with the
lease-accounting proposals, with 65% of the preparer group "moderately" or "very"
familiar with the new proposals compared with only 34% of the user group (difference
significant at the 1% level).
A questionnaire investigating "leasing and coqjorate financing decisions" was sent out over a similar time
period to the remaining two-thirds of the UKQI (U.K. quoted industrials) population. Respondents to this survey
were invited to request the "lease-accounting reform" questionnaire and 13 requested and completed the
questionnaire.
'" Including 136 negative responses from the investment analysts, the overall response rate was 38%.
Interestingly, the major reasons for negative response were insufficient knowledge of lease accounting (47%) and
lack of time/too busy (40%).
' These tests suffer from a number of well-known limitations; see Wallace and Mellor (1988) and Wallace and
Cooke (1990) for discussions.
Responses were classified into three approximately equal-sized groups (early, middle, and late), according to
the date that their completed questionnaire was received.
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4.2. Accounting standards generally
Respondents' views on lease-accounting reform may be conditioned by their opinion of
accounting standards in general (Taylor & Turley, 1985). Opinions on accounting
standards are, therefore, reported in Table 1, panel A. The general need for accounting
standards is almost universally supported, however preparers are, not surprisingly, more
aware of the compliance burden.*^ It appears, therefore, that the responses to questions
concerning lease accounting are unlikely to be colored by a disagreement with accounting
standards in general. Any difference in the perceived burden imposed on companies
arising from the existing standard and the new proposals could, however, be an issue.
Unsurprisingly, there were no significant differences in response associated with
familiarity, operating-lease usage, or company size.
4.3. Deficiencies in current lease-accounting standards
In the development of high quality accounting standards, new proposals should, in
addition to possessing certain other attributes, address a current deficiency (Imhoff, 1998).
Respondents' agreement with ten suggested deficiencies of SSAP 21, taken mainly from
the G4+1 special report, are shown in Table 1, panel B, in descending order of agreement
by the user group. Most of the deficiencies also apply to IAS 17, however the questions in
rows 1 and 3 relate specifically to the existence of a bright line in relation to lease
classification.
Both groups agreed that the current standard was open to manipulation, lacked
uniformity, did not portray the substance of fransactions, was incomplete, inconsistent and
lacked clarity (rows 1-5; 8, 9). It is of note that while users did believe that their decision
making was impaired by these deficiencies, preparers did not (rows 6, 7, 10). The user
group also felt significantly more strongly than the preparer group about the difficulty of
estimating the balance-sheet impact of operating leases (row 2), and was more concerned
about the subjectivity of lease classification (row 10).
The primary deficiency of SSAP 21 identified by both groups (that lease fransactions
could be deliberately structured for classification as operating leases — row 1) was
recognized more keenly by "familial^' preparers ("familiar" group mean =4.26; "less
familiar" group mean = 3.82). There were no other significant differences.
4.4. Lease-accounting proposals: general principles
The approach in the G4+1 discussion paper is grounded in the definitions of assets and
liabilities and seeks to improve information for users' decision making. The general
'^ Opinion varies regarding whether it is better to use parametric or non-parametric statistical tests on responses
from Likert-type scales. Strictly, a Likert scale is not an interval scale and so the more conservative non-
parametric tests should be used. In practice, however, the results of both forms of tests are very similar and so the
more familiar and tractable parametric versions are commonly used. Studies involving Likert scales that use
parametric tests include Bebbington, Gray, Thomson, and Walters (1994), Yap (1997), and Hermanson (2000),
while Deegan and Rankin (1999) use non-parametric tests exclusively.
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Table 2
Views on the general principles in the G4+1 lease-accounting proposals
Question asked (abbreviated)'^ No. of responses^ Mean"'^ (std. dev.) Difference^
Users Preparers Users Preparers
To what extent do you agree with the following principles in the proposed approach to lease accounting?
1. One accounting method should be 39 89 3.72*** (1.07) 3.32*** (1.25) ns
applicable to all leasing transactions
2. A lease-accounting method should apply 39 88 3.74*** (1.02) 3.07 (1.27) 0.01
to all types of tangible assets, including
land and buildings
3. A lease-accounting method should be 39 86 3.33** (0.96) 3.01(1.13) ns
equally applicable to leases of intangible
and tangible assets
4. All wa/ena/ leases should give rise to an 40 89 3.95*** (0.81) 3.27** (1.23) 0.01
asset and liability on the lessee's
balance sheet
5. A lease-accounting method should not 36 88 3.67*** (0.86) 2.96 (1.15) 0.01
contain a threshold to exclude short leases;
this should be addressed by the concept
of materiality
Notes: see Table 1.
principles focus on recognizing the substance of leasing transactions and the application of
uniform methods across all leases. Respondents were asked the extent of their agreement
with these general normative principles and their views are summarized in Table 2. Row 1
deals with the general principle that there should be one accounting method for all leasing
transactions. This is amplified to confirm that the method should apply to land and
buildings and to intangible assets (rows 2-3). The final two rows focus on whether a de
minimis threshold should apply to leases or whether the general concept of materiality is
sufficient.
The user group was in favor of all of these general principles. However, the preparer
group was far less positive, on average, and exhibited high variability. There was relatively
moderate agreement, on average, with just two of the principles (rows 1 and 4). Thus,
while recognizing the deficiencies of SSAP 21, preparers were not particularly supportive
of the general principles of reform. This could stem from opposition to the G4+1 proposals
per se, or aversion to any form of change, a manifestation of the status quo bias
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Moreover, opposition to the G4+1 proposals could arise
either from opposition to the conceptual basis of the principles or from expected adverse
economic consequences for their companies should the new proposals form the basis of a
new lease-accounting standard.
There was only one significant difference associated with background characteristics.
Preparers in companies with low lease usage favored the application of a single method
to all tangible assets, including land and buildings (mean = 3.44), whereas those in
companies with high operating-lease usage opposed this (mean = 2.68). Perhaps
preparers with few property leases are more concerned with administrative simplicity
than balance-sheet impact (and vice versa for those with high exposure to property
leases).
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4.5. Lease-accounting proposals: specific issues
While high quahty accounting standards should preferably be based on concepts rather
than arbitrary rules, supplementary rules are usually necessary to limit alternatives and
ensure consistency of application. The G4+1 discussion paper considers and recommends
ways of dealing with some of the complexities of lease contracts, specifically the treatment
of renewal options, contingent rentals, and rentals that vary in line with prices.
4.5.1. Renewal options
There are two main differences between SSAP 21 and the G4+1 proposals. Under
SSAP 21, a renewal option (if reasonably likely to be exercised) is included in determining
the lease term for classifying agreements as finance or operating leases. For a finance lease
in which the exercise of a renewal option is reasonably certain, the present value of lease
rentals payable in the initial period and the renewal period would generally appear on the
balance sheet. While the G4+1 proposals would require the present value of all material
lease agreements to be recorded on the balance sheet, they suggest that renewal options
should not be anticipated.^^ Thus, only the present value of rentals payable in the initial
period would appear on the balance sheet and hence shorter guaranteed terms could
actually reduce balance-sheet obligations for leases that are currently classified as finance
leases.
Second, SSAP 21 makes no distinction between the renewal option and the value of the
right to use the asset, whereas the 04+ 1 document proposes that the two should be
recorded separately on the balance sheet, to highlight the flexibility of different lease-
agreement arrangements. It is proposed that option values could be ascertained through
direct comparison with similar lease agreements without options.
Table 3, panel A provides a summary of responses conceming renewal options. Both
groups are neutral regarding the benchmark SSAP 21 treatment (row 1). Preparers' views
regarding the new proposals are both stronger and significantly different fi^om those of
users, with preparers agreeing that renewal options should not be anticipated but
disagreeing that options should be recorded separately. The latter view may arise from the
perceived difficulties of valuing the option. Preparers do not think that option values can
be established by comparison with similar agreements; users are neutral. However, both
groups envisage significant compliance costs (especially preparers) and the negotiation of
shorter initial lease terms. The technical complexity of the treatment of renewal options
may be contributing to the general neutrality (uncertainty) of the user group.
There were two significant differences relating to background characteristics. First,
although both the high and low operating-lease usage sub-groups agreed that the exercise
of renewal options should not be anticipated, high users were in stronger agreement
(mean =3.91 (high); 3.49 (low); row 2). Second, while preparers were neutral, on average,
to the recording of renewal option assets and liabilities at the start of the lease, small
'^ The use of "break clauses" is more common in the U.K. commercial property market than "renewal options"
but the effect is very similar. These break clauses can be used to give the lessee an option to exit the lease contract
at various stages during the contract (e.g., every five years). It is, in effect, an option to "not renew."
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company preparers were against the suggestion (mean = 2.54 (small); mean=3.05 (large);
row 1).
4.5.2. Contingent centals
Under SSAP 21, lease rentals contingent on asset usage or lessee revenues/profits are
not included in the minimum lease payments used for lease classification, nor are they
included in the capitalized value of finance leases recorded in the balance sheet.
Similarly, under the G4+1 proposals, contingent rentals based on asset usage would not
generally be anticipated but would be charged as an expense when the contingency
arises. An exception to this general rule would be when the minimum lease payments
are unrepresentative of the value of property rights conveyed, in which case a greater
amount reflecting the value of such rights would be recognized. It is expected that this
exception would be the norm in the case of contingent rentals based on lessee revenues
or profits (para. 4.67). The proposals suggest that the value of property rights conveyed
by a lease agreement with contingent rentals might be determined by comparison with
lease payments for a similar agreement without contingent rentals. Respondents' views
are shown in Table 3, panel B.
Only preparers agreed with the G4+1 proposal that contingent rentals generally should
not be recognized on the balance sheet (row 1 ), and disagreed with the opposing view that
estimated contingent rentals should be recorded on the balance sheet (row 2). Users were
neutral to both options, on average, although there was wide dispersion in views. Both
groups were neutral to the "unrepresentativeness" exception to the non-recognition rule
(row 3). This may reflect the difficulty associated with estimation of fair value, as
preparers in particular did not believe that the G4+1 method of comparison with non-
contingent agreements is valid (rows 4 and 5). These results suggest that the difficulties
associated with estimating the value of future contingent rentals contribute to the view that
contingent rentals should not be recognized on the balance sheet. There were no
significant differences relating to background characteristics.
4.5.3. Rentals that vary in line with prices (e.g., upwards-only rent reviews on leased land
and buildings)
70% of property (real estate) leases in the U.K. granted in 2002-03 contain a five-
yearly review (BPF IPD, 2003). Under SSAP 21, any associated variation in lease rentals
is not anticipated at the beginning of the lease term, but treated as an increase/decrease in
liability in the period in which the price change occurs. The G4+1 consensus is that the
likely iliture price changes should be estimated at the start of the lease contract and
incorporated in the calculation of the present value of minimum lease payments, to ensure
that the difference in values for lease agreements with and without rent reviews is not
misleading. However, the ASB dissented from this view on the grounds that estimates of
future price increases would be unreliable. Respondents' views are shown in Table 3,
panel C.
Users' views were widely dispersed though, on average, neutral. Preparers agreed with
the SSAP 21 treatment (row 1) and disagreed with the alternative G4+1 proposal (row 2).
The perceived unreliability of estimating fiiture price rises seems to be a major reason for
this view (row 3).
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In relation to background characteristics, familiarity had a significant impact on views,
with those who best appreciate the issue (i.e. respondents "familial^' with lease accounting)
having stronger views. In particular, "familiar^' users disagreed with recognition based only
on rentals at the beginning of the lease whereas "less familiar^' users agreed ("familiar"
group mean = 2.50; "less familiar" group mean = 3.40; row 1). Thus, the views of "familiar"
users were diametrically opposed to the views of all preparers (preparer mean = 3.71). In
addition, "familiar" preparers strongly disagreed with recognizing rental estimates
("familiar" group mean = 2.36; "less familiar" group mean = 2.83; row 2). This differ-
entiates the views of this preparer sub-group even more from the views of all users (user
mean = 3.00).
4.6. Economic consequences
Potential economic consequences were identified from the G4+1 discussion paper
(ASB, 1999), from published responses to this (Finance and Leasing Association, 1999),
and from prior research (Beattie et al., 1998; Taylor & Turley, 1985). Respondents' views
were elicited using two multi-part questions, the first covering all leased assets and the
second focusing specifically on land and buildings (to deal with some consequences that
are specific to land and buildings).
4.6.]. Consequences of adopting the lease-accounting proposals: all assets
Respondent's views are shown in Table 4, panel A, in descending order of user group
agreement.
Not surprisingly, both respondent groups fiilly recognized that many operating leases
would give rise to assets and liabilities on the balance sheet (row 1) and that this would
lead to an increase in reported measures of gearing (row 2), consistent with prior empirical
research (Beattie et al., 1998).' '' Both groups also agreed that companies may need to
renegotiate borrowing covenants although preparers' level of agreement was significantly
stronger than that of users (row 6). Technical violation of accounting-based debt covenants
is costly. Beneish and Press (1993) estimate that the average costs range between 1.2% and
2% of equity market value, or between 4.4% and 7.3% of the outstanding balances of the
violated debt agreements. There were also similar levels of agreement by both groups that
credit rating would fall for some companies (row 8).
Certain consequences impact primarily on lessees/lessors. Both groups agreed that lease
terms would shorten to minimize lessees' balance-sheet obligations (row 9). This suggests
a transfer of risk to lessors from lessees, so would be of some benefit to lessee companies.
However only preparers thought that lease finance would be less atfractive (row 1 1 ),
although they were neufral about whether this would affect U.K. investment and leasing
volumes (row 16), and disagreed that new assets would be purchased (or constructed)
rather than leased (row 14). By contrast, users disagreed that investment and leasing
volumes would be affected and were neufral about the impact on purchase decisions. This
' ^ These consequences have Hkely indirect economic consequences because of the impact on matters such as
breach-of debt covenants, which affect cash flows.
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might suggest that, ahhough less attractive, lease finance would still compare favorably
with alternative sources of finance. Alternatively, it might suggest that companies don't
always have the choice between purchase/construction and leasing. The use of specific
assets may only be available in one form or the other. General comments made by the
respondents provide some indication of this being the case (for example, "the alternative to
leasing isn't always available" and "the properties we operate fi^om are only available on
lease").
Users agreed significantly more strongly than preparers that users' assessments of
companies would be improved (rows 3 and 4) if the proposals were adopted. This is
somewhat inconsistent with preparers' rejection that the current accounting standard
impairs users' assessments (Table 1). Users agreed that they would increase risk estimates,
though they were neutral that the assessment of either debt-paying ability or dividend-
paying ability would be affected (rows 5, 13 and 15). Preparers were neutral to the first
two consequences, but did think that dividend-paying ability would be adversely affected.
Users were neutral regarding the effect on administrative burdens and compliance costs,
whereas preparers agreed that these would increase significantly (rows 10 and 1 1). Finally,
users agreed that the proposals would reflect the financial flexibility of different leasing
arrangements, while preparers disagreed (row 7).
This set of responses highlights the fact that it is the economic consequences relating to
company risk (and the perception of it) that are of prime importance in the debate on lease-
accounting reform. The increase in measured levels of gearing would affect debt
covenants, lease terms, credit ratings, financing choices, and users' assessment of
company risk.
4.6.2. Consequences of adopting the lease-accounting proposals: land and buildings
The proposed new approach to lease accounting would have a major impact on
property leases (i.e., land and buildings). Under SSAP 21, such leases are generally
treated as off-balance-sheet operating leases, since the landlord lessor retains a
significant residual interest in the property. Under the G4+1 proposals, the present
value of future rentals and an estimate of fiiture increases would be recorded on the
lessee's balance sheet. The views of respondents on various potential consequences of
the new proposals being applied to the leasing of land and buildings are shown in Table
4, panel B, in descending order of user-group agreement. The question in row 7 is
reiterated in the specific context of land and buildings; the other potential consequences
are peculiar to land and buildings.
The new proposals suggest that balance-sheet recognition of the rights and obligations
to occupy leased property would enable any loss on leased property to be written-offwhen
it occurs rather than on vacation of the property, and any increase in value arising fi-om
sub-leasing at a higher rent to be shown. Both groups of respondents appear to support
these arguments (rows 1 and 2). Consistent with the general trends observed in Table 4,
panel A, the difficulty and costs involved in estimating the present value of future
property-rent increases (row 3) were not recognized by users, but were strongly identified
by preparers. The G4+1 discussion paper suggests that an estimate of the fair value of a
property lease subject to rent reviews might be obtained by comparison with a similar
property lease that was not subject to rent reviews. However, according to the Finance and
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Leasing Association (FLA) in their response to the new proposals, virtually no such leases
exist in the U.K. Preparers recognized that the combined profit and loss expense of
depreciation and interest would exceed market rent in the early years of the lease
agreement (row 4); perhaps surprisingly, users did not appreciate this fact.
The FLA suggests that rent yields may rise to reflect an increase in lessors' risk and that
it may be difficult to fund new property development without the security of long-term
tenants. On average, both groups were neutral to these possible property-market
consequences (rows 5 and 6); their views on rent yields are surprising and may not be
shared by landlords. The purchase of property instead of leasing was considered unlikely
by both groups (row 7), the views being stronger than in the case of assets generally (Table
4, panel A). Perhaps the choice to purchase specific properties is not an option, as they are
already owned by institutions or property companies who wish to retain them for renting
to tenants.
4.6.3. Background characteristics
The impact on respondent views of three background characteristics (familiarity with
the G4+1 proposals, level of company lease usage, and company size) was examined.
Seven significant differences existed. (In considering these, it should be borne in mind
that, when conducting multiple individual tests, some random differences are likely to
emerge as statistically significant.) First, although users were neutral overall to the view
that companies would find it difficult and expensive to estimate the present value of
future property-rent increases, "familiar" users disagreed ("familiar^' group mean = 2.54;
"less familial^' group mean = 3.28; panel B, row 3). The level of operating-lease usage
gave rise to two differences: the view that leasing will become less attractive was driven
by low lease-usage preparers (mean = 3. 18 (high); mean = 3. 5 7 (low); panel A, row 12),
whereas disagreement with the view that companies would buy rather than lease
property was driven by high lease-usage preparers (mean = 2.58 (high); mean = 2.97
(low); panel B, row 7). There are two possible, non-mutually exclusive, explanations for
these different opinions. First, high lease-usage companies may believe that they have
chosen lease finance for sound commercial reasons that will not be greatly affected by
the change in accounting treatment. Nevertheless, they would still prefer to keep their
leased assets, particularly land and buildings, off-balance sheet. Second, high lease-usage
companies may perceive that they are in a stronger bargaining position with lessors,
compared to low lease-usage companies. Thus, they may expect to be able to negotiate
relatively more favorable terms (such as shorter leases with renewal options or break
clauses) in response to any new accounting requirements. In other words, they expect
leasing to continue to be an attractive form of finance but would like flexibility within
any new accounting standard to enable them to minimize the impact on their financial
statements.
The remaining four significant differences concemed company size. Large companies
were more acutely aware than small companies of the need to renegotiate bond
covenants (mean=4.13 (large); 3.79 (small); panel A, row 6), perhaps because large
companies are likely to have greater exposure to securitized long-term debt (Bevan &
Danbolt, 2002; Lasfer & Levis, 1998). On the other hand, small companies showed
greater concem over the expected increase in administrative burdens (mean = 3. 8
3
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Table 5
Lease-accounting alternatives and implementation
No. of responses"* Mean""^ (std. dev.) Preparer Difference'^
rank"'
Users Preparers Users Preparers
Question asked (abbreviated)
Panel A: Alternatives
To what extent do you agree with the
following statements regarding
lease-accounting alternatives?
1. Note disclosure to be accompanied by 38
analysis of lease commitments by asset
type
2. Capitalized value of all leases 39
recorded on balance sheet with other
material aspects disclosed in a note
3. Introduction of 75% threshold in 36
fmance-lease classification
4. Current distinction between 39
finance and operating leases
should be maintained
5. Capitalized value oi all leases 39
recorded on balance sheet without
note disclosure of other material aspects
Panel B: Implementation
To what extent do you agree with the
following statements regarding
implementation of new proposals
for lease accounting?
1. Immediate implementation of proposals 39
to new and existing leases
2. Transition period with operating-lease 39
capitalization required for new leases
and disclosure of capitalized value required
for existing leases
3. Transition period with the capitalized 39
value of (new and existing) leases disclosed
and only incorporated in balance sheet
at end of transition period
4. Transition period with operating-lease 39
capitalization required for new leases only
87 3.76*** 3.75*** 1
(0.85) (0.93)
86 3.62*** 2.95 3
(0.91) (1.23)
80 2.92 2.73** 4
(0.94) (0.97)
86 2.46*** 3.05 2
(1.14) (1.23)
86 2.46*** 2.27*** 5
(0.82) (0.95)
87
3.36** 2.61*** 1
(1.01) (1.25)
2.85 2.52*** 4
(0.99) (1.14)
2.72 2.56*** 2
(1.02) (1.12)
2.54*** 2.55*** 3
(0.97) (1.19)
0.01
0.05
0.01
Notes: see Table 1.
(small); 3.42 (large); panel A, row 10) and compliance costs (mean = 3.86 (small); 3.51
(large); Table 4, panel A, row 11). Presumably, small companies have a smaller
administrative team over which to spread such matters.
Further, large companies agreed more strongly that lease terms would shorten
(mean = 3.62 (large); mean = 3. 15 (small); panel A, row 9), presumably reflecting the
relative bargaining power that large firms have in contract negotiations. Finally, large
companies tended to agree that "companies would be reluctant to enter long property
leases making it difficult to fund new property development" in contrast to small
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companies who disagreed (mean = 3.37 (large); mean = 2.77 (small); panel B, row 8). This
may reflect large company views on the first, rather than the second, part of the statement.
There is anecdotal evidence that companies may wish to negotiate shorter lease contracts
for commercial rather than accounting reasons. Large companies may find this easier to
accomplish than small companies in view of their stronger negotiating position.
4. 7. Lease-accounting alternatives
The UK Finance and Leasing Association suggested an "improved" version of SSAP 2
1
in which the arbitrary 90% classification test for finance leases ofSSAP 2 1 would be reduced
to 75%. They argue that this would bring the vast majority of U.K. operating leases onto the
balance sheet while retaining the existing principles that are widely understood. The SSAP
21 and G4+1 treatments are also included to serve as benchmarks. We also asked about
increased footnote disclosure and fiiU capitalization without any additional disclosure.
Responses are shown in Table 5, panel A, in descending order of user agreement.
Users agreed with the G4+1 treatment, disagreed with the SSAP 21 treatment, and were
neutral to changing the classification threshold (rows 2~4). Both groups agreed that lease
commitments should be analyzed by asset type, as already practiced in the U.K., but not in
all countries (row 1). On the other hand, both groups disagreed with the suggestion that
capitalization made additional disclosure unnecessary (row 5). Although users were
neutral overall to the 75% threshold alternative, "familial^' users disagreed ("familial^'
group mean = 2.50; "less familiar" group mean = 3.13; panel A, row 2).
4.8. Implementation of the lease-accounting proposals
Respondents were asked their opinion on four alternatives for implementing the new
proposals — immediate implementation for all leases and three different transition
arrangements. Responses are summarized in Table 5, panel B.
Users favored immediate implementation to new and existing leases (row 1),
perhaps to minimize the disruption and uncertainty associated with multiple change
points and also to benefit immediately from the improved information. They disagreed
with the suggestion of a transition period in which operating-lease capitalization would
be required for new leases only (row 4) and were neutral about disclosure of
capitalized values. Preparers disagreed with all four alternatives, although this may
simply reflect their disagreement with the general principles of the proposals. Preparers'
views varied highly, however. There were no significant differences relating to
background characteristics.
5. Summary and conclusions
This paper reports the findings from a questionnaire survey of U.K. users and preparers
regarding lease-accounting reform. In common with all research methods, the survey
method used in the present study suffers from a number of limitations that must be borne
in mind when evaluating the results. There are three principal potential limitations: (i) non-
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response bias, which can mean that the findings are not generahzable to the population of
interest; (ii) uninformed respondent bias, which means that the respondent does not
possess the appropriate knowledge or experience to answer the questions posed; and (iii)
the risk that respondents do not answer with complete honestly. A further limitation of the
study is that, as respondents were confined to U.K. subjects, the results cannot be
generalized beyond the U.K., especially where there are significant institutional differ-
ences. One might speculate, for example, that the views of users in less active capital
markets to that in the U.K. (and U.S.) would differ less from those of preparers. The extent
of variation in the views of users and preparers across countries is also of interest.'^
Further research conducted in other jurisdictions could usefully be undertaken to
investigate these issues.
This survey has shown that the current U.K. lease-accounting standard, which is
representative of many extant lease standards worldwide in key respects, is recognized as
deficient in a number of respects by both users and preparers, thereby failing to meet the
criteria for a high quality accounting standard. In particular, they agreed that it allows
transactions to be deliberately structured for classification as off-balance-sheet operating
leases, thereby enabling similar transactions to be accounted for in different ways.
However, preparers did not believe that this impaired various user decisions.
Expert users were strongly in favor of the general principles in the G4+1 proposals.
However, preparers were far less positive, showing only moderate support for just two
of the principles (that all material leases should be recognized on the lessee's balance
sheet and that one accounting method should apply to all lease transactions). The G4+1
discussion paper makes specific proposals for the treatment of renewal options,
contingent rentals, and rentals that vary in line with prices. While the views of users
were generally neutral, preparers were against the proposals, instead favoring the
treatment of these issues in the current standard. The main arguments against the
detailed proposals seemed to be based on cost-benefit considerations and concerns about
their operationality. Given that the preparers (companies) initially bear the costs and
users (analysts and others) are more likely to reap the direct benefits from improved
financial information, the differing responses from preparers and users are understand-
able. The attitude of preparers is entirely consistent with the arguments put forward by
Parfet (2000) who suggests that accounting standards "are overhead, not something a
customer consumes and will pay for" (p. 483). Consequently, business responds toward
new accounting rules with a "healthy negative bias," which is "one of the healthy checks
and balances in the great standard-setting system we have" (p. 483; p. 484). However,
preparers' expressed views may ignore any potential, indirect, long-term benefits that
companies may enjoy from improved user/market confidence as a result of the improved
information (e.g., reduced costs of finance). Accounting standard setters act as arbiter
between those who might benefit from the improved information and those who will
incur the costs of providing the information.
Another challenge faced by accounting standard setters is to identify the economic
consequences that may result from a change in accounting standards, estimate their
We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these points to us.
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magnitude, and then take them into account. The current paper contributes by asking
key interested parties what they beheve will be the consequences if the G4+1 proposals
are adopted. There was clear acceptance by both users and preparers that additional
assets and liabilities would be brought on to the balance sheet under the new proposals
and that this would impact on reported gearing. This was considered likely to lead to: re-
negotiation of borrowing covenants; a reduction in credit ratings for some companies;
improved users' evaluation of long-term financial commitments; and improved company
comparisons. Additional compliance costs and administrative burdens relating to lease
accounting were anticipated by preparers (particularly from smaller companies), but not
by users.
Both groups believed that lease terms would become shorter to minimize balance-sheet
obligations and some preparers (fi^om low operating-lease usage companies), but not users,
also believed that the proposals would make lease finance less attractive. However, neither
group believed that the proposals would adversely affect U.K. investment and leasing
volumes in the short term, nor that they would substantially change the U.K. property
market. In particular, the purchase of property rather than leasing was considered unlikely,
probably because the purchase altemative is not always available. Overall, respondents
anticipated significant economic consequences if the proposals are incorporated in a new
lease-accounting standard.
Alternatives to the new proposals were explored but none appeared to be favored by
preparers. They were neutral to the current SSAP 21 treatment and to disclosure (rather
than recognition) approaches, while opposing a 75% threshold for finance leases, and the
suggestion of capitalization in the balance sheet without footnote disclosure of other
material aspects. By contrast, users clearly favored the G4+1 proposals. Immediate
implementation of the new proposals to new and existing leases was favored by the user
group, implying that a "clean break" would be preferred over a transition period. Preparers
disagreed with all four of the altemative suggestions for implementation, probably
reflecting general disagreement with the new proposals per se.
The findings of the present study demonstrate very clearly that the views of expert users
and preparers differ significantly. This suggests that the interests of these two groups'
conflict and standard setters must address this. These group differences also show that
concerns about the general under-representation of users' views on accounting standards
are well-founded. By examining the views of representatives fi"om both key constituencies
(users and preparers), investigating the impact of background characteristics on those
views, and covering a range of key reform issues (e.g. general principles, economic
consequences, implementation), the ex ante evidence presented here provides a more
balanced and comprehensive set of views in support of the standard-setting process than
has hitherto been available.
The findings also provide further evidence that lease-accounting standards currently in
force worldwide are not perceived as being of high quality. It is shown that the distinction
between operating and finance leases is not generally believed to be a useful principle on
which to base a standard. The distinction is not clear-cut and hence the detailed accounting
rules that emerge are inherently unsatisfactory. The principle upon which there is
widespread agreement is that all material rights and obligations arising fi-om lease
contracts should be recognized on the balance sheet. It is the detailed implementation
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guidance associated with this principle that is the subject of most debates. Further research
to explore the detailed nature of lease contracts across different jurisdictions and
investigate the economic consequences of adopting different detailed implementation
guidance would further assist in the process of lease-accounting reform. Ultimately,
however, it will be the responsibility of the standard setters to balance conceptual
principles and economic consequences and also to resolve the conflicts of interest that
exist between the key interested parties (Cyert & Ijiri, 1974).
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Robert Wearing, Cases in corporate governance, SAGE Publication, London, 2005,
ISBN 1-4129-0877-9, xii+162 pp., US$ 31.95 (pbk)
Which of the competing approaches to understanding the governance of corporations
provides the most useful tool for analyzing recent corporate failures? Is it more sensible to
understand corporate governance from the standpoint of the principal-agency problem,
with its attendant and implicit preference for maximizing shareholder value and implicit
devaluing of the claims of workers, the community, and other non-owners also affected by
corporate decision-making? Or, is it more sensible to explain governance as a problem of
optimizing value among competing stakeholders, recognizing that a theory of governance
inevitably must address the interests of various groups directly affected by corporate
decision-making? Or, are the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders not
necessarily inconsistent — that, as Jensen (2001) has argued most recently, attending to
the interests of stakeholders is necessary to maximizing the value of the firm to the
shareholders? These are questions Robert Wearing raises in his new book Cases in
Corporate Governance . Each of these competing theories is well established as an
explanation for corporate and managerial behavior, and each holds pitfalls close to the
theoretical edges. Wearing provides a sophisticated, succinct, and balanced presentation of
dominant theories as well as a series of cases through which to examine theory.
One might quibble with Wearing's reliance on traditional wisdom of corporate
governance. For example. Wearing explains the phenomenon of shareholder passivity as
the necessary trade-off for a limitation of liability for the debts of the corporation. This
shibboleth holds no longer in most modem industrial societies, where myriad new forms
of business organization - cousins of continental European and Latin American business
forms - have eroded it. The limited liability company and the limited liability partnership,
for example, invoke no necessary relationship between limitation of liability and control,
permitting ftill control by the owners and their limitation of liability for the debts of the
company. The more likely explanation of the shareholders' limitation of liability is the
need of the capital markets for financial products that trade with uniform and bounded risk,
as well as the sheer impracticability of suing and collecting from the millions of
shareholders in the modem corporation. And the critical trade-off of limited liability is not
control but public disclosure, so that third parties are protected in their expectations. The
significance of this seemingly picky point is that it underscores the increasingly paramount
role of transparency and disclosure in corporate govemance, a point to be explored below.
Similarly, the traditional wisdom of stakeholder theory that corporate citizenship is a
good surrogate for good corporate govemance is unchallenged by Wearing. Yet, arguably.
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it is exploded by the cases Wearing proceeds to discuss. Enron stands out in this regard:
Enron was a model corporate citizen, an asset to the Houston community, and it was
regarded as a great place to work. Jobs at Enron were coveted and highly competitive. It
had many trusting [obviously too trusting] business relationships with suppliers,
customers, bankers and other sources of capital. These qualities portended nothing about
the fundamental honesty and adequate governance of the corporation, where lies and
cover-ups of lies abounded right under the nose of a highly qualified board of directors and
with the apparent blessing of some of the most prestigious law firms and auditing firms in
the United States. Enron was a model corporate citizen but its governance stank because it
thrived on lies and corruption. This reviewer's mind cries out for Wearing to coimect these
dots.
hi fairness, however. Wearing does not advance any extant theory nor does he choose
among theories. Rather, he invites the reader to consider the operation of these theories in
nine recent cases of corporate dysfunction in major firms in Europe, North America, and
Asia. Thus, he presses theory into the service of understanding and evaluating managerial
behavior in specific fact situations. And of that he does a masterful job.
The cases Wearing examines include the saga of Robert Maxwell, Polly Peck, the Bank
of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), the Enron Corporation, WorldCom, Inc.,
Parmalat, Eurotunnel, Barings Bank, and Shell Oil. Wearing's succinct and well-written
summaries of complex issues in these cases reflect good use of major contemporary
sources. Sometimes, in the interest of bypassing tangential detail, he uses the passive voice
excessively, for this reader. In general, however, he does an excellent job of integrating
explanations of basic concepts with a factual and well-written narrative. In this way he
makes an understanding of the business complexities involved in the cases accessible to a
wide audience, and to a wide range of students. Those who understand these ideas already
are not belabored with a quick review, and those who are being introduced to them for the
first time do so in a practical, useful, and memorable context.
In the concluding chapter Wearing highlights both disparate and common causes of the
corporate failures he has examined. Among other factors, he identifies the problem of the
concentration of power in the hands of the chairman and chief executives, spectacular
share price performance, devices to support share price, the complexity of financial
statements and structures, the failures of the audit function, the insufficient oversight of
boards of directors, the actions taken by the firm against analysts and journalists, the
subjective relationship with banks and financial institutions, the role of whistleblowers, the
prevalence of fraud, and the use of creative accounting to disguise fraud.
While Wearing highlights the use of theories in his case narratives, he does not attempt
to take a position on which dominant theory of corporate govemance best explains these
failing companies. This reader is led to speculate that perhaps Wearing's decision to leave
the answer open-ended is because none of these theories - principal-agent theory,
stakeholder theory, or enlightened value maximization - adequately explains the ethical
failure of the actors in the cases Wearing has selected. Something is missing. None of these
failings reflected a frittering away of shareholder assets to enrich suppliers, workers, or
communities. None of these failings represented a driving passion to enrich shareholders,
with little regard for the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders. None of these
failings represents failure to follow principles of enlightened value maximization.
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Rather, the theme that stands out in the case analyses is that the central ethical failing of
the managers in each was myopic greed and selfishness, tinged often with an exaggerated
sense of self-importance, and a driving passion to enrich or protect oneself with no
particular regard for the interests of stakeholders or shareholders at all. That this central
ethical failing of managers led to fraud and to disaster for all concerned was the
professional failure of all those to whom fell the responsibility to monitor management.
Thus, two conditions are common to these corporate governance disasters: deceptive,
deceitftil, fraudulent behavior on the part of managers acting in their own interests at the
expense of shareholders and other stakeholders; and the failure of monitoring systems -
internal, external, and governmental - to detect, disclose, and stop the fraud.
Maxwell stole more than 43 million pounds from pension frinds, and Coopers and
Lybrand failed to report these abuses to pension frmd trustees (who in turn failed to detect
the theft). Polly Peck's management deliberately created false accounting entries,
presumably undetected. At base the problems of Enron involved elaborate and fraudulent
schemes to hide debt in order to lie to shareholders about the true financial condition of the
firm; internal and external auditors colluded to perpetrate the fraud, while senior managers
collected millions of dollars in undisclosed compensation for running the fraudulent
schemes. WorldCom, BCCI, and Parmalat, too, involved complex accounting fraud by
senior managers with a personal interest in the fraud, with all monitors complicit. The
Eurotunnel case involved intentionally overoptimistic projections of costs and revenues in
reports to all stakeholders, done to enrich and enfrench management. Barings' problems
are attributable to the action of a frader whose responsibility for both frading and
backroom operations of a European bank in Singapore made it possible to cover up
enough bad frades to sink the Bank, all for the manager in question to "make" personal
bonuses for trading gains and to avoid being detected and sacked; intemal audit
mechanisms were almost non-existent. Shell Oil's problem in the 21st century involved
fraudulent estimates of oil reserves to maintain share price at unwarranted levels to support
management.
None of these frauds redounded to the benefit of shareholders as a class or of any group
of stakeholders. To the extent that shareholders paid stock prices that reflected the
disclosure of fraudulent information, or held stock they would have sold had information
been accurate, they were injured. And the communities of stakeholders who depended on
the integrity and continuity of the firms for their livelihood were injured as well. And
neither group suffered at the expense of the other, as the competing theories often hint. At
the end of the day, theoretical debate about whether managers owe greater duties to
shareholders than to other stakeholders is muted (and mooted as well), if not made
irrelevant, when managers act primarily to enrich and entrench themselves at the expense
of everyone else.
And this may be the fiindamental unifying theme of the cases: their relationship to
corporate govemance lies, in part, in the ability of a govemance mechanism to check and
balance the greed and temptation to self-aggrandisement of the managers. This suggests a
preference for principal-agent analysis, and it is.
This reviewer thinks that the corporate govemance problem is more likely to be solved
if it is identified and analyzed correctly, and that requires a step beyond the traditional
management theories of corporate govemance. Traditional principal-agent theory despairs
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at the conundrum of the incomplete contract — the inabiUty of humans to specify and
agree in advance on the behavior of the agent that the principal-agent relationship
requires. As Wearing aptly observes, this problem was evident even in the 18th century in
Adam Smith's writing. The common law's solution to this problem, however, long
predates Berle and Means' (1932) and Jensen and Meckling's (1976) 20th century
articulation of the problem. American law students have long cut their teeth on crusty old
cases such as one decided by Judge Benjamin Cardozo in which he summarized the
component parts of the fiduciary duty that an agent (in that case, mutual agents) owes to a
principal.
[Mutual agents owe] the duty of finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible
in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length are forbidden to those bound
by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,
is then the standard of behavior.
'
This concept - that the agent has an overriding duty to look out for the interests of the
principal, to meet the duty of care and the duty of loyalty regardless of whether the
employment contract has contemplated the present facts - completes the "incomplete
contract." It dots the "i" and crosses the "t." It has been adopted in the corporate law of
every common law country and has its counterpart in the civil-law traditions of the
European continental systems. The solution to the problem is to regard the fiduciary duty
as a legal obligation for which the agent owes recompense to the principal. Moreover,
modem corporate and securities law treats the failure to disclose to the principal that which
the agent has a duty to disclose as fi^aud compensable through the civil law and punishable
by the criminal law.
It must be admitted that this analytical fi"amework does not tell us why things went
wrong in these cases (nor do the dominant theories described by Wearing). It does,
however, provide us with the language to explain what was wrong and why it was
wrongful. It takes us a step beyond the extant management theories that are of quite limited
use in explaining either positively or normatively what went wrong. It also suggests that
the solution to the corporate governance problem - at least as it appears in the book's cases
- lies in the education, training, and socialization of managers and those who monitor
managers' professional role, and in enforcement of fiduciary law. This may take us fiirther
toward solving the ethical problem than does pursuing better corporate citizenship or
workplace satisfaction or tweaking other elements of governance unrelated to the
transparency, honesty, and integrity of financial information.
In short. Wearing has written a superb and highly provocative book that does an
excellent job of introducing students to theories of corporate governance and exposing
complex fact situations in a clear and well-written manner. It would be an excellent text or
text supplement in many different types of courses and is well worth the read.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
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Hugh Coombs, David Hobbs, Ellis Jenkins (2005). Management accounting,
principles and applications. Sage Publications, London, 2005, xii+347 pp., £26.99,
ISBN 1-85396-383-6 (pbk)
This first edition of Management Accounting, Principles and Applications by Hugh
Coombs, David Hobbs, and Ellis Jenkins is primarily intended for "students pursuing
courses of study in management accountancy at undergraduate, postgraduate and
professional level" (back cover). Its main objective is to show how management
accounting contributes to decision making in a variety of organizational contexts by
adopting a "new" and "accessible" approach. In the mind of the authors, such an approach
should include both a presentation of practical techniques and appropriate references to
research. Also, quantitative and qualitative issues are to be raised for each technique
covered.
1. Outline of the book
The book is divided into ten chapters: (1) An introduction to management accounting;
(2) Cost analysis and decision making; (3) Costing products and services; (4) and (5)
Management accounting and the planning process — 1 and 2; (6) and (7) Management
accounting and the control process — 1 and 2; (8) Operational decision making; (9)
Strategic decision making; (10) Management accountancy and performance measurement
systems. Each chapter starts with a list of key learning objectives, ends with a conclusion,
a summary, recommended further readings (summaries in one to two pages of research
articles), review questions, and one to three case studies (except for Chapter 1).
Unfortunately, no answers are provided to the review questions or to the case studies (no
other resource, such as a website, was available at the time this review was written).
This content is similar in many respects to the material covered in most management
accounting textbooks. This raises the question ofwhether there is something unique or novel
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about this text. Chapter 1 proposes a thorough introduction to management accounting:
nature and role, history and context, scope, time dimension, etc. Management and financial
accounting are paralleled in what they have in common (p. 5) and in which ways they are
different. Related issues of ethics and power are also interestingly developed (p. 12-14).
End-of-chapter review questions are a bit too difficult at this introductory stage.
Chapter 2 introduces a lot of useful concepts related to cost analysis and decision
making: cost objects, cost classification, unit costs, etc. But the different types of costs are
defined and illustrated too briefly (pp. 29-30): only one page is devoted to sunk, relevant,
avoidable, opportunity, and marginal/incremental costs. A table presenting the different
types of costs to be used depending on the context and the type of decision at hand would
make the chapter easier to get across. In the same vein, concepts such as responsibility
centers, apportionment of overheads, and revised budgets are used without sufficient, clear
explanations. Given this, the "SHB" case study (pp. 44-46) seems too complex and would
be easier to do after having read the next chapter.
Chapter 3 provides an in-depth discussion of the issues of product and service costing.
Overheads allocation and apportionment, activity-based costing (ABC), and marginal/
variable costing are reasonably clearly developed. Although, the presentation ofABC does
not really show how it contributes to decision making (pp. 60-68). Further, some concepts
are used before being clearly introduced (for example flexible budgets are used in the
"Billy Griffiths" case, pp. 75-76, even though this concept is only developed in Chapter 6,
pp. 151-155). More generally, the chapter would benefit from a table clearly explaining
when one should use full costing vs. variable costing.
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the role of management accounting in the planning
process. Chapter 4 tackles general issues about planning and budgeting. It provides
excellent examples and useful tables and figures illustrating the articulation between an
organization's missions, objectives, aims, goals, targets, and plans (see for example
Table 4.1 and 4.2, pp. 85-88; and Fig. 4.1, p. 90). Chapter 5 extends the discussion to
cost-estimation methods (engineering methods, inspection of accounts, high-low
method, and mathematical methods) and "advanced" budgetary techniques (zero-based
and activity-based budgeting, balanced scorecard, etc.). Although up-to-date and well
documented, this chapter lacks a clear comparison of the various methods it presents.
In Chapters 6 and 7, the authors outline various aspects of control: the control
process in itself, feedback concepts, standard costing and variance analysis, and the
influence of control systems on organizational design. This is done in a very
understandable fashion, based on clear examples and calculations. More specifically,
there is a rather effective treatment of variance's decomposition into subvariances, which
remains a difficult topic for non-specialist readers. Tables and figures provide a helpful
basis for such a treatment (see Table 6.12, p. 162; Fig. 7.1, p. 189; Fig. 7.2, p. 191; and
Fig. 7.3, p. 198).
Chapter 8 delves into operational decision making issues such as marginal and relevant
costing and linear programming. Various types of decisions (product-mix adjustment,
make or buy, product abandonment, etc.), are clearly presented through a series of exhibits
(pp. 221, 224-227, 231-240, and 245-246). This chapter is far more understandable and
thorough than previous ones dealing with cost for decision. Although, further
recommended readings, such as the articles by Otley (2001) and Spicer (1988), seem a
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bit out of place as they deal with performance management systems rather than operational
decision making.
Chapter 9 is entitled "Strategic decision making" but focuses mainly on investment
appraisals. The various steps of this latter process are more or less discussed: specification
of scope and objectives of the project, identification of relevant cash flows, application of
appraisal methods, and analysis of results and decision. The authors also tackle related
important issues such as advantages and drawbacks of each appraisal technique and
qualitative, non-financial criteria.
Finally, performance measurement systems (PMS) are discussed in Chapter 10. After
having explained the need for effective PMS, the authors provide an interesting review
of the impact of various environmental aspects on the design of such systems.
Unfortunately, transfer-pricing considerations are developed without reference to the
different types of responsibility centers (pp. 299-307). A clear presentation of financial
and non-financial aspects of performance measurement follows. Completed by three
interesting case studies and a wide range of recommended further readings, this chapter
provides a good basis for an introduction to advanced management accounting/control
systems courses.
2. Discussion
How do the authors succeed in achieving their goals (i.e. being new and accessible,
making sound references to research, raising quantitative and qualitative issues, dealing
with a variety of contexts)?
Overall, the approach to many concepts is pragmatic, realistic and "open-minded."
The book is easy to read and "accessible" for the intended audience, thanks to the clear
writing style of the authors and the good graphics and tables. This is also due to the
relatively short length of the book (347 pp.) compared to other well-established
counterparts: Atkinson, Kaplan and Young (2004) Management Accounting, 624 pp.;
Drury (2004) Management and Cost Accounting, 1280 pp.; Homgren, Datar and Foster
(2006) Cost accounting, 896 pp.
But covering almost all possible issues in management accounting in 350 pages hinders
the authors from developing many related issues (such as qualitative ones) in depth. This
could also explain why no solutions are provided to the review questions and case studies.
However some space could be saved as the summaries and conclusions provided are often
redundant and some further recommended readings are already included in the body of the
chapters (for example, pp. 10-11 and 17-20).
Also, a clearer outline of examples would make the book more user-fiiendly. Some
examples are part of the text (see pp. 31-33), others are exhibits within a chapter (such as
exhibit 4.1, pp. 93-105) or at the end (exhibit 2.1-2.3, pp. 37^2) of a chapter. Putting all
examples in exhibits within the chapters would make the book even easier to read.
Most recommended further readings - linking research to practical issues - are well-
chosen and up-to-date (see for example pp. 6, 10-12, 42^4, 200-205, and 316-317). This
is another strong point of the book and it deserves to be highlighted as it is quite
uncommon. Specificities of the public sector are interestingly and thoroughly developed
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(for example pp. 9-10, 107-108, 132-133, 329-331) as well as a variety of other
organizational settings, such as services, retailing, sports, manufacturing, and education.
As noted earlier, no answers to the case studies and review questions are provided. This
partly hinders the intended audience from self-fraining and assessment. It also would be
useful if the topics tackled by these cases and questions were clearly indicated as is done in
other management accounting textbooks. Further, many case studies only deal with either
quantitative issues ("Budget preparation", Ch. 4; "Tuba Accessories," Ch. 5) or qualitative
ones ("SHB," Ch. 1; "Jim Davies," Ch. 3, "Dayview Ltd," Ch. 7; "Callas Pic," "Fantasy
Planet University," and "Sioca Pis," Ch. 10). However, four of them present a good mix of
both calculations and discussion questions ("Billy Griffiths," Ch. 3; "Odd-Job Manufac-
turing Co.," Ch. 8; "Branchester United," Ch. 9; "Social services agency," Ch. 9).
Finally, the main drawback of the book is its (lack of) structure. The 10 chapters are
organized in a stand-alone fashion without any sort of grouping. However, these chapters
deal with different aspects and ftinctions of management accounting that could easily fall
into two parts: information for decision making (Chapters 2-3, 8 and 9) and information for
planning, control, and performance measurement (Chapters 4-7 and 10). This mixture of
themes is confiising for the reader as many concepts are partly introduced in early chapters
and then recalled and developed later in the book. For example, definitions of the various
types ofcosts are provided in Chapter 2 and then only used in the context ofdecision making
in Chapters 8 and 9. A reordering of chapters in two parts would allow for an easier
progression throughout the book and would make it more accessible for novice readers.
That being said, I would recommend this book for readers who wish to develop a
general understanding of management accounting issues. The authors have made a
commendable effort to tackle a wide range of issues dealing with decision making and the
planning/control process in organizations within a limit of 350 pages. It makes this book
very well suited for introductory management accounting courses at all levels
(undergraduate, postgraduate, and professional). However, those who wish to specialize
in the management accounting/confrol field would be better off investing in a more
expanded textbook.
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Spicer, B. H. (1988). Towards an organisation theory of the transfer pricing process. Accounting, Organizations
and Society, J3{3), 303-322.
Simon Alcouffe
EM Lyon Business School,
Lyon, France
doi: 10. 1016/j.intacc.2005. 12.009
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Thomas R. Robinson, Paul Munter, Julia Grant, Financial statement analysis: A
global perspective, Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2004, ISBN: 0-13-122696-7 (International
edition, 793 pages, $145.60)
This text is designed for financial statement analysis modules in undergraduate or
graduate business programs. In the preface, the authors indicate that it could also be used
in MBA financial accounting modules and that, although the ideal user is a student who
has taken one prior accounting module, the book is also accessible to those with no
accounting background. It comprises three parts. Part 1 provides an introduction to
accounting, including uses of financial statements, the regulatory context for accounting,
transaction recording, the income statement, the balance sheet, and the statement of cash
flows. Part 2 covers a number of financial statement analysis topics, including common-
size analysis, ratio analysis, credit analysis and equity analysis. This part ends with a
chapter on valuation. Part 3 covers a number of advanced accounting issues, including
inventories, fixed assets, deferred tax, employee stock options, post-retirement benefits,
derivatives, and foreign currency translation. It ends with a chapter on the use of financial
statements in performance evaluation.
An attractive feature of the book is that it addresses topics by reference both to
U.S. GAAP and to International Accounting Standards, which is important now that
analysts need to be comfortable working with both sets of standards. The authors
make good use of examples based on Motorola (U.S. GAAP) and Nokia (international
standards) to illustrate the application of techniques, and to illustrate differences
between U.S. GAAP and international standards. Another attractive feature of the text
is its use of illustrative material from brokers' reports and conference-call notes. I also
like the end-of-chapter cases, which are of a good length and complexity for working
through in case classes. I note also that the cases in the "advanced issues" section of
Part 3 require students to apply financial statement analysis techniques covered in Part
2. The text is especially attractive for modules that aim to combine an introductory
coverage of both basic and more advanced accounting topics, by reference to both
U.S. GAAP and International Accounting Standards, with coverage of the basics of
financial statement analysis.
I have a couple of suggestions for possible changes in subsequent editions. First, the
authors emphasise that their text eliminates reference to "debits" and "credits." Avoidance
of these terms can have its advantages, but the resultant avoidance of emphasis on the
double-entry nature of accounting transactions might cause difficulties when covering
some of the more advanced topics in the final section. And many students will come up
against the terms sooner or later in their studies or in their professional lives. Perhaps the
authors might consider extending their coverage of transaction recording in their
introductory chapter to encompass this. Second, I felt that the coverage of valuation
was rather thin. This topic is covered in only one chapter at the end of Part 2. Much of the
material on financial statement analysis techniques in Part 2 of the text leads naturally into
valuation applications, and there is a wealth of recent academic research on accounting-
based valuation methods that can be directly related to issues faced by practitioners since
understanding of valuation methods is important to financial analysts. I would have liked
to see a more extensive coverage of this topic.
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This text is well worth considering for a certain type of financial statement analysis
module. For a module aimed at students who wish to build upon a good accounting
background to study financial statement analysis, this text may contain too much
accounting and too little financial statement analysis, particularly on valuation. For such
modules, the texts by Palepu, Healy, and Bernard (2004) and Penman (2004) might be
more suitable. For a module that aims to provide introductory coverage of basic and more
advanced accounting topics and of the basics of financial statement analysis with reference
to both U.S. GAAP and International Accounting Standards, this text is well worth
looking at.
References
Palepu, K., Healy, P., & Bernard, V. (2004). Business analysis and valuation using financial statements: Text and
cases (3rd ed.). South-Westem.
Penman, S. (2001). Financial statement analysis and security valuation (2nd ed.). McGraw-Hill-Irwin.
John O'Hanlon
Lancaster University,
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Hennie Van Greuning, International financial reporting standards — A practical
guide, 2nd edition, The World Bank, Washington (USA), 2005, 0-8213-5910-X
(x+297 p, US$30.00)
Following several other countries in the world, the European Union decided in 2002 to
make the use of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) mandatory for listed
companies as of 2005. The implementation of this new regulation gave rise to an
increasing interest for these standards, not only from users of financial statements, but also
fi-om accounting professionals who, until recently, did not feel the need for studying
standards they did not use in their daily activities. Practical guides on IFRS have thus
multiplied in several languages, with the aim of rendering these standards accessible to a
large audience.
These books can be classified into two categories. Some are simply a collection of
summaries obtained by extracting the main provisions of each standard. Such work may be
useful to specialists of accounting searching for a brief outline of international standards,
but it is of limited interest for those who do not have a thorough knowledge of accounting.
On the books of the second category, the description of standards is complemented by
practical examples that allow non-specialists to really understand their consequences on
financial statements. The work of Hennie Van Greuning undeniably belongs to the latter
category since its declared objective is "to focus on the needs of executives and financial
\
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analysts in the private and public sectors who might not have a strong accounting
background" (p. ix).
Unlike other books whose plan is based on the main subdivisions of the balance sheet
and income statement (assets, liabilities, equity, revenues and expenses, etc.), each
standard (either IFRS or IAS) here is dealt with in a specific chapter. This is probably a
preferably solution, in as much as most standards, as for example IAS 1 2 (income taxes) or
IAS 2 1 (the effects of changes in foreign exchange rates) to name but a few, have an
impact on several headings of financial statements.
Each chapter follows a common outline. It begins with a description of the objectives of
the standard and a presentation of its key concepts and definitions. Then a section
summarizes the main provisions of the standard, focusing on recognition and measurement
issues. It is followed by a description of disclosure requirements. Each chapter ends with a
discussion of the implications for financial analysis. Most chapters also include examples
aimed at illustrating selected dispositions of the standard.
One of the strengths of this book is its high pedagogical quality. An illustration is the
fact that the author does not hesitate, when necessary, to simplify official definitions
contained in standards or to provide additional explanations in order to make these
definitions more understandable by non-specialists. Admirably, these changes are
developed in such a way as to maintain the related concepts and not lead to significant
losses of rigor or accuracy. The same concern for pedagogy appears in the part of each
chapter that describes the main provisions of each standard. This section is written in a
bold and particularly clear style, allowing the author to summarize the substance of the
standard in one or two pages only.
But the clearest evidence of the author's concern for pedagogy is the presence of
practical examples at the end of each chapter. These examples, which do not require any
knowledge of the bookkeeping technique (there is no accounting entry) provide
illustrations of the most important points, allowing the reader to better understand the
main provisions of the standard. One may regret, however, that these examples are
relegated at the end of the chapter, rather than being presented immediately after the
description of the corresponding provisions.
What makes this book really original is the presence, in each chapter, of a section
devoted to the implications of each standard for financial analysis. In this section, the
author exposes the impact that alternative accounting treatments have on financial
statements and main ratios used by analysts. The choice of issues covered is relevant,
explanations are clear and understandable by any person with a basic knowledge of
financial analysis. The use of tables summarizing the effects of each accounting treatment
facilitates the understanding of the impact of standards and again, illustrates the author's
concem for pedagogy. This section fiilly justifies the orientation of the book and gives it
the opportunity to break free from most other guides on IFRS that are mainly directed
toward accountants.
As any book, this one has limitations, most of them being the consequence of its
relatively small size. The bound volume of IFRS published by the International
Accounting Standards Board (lASB) contains more than 2000 pages. Summarizing these
standards in a 300 pages book is a difficult challenge, especially when description of
standards are completed with examples and comments. It is thus no wonder that there are
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some excessive simplifications as, for example, when the choice of the consolidation
method (full consolidation, proportionate consolidation, equity method, or fair value) is
described as depending only on the percentage of ownership (p. 49), while according to
the lASB, this choice is based on control, a concept much wider than ownership. Another
example of excessive simplification is when the author notes that the choice of the useful
life of an asset does not affect cash flow (p. 128), an assertion that eludes the tax effect of
depreciation. Nevertheless, such mistakes are scarce and globally, the quality of the
simplification effort must be emphasized.
The desire to maintain the length of the book into reasonable limits probably also led
the author to make choices and provide explanations that might be useful to a good
understanding of standards. For example, one may regret that some non-obvious
definitions [e.g. "temporary differences" (IAS 12)] are not illustrated with examples that
would explain their meaning. Given the importance of the issue, it would also have been
useful to describe more deeply the rules governing the revaluation of tangible fixed assets
and to provide an example of such revaluation. The same applies to changes in accounting
policies (IAS 8).
Generally speaking, space devoted to some particular standards seems inadequate as in
the case for IAS 39, complex standard, whose description of recognition and valuation
rules does not exceed 2.5 pages. In some cases, the reader would find practical examples
provided at the end of each chapter helpful, however, these examples do not provide
answers to all questions raised in the chapter. This shortcoming must nevertheless be
moderated in as much as it was probably difficult to do a better job in such a limited
volume.
Given the personality of both the author and the publisher (Hennie Van Greuning is a
senior advisor in the World Bank's Treasury and the book is published by World Bank),
some potential readers might fear that this book reflects the World Bank's view of financial
reporting more than it provides a fair description of IFRS. They must be reassured. Only
the chapter on the accounting fi-amework, because of its insistence on transparency (a
concept absent in the lASB fi"amework), may be considered as stamped with some
subjectivity. All other parts of the book provide a fair description of IFRS.
To conclude, Hennie Van Greuning seems to have attained his objective which was to
provide to non-specialists a clear description of the main provisions of IFRS, insisting on
the impact that these standards have on financial statements. Of course this work is neither
an accounting textbook, nor a financial analysis handbook. It could nevertheless constitute
a useful additional reference for a course on financial statement analysis.
Bernard Raffoumier
HEC Geneve, University of Geneva, Switzerland
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2005. 12.005
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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of a firm's leadership structure on its abiUty to generate value
from loans by examining the market reaction to the disclosure of Canadian bank credit agreements.
Two leadership structures are considered in this paper. In the first scenario, the positions of Chief
Executive Officer and Chair of the Board are held by two different persons (denoted as a Separate
CEO-Chair structure); in the second scenario, both positions are held by the same person (denoted as
a Combined CEO-Chair structure).
We observe a stronger market reaction to the announcement of bank credit agreements when
firms have a Separate CEO-Chair structure (relative to a Combined CEO-Chair structure). This
stronger market reaction for firms with a Separate CEO-Chair structure suggests that the division of
CEO and Chair of the Board responsibilities between two people enhances a firm's ability to
generate value from its loans. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the observed
market reaction for firms with a Separate CEO-Chair structure is even greater when the size of the
board of directors is small. Our results also indicate that bank monitoring activities are more valuable
for firms with a Combined CEO-Chair structure and no institutional shareholder.
© 2006 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
We investigate the impact of a firm's leadership structure on the value of its debt
contracts by examining the market reaction to the disclosure of bank credit agreements.
There are two types of leadership structures in this paper: the positions of Chief Executive
Officer and Chair of the Board are held by two different persons (i.e., Separate CEO-Chair
structure), or both positions are held by the same person (i.e.. Combined CEO-Chair
structure). Our results support two distinct valuation/future-performance implications of
new bank debt contracts. First, when a firm is organized in a low-agency-cost form (i.e.,
separation of CEO and Chair positions) new debt contracts are associated with an increase
in firm value when measured by debt-announcement-period returns. This is consistent with
a value-adding performance role for such an organizational form. Second, for firms
organized in the higher-agency-cost combined CEO-Chair form an increase in firm value
is observed only for firms lacking institutional ownership monitoring. This suggests that
the valuation implications and, by extension, the agency monitoring impact of institutional
equity ownership and bank debt ownership are similar for such firms. These findings are
inconsistent with any sort of positive efficiency-gain role for combined CEO-Chair
structures in debt-issuance settings.
In the extant literature, the effectiveness of various leadership structures is often
measured with reference to a firm's overall performance (e.g.. Pi & Timme, 1993; Rechner
& Dalton, 1991). However, in practice it is difficult to isolate the effect of leadership
structure on firm performance since firm performance is strongly influenced by many
factors that are not related to differences in leadership structure (such as interest rates,
economic growth rates, and changes in governmental regulations and policies). As a result,
measures of firm performance may not be well suited to detecting the effects of different
leadership structures. This may explain some of the inconsistencies in results documented
in previous studies. By using an event-study methodology, the impact of these potentially
confounding factors can be mitigated. This allows us to contribute to the debate on the
effectiveness of various leadership structures by providing new empirical evidence from a
different perspective.^
Corporate governance consists of controls imposed by the board of directors and by
debtholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). A firm's leadership structure is an important
element in its overall corporate governance. In their analysis of governance issues leading
to the demise of the Enron Corporation, Healy and Palepu (2002) emphasize how
important director monitoring is to the efficient functioning of capital markets. In
addition, the SEC and NYSE have recently proposed regulatory reforms aimed at
improving corporate governance of companies listed on US exchanges (Canadian
regulators are proposing similar regulatory reforms). These reforms would require that
corporate boards of all listed companies be comprised of a majority of independent
' The event-study approach has been used in prior hterature to examine the relative effectiveness of leadership
structures. For example, Brickley et al. (1997) examine the market reaction to changes in leadership structure.
Given that our objective is to examine the impact of a firm's leadership structure on the value of its loans, and not
to measure its overall relative effectiveness, several costs associated with a Separate CEO-Chair raised in
Brickley et al. (1997) are not relevant in our analysis (discussed below).
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directors and that audit committees be comprised only of independent directors (Pitt,
2002).
The value of a debt contract to a firm is the benefit received by the shareholders from
the contract, and the expected value of this benefit should be reflected in the firm's stock
price at the initial announcement of the debt contract. The market reaction to this
announcement of new debt depends in part on the firm's corporate governance, since the
govemance structure of the firm affects the firm's performance. We examine the market
reaction to the announcement of debt contracts while controlling for firms' leadership
structure (and other related variables), in order to measure the impact of leadership
structure on the value of debt contracts to firms.
Past studies examining the effectiveness of the two leadership structures have been
extensive but not conclusive and have relied almost exclusively on U.S. data. Agency
theory argues that the Separate CEO-Chair structure is preferable. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) argue that the costs of an agent's actions are due to incomplete alignment of the
agent's and owner's interests. To control for agency problems, there must be an effective
corporate-governance structure to separate the management of decisions and the control of
decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The theory states that the CEO in a Combined CEO-
Chair structure cannot separate the firms' interests from his/her personal interests. Also,
without the direction of an independent leader, it is more difficult for the board to perform
its critical functions (Jensen, 1993). Furthermore, the CEO in a Combined CEO-Chair
structure may engage in opportunistic behavior that is detrimental to the interests of the
firm's shareholders.
Some empirical evidence supports the agency-theory argument. For example, Rechner
and Dalton (1991) used three accounting measures of profitability to study the
performance of a sample of Fortune 500 firms and found that the firms with a Combined
CEO-Chair structure underperformed firms with a Separate CEO-Chair structure.
Similarly, Pi and Timme (1993) provide evidence that banks with a Combined CEO-
Chair structure are less profitable than banks with a Separate CEO-Chair structure.
Fosberg ( 1 999) and Core, Holthausen, and Larcker ( 1 999) find that on average CEOs who
are also board chairs receive higher compensation than CEOs who are not board chairs.
However, it is also argued that a Combined CEO-Chair structure promotes better
communication and information flow between management and the board of directors, and
that better communication can lead to better decision making by the board. If this is true,
firms with a Combined CEO-Chair structure should not exhibit inferior performance
relative to firms with a Separate CEO-Chair structure. Baliga and Moyer (1996) provide
evidence that separating the two positions neither increases a firm's accounting profit nor
its stock price. Brickley, Coles, and Karrell (1997) argue that there are specific costs
associated with maintaining a Separate CEO-Chair structure, including agency costs of
controlling the behavior of the chairperson, information costs, costs of having firms
change their succession processes, and costs resulting fi"om inconsistent decision making
with shared authority. They find no evidence that the Combined CEO-Chair structure is
associated with inferior accounting and market returns.
Our study contributes to the literature by providing additional evidence on a specific
aspect of leadership structure using a different economic setting (Canadian data). We use a
sample of bank credit-agreement announcements in the Canadian market between 1 984
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and 1997 to examine the market reaction to the disclosure of credit agreements while
controlling for firms' leadership structures. We observe a stronger market reaction to the
announcement of credit agreements when firms have a Separate CEO-Chair structure
relative to firms with a Combined CEO-Chair structure. This suggests that the division of
responsibilities between CEO and Chair of the Board enhances a firm's ability to generate
value from its loans. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the market reaction for
firms with a Separate CEO-Chair structure is further increased when the size of the board
of directors is small. We also document that bank monitoring activities are most valuable
for firms with a Combined CEO-Chair structure and with no institutional shareholders,
and to a lesser degree, when the board is dominated by inside directors. These results
suggest that the division of responsibilities between CEO and Chair of the Board enhances
a firm's ability to generate value from its loans, and has implications for equity valuation at
the issuance of debt.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related
literature and develop hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe the data collection and
methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results on the market reaction to the
disclosure of bank credit agreements and in Section 5 we provide conclusions.
2. Related literature and hypotheses development
2.1. Related literature
Corporate governance consists of controls imposed by shareholders and debtholders to
reduce agency costs and improve firm value. These controls are linked to the composition
of the board of directors (proportion of outside directors, size, and leadership structure),
the ownership structure of the firm (the presence of an institutional shareholder), the
quality of the external auditor, and the concentration of borrowing." To investigate the
effectiveness of leadership structure on the value of debt contracts, we develop our
hypotheses by analyzing the relationship between the leadership structure and the
proportion of outsiders on the board, the presence of institutional shareholders and the size
of the board of directors. The quality of the external auditor and the concentration of
borrowing are included as control variables in the multivariate analysis (Section 4.3).^ For
the sake of brevity, in the development of our hypotheses, we do not discuss the effect of
the control variables on market reaction (their impact is discussed in detail in the
multivariate-analysis section which follows).
The market reacts to the announcement of bank credit agreements because it can
infer the lender's assessment of the firm's quality and because the agreements also
provide firms with opportunities to generate value directly from the use of the loans.
" The Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) responded to the recommendations of their Corporate Governance
Committee (TSE, 1994) by introducing corporate-governance disclosure guidelines regarding the importance of
including outside directors on the board and audit committee (Bujaki and McConomy, 2002).
^ Since one of the (four) large international audit firms audits most of the firms included in our sample, we do
not include a measure of the quality of the external auditor in the univariate analysis.
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Prior to granting a loan, a bank usually carries out an investigation to evaluate the
firm's ability to repay the loan. Therefore, the disclosure of a bank credit agreement
reveals the bank's superior private information gained during its investigation (Andre,
Mathieu, & Zhang, 2001; Fama, 1985; James, 1987). Several studies have documented
a positive market reaction at the disclosure of bank credit agreements (Aintablian &
Roberts, 2000; Best & Zhang, 1993; Datta, Iskanda-Datta, & Patel, 1999; James &
Wier, 1990; Lummer & McConnell, 1989; Slovin, Johnson, & Glascock, 1992; Slovin
& Young, 1990).
The market's reaction to the disclosure of bank credit agreements also reflects the
expected increase in firm value from the use of the loan. Two reasons can explain this
increase in value. First, debt contracts can improve the firm's existing conti'ols. Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) point out that a debt contract is a control mechanism for solving
agency problems. The lender can prevent the borrowing firm fi"om investing in negative
net-present-value projects, it can force the sale of assets that are worth more in
alternative uses or it can prevent shirking (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994; Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997).
The incremental value derived from banks' monitoring activities is a decreasing
function of the effectiveness of the firm's other controls. In other words, the weaker a
firm's controls are, the more important the bank's monitoring activities are to the
shareholders, and a stronger market reaction to the announcement of a bank credit
agreement should be observed. Both theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that
monitoring of firms by financial and informational intermediaries including banks,
financial analysts, auditors, and governance agents (e.g., boards of directors and
influential shareholders) offers one possible solution to these information problems
(Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Lapides, 2000; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Titman &
Trueman, 1986).
Second, the increase in firm value depends on how efficiently the debt is used."*
Efficiency is determined by the quality of the firm's decision-making and the
implementation of its decisions. Better decision-making and implementation processes
can allow firms to generate higher net present value projects. Therefore, the market
reaction to the disclosure of a bank credit agreement should be stronger for firms that can
employ loans more efficiently.
2.2. Hypotheses development
Our first two hypotheses deal with the notion of control; our third hypothesis deals with
the notion of efficiency. Prior studies provide evidence that when one control is improved,
** The notion of control used in this paper refers to the abihty of the manager to act in his or her own interest.
The notion of efficient use of the loan refers to the quality of the decision process of the firm. While there is a
correlation between these two concepts, the quality of the decision process can vary across firms independently of
the quality of control. In other words, the decision process of a firm with a strong internal control system can be
influenced by other factors such as the quality of the management team and the size of the board of directors. The
disclosure of bank credit agreements does not provide information about leadership structure per se since it is
already publicly known.
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the incremental value of another control is usually reduced. For example, McWilliams and
Sen (1997) document that the influence of outside directors on corporate control is
inversely related to the effectiveness of the leadership structure. Consequently, the
relationship between leadership structure and other control factors are mainly substitutive
to each other in determining the overall quality of a firm's control. As a result, the
incremental contribution of a bank's monitoring activities to corporate governance should
be a decreasing function of the effectiveness of the other controls. On one hand, if the
leadership structure and other factors are weak in respect to control, the bank's monitoring
activities can compensate for the firm's lack of control. On the other hand, if leadership
structure is strong in control, a bank's monitoring activities should not significantly add to
the firm's overall level of control.
We use the percentage of outsiders on the board of directors and the presence of
institutional shareholders as additional control factors to the leadership structure in
developing our hypotheses. The existing literature provides evidence that outside directors
do a better job of acting in shareholders' interests than inside directors. More specifically,
outside directors can monitor the firm better because they are independent of
management.^ Since both banks and outside board members can act as monitoring
agents, when a board is dominated by inside directors there is a stronger need for banks to
perform the monitoring function. Therefore, we expect that firms with a weaker leadership
structure can derive higher value from bank monitoring activities if insiders dominate the
board of directors. For firms with a strong leadership structure, the value derived fi-om
bank monitoring activities should not be affected by the composition of the board. This
discussion leads to Hypothesis 1
:
Hypothesis 1. For a firm with a weak leadership structure, the market reaction to the
disclosure of a bank credit agreement is stronger if the board of directors is composed
mainly of insiders.
In other words, the market relies more on the external monitoring of a firm by a
financial institution in cases where the independence of a firm's board is suspect. Note that
if a firm's leadership structure is strong with respect to control, the market reaction to the
^ For example, prior empirical work indicates that a higher proportion of outside directors on the board
ensures the replacement of a poorly performing CEO (Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 200 1 ), and is associated with a
higher level of corporate-governance disclosure (Bujaki and McConomy, 2002). Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt
(1993) find that CEOs receive higher compensation when they have personally appointed a greater proportion
of directors to the board. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) observe a positive stock-price reaction to the
announcement of the appointment of an additional outside director, which suggests that shareholders' wealth
may be affected by the proportion of outside directors. Byrd and Hickman (1992) observe a higher market
reaction when bidding firms in takeover attempts have a proportion of outsider directors on their boards greater
than or equal to 50%. Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, and Davidson (1992) document that boards dominated by
independent members are associated with larger abnormal returns in transactions in which management
participates in taking the entire firm private (management buyouts). Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994) find that
the average stock-market reaction to announcements of poison pills is positive when the board has a majority of
outside directors and negative when it does not. Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapini (1996) document a strong
positive relation between the percentage of outside directors on the board and the fi^equency of outside CEO
successions.
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disclosure of a bank credit agreement should be unaffected by the composition of the
firm's board of directors.*^
Since an institutional shareholder usually holds a significant number of shares and can
mitigate agency costs (Brickley et al., 1997), it can also act as an important complementary
control to the leadership structure/ Following the argument from Hypothesis 1, we
develop Hypothesis 2 to test the strength of the two leadership structures with respect to
control in the presence (or absence) of institutional shareholders:
Hypothesis 2. For a firm with a weak leadership structure, the market reaction to the
disclosure of a bank credit agreement is stronger if there are no institutional shareholders.
Again, the market relies more on the external monitoring of a firm by a financial
institution in cases where the independence of a firm's board is suspect. Note that if a
firm's leadership structure is strong with respect to control, the market reaction to the
disclosure of a bank credit agreement should be unaffected by the presence (or absence) of
institutional shareholders. In other words, the market relies on institutional shareholders to
mitigate the lack of confrol, and as a result, does not need to rely as much on the external
monitoring fiinction performed by financial institutions.
Our third hypothesis considers the efficiency with which loans are employed by the
borrowing firm. If a firm has a leadership structure that is more efficient in making
and implementing decisions, ceteris paribus, the incremental value derived from a loan
is higher. As a result, the market reaction to the disclosure of a bank credit agreement
should be sfronger. Factors affecting efficiency are mainly complementary to each
other since an efficient system usually requires every element in the system to
function well.
Yermack (1996) provides evidence that smaller boards of directors are more efficient.
In order to determine which leadership structure leads to more efficient use of the loan, we
control for the size of the board. We expect that the benefit of smaller boards can be better
captured by a more efficient leadership structure. Consequently, when a firm has an
efficient leadership structure, the market reaction should be stronger when the board is
smaller. However, if the leadership structure is not efficient in the first place, the size of
the board should not have a significant impact on the operation of the firm. Hypothesis 3
allows us to investigate the efficiency of debt usage. Formally, we predict:
Hypothesis 3. Ceteris paribus, if the leadership structure of a firm is efficient with respect
to debt usage, then the market reaction to the disclosure of a debt contract should be
stronger for a firm with a small board of directors.
Hypothesis 1 , as well as the more general notion that Combined CEO-Chair structures pose greater agency/
control issues than Separate CEO-Chair structures, both have a potential endogeneity problem. Specifically, in
choosing CEO-Chair structure and board composition a firm presumably takes into account the amount of agency
costs associated with these arrangements. One could argue that Combined CEO-Chair and high inside-board
firms choose these structures because the inherent agency benefits fi'om alternative more independent structures
are mixed. If this is the case, other agency-cost-reduction arrangements (such as lender monitoring) may also have
mixed or indeterminate benefits.
' While the presence of a large shareholder minimizes the agency problems arising from manager-shareholder
conflicts of interest, it may also create conflict between the interests of the large shareholder and minority
shareholders (Fan & Wong, 2002).
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Note that if the leadership structure is not efficient with respect to debt usage, then the
market reaction to the disclosure of a debt contract should be unaffected by the size of the
board of directors.
3. Data and methodology
The Globe & Mail on CD-ROM and the database of Canadian Business and Current
Affairs (CBCA) are used to obtain announcements of Canadian bank loan agreements for
the period fi"om 1984 to 1997.^ An exhaustive search was conducted using key words to
identify all publicly available announcements of bank credit agreements disclosed in the
Globe & Mail. We kept all announcements that did not contain other non-trivial corporate
news.^ Furthermore, only firms with stock prices on the TSE Western daily file are
included in the sample. We obtained a total of 1 73 announcements for firms listed on the
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE). From this total, 13 observations were eliminated due to
significant thin-trading problems. We collected information regarding the borrowing firms'
corporate governance structures fi^om their proxy statements. We could not locate the
proxy statements for 38 companies, thus, reducing the sample to 122 armouncements.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics regarding characteristics of the bank credit
agreements (Panels A and B) and various aspects of the firms' corporate-governance
structures (Panels C to F). As indicated in Panel A, the total sample of announcements
includes 50 lines of credit, 57 term loans and 15 announcements involving both lines
of credit and term loans. However, the average dollar amount of the loans can only be
determined for 112 of the 122 announcements. The average value is $317 million
(Can) with a maximum of $2.52 billion (Can) and a minimum of $0.5 million (Can)
(Panel B).
Our announcement sample is composed of 92 new credit agreements, 27 renewals,
and three announcements including a new and a revised credit agreement (Panel A). A
credit agreement is classified as new if the announcement in the Globe & Mail makes no
mention of a revision or a modification of an existing loan or if it is specifically
identified as a new credit agreement. Otherwise, the loan is classified as a revised credit
agreement.
'°
We control for the number of lenders involved in the credit agreements since Preece and
Mullineaux (1996) observe that the size of the market reaction to loan announcements is a
** The Globe & Mail is a daily newspaper that specializes in economic issues and is the Canadian equivalent of
the Wail Street Journal. Most economic announcements made by Canadian firms are published in this newspaper.
Given that some parent companies are not Canadian corporations, there is a possibility that the
announcements in Canada lag the announcements in foreign countries. We conducted a search using a large
proportion of our sample and found no evidence that such a lag exists.
" Previous studies provide evidence that the market reaction to the disclosure of a revised credit agreement
depends on the type of revision (i.e., favorable, unfavorable, or mixed). Using the criteria defined by Lummer and
McConnell (1989) to distinguish between the announcements (time until maturity, relative interest rates, debt
covenants, and the dollar amount), we find that our sample of renewals is mostly composed of favorable
revisions. Given that the fi^equency of the two other types of revisions is relatively low, we do not control for type
of revision in our tests.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
(A) Sample composition
Number of observations
Full sample
Lines of credit
Term loans
Lines of credit and term loans
New credit agreements
Revised credit agreements
New and revised credit agreements
Credit agreements provided by single banks
Credit agreements provided by multiple banks
122
50
57
15
92
27
3
40
82
(B) Loan amount, firm size and leverage ratio
Number of observations Mean (S.D.) Median Minimum Maximum
Loan amount (in million of dollars)
Full sample" 112
Lines of credit 49
Term loans 49
Lines of credit and
term loans 14
New agreements'' 87
Revised agreements 23
Firm size (in million of dollars)
Full sample 122
Leve-rage ratio
Full sample 122
317(541) 125 0.5 2520
316(483) 100 4.1 2250
303 (590) 111 0.5 2520
372(581) 198 34.6 2200
327 (581) 111 0.5 2520
284 (380) 150 4.1 1400
2229 (5847) 464 0.8 38,092
0.55 (0.27) 0.58 0.01 1. 65
(C) CEO-Chair structures
Combined CEO-Chair structure Separate CEO--Chair structure Unknown
Full sample 57
Small firms 27
Large fums 30
(D) Institutional shareholder
60
29
31
5
5
Presence of an institutional shareholder Absence of an institutional shareholder Unknown
Full sample 60
Small fums 3
1
Large firms 29
(E) Composition of the board of directors
62
30
32
Mean (S.D.) Median Minimum Maximum
Size of board of directors 10.3 (3.90)
Number of outside directors 7.6 (3.67)
10
7
5
2
21
17
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 {continued)
(F) Ownership of directors on the board
Number of observations Mean (S.D.) Median Mmimum Maximum
Full sample 119 0.14(0.23) 0.03 0.00 0.97
(G) International audit firms
Presence of an international audit firm Absence of an international audit firm Unknown
Full sample HI 11
'^ All required information is available for a total of 112 observations.
'' Out of the 1 12 observations in this sub-sample, 2 releases contained both a new and revised credit agreement.
declining function of the number of lending banks. Petersen and Rajan (1994) provide
evidence that concentration of borrowing has value for small firms. In our sample, 40
agreements were issued by a single bank, while a syndicate of banks was involved in 82
cases (Panel A).
Panels C to F provide information with respect to some determinants of the sample
firms' corporate-governance structures. The first variable of interest for this study is the
presence of a Combined CEO-Chair structure versus a Separate CEO-Chair structure
(Panel C). We were able to obtain this information for a total of 117 firms; 57 firms
have a Combined CEO-Chair structure, while 60 firms have a Separate CEO-Chair
structure. Note that leadership structure does not appear to be related to firm size.
Specifically, for small firms (i.e., firms where total assets are lower than the median
value for the entire sample of fums), 27 out of 56 companies that disclose this
information have a Combined CEO-Chair structure (the information is not available
for five firms). For large firms, 30 out of 61 firms have a Combined CEO-Chair
structure.
Panel D presents the statistics relating to large institutional shareholders. A total of 60
firms in our sample have an institutional shareholder (i.e., a shareholder having at least
10% of the voting rights) and 62 firms do not have an institutional shareholder. The
presence or absence of an institutional shareholder does not seem to be related to firm size.
Panel E provides information relating to the number of directors on the board and the
proportion of outsiders on the board. *^ The boards of directors for firms in our sample vary
in size fi-om 5 to 21 members and have an average of 10.3 directors (median of 10). The
number of outside directors varies between 2 and 17, with an average of 7.6 (median of 7).
Panel F presents statistics about director ownership.
The information content of bank credit agreements is measured by the change in a
firm's market value at the time of the announcement (using an event-study
methodology). As in Aintablian and Roberts (2000), Andre et al. (2001), Brown and
Warner (1980), and James (1987), among others, excess returns are calculated using the
'
' A member of the board of directors is considered to be an outsider if she is not employed by the company
(otherwise she is treated as an insider). This definition is not perfect since there are affiliated outside board
members who are not necessarily independent (i.e., grey directors). To compensate, in our analysis we use 55% as
the cutoff point, rather than 50%, in determining whether a board is dominated by outsiders.
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market model, and the two-day event window is defined as the day of the announcement
in the Globe & Mail (?= 0) and the previous day {t = —\). The parameters of the market
model on daily returns are estimated over the period ? = — 170 to t= — 2\ prior to the
announcement.'^ Pearson-correlation coefficients for the variables used in the tests are
presented in Table 2.
4. Results
4.1. The market reaction to the disclosure of bank credit agreements
Table 3 presents the average announcement excess return at the disclosure of bank
credit agreements. As indicated in Panel A, we observe a positive market reaction to the
disclosure ofbank credit agreements for the sample overall (average announcement excess
return of 2.19 and a z-statistic of 3.04), which is consistent with the extant literature (see,
for example, Aintablian & Roberts, 2000; James, 1987). This result is consistent with the
view that banks play an important role in corporate governance through their screening
and monitoring activities.
The market reaction is positive and significant, at a 1% level, when a firm receives a
term loan but it is not significant when it receives a line of credit. However, the null
hypothesis that the two market reactions are the same cannot be rejected at conventional
levels (^-statistic of 0.72). This can be explained by the lower level of bank commitment
associated with lines of credit (caused by the introduction of legal capital adequacy
requirements).'^
For new credit agreements, the average announcement excess return is 1 .97%, which is
statistically different fi"om zero at a level of 1% (z-statistic of 2.74). For revised credit
agreements, the average excess return is 2.69% and is not statistically significant fi-om zero
(z-statistic of 0.84). The null hypothesis that the two market reactions are the same cannot
be rejected at conventional levels (^statistic of 0.03). Using U.S. data, Lummer and
McConnell (1989) obtain an excess return of —0.01% for new credit agreements while
Best and Zhang (1993) obtain an excess return of 0.26%.'"^ We find that the market
reaction is positive and significant at a 1% level when the credit agreement is provided by
a single bank, and it is significant at a 10% level when it is issued by multiple banks. The
null hypothesis that the market reactions are the same cannot be rejected at conventional
levels (/-statistic of 1.05).
' To correct for thin-trading problems, missing returns are calculated using the bid and ask prices disclosed in
the TSE Western database. More precisely, the price used to calculate a daily return is assumed to be the mean of
the bid and ask prices when no transaction is recorded for that day. However, when a significant proportion of the
returns were missing, the firm was eliminated from the sample (13 firms).
' In their study, Andre et al. (2001) argue that since banks can eliminate the impact of lines of credit in the
calculation of capital-requirement ratios by reducing their level of commitment, the informativeness of the
disclosure of lines of credit is reduced. Their empirical results support this argument.
' Slovin et al. (1992) observe a positive market reaction to the disclosure of new and revised credit agreements
for small firms but not for large firms. In our sample, the null hypothesis that the two reactions are the same
cannot be rejected even after controlling for size.
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Table 3
Average announcement excess returns
Number of Announcement period z-statistic
observations excess returns (%)
Panel A: Characteristics of bank credit agreements and firm size
Full sample 122 2.19 3.04***
Lines of credit 50 1.33 0.68
Term loans 57 2.47 2.34***
Term loans and lines of credit 15 3.98 2.86***
New credit agreements'* 92 1.97 2.74***
Revised credit agreements 27 2.69 0.84
Credit agreements provided by a single bank 40 3.44 2.60***
Credit agreements provided by multiple banks 82 1.58 1.89*
Panel B: Leadership structures
Separate CEO-Chair 60 3.54 3.50***
Combined CEO-Chair 57 0.55 0.65
***
Three announcements contained both a revised and new credit agreement.
Significant at 0.10 level.
Significant at 0.01 level.
Panel B of Table 3 examines the market reaction to the disclosure of bank credit
agreements while controlling for firm-leadership structure. We observe a positive
significant market reaction for firms with a Separate CEO-Chair structure (average
announcement excess return of 3.54 and a z-statistic of 3.50), but not for firms with a
Combined CEO-Chair structure (average announcement excess return of 0.55 and a z-
statistic of 0.65). The difference between the two market reactions is significant at 5% (t-
statistic of 2.02). This result suggests that firms with a Separate CEO-Chair structure can
obtain a higher total value fi"om a debt contract than firms with a Combined CEO-Chair
structure. In the following section, we will test whether the higher value results fi"om
banks' monitoring activities, effective use of the loan, or both.
4.2. Monitoring activities and the effective use of bank loans
The results of Best and Zhang (1993) and Slovin et al. (1992) imply that bank
monitoring is valuable when the market believes that firms are not already well-monitored.
The leadership structure of a firm can be viewed as an important component of internal
monitoring controls. If a leadership structure is viewed as strong, the market reaction to the
disclosure of bank credit agreements should not depend on the presence of other
monitoring devices. We use both the presence of a large proportion of outsiders on the
board of directors (Hypothesis 1) and the presence of an institutional shareholder
(Hypothesis 2) as alternative monitoring devices.
Panel A of Table 4 presents results when controlling for the proportion of outsiders on
the board (Hypothesis 1). The threshold percentage of outside directors on the board used
to define whether there are a majority of outsiders is 55%. Byrd and Hickman (1992) use
50% as the cutoff point in their study but exclude affiliated outsiders from the outside
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Table 4
Institutional shareholders and the board of directors
Panel A: Proportion of outside directors on the board
Full sample
Less than 55% of the board
At least 55% of the board
Separate CEO-Chair
Percentage of outside directors < 0.55
Percentage of outside directors > 0.55
Combined CEO-Chair
Percentage of outside directors < 0.55
Percentage of outside directors > 0.55
Number of Announcement period 2-statistic
observations" excess returns {%)
19 2.76 2.58***
103 2.08 1.67*
6 7.57 2.05**
54 3.09 3.00***
10 0.62 0.88
47 0.53 0.31
Panel B: Institutional shareholder (IS)
Full sample
Presence of an IS 60
Absence of an IS 62
Separate CEO-Chair
Presence of an IS 29
Absence of an IS 31
Combined CEO-Chair
Presence of an IS 29
Absence of an IS 28
Panel C: Size of the board of directors
Full sample
Number of directors > 9 65
Number of directors < 9 57
Separate CEO-Chair
Number of directors > 9 30
Number of directors < 9 30
Combined CEO-Chair
Number of directors > 9 30
Number of directors < 9 30
Combined CEO-Chair
Number of directors > 9 35
Number of directors < 9 22
1.07
3.27
3.26
3.80
1.80
2.99
0.48
4.13
0.90
6.19
0.90
6.19
0.13
1.22
1.13
3.15**
2.80***
2.16**
-1.56
2.51**
0.70
1.18
1.18
2 yy***
-0.14
1.22
" The total number of observations is 122. However, some information was not available in the disclosure of
the bank credit agreements or in the proxy statements, thus the final sample is smaller.
* Significant at 0.10 level.
** Significant at 0.05 level.
*** Significant at 0.01 level.
director category. In our sample, we do not have access to information that would allow us
to identify affiliated outsiders. To allow for the coarseness of our measure, 55% is used as
the threshold percentage.'^
'^ The results presented in Panel A of Table 4 are robust to the cutoff point chosen. We obtain similar results for
cutoff points between 55% and 75%.
R. Mathieu et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 119-140 133
The first two rows of Panel A in Table 4 do not take into account leadership
structure. In both cases, the market reaction is positive and significant. The null
hypothesis that the two reactions are the same cannot be rejected at conventional levels
(^statistic of 0.34). Therefore, the results of the univariate analysis do not support the
view that firms with a larger proportion of outside directors are better monitored. For
firms with a Separate CEO-Chair structure, the market reaction is significant at the 5%
level for firms with a low percentage of outside directors (average announcement excess
return of 7.57 and z-statistic of 2.05) and is significant at the 1% level for firms with a
large percentage of outside directors (average announcement excess return of 3.09 and z-
statistic of 3.00). The null hypothesis that the two reactions are the same cannot be
rejected (r-statistic of 0.83). For firms with a Combined CEO-Chair structure, the
market reaction is positive but insignificant in both cases.
Panel B of Table 4 examines the market reaction after taking into account the presence
of an institutional shareholder (Hypothesis 2). The first two rows present the market
reaction without controlling for leadership structure. As expected, the market reaction
is positive and significant at a 1% level when there is no institutional shareholder
(average announcement excess return of 3.27% and z-statistic of 3.15). The market
reaction is positive but not significant when there is an institutional shareholder
(average announcement excess return of 1.07 and z-statistic of 1.13). While the
results are consistent with expectations, the null hypothesis that the market reactions
are the same cannot be rejected at conventional levels (/-statistic of 1.51).
When a firm has a Separate CEO-Chair the market reaction is positive and significant
regardless of the presence (or absence) of an institutional shareholder (average
announcement excess return of 3.80 and z-statistic of 2.16 when there is no institutional
shareholder and average announcement excess return of 3.26 and z-statistic of 2.80
otherwise). Furthermore, the null hypothesis that the two reactions are the same cannot be
rejected at conventional levels (/-statistic of 0.25).
When a firm has a Combined CEO-Chair, the market reaction depends on the
presence of an institutional shareholder. When there is an institutional shareholder, the
market reaction is negative but insignificant (average announcement excess return of
— 1.80 and z-statistic of — 1.56). However, when there is no institutional shareholder the
market reaction is positive and significant at a 1% level (average announcement excess
return of 2.99 and z-statistic of 2.51). The null hypothesis that the market reactions are
the same is rejected at a 1% level (/-statistic of 2.65). From Hypothesis 2, these results
suggest that the market perceives firms with a Separate CEO-Chair structure as having
better internal control than firms with a Combined CEO-Structure.
Another possible explanation for the stronger market reaction for firms with a Separate
CEO-Chair structure is that they employ loans more effectively. Ifthis is the case, the market
reaction should be stronger when the board of directors is smaller (Hypothesis 3). Panel C
presents the results after controlling for the size of the board. The threshold number used in
the test for dividing the sample into large and small boards is nine.'^ The first two rows
We use other threshold numbers such as 8, 10, 11, and 12 and obtain similar results. That is, for all of these
threshold numbers, the null hypothesis that the two market reactions are the same can be rejected for the full sample
and for firms having a Separate CEO-Chair structure but not for firms having a Combined CEO-Chair structure.
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present the market reaction before controlling for leadership structure, and indicate that the
market reaction is positive and significant when the board is small (average announcement
excess return of 4.13 and z-statistic of 3.69) and insignificant otherwise (average
announcement excess return of 0.48 and z-statistic of 0.70). The null hypothesis that the
two market reactions are the same is rejected at a 5% level (/-statistic of 2.45).
For firms with a Separate CEO-Chair, the market reaction is positive and significant
at a 1% level when the board is small, and positive but insignificant when the board is
large (average announcement excess return of 6.17 and 0.90, respectively). The null
hypothesis that the two reactions are the same is rejected at the 5% level (/-statistic of
2.47). For firms with a Combined CEO-Chair, the market reaction is insignificant in
both cases and the null hypothesis that they are the same cannot be rejected at
conventional levels (/-statistic of 0.55). These results are consistent with Hypothesis 3.
Overall, the results of the univariate analysis indicate that firms with a Separate CEO-
Chair structure have better control and are more effective in using loans than firms with a
Combined CEO-Chair structure. The results are also consistent with the evidence
provided in Pi and Timme (1993) which indicates that firms with a Separate CEO-Chair
structure are more effective.
We perform an additional analysis to take into account the findings of Brickley et al.
(1997). They provide evidence that a number of firms use the Separate CEO-Chair
structure as a temporary leadership structure when a new CEO is hired, and both titles are
later combined after some time has elapsed. To eliminate the impact of a transitory
leadership structure, we replicate the tests performed in Tables 3 and 4 using only firms
having the same leadership structure over a 3-year period (24 firms were excluded).'^
The results (not reported) are essentially the same for all tests involving leadership
structure.
4.3. Multivariate analysis
In this section, we perform multivariate analyses to examine the relationship between the
market reaction to the disclosure ofbank credit agreements and firm leadership structure in a
more controlled environment. We control for the type of agreement (term loan vs. line of
credit, revised vs. new loan), the concentration ofborrowing (single vs. muhiple banks), the
features ofthe board of directors (proportion of outside directors, director ownership, size of
the board and leadership structure), the type of auditor (intemational audit firm vs. national
audit firm), the presence of an institutional shareholder, and firm leverage. We estimate the
following model using ordinary least-squares (OLS):^^
PE, = a + i^iLOC, + jSjNR, + i53BANK_NUM, + i54CEO_CHAIR, + i^jOUT-DIR,
+ i?6DIR-OWN, + i?7lNTAUD, + i^gLEVERAGE, + j^glNSTIT, + i^ioDIR, + £,
' The time period is limited due to the difficulty in obtaining proxy statements for some sample firms.
"^ Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Johnson (1996) control for heteroscedasticity in cross-sectional stock
returns by using a weighted least-squares regression with the inverse of the relevant standard-prediction errors as
weights. However, tests on our sample of Canadian data indicate that heteroscedasticity is not present, thus we
report results using OLS.
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where: PE = the 2-day excess return; LOC = a dummy variable that takes the value of
"one" when a firm receives a term loan and takes the value of "zero" otherwise;
NR=a dummy variable that takes the value of "one" for a revised loan and takes the
value of "zero" for a new loan; BANK_NUM= a dummy variable that takes the value
of "one" when the loan is provided by a single bank and takes the value of "zero"
when the loan is provided by multiple banks (or when the number of banks cannot be
determined); CEO_CHAIR=a dummy variable that takes the value of "one" when the
frnn has a Combined CEO-Chair structure and "zero: when the firm has a Separate
CEO-Chair structure; OUT_DIR=a dummy variable that takes value of "one" if the
ratio of the number of outside directors to the total number of directors on the board
is greater than 55%, and takes a value of "zero" otherwise; DIR_OWN = the natural
logarithm of the percentage of the voting shares owned by directors; rNTAUD = a
dummy variable that takes the value of "one" if the audit firm is an international audit
firm, and takes a value of "zero" otherwise; LEVERAGE = the financial leverage of the
firm defmed as total liabilities over total assets; INSTIT=a dummy variable that takes
the value of "one" if there is an institutional shareholder, and takes a value of "zero"
otherwise; DIR=the number of directors on the board of directors; and e, = a noise
term.
The predicted sign of the variables are presented in Column A of Table 5. According to
Andre et al. (2001), the announcement of term loans is more informative than the
announcement of lines of credit after 1988 due to changes in capital-adequacy
requirements. Since the majority of the announcements included in our sample are
disclosed after 1988, the sign of the variable LOC is predicted to be positive.
Based on the results of the univariate analysis (Table 3), we predict a negative sign for
the variable NR. Petersen and Rajan (1994) provide evidence that concentration of
borrowing is viewed as good news. Preece and Mullineaux (1996) also provide evidence
that the market reaction is a declining ftanction of the number of lending banks. As a result,
the sign of BANK_NUM is predicted to be positive. ^^ From the results presented in the
univariate analysis, the sign of CEO_CHAIR should be negative. That is, the market
reaction is stronger at the disclosure of bank agreements for firms with a Separate CEO-
Chair structure.
From previous empirical evidence (for example, Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Rosenstein &
Wyatt, 1990) the sign of OUT_DIR is predicted to be negative; as the proportion of
outside directors increases, the impact of banks' monitoring activities is lower. We have no
ex ante prediction for the sign on DIR_OWN since prior literature provides mixed results.
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) provide evidence that firm value first rises with
increases in director ownership and then falls.^^
'^ However, Rajan (1992) claims that the information acquired by a bank can create an "information monopoly"
or hold-up problems in that it is costly for the borrower to switch lenders. Houston and James (1996) support
Rajan's claim by providing evidence that firms borrowing from multiple banks undertake more investment
opportunities than firms borrowing from a single bank since, in the latter case, the firm does not have incentives to
invest in new projects given that the bank uses its information monopoly to capture most of the profits. If this is
the case, the sign of NUMBK could be negative.
"'' We also distinguish between the ownership amounts of inside and outside directors. This distinction does not
alter the reported results.
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Table 5 1
Multivariate analysis
Independent variables (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Sign Results /-statistic Results r-statistic Results /-statistic
Intercept ? 0.0765 2.10** 0.0380 1.07 -0.0015 -0.04
LOC + 0.0163 1.03 0.0196 1.27 0.0098 0.67
NR - 0.0052 0.26 0.0064 0.32 -0.0186 -0.96
BANKJWM + -0.0280 -1.56 -0.0175 -1.00 -0.0188 -1.14
CEO_CHAIR - -0.0317 -1.99** -0.0552 -2.92*** -0.0460 -2.57**
OUT_DIR - -0.0108 -0.44 -0.0189 -0.80 0.0067 0.28
DIR_OWN ? -0.0019 -0.54 -0.0033 -0.97 -0.0012 -0.38
INTAUD - -0.0202 -0.69 -0.0119 -0.42 -0.0055 -0.21
LEVERAGE + 0.0607 1.82* 0.0664 2.06** 0.0698 2.23**
INSTIT - -0.0309 -1.82*
INSTIT_CEO + 0.0528 2.29** 0.0480 2.25**
DIR - -0.0027 -1.14
DIR'^" - -0.0443 -2.43** -0.0313 -1.78*
LOAN + 0.0440 1.18
Number of observations 110 110 101
Adjusted R^ 0.057 0.107 0.095
F value 1.66 2.31 1.95
Pr>F 0.101 0.018 0.042
PE, ^0L + /?,LOC, + iSjNR, + i?3BANK_NUM, + iS4CE0XHAIR, + /?50UT_D1R, + ^^DIR-OWN,
+ ^^7INTAUD, + iSjjLEVERAGE, + ^SglNSTIT, + i9,oDIR, + e,
where: PE=the two-day excess return; LOC=a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a firm
receives a term loan and takes the value of zero otherwise; NR=a dummy variable that takes the value of one
for a revised loan and takes the value of zero for a new loan; BANICJNUM=a dummy variable that takes the
value of "one" when the loan is provided by a single bank and takes the value of "zero" when the loan is
provided by multiple banks (or when the number of banks cannot be determined); CEO_CHALR=a dummy
variable that takes the value of one when the firm has a Combined CEO-Chair structure and zero when the
firm has a Separate CEO-Chair structure; OUT_DIR=a dummy variable that takes value of one if the ratio of
the number of outside directors to the total number of directors on the board is greater than 55% and zero
otherwise; DIR_OWN=the natural logarithm of the percentage of the voting shares owned by the directors;
INTAUD = a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the audit firm is an international audit firm and zero
otherwise; LEVERAGE = the financial leverage of a firm defmed as total liabilities divided by total assets;
INSTIT= a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is an institutional shareholder and zero
otherwise; rNSTIT_CEO = a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm with a Combined CEO-Chair
has no institutional shareholder and zero otherwise; DIR = the number of directors on the board of directors;
jjIRdv ^ ^ dummy variable equal to one if the number of directors of the board exceeds nine and equal to zero
otherwise; and LOAN = the amount of the loan divided by the sum of the total value of assets prior to receiving
the loan plus the value of the loan.
* Significant at 0.10 level.
** Significant at 0.05 level.
*** Significant at 0.01 level.
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Yermack (1996) observes that firm value is significantly higher when officers and
directors have greater ownership, but this ownership variable has an ambiguous
relationship with contemporaneous measures of accounting operating performance.
The sign of INTAUD is expected to be negative since international audit firms are
viewed as being of higher quality than domestic audit firms and this reduces the
impact of bank monitoring activities (Titman & Trueman, 1986). The sign on
LEVERAGE is expected to be positive since additional debt signals the existence of
positive net present-value projects/opportunities for the firm (Johnson, 1996). The sign
of INSTIT is expected to be negative since, in the absence of an institutional
shareholder, banks' monitoring activities are more valuable. Finally, the sign of DIR is
expected to be negative since smaller boards are perceived as being more efficient
(Yermack, 1996)."^
Columns B and C of Table 5 present the results of the regression.^^ The adjusted R^ of
the model is 0.06 and three variables are significant. The coefficient on the variable
CEO_CHAIR is negative and significant at the 5% level (as expected). This resuU is
consistent with the univariate analysis. The coefficient on LEVERAGE is positive and
significant at the 10% level, and the coefficient on INSTIT is negative and significant at
the 10% level as predicted.
The specification of the first model is somewhat weak (F-value of 1.66). To improve
the fit of the model and to relate more closely the multivariate analysis to the univariate
analysis, we redefined some variables. First, we use a dummy variable equal to "one"
when the size of the board of directors exceeds nine and "zero" otherwise (DIR ^).
Consistent with the univariate analysis, we expect a negative sign on this variable.
Second, we define a dummy variable equal to "one" when a firm with a Combined CEO-
Chair has no institutional shareholder and "zero" otherwise (rNSTIT_CEO). Given that
the bank's monitoring activities are expected to be more valuable when a firm has a
Combined CEO-Chair and no institutional shareholder, we expect a positive sign on this
variable.
The results of the modified model are presented in Columns D and E of Table 5. The fit
of the model has improved (F-value of 2.31 and adjusted R" of 0.11). As in the previous
model, the variable CEO_CHAIR is negative and significant, but the significance level has
improved to a 1% level. The variable DIR''^ is negative, as expected, and significant at a
5% level, while INSTIT_CEO is positive and significant at a 5% level.
Lastly, we introduce the relative loan amount (LOAN) into the regression. LOAN is
defined as the amount of financing provided by the bank divided by the sum of the total
value of assets in the fiscal year prior to the loan plus the amount of financing. The sign on
this variable is expected to be positive since the loan amount signals the bank's willingness
to finance the firm's activities. By introducing this variable, we lose nine observations
" Because there is a high correlation between firm size and board size, we only include the variable DIR in the
regression.
^^ There are a total of 1 1 observations used in the multivariate analysis. We eliminated three announcements
involving both a new and a revised credit agreement, five observations where the leadership structure could not be
determined, and four observations where director-ownership information was not available.
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since the announcements in the financial press do not always provide this information. The
results of this final version of the model are presented in Columns F and G of Table 5. The
adjusted R^ is 0.10 while the F-value declines slightly to 1.95. Overall, the inclusion of the
relative loan amount (LOAN) does not substantively alter the results of the model from
those reported in Columns D and E of Table 5.^^
In summary, the CEO-Chair variable is negative and at least significant at a 5% level in
all three iterations of the model. This indicates that leadership structure has a significant
impact on corporate control even when we control for the presence of other monitoring
devices (the presence of an institutional shareholder and the presence of outside directors
on the board) and for the efficiency of the board (the size of the board). Combining this
observation with the results fi-om the univariate analysis, we argue that the Separate CEO-
Chair structure is more effective than the combined CEO-Chair structure with respect to
the use of loans.
5. Conclusion
Our results support two distinct valuation/future-performance implications ofnew bank
debt contracts. First, when a firm is organized in a low-agency-cost form (i.e., separation
of CEO and Chair positions) new debt contracts are associated with an increase in firm
value when measured by debt-announcement-period returns. This is consistent with a
value-adding performance role for such an organizational form. Second, for firms
organized in the higher-agency-cost combined CEO-Chair form an increase in firm value
is observed only for firms lacking institutional ownership monitoring. This suggests that
the valuation implications and, by extension, the agency-monitoring impact of
institutional-equity ownership and bank debt ownership are similar for such firms. These
findings are inconsistent with any sort of positive efficiency-gain role for combined CEO-
Chair structures in debt-issuance settings.
We are interested in examining the impact of leadership structure on the ability offirms to
generate value fi^om loans. The use of an event-study methodology enables us to eliminate
the impact ofconfounding factors offirm performance, and hence, the difficulties in relating
performance measures to leadership structure. Another advantage of our approach is that by
narrowing the focus to only consider the impact of firm-leadership structure on the use of
debt, several of the costs associated with a Separate CEO-Chair structure (as raised in
Brickley et al., 1997) become irrelevant in our analysis.
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Abstract
I examine the usefulness (relevance and timeliness) of earnings announcements in two emerging
markets, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores Stock
Exchange (BMV). A weighted least-squares regression is used to test the association of book values
of earnings and equity with firm market value. I find that, on JSE and BMV, earnings and/or book
value of equity are value relevant in explaining stock prices. I also find that this association is greater
in 2000 as compared to 1998 on the BMV. Regarding timeliness, I find that earnings announcements
are accompanied by unusually different returns on JSE, but not on BMV. Market infrastructure,
specifically insider-trading rules, may explain BMV results. I suggest that accounting and market
infrastructure interact and that such interaction is valuable input to the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (lASB) in their deliberations
regarding one set of accounting regulations for all countries.
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1. Introduction
Worldwide convergence of accounting standards has received much attention in
academic and professional accounting literature. A major issue is whether one set of
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accounting standards can be useful for both developed and developing countries
(Amenkhienan, 1986; Falk, 1994; FASB, 1999; Gray & Roberts, 1991; Hove, 1989;
Samuels & Piper, 1985). Some contend that the differences in culture and business
environment between developed and developing countries are so vast that no one set of
standards can be useful to both kinds of countries. Others argue that, if international
accounting standards are flexible enough to allow for differences in culture and business
practices across nations, then one set of accounting regulations may be useful to developed
and developing countries alike. The objective of this study is to assess whether two
developing countries (South Africa and Mexico) that are moving toward convergence with
developed-country accounting standards (International Accounting Standards and/or U.S.
GAAP) find developed-country standards useful. Here, usefulness is defined as having
value relevance and timeliness.
The International Accounting Standards Board (lASB) and the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) publish frameworks to which they refer when promulgating
accounting standards. Both fi^ameworks define useful accounting reporting as information
that possesses the qualitative characteristics of relevance and reliability to market
participants worldwide. The frameworks also state that financial reporting should be
timely. In this study, timeliness is assumed when there are abnormal share-price returns
within a 3-day window of earnings announcements.
I focus on whether developing countries' firm-specific accounting earnings and equity,
based on standards that are converging with IFRS and U.S. GAAP, provide value relevant
information as measured by the book values' response coefficients. Similar to extant
accounting research, I use the R^ association test of book values (earnings and equity) with
market value of equity to suggest whether, over time, convergence with developed-country
accounting standards produces persistent or increasing value relevance, R^, in developing
countries (see Ohlson, 1995).
South Africa (specifically the Johannesburg Stock Exchange or JSE) and Mexico (the
Bolsa Mexicana de Valores Stock Exchange or BMV) provide rich settings for testing the
value relevance and information content of developing countries' accounting standards.
Johannesburg is the largest emerging stock market that allows its domestic listers to
comply with IFRS.' JSE allows its domestic listers to use either South African GAAP or
International Accounting Standards (IAS) (Andersen et al., 2001; lASC, 2000). JSE has
been adopting IAS with a lag" as early as 1995^ and in 2005 required all domestic listers to
comply with IFRS. Mexico is the largest emerging stock market converging with U.S.
GAAP as well as IAS. As a result of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
Mexico, Canada and the United States have taken steps to converge accounting standards
The two largest emerging stock exchanges are China and Taiwan, neither of which permits IFRS for its
domestic hsters.
"
"With a lag" means that, after an IAS or IFRS was promulgated by the lASC or lASB, the South Afiica
Institute of Chartered Accountants would review the standard before adopting it as part of South African GAAR
^ Juta Service stated that South African GAAP was developed to be in line with IAS as early as 1995 when
publishing the background on "Net profit or loss for the period, fiindamental errors and changes in accounting
policies." (See Everingham & Watson, 1 999. Generally accepted accounting practice: A South African viewpoint.
The Republic of South Aftnca: Juta and Co. LTD, p. 48).
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(Agami & Cascini, 1995). The Mexican Institute of Public Accountants also requires
compliance with IFRS on a supplementary basis when Mexican GAAP is silent (Andersen
et al., 2001). South Africa converged with 11 IAS and Mexico converged with five
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SPAS), one Accounting Principles Board
(APB) Opinion, and four IAS between 1998 and 2000 (see Appendix A for more details).
My study is unique because prior studies on the useftilness of IAS have focused on Asian
or German countries (Bartov, Goldberg, & Kim, 2004; Eccher & Healy, 2003; Hung &
Subramanyam, 2004).
The differences in financial-reporting practices between nations make it difficult to
compare and interpret financial statements of firms listed in different countries. Similarly,
the costs of providing financial reports prepared in accordance with the host country's
reporting standards are nontrivial (Biddle & Saudagaran, 1991) and can influence a
multinational firm's choice of foreign-listing location (Saudagaran & Biddle, 1995). These
costs, as well as the pressure of exchanges in competition for foreign listings, have led to
demands for international convergence of accounting standards.
While convergence of accounting standards may make foreign capital more accessible
to large firms, extant accounting literature suggests that standards promulgated for
developed countries may not be usefiil for market participants in emerging markets. U.S.
GAAP and IFRS were developed and heavily influenced by developed counfries for
market participants on developed stock exchanges. Nair (1982) argues that British and
U.S. financial reports are prepared for investors in organized capital markets, whereas
Latin American and Afiican financial reports are prepared for creditors, owner-managers,
and tax collectors. Hence, accounting standards and financial reports with the investor as
the intended subject may not be useful for market participants in Latin America, Asia, or
Afiica.
Like Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (2001), I believe that the value-relevance model
provides insight to the lASB and FASB regarding relevance and reliability. Information is
relevant when it faithfiilly represents that which it purports to represent without bias. The
lASB (2004), lASC (1989), and FASB (1980) define relevance as input that helps users
evaluate the past, present, or future of an entity. The information should assist users in
explaining stock-price movements as well as other factors such as dividend and wage
payments, ftiture financial position, and the ability of a firm to pay its obligations when
due. I understand that financial reports are supposed to be relevant and reliable for a
number of applications, such as debt and management compensation confracts. My
assumption, like that of Barth et al. (2001), is that the primary focus of lASB and FASB
standard setting is equity investment decisions. Relevance and reliability imply that there
should be a significant association between book value of earnings and equity with firm-
specific stock market returns.
Some empirical evidence suggests that the market may not respond immediately to
public information when it is disseminated (see Bhattacharya, Daouk, Jorgenson, & Kehr,
2000; Holthausen & Watts, 2000). That is "information may be highly relevant and
reliable but of little use to those who have had to make decisions in the interim" (lASC,
1989, paragraph 43).
Unlike the United States, many developing countries have heavily concentrated
ownerships in their financial markets. Shareholders of these corporations own large blocks
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of shares and often times are active in corporate governance (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishney, 1998). These large shareholders, then, may possess private
information that is unknown to others until a public announcement is made. Extant
literature suggests that both JSE and BMV have historically had low market integrity.
Market integrity is defined as the country-specific legal rules related to shareholder rights
and insider trading. In the past, family-controlled companies have dominated the Mexican
market (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999) and institutional conglomerates
have dominated the South African market, although recently this has diminished (Choi &
Meek, 2005). If a market is dominated by insiders, earnings announcements may be fiiUy
anticipated. In such a market, earnings announcements will bring no surprises and thus no
significant changes in stock prices because insiders will have incorporated their superior
information through trades prior to the announcement date.
I test for timeliness using an information-content model. If earnings announcements
contain timely information, then market participants should respond in a timely manner. I
study the market's reaction to earnings within a 3-day event window. If there is a
significant difference in abnormal returns at the event period, then I assume that earnings
are reported in a timely fashion. That is, I test whether good (bad) news is associated with
positive (negative) abnormal returns where positive (negative) returns are defined as
earnings higher (lower) than the mean analysts' earnings forecast.
First, I provide evidence on whether the lASC's and FASB's qualitative characteristics
of financial reports-relevance and reliability-are experienced in two developing countries'
capital markets. I find that the JSE's and BMV's reported earnings and/or book value of
equity are significant in explaining market prices. Further, convergence to IAS and U.S.
GAAP reporting standards have resulted in increased explanatory power between
accounting earnings and book value of equity with market prices on the BMV. I conclude
that developing-country GAAP converging with IAS and U.S. GAAP can produce
relevant and reliable information in developing countries. Because these qualitative
characteristics are considered by the lASB and FASB when selecting among alternative
accounting treatments, my evidence shows that it may be possible to develop one set of
accounting standards that will be useful for both developed and developing countries.
A second question addressed is whether financial reports are disseminated in a timely
manner. Saudagaran and Diga (1997, p. 48) suggest that "the underlying infi-astructure of
emerging capital markets is sufficiently different from those in developed markets to affect
the efficiency by which information is processed." Moreover, the relevance and reliability
of financial reports in emerging markets may depend on market-integrity factors, such as
the presence of insider-information trading and degree of shareholder rights. I find that
earnings announcements are accompanied by significantly different returns on JSE, but not
on BMV. These findings infer that the FASB and lASB should be concerned about the
interaction of relevance and timeliness of financial reporting with capital-market
infrastructure for equity investors in developing countries.
The remainder of this paper is presented as follows. Section 2 presents the accounting
standards and investor-protection laws in South Africa and Mexico. Section 3 describes
the hypotheses and method of analysis. Section 4 explains the sample-selection process
and the empirical results of the hypotheses tested. Finally, in Section 5, I provide a
summary and suggestion for future research.
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2. Background
South Africa and Mexico are developing counfries converging with developed-
country GAAP, specifically IFRS and U.S. GAAP. The following section provides
backgrounds on South Africa's and Mexico's accounting standards and capital-market
development and infrastructure. IFRS has a strong Western-world or developed-country
influence, as both Great Britain and the United States have played leading and dominant
roles in the promulgation of IFRS. Additionally, U.S. GAAP is that of a developed
country: America.
2.1. Accounting standards
South Africa was settled by Europeans in 1652 and became a British Colony. By 1828,
English was the only official language. In 1910, South Africa was granted colonial self-
governance and became the independent Union of South Africa, although it remained a
colony of Great Britain. In 1931, South Africa became independent and in 1961 left the
Commonwealth Nations to become a republic (World Book Encyclopedia, 1990).
However, as a result of the long association with Britain, South Africa's government
and legal system reflect that of the British Common Law.
The Council of the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) and the
Accounting Practices Board, an accounting self-regulatory body, promulgates South
African accounting standards. SAICA has been adopting IFRS with occasional minor
modifications since 1 995 and listed companies may follow South African GAAP or IFRS
(lASB, 2000). During 1999, South Africa adopted over six IAS, effective in 2000,
bringing South African accounting principles into almost complete harmonization with
IAS (Crotty, 1999). Moreover, from 1998 to 2000, South Africa converged with 11 IAS
(see Appendix A for more details).
While convergence of accounting standards may be preferred in South Africa, the
technical director of Saica, Blumberg (see Crotty, 1999), believes that complying with IAS
does not come without complications. She states that South African companies were to be
given lead time to allow for compliance with LAS in 2000 as South African companies
have not had a good track record of compliance with accounting principles (see Crotty,
1999). van Niekerk (1999) expressed the concern that IAS is required but not legally
enforceable. Hence, South Africa's adoption of LAS may not result in relevant reporting to
South African market participants. But most of the JSE companies in my sample are
audited by one of the then Big 8 international accounting firms, implying understanding of
and compliance with IAS.
McGregor and McGregor (1995) show that, prior to 1995, Anglo American and Sanlam
owned 40.5% and 12.8%, respectively, of the JSE market capitalization. Hence, the JSE
market may be dominated by institutional investors who have a controlling ownership of
the common shares of a company. However, from 1998 to 2000, I find that Anglo
American had greater than a 20% or controlling interest in only three of my sample firms
and Sanlam had greater than a 20% interest in only one of my sample firms. I tested
whether the presence of institutional owners with controlling interests explained value
relevance on the JSE and found no support.
14.29 -8.28 -17.29 7.60
1.28 1.09 0.89 -2.11
76.65 13.11 27.03 228.51
0.51 -0.66 0.61 0.26
0.84 0.93 0.77 0.68
24 24 16 64
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Table 1
Difference in net income reported using U.S. and Mexican GAAP
Year 1997 1998 1999 1997-1999
Mean (in millions)
Median (in millions)
Standard deviation
Test of means: parametric Z-test statistic
Test of medians: Wilcoxon Z-test statistic
Number of observations
Mexico was conquered by the Spanish in 1951 and was a Spanish colony until it
became independent in 1821 (World Book Encyclopedia, 1990). Mexico is the most
populated of the Latin American countries and is both a Spanish- and English-speaking
country. Mexico is strongly influenced by the United States and is a substantial trading
partner with the United States, thereby explaining the enactment of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that dismantled trade barriers to foreign investment
between these two countries. More recently, Mexico, Canada, and the United States have
initiated annual meetings to orchestrate the convergence of their accounting standards.
Mexico continues to use U.S. textbooks and professional literature in their accounting-
education classrooms and as guides for accounting issues.
Accounting regulations and auditing standards are issued by a private standard-setting
body: The Mexican Institute of Public Accountants (Choi, Frost, & Meek, 2002; Davis-
Friday & Rivera, 2000). The Mexico accounting standard-setting process is similar to that
of the British-American approach with exposure drafts disseminated to the public for
review and comment. Accounting standards are promulgated by the Accounting Principles
Commission (CPC) of the Mexican Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Mexico's
accounting standards are called "Bulletins." From 1998 to 2000, Mexico converged with
five SFAS, one APB Opinion, and four LAS (see Appendix A for details).
With few exceptions, Bulletins are essentially similar to U.S. and Canadian GAAP
(Davis-Friday & Rivera, 2000; Securities & Exchange Commission, 1996).^ I confirm the
similarity of Mexican GAAP to U.S. GAAP by examining the net incomes of Mexican
firms listed on U.S. exchanges. The SEC requires foreign companies to complete a form
20-F with reconciliation between home country and U.S. GAAP reporting. I obtain a
sample of 20-Fs for Mexican firms by searching Lexis-Nexis for the names of 93 Mexican
companies listed on DataStream. Of these, 29 filed a 20-F between January 1 997 and
December 2000. Table 1 provides the mean and median difference in reported net income,
where the difference is calculated as net income reported using U.S. GAAP less net
income reported using Mexican GAAP.
For each year, the median difference between U.S. and Mexican reported net income is
about $1 million. Two-sample /-tests and Wilcoxon matched-pairs tests are used to
measure whether the population means and medians differ significantly between net-
'^ One notable difference between Mexican and U.S. GAAP is that, while U.S. GAAP prohibits revaluation of
fixed assets subsequent to the initial purchase cost, Mexican GAAP permits revaluation of fixed assets. Unlike the
United States, Mexico has historically been a hyperinflationary business economy.
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income reported using U.S. GAAP and net-income reported using Mexican GAAP. I find
no significant difference in reported net income under the two standards.
While the United States has a dominant influence on accounting standards in Mexico,
Mexico also shows signs of convergence with LAS. For example, Mexico was one of the
founding member countries of the lASC in 1973. IAS is to be followed by Mexican
companies when Mexican GAAP is silent (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants,
2002). In December 1995, the Mexican bank regulatory agency began requiring Mexican
banks to apply accounting principles consistent with those of IAS (lASC, 2000).
However, unlike the United States, the Mexican capital market is said to be controlled
by families (La Porta et al., 1999). These families who have more than 10% of outstanding
equity have the right to privileged information (see Bhattacharya et al., 2000).
In summary, both South Afiica and Mexico are converging and, in some instances,
complying with IFRS and/or U.S. GAAP. In South Afi^ica, complying with South Afiican
GAAP is complying with IFRS, though not vice versa, and in Mexico many of the
accounting regulations replicate or are highly influenced by U.S. GAAP and IAS.
2.2. Capital market structure
Usefulness implies that accounting has a dual role: relevance/reliability and timeliness.
Investor protection differs across countries (Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Frost & Pownall,
1994). Defond and Hung (2004) and Saudagaran and Diga (1997) suggest that varying
investor-protection laws and enforcement in capital markets across the world may affect
the timing of when information is processed. For example, emerging capital markets may
allow insider trading or may have poor investor-protection laws. These capital market
environments may affect the timing of when earnings are known to the market.
Timely financial reporting is essential to reduce information asymmetry between
market participants. Unlike the United States, many developing countries have heavily
concentrated ownerships in their financial markets. These principal shareholders will have
incorporated their superior information through trades prior to the announcement date.
I describe the market infrastructure of two developing countries' stock exchanges. Then
I measure the reaction to annual-earnings announcements within a short, 3-day window to
suggest whether market infrastructure, specifically insider-frading laws, affects the
information content of earnings announcements.
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) became privately owned after the end of apartheid
in 1995. The JSE is the 16th largest market in the world and the third largest^ emerging
market (see Jefferis & Okeahalam, 1999). As shown in Table 2, at the end of 1998, JSE
had total market capitalization of more than $262 billion and 668 listed companies (World
Bank, 1999). In 1998, the exchange implemented an automated electronic-matching
system: Johannesburg Equity Trading (JET). Dealers sell and buy orders at their
investment house JET workstations. The JET system inserts orders into a queue and the
main board ranks the orders based on a price/time priority. During the exchange hours.
The South African Stock Exchange is third largest in size, with China and Taiwan having the first and second
largest domestic-share capitalization, respectively (see Choi et al., 2002).
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Table 2
JC1998 capital market description
South Africa (JSE) Mexico (BMV)
Market capitalization 000s of U.S. dollars
Rank among emerging markets
Number of companies listed
Average company size
Compliance
Institutional ownership
Concenfration of ownership
Voting rights rule
Shareholder voting rights overall
Restriction on trading before meeting
Proxy-by-mail rights
% Shares needed to call a shareholder's meetine
262,478,000 154,044,000
3rd 8th
668 188
392,900 819,400
Not strong Not strong
Yes, companies Yes, families
63.6% 52%
No one-share one-vote No one-share one-vote
Very Sfrong—
5
Weak—
1
No Yes
Yes No
5% 33%
Sources: Voting rights data are from La Porta et al. (1998). All other data are derived from the World
Development Report (World Bank, 1999) and DataSfream.
9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., buying and selling orders at the same price level are automatically
matched. After JET replaced the outcry floor of the JSE in May 1998, daily trades
increased from 2933 in February 1995 to 18,187 in May 1998 (MGK Maher BCom,
1 999). I study the JSE after implementation of JET.
The JSE requires all listing firms to provide annual financial statements that are in
English and audited by an independent accountant. Statements must be mailed to
shareholders and submitted to the JSE Listings Division "within six months after year-
end or at least 21 clear days before the date of the annual general meeting"
(Johannesburg Stock Exchange Listings Division, 1999, pp. 3-23). If audited aimual
reports are not distributed to shareholders within 3 months of the financial year-end, a
preliminary financial report must be distributed to the shareholders even if the report is
unaudited.
Table 2 presents the JSE market infrastructure. JSE has very sfrong voting rights, no
restriction on trading before a meeting, and proxy voting by mail. However, Block (2000)
argues that insider trading is rampant on the JSE. The average holdings of the three largest
shareholders for South African firms are 63.6% (La Porta et al., 1998). La Porta et al.,
(1998) provide evidence of an inverse relationship between market integrity and
ownership concentration. However, they also report very sfrong shareholder rights on
the JSE and Prather-Kinsey in 1 999 found substantially increased surveillance of insider
trading on the JSE with stiff penalties for violations.
Bolsa Mexicana de Valores Stock Exchange (BMV), located in Mexico City, is
privately owned by a few Mexican brokerage houses. Trading began in the 1850s when
Americans and Europeans traded mining shares on the streets in Mexico. Trading on the
Bolsa floor did not begin until October 1895 (Bhattacharya et al., 2000). Since then,
various institutions have provided facilities for the trading of shares in Mexico. The BMV
is the only stock exchange in Mexico.
Regulation for the BMV was promulgated by the Credit Organization Law of 1932 and
the Exchange Regulation Law in 1933 unfil 1975. After 1975, the Securities Market Act
govemed the BMV (see Bhattacharya et al., 2000). As noted in Table 2, the BMV had 188
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issuers, not including mutual funds, and over $154 billion in capitalization at the end of
1998. It is the largest developing stock exchange that is converging with U.S. GAAP.
Listing firms must provide annual, December 31 year-end, audited financial reports.
The National Banking and Securities Commission is responsible for enforcing insider-
trading laws, and states that inside information consists of "the acts of a corporation,
accountants or administrators of a said corporation, which is not divulged to the public
investor, but which can influence the prices and quotations of the stock's price of said
corporation" (Bhattacharya et al, 2000, p. 74). Block (2000) and Davis-Friday and Frecka
(2002) assert that the BMV continues to be plagued with the perception of unchecked
insider trading. Moreover, Mexican companies often issue multiple classes of equity that
discriminate between foreign and domestic traders. These observations suggest that BMV
may have poor market integrity.
Mexican protection rules are rooted in French civil law. French civil law provides the
poorest legal protection to its shareholders (La Porta et al, 1998). As presented in Table 2,
La Porta et al. (1999) report that BMV has the weakest shareholder rights and does not
allow proxy-by-mail voting rights.
In summary, capital markets in both countries exhibit mixed characteristics relative to
market infrastructure. JSE and BMV have historically had institutional or family
dominated capital markets. However, on JSE, the companies in my sample tend not to
be controlled by institutions (only 4 with controlling owners), have strong investor-
protection laws, and increased surveillance and penalties for insider trading. On the other
hand, Mexico has 12 companies with controlling family/institution owners, poor investor-
protection laws, and no evidence of strong enforcement of insider-trading laws. Mexican
investors, then, may be privy to accounting firm-specific information before it is released
to the public, resulting in a market's non-response (no information content) to the
announcement of earnings.
I assess the relevance and reliability of financial-statement information in two ways.
First, I measure the presence of a significant relation between market value and accounting
information: book value of equity and/or earnings. Book values are value relevant in both
markets: there is a positive and significant association between firm market value with
financial statement reported earnings and/or equity values.
Second, I examine the information content of earnings announcements. For the South
African sample, I find an immediate reaction to earnings announcements. Both trading
activity and returns increase immediately and significantly at the time of the
announcement of earnings. In contrast, on the Mexican stock exchange, I find no overall
significant change in abnormal returns at the time of earnings announcements. The lead-
lag relationship between A-shares and B-shares' abnormal returns, respectively, suggest
that the market infi-astructure supports insider trading on the BMV.
3. Hypotheses and method of analysis
Prior studies show that the usefulness of financial reporting varies across countries.
Alford, Jones, Leftwich, and Zmijewski (1993) find that earnings announcements have
varying degrees of information content across 17 countries. They link the degree of
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information content to reporting frequency and timeliness and suggest that ftiture research
should link the differences in earnings usefulness to differences in capital-market integrity
(regulation) across countries. To my knowledge, no one has tested the usefulness of
earnings announcements of JSE companies. I use two measures of usefulness-value
relevance to test the relevance of reported earnings and equity and information content to
test the timeliness of financial reporting.
3.1. Value relevance
I use the value-relevance model to examine the relation between firm market values and
accounting measures. For this approach, an accounting variable Ij, has value relevance for
firm 7 at time Mf a function g{ ) maps Ip into the firm's price Pj,:
Pj>=s[ljt) (I)
I use a weighted least-squares regression model to test the value relevance of book values.
MVy/BV,-,_i = ao,l/BVy,,_i + auBV,v/BV,-,_i + a2,NIy,,_i + e^ (2)
where: MV/,= market capitalization (market price per share times the number of shares
outstanding) for firmy at the end of period t; BV; ,_ i =the book value ofcommon equity of
firm 7 at the end of period /—I; NIy, = income statement reported net income for firmy for
the time t—\ to t; e„ = residuals or error term.
This model mitigates the scale effect in price-levels regressions as it precludes
heteroscedasticity and possible coefficient bias associated with the largest firms in the
sample (see Chandra & Balachandran, 1992; Easton & Sommers, 2003). As a diagnostic
test, I use least-squares regression to determine if the error term, e,,, is explained by
principal ownership.
I test for convergence by comparing the weighted least-squares regression models' R"
of 1998 with that of 2000. If the two markets find convergence with developed-country
GAAP useful information, then the R~ of 2000 should be equivalent to or greater than that
of 1998. Therefore, the two hypotheses tested are whether reported income and equity
provide information useful to market participants and further whether convergence with
developed-country standards provides persistent or increasing value-relevant information.
Hypothesis 1. There is a significant association between the book value of earnings and
equity with market value on the JSE and BMV.
Hypothesis la. There is an increased explanatory power of the book value of earnings and
equity with market value in 1998 as compared to 2000^ on the JSE and BMV.
3.2. Information content
An announcement is timely or has information content if it leads to price changes
different from those expected before the announcement. Studies that document price-
''
I select 1 998-2000 as the sample period. During this period, SA adopted the following IFRS, sometimes with
slight modifications, in converging with IFRS.
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related information content for earnings announcements include event-type studies such as
Beaver (1968) and Ball and Brown (1968). I measure information content as an
unanticipated change in the returns of a security. For announcements that are good news,
the announcement has information content if returns are higher than expected; bad news
announcements will have returns lower than expected.
Hypothesis 2. Earnings announcements on the JSE and BMV have information content if
returns are higher than expected for positive earnings surprises and lower than expected
for negative earnings surprises.
I continue the examination of returns by controlling for market movements at the time
of the earnings-announcement period. For each firm announcement/ and day t, I estimate
aj and Pj for the time period / = — 130to— 31:
Rjt = ocj + PjRmj (3)
where Rj, is the return for stocky on day t and Rf„ , is the return on the market for day t. I
use the returns on the JSE and BMV value-weighted market indices fi^om DataStream as
proxies for the market indices in the two markets. The parameters a and P are estimated
using both ordinary least squares and the method developed in Scholes and Williams
(1977). Scholes and Williams' (1977) estimates of the market-model coefficients are used
to compensate for nonsynchronous trading problems associated with infrequently traded
securities. The Scholes-Williams ^ is estimated as
where P]~ is the OLS slope estimate fi^om the linear regression of Rjj on /?„, , i; Pj is the
OLS slope estimate from the linear regression of Rjt on R,„/, p} is the OLS slope estimate
from the linear regression of Rj, on Rni,i+u and p,„ is the estimated first-order
autocorrelation of R^- As in OLS, the intercept estimator forces the estimated regression
line through the sample mean:
aj = Rj - pf'^R,,, (5)
where Rj is the mean return of stocky over the estimation period and R^ is the mean market
return over the estimation period.
The abnormal return (ARy ,) for firm j on each trading day t of the event period is
calculated as
AR,-, = Rjr - ocj - Pj Rr„.t (6)
The average abnormal return (AAR,) on trading day t for a sample of A'^ firms is the
sample mean:
7=1
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I aggregate average abnormal returns for all A^ firms across event days f = — 1, 0, and 1
to calculate a cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR):
CAAR = ^|]'f;AR,, (8)
I examine abnormal returns using a short time window of 3 days (—1, 0, and 1)
surrounding the earnings announcement. Long event windows can include price changes
associated with news other than the release of earnings.
The sample of announcements is divided into two groups, based on whether earnings
are higher or lower than the mean analyst estimate. Based on Hypothesis 2, announce-
ments in a market will have information content if the sample of positive earnings
surprises is accompanied by a positive CAAR and the sample of negative earnings
surprises is accompanied by a negative CAAR.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Sample
My sample consists of JSE and BMV listed companies. I collect announcement dates
for all earnings announcements made in 1998-2000 from Bloomberg and daily price data
are from DataStream. I exclude two JSE armouncements with fewer than 50 frading days
during the estimation period, — 130 to —31. For the value-relevance analysis, I limit the
sample to firms that have earnings and book value of equity from Global Vantage—262
firm-year South African observations and 164 firm-year Mexican observations. Earnings
are measured as total net profit after deducting tax, minority interest, and preference
dividends but before any post-tax extraordinary items, allocation to reserves other than
untaxed reserves, and post-tax disclosed exfraordinary items. The sample selection process
is presented in Table 3.
The final information-content sample consists of 624 JSE and 115 BMV earnings
announcements. The JSE and BMV sample is fairly small in market value compared to the
companies listed on DataSfream. The mean market value for all firms on DataSfream is
$2,941,760,000, but the mean market value for all firms in my JSE sample is
$475,000,000 and BMV sample is $1,950,000,000. The average market capitalization
Table 3
Sample selection criteria 1998-2000
Sample criteria South Africa JSE Mexico BMV
Announcements on Bloomberg
Sufficient returns on DataStream" (information-content sample)
Sufficient earnings and book value of equity data on Global
Vantage (value-relevance sample)
"
I exclude firm-year observations with less than 50 of the 100 trading days during the estimation period, that is,
the firm-year trades less than 50% of the days during the estimation period.
314 309
624 115
262 164
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for domestic firms on the JSE and BMV are approximately $392.9 million and $819.4
million (Standard & Poor's, 2000). My sample firms, then, tend to be larger than the
market capitalization of domestic fums listed on JSE and BMV, respectively.
The distribution of announcement dates appears in Table 4. As can be seen in Panel B,
the most fi^equent month for earnings announcements on JSE is August, with 126 earnings
announcements. Only six firms announced earnings in January. JSE earnings-announce-
ment dates are spread throughout the year, with 46% of the announcements in the first half
of the year and 54% of the announcements in the second half of the year. Further, as shown
in Panel A, the announcements are fairly evenly distributed across the years 1998-2000.
This dispersion of earnings-announcement dates throughout the 3 -year period minimizes
the effect that market-wide events on any given day, month, or year, may have on stock
prices or trading activities. On the other hand, BMV announcements are all within the fnst
three months of the year with February having the greatest number of announcements, 78.
The BMV requires all listed firms to provide annual reports using December 3 1 year-ends.
Panel C of Table 4 presents the distribution of the sample firms by industry for South
Afiica and Mexico. My sample spans all of the one-digit standard industrial-classification
codes. Except for finance, insurance and real estate, and wholesale and retail trade in South
Afi-ica, and manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade in Mexico, no one industry
accounts for more than 12% of the sample. Thus, there is little evidence of industry
clustering in the sample.
Table 5 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for market value, reported net
income, and book value of equity. The strongest correlation of the South Afi-ica variables
is between market value with book values of net income and equity. The strongest
correlation in the Mexican market is between the independent variables book values of net
income and common equity. Therefore, variance-inflation factors (VIF) were used to test
for significant multicollinearity among the independent variables.
Table 6 shows the mean, median, and standard deviation ofbook values of earnings and
equity, market value of common equity, and book values of net income and market value
scaled by book value. Overall, the scaled book values of net income and equity are greater
in Mexico than in South Afi^ica. The market value of common equity, and book values of
net income and common equity increased from 1998 to 2000 in South Afiica and Mexico.
These findings indicate a growing economy and capital market fi-om 1998 to 2000 in both
developing countries.
4.2. Value relevance
I test whether there is an association between book values of earnings and equity with
firm market value. Table 7 provides the coefficient estimates, weighted regression model
significance, VIF, and R" for estimation of Eq. (2) for each market, as well as for years
1998 and 2000. Consistent with financial statements providing value-relevant information,
the weighted regression models for the South Africa and Mexico samples have adjusted
/?~'s of 0.55 and 0.70, respectively.^ A significant association exists between market value
Easton and Sommers (2003) find the 7?"'s for their sampled firms to be between 0.19 and 0.80 when
regressing price on earnings.
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Table 4
Distribution of announcement dates and industry classifications
Panel A: distribution of announcement dates by year
Year South Africa (JSE)
N Percent
Mexico (BMV)
A^ Percent
1998
1999
2000
Total
143
220
261
624
22.91
35.26
41.83
100.0
43
32
40
115
37.39
27.83
34.78
100.0
Panel B: distribution of announcements by month
Month South Africa (JSE) Mexico (BMV)
N Percent N Percent
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Total
6
32
46
33
108
65
28
126
84
35
52
9
624
0.96
5.13
7.37
5.29
17.31
10.42
4.49
20.19
13.46
5.61
8.33
1.44
100
13
78
24
11.30
67.83
20.87
115 100.00
Panel C: industry distribution
1
-digit SIC code Description Number of firms
South Africa
1 Agriculture, mining, and construction 28
2 Manufacturing—food, paper, chemicals, and petroleum products 27
3 Manufacturing—metal, machinery and equipment, and electronics 39
4 Transportation, communication, electric gas, and sanitary services 10
5 Wholesale and retail trade 56
6 Finance, insurance, and real estate 70
7 Services—hotel, personal, business, repairs, motion picture, and amusement 26
8 Services—health, legal, education, and other 4
9 Public administration 2
Total 262
Mexico
1 Agriculture, mining, and construction 7
2 Manufacturing—food, paper, chemicals, and petroleum products 40
3 Manufacturing—metal, machinery and equipment, and electronics 28
4 Transportation, communication, electric gas, and sanitary services 12
5 Wholesale and retail trade 42
6 Finance, insurance, and real estate 17
7 Services—hotel, personal, business, repairs, motion picture, and amusement 7
9 Public administration 1
1
Total 164
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Table 5
Pearson correlation coefficients: South Africa and Mexico 1998-2000
Market value BV equity Net income
Panel A: South Africa
Market value
Net income
BV equity
Panel B: Mexico
Market value
Net income
BV equity
1.000
1.000
0.604***
1.000
0.825***
1.000
0.559***
1.000
0.750***
0.866***
1.000
***/7<0.0001.
and earnings for the sample overall and for 1998 and 2000. This association is greater in
Mexico than in South Africa for the full sample and year 2000, but the association is
greater in South Africa in 1998. The book value of common equity is significant in
explaining market values on the JSE but not on the BMV. In summary, there is a positive
and significant relationship between book values of earnings and/or equity on the JSE and
BMV; however, the explanatory power of book values is greater on the BMV except in
year 1998.
Table 6
Mean, median, and standard deviation: South Africa and Mexico
Rands/Pesos
No. of Market value Net income NI/BV Book value 1/BV
observations of common
equity (MC)
(NI) of common
equity (BV)
South Africa
Full sample 262 6488.56 632.62 0.257 3070.11 0.007
2879.12 254.30 0.173 1517.54 0.001
9824.25 1242.04 0.446 4098.63 0.058
1998 96 5242.43 420.31 0.237 2834.26 0.014
2553.97 239.16 0.166 1351.55 0.001
7391.68 544.70 0.448 4041.86 0.092
2000 63 8009.98 821.13 0.218 3716.44 0.002
3072.58 293.93 0.173 2335.00 0.000
12,960.71 1399.77 0.217 4493.79 0.009
Mexico
Full sample 164 23,675.02 1836.18 0.126 12,295.33 0.000
6596.06 856.27 0.116 7690.34 0.000
67,943.09 4178.38 0.086 18,780.75 0.001
1998 58 10,646.26 1298.42 0.104 11,707.72 0.000
5096.27 792.615 0.104 7376.31 0.000
12,733.08 2961.62 0.056 19,219.80 0.001
2000 50 23,807.53 2147.17 0.144 11,860.17 0.000
7127.38 860.33 0.121 8956.19 0.000
47,480.90 4875.93 0.101 12,333.86 0.000
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Table 7
Value relevance: dependent variable is market value 1998-2000
Full sample Convergence
1998 2000
South Africa—number 262 96 63
of observations
Parameter estimate VIF Parameter estimate VIF Parameter estimate VIF
1/BV 21.370*** 1.01 22.583*** 1.02 141.024*** 1.07
BV/BV 0.539 1.35 -1.561*** 1.31 0.907** 2.16
NI/BV 10.850*** 1.33 22.977*** 1.28 5.377*** 2.06
F-value 109.50*** 430.7*** 79.60***
Adjusted R~ 0.55 0.93 0.79
Mexico—number of 164 58 50
observations
1/BV -120.213 1.13 -361.681 1.55 -331.304 1.57
BV/BV 0.654*** 3.37 0.805** 4.59 0.455* 3.40
NI/BV 6.033*** 3.19 4.319* 4.67 7.653*** 3.09
F-value 126.85*** 47.52** 98.75***
Adjusted R- 0.70 0.71 0.85
MWj,IBVjj_
I
= ao, l/BVy.,_ , + ai,BV;,/BVy.,_ , + a2rNI;,/BVy.,_ , +e;,.
VIF= variance inflation factor.
Market price is based on closing stock prices 3 months subsequent to fiscal year-end.
NI is earnings is total net profit after deducting tax, minority interest, and preference dividends but before
extraordinary items.
BV is book value of common equity.
I compared the R' of 1998 with that of 2000 to assess whether converging with developed country GAAP results
in more value relevance over the database period. Using the Vuong test, there were no significant differences
between 1998 and 2000.
*/7<0.01.
** ;?<0.001.
*** ;?<0.0001.
The other research question relative to value relevance was whether the JSE and BMV
capital markets find financial reporting converging with developed-country GAAP useful.
The results indicate that the TJ-'s are greater at the end of the database period, 2000, for
Mexico (i?" = 0.85) than at the beginning of the database period, 1998 (/?~ = 0.71).
However, in South Afiica, there is a decrease in the explanatory power of book values
from 1998 (/?^ = 0.93) to the end of the database period, 2000 (R~ = 0J9). During this
period, South Afiica was accepting IAS with a lag and Mexico was adopting U.S. GAAP
and LAS methodologies.
I used the Vuong test to assess whether the adjusted R'^'s between 1998 and 2000 were
significantly different. The Vuong Z-test statistic was not significant. Thus, while I find an
increase in /?^ between 1 998 and 2000 for Mexico, I find no evidence that 7?" 's between 1998
and 2000 are significantly different. These findings must be interpreted with caution, as I had
to delete those firms that did not have data in both 1998 and 2000 and the database includes
only 3 years. Further, unlike Dechow (1994), I measure the R^ between two time periods
rather than within one time period. I therefore conclude that Mexico, converging with
developed-country GAAP, had marginal increases in value relevance from 1998 to 2000.
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4.2.1. Diagnostics
I tested for multicollinearity using variance inflation factors (VIFs). The VIFs are
presented in Table 7. The VIFs tended to be less than 10. I therefore assumed that the
independent variables were orthogonal to each other and that multicollinearity was not
present in the weighted least-squares regression models.
I was concerned that firm market values also might have been explained by the presence
of a principal owner that controlled greater than 20% of common shares outstanding.
Disseminating information in developed-country GAAP (for example South African
companies reporting using IAS on the London Stock Exchange and Mexican companies
reporting using U.S. GAAP on the New York Stock Exchange) may overstate the value
relevance of financial reports prepared in domestic country GAAP. I define developed-
country GAAP as Afi-ican or Mexican firms cross-listed on the New York, NASDAQ,
American or London Stock Exchanges, or South Afiican companies that prepare their
financial reports in compliance with IAS or Mexican firms that prepare their financial reports
in compliance with U.S. GAAP or IAS. Developed-country information was collected from
Global Vantage and Mergent Moody's International Manual (2000). Principal owners who
own a controlling or greater than 20% ofthe common shares outstanding may be influencing
the value relevance ofbook values. Thus, I included developed country GAAP and principal
owner as dummy variables to assess whether institution/family also explained the value
relevance of earnings in South Africa and Mexico.
Ordinary least-squares linear regression was used to determine if the residuals in the
weighted least-squares regression were explained by developed-country GAAP disclo-
sures and/or principal owner. My results indicate that, for the full sample of Mexican and
South African firms, value relevance was not further explained by whether the company
also reported in a developed-country GAAP or whether a principal owner owned greater
than 20% of the common shares outstanding.
4.3. Abnormal market returns
Earnings announcements have information content if they exhibit returns different from
those during the non-announcement period, whether announcements are good news or bad
news. 1 examine daily returns in two emerging capital markets: JSE and BMV. Ordinary
least-squares regression is used to determine whether returns are significantly different
during the estimation period as compared to the event period. However, there is concern of
bias and inconsistency in the least-squares estimators as some securities listed on these
exchanges are traded infrequently, only 50% of the time, during the estimation period.
Infrequent trading may cause an econometric problem of "errors in variables" resulting in
overstatement of the true variance and understatement of true covariance of returns
(Scholes & Williams 1977, p. 311). I also use the Scholes-Williams estimation of a^ and fij
to control for nonsynchronous data and to increase the power of the tests.
Table 8 shows the abnormal returns using ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression
estimators and Scholes-Williams (SW) estimators for JSE and BMV. During the 3-day
earnings-announcement window, both estimators (OLS and SW) show significantly
different abnormal returns for South Africa but not for Mexico. That is, earnings are
reported timely on the JSE but not on the BMV. Regarding returns on each event date for
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the full sample, OLS and SW display significantly different returns during the event period
for JSE but not for BMV.
Table 8 also presents the OLS and SW results for firms reporting positive earnings surprises
and negative earnings surprises. During the 3 -day event period, abnormal returns are
significantly different than during the estimation period for JSE but not for BMV. Again, JSE
finds earnings announcements as timely information whereas BMV does not. BMV allows
market participants with >10% interest in a company to have inside information. Because
BMV has many companies with principal ownership > 10% of common equity outstanding,
the market may have adjusted their securities before the earnings-announcement date. Hence,
although one would expect to find a significant relationship between market value and book
Table 8
Panel A: abnormal returns for earnings announcements for years 1 998-2000
South Africa Mexico
Abnormal
returns ordinary
least squares (%)
Abnormal returns
Scholes-Williams
estimation (%)
Abnormal returns
ordinary least
squares (%)
Abnormal returns
Scholes-Williams
estimation (%)
Full sample
Days - 1 to + 1
Day - 1
Day
Day + 1
7V=624
3.28**
0.32*
2.63**
0.33*
A^=624
3.37**
0.35*
2.67**
0.35*
N=\\5
-0.14
0.10
-0.24
0.00
A^=115
0.09
0.14
-0.15
0.12
Positive surprise
Days - 1 to + 1
Day - 1
Day
Day + 1
N=\59
1.52**
0.56*
0.63*
0.33
N=\59
1.61**
0.58*
0.66*
0.37
iV=45
0.79
0.57
-0.28
0.50
N=A5
1.02
0.57
-0.18
0.63
Negative surprise
Days - 1 to + 1
Day - 1
Day
Day + 1
N=10Q
6.01**
0.05
6.19**
-0.24
7V=200
6.13**
0.09
6.25**
-0.22
7V=67
-0.91
-0.26
-0.32
-0.33
N=61
-0.68
-0.21
-0.24
-0.22
Legend: ***z<0.0001, **r<0.001, *z<0.01. A^=sample size.
Positive (negative) surprise=net income of firm /> (<) mean analyst forecast of firm /. There were 265 South
African firm-year observations and three Mexican firm-year observations excluded because they had no analyst
following reported on 1/B/E/S.
Panel B: abnormal returns on days - 10 and + 3 for years 1998-2000
Scholes-Williams market model
Day - 10 Day + 3
/-statistic z-statistic /-statistic r-statistic
2.00*
1.60
1.33
0.66
-0.01
-3.43**
0.34
-2.71*
A-shares
B-shares
*/7<0.05, **p<0.01.
There were ten companies with A-shares-only issues and 29 companies with B-shares-only issues.
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values, since earnings are known by some on BMV before the earnings announcement date,
there is no earnings information content on the announcement date.
I conducted a more refined test for insider trading using a method ofthe finance Uterature.
Bhattacharya et al. (2000) test for insider trading by first categorizing returns into A-share
and B-share firm issues. Then they study the lead-lag relationship between A-shares and B-
shares to test for insider trading as A-shares, owned by domestics only, would have access to
information before the earnings announcement day, whereas B-shares, owned by non-
domestic shareholders, would not. Global Vantage provides a distinction between A-share
and B-share series and I found that, during 1 998-2000, 1 sampled companies had issued A-
share-only issues and 29 sampled companies had issued B-share-only issues. Table 8, Panel
B provides the abnormal returns test on days — 1 and + 3 for the A-share and B-share
issues. The abnormal returns, computed using the Scholes-Williams Market Model, for A-
share issues are significantly different from those during the non-announcement period on
day — 10 and not so on day + 3. However, the abnormal returns for B-share issues on day + 3
are significantly different from zero but not on day — 10. Thus, the lead-lag relationship
between A-shares and B-shares from the pre-announcement and announcement periods,
respectively, indicates that information is incorporated into the A-shares first and then into
the B-shares. As the finance literature contends, and I support, this lead-lag relationship
translates to insider trading which may be responsible for the overall non-response ofreturns
to earnings announcements during the event period (—1 to 1) on the BMV.
The FASB and lASB may find these results interesting because book values may provide
relevant information, but not timely. Developing countries have capital-market infra-
structures different from that of developed counfries. BMV allows insider frading and has
poor investor-protection laws. This phenomenon may explain why overall earnings
aimouncements on the BMV do not have information content. The FASB and lASB should
consider that timeliness may be hampered by the infrastructure of a stock exchange. I agree
with Ball et al. (2003), who argue that the focus on accounting standards in the literature is
incomplete. They also find that financial reporting is sensitive to manager incentives and
my research shows that financial reporting is sensitive to capital-market infrastructure, too.
5. Summary and suggestions for future research
The objective of this study is to assess whether developing countries (South Africa and
Mexico) moving toward convergence with developed-country accounting standards
(International Accounting Standards and/or U.S. GAAP) fmd developed-country standards
usefiil. Many contend that accounting standards must reflect their environments to provide
useful earnings numbers (Nobes & Parker, 1983; Radebaugh & Gray, 1997). The LASB
contends that one set of accounting regulations should be useful to all countries, regardless
of the degree of development. JSE and BMV represent the two emerging stock exchanges
converging with IAS and/or U.S. GAAP.
My results show that both countries are using accounting regulations converging with
developed-country GAAP and find book value of equity and/or earnings as value relevant.
However, I found that earnings are timely reported on JSE and not on the BMV. That is,
overall, earnings announcements in Mexico have no significant information content. The
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lead-lag reaction to earnings announcements between A-shares and B-shares suggests insider
trading. Accounting regulators, then, should consider the effect that market infrastructure has
on accounting usefulness as it can jeopardize the timeliness of reported earnings.
I suggest that future research consider the value relevance of developed-country GAAP
over a longer period of time to access M'hether convergence results in significantly
increased value relevance. These tests might also be applied to smaller and less developed
countries than South Africa and Mexico to understand what generalities, regarding the
usefulness of developed-country GAAP, apply to developing countries.
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Appendix A. South African adoption of IAS from 1998 through 2000
LAS 10 Events after the balance-sheet date (1999)
IAS 16 Property, plant, and equipment (1998)
IAS 19 Employee benefits (2000)
IAS 22 Business combinations (1998)
IAS 28 Accounting for investments in associates (2000)
IAS 3 1 Financial reporting of interests in joint ventures (2000)
IAS 34 Interim financial reporting (February 1998)
IAS 35 Discontinuing operations (1998)
IAS 36 Impairment of assets (1998)
LAS 37 Provisions, contingent liabilities, and contingent assets (1998)
IAS 38 Research and development costs, intangible assets (1998)
Source: Deloitte and Touche (2003).
Appendix B. Mexican adoption of U.S. GAAP and IAS methodology from 1998 to
2000
SFAS 52, IAS 21 Foreign Currency Translation (1998) Bulletin B-15
SFAS 109, IAS 12 Income Taxes (May 1999) Bulletin D-4
APB 14, SFAS 107 and 133, IAS 32 Financial Instruments (February 2000) Bulletin
C-2
SFAS 130, IAS 1, Comprehensive Income (August 2000) Bulletin B-4
Sources: Alberto Napolitano (in an e-mail message dated July 8, 2005) and Canadian
Institute of Chartered Accountants (2002).
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Abstract
This study investigates whether foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) in China aUer their
corporate reporting behavior in response to a known schedule of tax-rate increases. The context of
this investigation is a tax-incentive scheme that allows firms to pay taxes at a reduced rate for a
limited period of time, and then at a higher rate when this period expires. If managers attempt to
maximize firm value by minimizing tax costs, then the spread of tax rates in the periods surrounding
the rate change may provide a substantial incentive for them to accelerate revenue and defer
expenses. Consistent with this hypothesis, the empirical results indicate that firms report significantly
higher discretionary current accruals for the years before tax-rate increases. The evidence, which
indicates that firms manage earnings upward to take advantage of lower tax rates that are available in
certain years, has important implications for tax policymakers.
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1. Introduction
Most research on tax-induced earnings management is devoted to publicly traded
firms in developed economies, and particularly the United States (Shackelford &
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Shevlin, 200 1 ). ^ However, due to data limitations, little research has been carried out on
the effect of tax on the corporate reporting of privately held firms in developing
economies. Although both publicly traded and privately held firms have incentives to
avoid corporate tax, privately held firms are more aggressive than their publicly traded
counterparts, because the consequences of tax avoidance for financial reporting are
relatively less important for them (Cloyd, Pratt, & Stock, 1996; Mills, 1998).^ Therefore,
this study makes an attempt to uncover systematic evidence of tax-induced income
shifting by privately held firms in a developing economy by investigating whether
foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) in China have a tax-rate-based incentive to
strategically shift income across different tax-holiday periods to minimize income taxes.
This question is important, because many developing countries, such as Brazil, India,
and Mexico, use tax holidays in a similar way to China to attract foreign investment by
granting qualified investors a limited period of tax exemption and reduction. Evidence
from this study will help tax policymakers to understand the possible impact of tax
holidays on the reporting behavior of foreign investors, and to plan more effective and
efficient tax auditing to minimize the loss of revenue that arises from abusive tax
avoidance.
The tax-incentive scheme in China provides a distinct setting within which to test the
effect of different tax concessions on corporate reporting behavior. In China, FIEs of a
production nature generally qualify for a five-year tax holiday (i.e. a tax rate of zero for the
first two profit-making years and a 50% reduction in the applicable tax rate for the
following 3 years), and are then taxed at the normal rate of 30% (or 15% in special zones)
when the concession period expires. These rules provide a productive setting within which
to test the incentive to manage earnings that are generated by the magnitude of the tax-rate
change. Following previous studies (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Guenther, 1994;
Lopez, Regier, & Lee, 1998), this research uses the current accruals, which are most
directly related to taxable income, to measure earnings management. By knowing ex ante
the types of accruals that are most likely to affect taxable income and by examining
whether the same group of firms shifts their taxable income in the periods before and after
tax-rate changes, this study reduces noise and avoids the need to control for the effect on
accounting earnings of certain confounding factors that are associated with different
corporate characteristics to create a more powerful test of tax-motivated earnings
management (Guenther, 1994).
' For example, Harris (1993), Guenther (1994), Lopez et al. (1998), Maydew (1997), and Scholes, Wilson, and
Wolfson (1992) provide evidence that the accounting earnings of US publicly held firms are managed in response
to changes in corporate income tax-rates. As different social contexts and business environments may provide
different incentives and opportunities for earnings management, corporate reporting behavior in developed
countries may not be the same as that in developing countries.
" Klassen (1997) suggests that as the ownership of privately held firms is often concentrated in the hands of
relatively few owners who are usually also the managers of the firm, private firms can efficiently inform
shareholders of firm value through channels other than audited financial statements. To the extent that it is less
costly to reduce both reported earnings and taxes, private-firm managers are likely to be more aggressive tax
planners. Furthermore, although no country is fi'ee fi-om tax avoidance, developing economies are likely to
experience a higher level of tax abuse than developed economies because they lack infrastructure and expertise in
tax administration.
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As changes in tax rates provide a substantial incentive for firms to shift income, it
is hypothesized that firms will report higher discretionary accruals for the year before
the scheduled tax-rate increase. This income shifting can be accomplished through
the acceleration of income from a high-tax to a low-tax year or the deferral of
expenses from a low-tax to a high-tax year. The hypothesis is tested using ordinary
least-squares (OLS) estimates from balanced panel data that covers four years and
112 firms. The empirical results support the view that firms alter their reporting
behavior in response to anticipated changes in tax rates, and specifically highlight that
the sample for the period before a tax-rate increase reports higher discretionary
accruals than the sample for the period after a tax-rate increase by an average of
1.03% of total assets.
This research complements the study of Chan and Mo (2000) on tax noncompliance
among FIEs in China. Although the results of Chan and Mo (2000) suggest that in the
tax-holiday period firms have low tax audit adjustments and thus are at their most
compliant, this does not necessarily imply that these firms lack the incentive to shift
revenues and expenses forward or backward to minimize their tax liabilities.
Furthermore, income shifting may not necessarily give rise to tax noncompliance,^
and therefore Mo (2003, p. 163) suggests that fijture research on the financial-reporting
behavior of FIEs during tax holidays is warranted. To this end, this paper examines a more
general case of the role of tax holidays in financial reporting by addressing how a tax-rate-
based incentive alters the decision by managers to engage in activities that affect the timing
ofincome and cash flows. From a public-policy perspective, the results provide evidence of
the consequences for government revenue of changes in tax rates that are associated with
differential tax statuses. Since many developing countries use tax holidays similar to those
of China to attract foreign investment for economic development, the results of this study
should provide a useful reference for policymakers in other developing counfries. Concern
has long been expressed that developing countries forego too much revenue through tax
concessions (Tanzil & Zee, 2001), and the ability of corporate managers to avoid taxes
through earnings management creates additional constraints on the fiscal revenue of these
countries."^
The remainder ofthe paper is organized into four sections. The next section describes the
background to the study and develops the research hypothesis. Section 3 explains the
research methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 draws some
conclusions.
For example, a firm can shift income across years by accelerating or delaying shipments of goods to
produce a more appropriate sales figure. Firms that accelerate or defer financial-statement income are, in
many cases, also accelerating or deferring taxable income (Guenther, 1994). Although firms that report a
conforming book income in the same accounting period are less likely to trigger tax-audit adjustments (Mills,
1998), fums that shift income between the periods surrounding a tax-rate change may be able to save on
current taxes.
"* For example, China's anti-avoidance campaign in 2002 resulted in the recovery of underreported tax
payments of about US$1.82 billion (SCMP, 2002). The effect of tax avoidance on the economies of developing
countries is more pronounced, because their govenmients face large fiscal deficits and rely heavily on public-
sector borrowing.
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2. Background and research hypothesis
2.1. Financial reporting for FIEs
The open-door policy that was launched by the Chinese government altered China's
development strategy from one that was based on self-sufficiency to one that is founded
on active participation in the world markets. In the early 1990s, China witnessed a sharp
growth in the inflow of foreign direct investment, and for most years since 1993 has
been the second largest recipient of foreign investment in the world behind the United
States. Following its accession to the World Trade Organization, China overtook the
United States for the first time in 2002 to become the largest recipient of foreign direct
investment (SCMP, 2003).
FIEs in China take the form of joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises.
By the end of May 2005, there were about 520,000 FIEs in China, and foreign
investment had reached US$600 billion (MOFCOM, 2005). The majority of these
enterprises are joint ventures, because the government wishes to disseminate modem
technology and management skills to Chinese enterprises through foreign-partnered
joint ventures. Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States are the main sources of foreign direct investment in
China.
Before 1985, the financial reporting of FIEs in China was govemed by the
accounting system for equity joint ventures. The unification of the tax laws in 1991
paved the way for the consolidation of accounting requirements, and in 1992 the
Ministry of Finance issued the Accounting System for Foreign Investment Enterprises,
which applies to all forms of ventures. Although under this system FIEs may prepare
their financial statements based on intemational practices, they are not allowed to make
entries in their account books that depart from the tax rules when determining financial
statement income. Given that tax rules prevail over general accounting principles in
circumstances in which the accounting freatment that is adopted by a business
contradicts the tax regulations, accounting income differs little from taxable income.
Therefore, to improve the usefialness of financial reports, China adopted a comprehen-
sive Accounting System for Business Enterprises, which came into effect on 1 January
2002 for both domestic enterprises and FIEs. The new system lessens the requirement
for book-tax conformity by allowing firms to make provision for asset-impairment
losses.
FIEs are required to submit their annual audited financial statements to government
agencies for monitoring purposes. Further govemment monitoring is exercised by the
introduction of local partners into FIEs as a confrol mechanism to reduce information
asymmetry, as expafriates from head offices usually take up key positions in FIEs and
thus give the foreign partner an information advantage over the govemment agencies
about the firm's operations. However, some of these local managers may not play the
monitoring role that the govemment expects them to play because their basic salary is
relatively low (Chan & Mo, 2000). Furthermore, most FIEs lack sfrong incentives for
quality audits, as they are private firms that can efficiently inform the owners of firm
value and performance by means other than audited financial reports (Klassen, 1997).
K.Z. Lin / The International Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 163-175 167
2.2. Taxable income ofFIEs
China adopts a resident concept to determine the extent to which FIEs are liable for
income tax, and requires FIEs to pay income tax on income that is derived from sources
both inside and outside China at a rate of 30% (or 15% in special areas), plus a local tax of
3%. Non-resident enterprises, such as foreign enterprises that are founded outside China
but have some form of business presence within China, are required to pay income tax on
income that is derived from sources within China only. The taxable income of FIEs is the
net profit after the deduction of costs, expenses, and losses in a tax year. In general, costs
and expenses that are charged to financial accounts are deductible for tax purposes as long
as they are not capital in nature, are incurred for business purposes, and do not exceed the
deductible limits that are imposed by the tax law. An accrual basis is used to compute
taxable income.
2.3. Tax incentives for FIEs
Like many other developing economies, China provides a comprehensive tax-incentive
scheme for eligible FIEs, which includes the granting of a five-year tax holiday to
production firms that are scheduled to operate for a period of not less than 10 years. In
other words, firms are exempt from enterprise income tax in the first two profit-making
years, and are allowed a 50% reduction in tax in the ensuing 3 years. The first profit-
making year is the year in which the firm makes a profit after offsetting allowable losses
that have been accumulated since the business commenced. Once started, the tax holidays
cannot be deferred due to losses that are incurred during the tax-holiday period. When the
concession period expires, firms pay standard taxes at the normal rate.
2.4. Tax-induced earnings management
As the tax-holiday period is generally limited to 5 years and the normal tax rate resumes
when the concession period expires, firms in the tax-holiday period will be motivated to
recognize revenue as early as the facts allow and to capitalize expenditure over as long a
period as is credible, whereas firms in the post-holiday period will be inclined to
exaggerate the expenses and losses that have been incurred. For example, the early
recognition of US$1.00 of taxable income from a year in which it would be taxed at 30%
to a year in which it would be taxed at 15%) would be equivalent to eaming a rate of 21%
[i.e. 1.00 X (1 —0.15)= 1.21 x (1 -0.30)]. If managers attempt to maximize firm value by
minimizing tax costs, then this tax-rate change provides a substantial incentive to shift the
recognition of revenue and expenses across periods. Fig. 1 identifies the years in which tax
rate incentives to shift income exist. It is expected that in anticipation of a future tax-rate
increase, managers will be inclined to accelerate revenue from relatively high-rate years
(years 3 and 6 in the figure) to relatively low-rate years (years 2 and 5) or defer expenses
from low-rate to high-rate years.
A manager can generate a higher income by accelerating the delivery of finished goods,
decreasing bad-debt provision, decreasing inventory write-offs, delaying the purchase of
expensive inventory at year-end when LIFO is employed, deferring R&D and advertising
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Before tax rate increases After tax rate increases
Income shifting
Year 2 (0%) ,, ^ Year 3 (15%)
Year 5 (1 5%) ^ Year 6 (30%)
Increase accruals through revenue Decrease (reverse) accruals
accelerations or expense deferrals
Fig. 1. The magnitude of the tax-rate change and income shifting across years.
expenditure, classifying more manufacturing overhead costs to be inventoriable costs
rather than period costs, or treating revenue expenditure as capital expenditure.^ However,
there are non-tax costs that are associated with these actions. For example, delaying the
delivery of finished goods may cause customer relations to deteriorate and inventory
holding costs to increase, and the ensuing report of low levels of accounting income may
violate debt-covenant restrictions (Cloyd et al., 1996; Guenther, 1994; Mills, 1998). Thus,
managers who engage in this form of earnings management typically trade off potential
tax savings and non-tax costs.
2.5. Research hypothesis
Earnings can be managed by a variety of means, including the use of accrual choices,
the implementation of changes in accounting methods or capital structure, and the proper
management of the timing of non-recurring transactions (McNichols & Wilson, 1998).
Compared to the changing of accounting methods (e.g., fi-om FIFO to LIFO), accrual
choices are less visible, and the tracing of income differences that are caused by accruals
can be difficult because the enforcing agency may not have enough information to make
the necessary adjustments (Cahan, 1992; Schipper, 1989). Therefore, this study examines
earnings management through the discretionary component of current accruals (Dechow et
al., 1995; Jones, 1991; Lopez et al., 1998). Current accruals (CA) for firm / in year t are
captured by the change in accounts receivable (AR) plus inventory (INV) less the change
in accounts payable (AP) plus accrued expenses (AE) fi-om year t—\tot.\n conformance
with Lopez et al. (1998), this relationship can be written as follows.
CA,, = (AAR„ + AINV,v) - (AAP,-, + AAE,-,) (1)
Based on this equation, increasing accounts receivable and inventory to accelerate
revenue or decreasing accounts payable and accrued expenses to defer expenses (or both)
Nelson, Elliott, and Tarpley (2003) broadly define earnings management depending on whether it is within
GAAP, difficult to distinguish from GAAP, and clearly not GAAP. Although the acceleration of revenue and the
deferral of expenses fall within GAAP, the recording of fictitious sales, the backdating of sales invoices, and the
recording of sales before they have been realized clearly violate GAAP. Moreover, there is a clear conceptual
distinction between earnings management and fraud. Whereas earnings management through the legitimate
exercise of accounting discretion may be acceptable, accounting choices that are fraudulent are likely to be
sanctioned by enforcing agencies. Hope and Pope (2003) suggest that when more choice among accounting
methods is allowed, it is important for firms to follow prescribed accounting standards to improve their earnings
quality.
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will cause accruals to be positive. Thus, if managers use accruals to accelerate financial
statement income in anticipation of a tax-rate increase, then current accruals in the year
immediately preceding the year of the rate increase will be positive. This leads directly to
the following hypothesis.
Firms will make greater positive (income-increasing) accrual changes in the year
before a tax-rate increase than in the following year.
3. Research methodology
3.1. Sample selection
To test the hypothesis, the financial-statement data of firms were collected from local
tax bureaus in major coastal cities in China where FIEs are densely located.^ The
following screening criteria were imposed. First, the firms must have gone through the
five-year tax-holiday period over their investment horizon. Second, six consecutive
calendar years of financial-statement data had to be available for each firm.^ Third, to limit
the effect of time on the reporting behavior of firms, the tax-holiday period had to have
commenced during the last 10 years. Fourth, the firms were not eligible for any extended
tax holidays after the expiration of the initial five-year holiday. Finally, to control for
corporate characteristics and audit risk, firms had to belong to the Class B category.^ To
minimize the selection bias, the tax bureaus selected firms from Class B at random when
the first four criteria were satisfied. As the tax bureaus were not informed of the specific
purpose of the study, there is little reason to believe that they intentionally included or
excluded particular cases in the sample.
As a result, a total of 1 12 sample firms that fall in the same calendar years (i.e. 1998-
1999 and 2001-2002) were identified for panel analysis. The relationships among the
financial statement account balances were reconciled for consistency and reliability. To
examine whether the firms had altered their reported discretionary accruals in light of
changes in tax rates, accruals for four years were computed and pooled for the regression
analysis. These 4 years cover 2 years in which there appears to be a tax motivation to
manage earnings (i.e. years 2 and 5 in Fig. 1), and 2 years in which it appears that this
Specifically, local tax bureaus in the Special Economic Zones and Coastal Open Cities were contacted for the
required data. However, the majority of the sample firms were obtained from the tax bureaus of five coastal open
cities. The tax bureaus were assured of complete confidentiality because no firm identity was required, and they
extracted account data directly from the financial statements of the firms and provided demographic information
about the sample from their company profile database.
^ Because accruals cannot be computed without a lagged year, six consecutive years of data are needed to
compute the accruals for 4years (i.e. years 2, 3, 5 and 6 in Fig. 1).
** To facilitate the selection of tax audits, most large tax bureaus in China have developed computer programs to
classify FIEs into three audit classes according to the firm's perceived likelihood of tax avoidance and evasion
(Chan & Mo, 2000). Class "A" firms are "good" taxpayers that are subject to tax audits every two years, class "C
firms are taxed based on a deemed profit rate because they do not keep a fiiU set of books for audit, and class "B"
firms represent the majority of FIEs and are subject to annual audit when resources permit.
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incentive is not present (years 3 and 6). This design facilitates the comparison of the
changes in accrual estimates on an aggregate basis.
3.2. Estimation of discretionary accruals
In this research, the measurement of current accruals is limited to tax-related items over
which the management has discretion. Discretionary current accruals are the difference
between the reported current accruals and the expected current accruals, where the
expected current accruals are a ftmction of a change in sales (Jones, 1991). The
discretionary current accruals for each of the 112 firms over the four-year period are
estimated using the residuals of a covariance model that regresses tax-related current
accruals on the change in sales and dummy variables that represent each firm and year
(Guenther, 1994; Jones, 1991). This model can be written as follows.
CA/,/ASSETS,-,_i = Z>o(l/ASSETS/,_i) + ^i(ASALES,y/ASSETS,v_i)
3 111
+ ^ bjYV.j + Y^ bk^mMk + Bit (2)
7=1 k=\
where ASALES is the change in sales for firm / between year t and t—\. Current accruals
(CA) in year t are computed for each firm / over the four-year period. CA and ASALES
are deflated by lagged total assets to reduce heteroscedasticity. The YR-dummy variables,
which are coded "one" for yeary (/= 1-3), measure the time effect for each of the 4 years,
and the FIRM variables, which are dummy-coded one for firm k{k=\ to 111), measure the
firm effect for each of the 1 12 firms. The prediction error £, or the difference between the
reported current accruals and the expected current accruals, can be interpreted as the
portion of the accruals that are "managed."
To test whether changes in discretionary accruals are systematically correlated to
changes in tax rates, discretionary accruals are regressed on a dummy variable that
separates the observations on the basis of whether they were incurred before or after the
tax-rate increase. This can be written as follows.
DA„ = )So + i^i BEFORE,, + j^sINDUSTRY, + ^SjJV, + ^4OWNERSHIP,
+ p^ SIZE,-, + jSgEXEMPTION,- + ;i,., (3
)
where DA is the estimate of discretionary accruals for each observation as described
earlier in this section, and BEFORE is dummy-coded as "one" if the observation is in the
year before the tax rate increase (years 2 and 5 in Fig. 1), and "zero" otherwise. As
BEFORE captures the years in which there appears to be an incentive to manage eamings
to take advantage of lower tax rates, this variable is expected to be significantly and
positively signed (which means that firms are likely to make income-increasing accrual
changes in these 2 years).
Five additional variables are included in the equation to control for the effect of
corporate characteristics on discretionary accounting practices. As industry affiliation,
form of investment, and ownership control affect tax noncompliance (Chan & Mo, 2000),
\
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the three dummy variables of INDUSTRY (manufacturing versus others), JV (joint
ventures versus wholly foreign-owned enterprises), and OWNERSHIP (manager-
controlled versus owner-controlled firms) are included in the model. In addition, a
continuous SIZE variable (which takes the logarithm of the firm's year-end total assets) is
used to control for the effect of firm size on earnings management (Watts & Zimmerman,
1978). Finally, as some firms may be less sensitive to the amount of tax paid overseas if
the country in which their parent company is located operates a tax credit, rather than an
exemption system, a dummy variable EXEMPTION is used to control for this
confounding effect.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
All of the sample firms are located in the designated areas that are subject to the
reduced tax rate of 15% in the post-holiday period. Manufacturing (69%), commerce
(14%)), and service (10%) are the main industries in which the sample firms operate. Sixty-
seven percent of the sample are joint ventures and the remainder are wholly foreign-owned
enterprises. Hong Kong and Taiwan are the main sources of foreign investment, followed
by the United States, South Korea, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. The sample firms
have average assets (sales) of US$12 million (US$10 million) over the test period, and all
started their tax holidays in 1997. The mean age at which the sample firms started to pay
taxes is about six years after the commencement of business.
4.2. Univariate and multivariate results
Table 1 presents the mean current accruals for Eq. (1). The mean value of current
accruals is 4.22% of total assets for all firms over the four-year period. On average, the
sample firms report mean accruals of 6.77%) of assets for the years before the increase in
tax rates, which is 5.14%o higher than the accruals that are reported for the years in which
tax-rate increases are in effect. The results also reveal higher changes in accounts
Table 1
Mean current accruals before and after tax-rate increases (n=448)
Pooled Before tax-rate After tax-rate Mean diff.
increases increases (;?-value)
Current accruals/total assets 0.0422 (0.203f 0.0677(0.231) 0.0163 (0.120) 0.0514 (0.006)^
Natural log of assets 4.5944 (0.474) 4.5850 (0.472) 4.6039 (0.473) -0.0189(0.053)
AAccounts receivable/total assets 0.0223 (0.121) 0.0342(0.113) 0.0104(0.123) 0.0238 (0.018)
AInventory/total assets 0.0254(0.190) 0.0386(0.196) 0.0120(0.115) 0.0266 (0.012)
AAccounts payable/total assets 0.0037 (0.041) 0.0035 (0.057) 0.0041 (0.033) -0.0006(0.236)
AAccrued expenses/total assets 0.0018 (0.008) 0.0016 (0.007) 0.0020 (0.008) -0.0004 (0.249)
" Standard deviations.
'' /-tests of the differences in the means.
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Table 2
Discretionary current accruals before and after tax-rate increases (h=448)
Before tax-rate
increases
After tax-rate
increases
Mean and median
differences
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Discretionary accruals 0.0098 0.0075 0.0021 0.0019 0.0077
(two-tailed /7 -value) (0.009f (0.018)" (0.220)' (0.307)" (0.011)'=
Discretionary accruals are computed as the error term from the following regression.
CA„/ASSETS„_i = Z7o(l/ASSETS,-,_i) +^,(ASALES/,/ASSETS„-i) + "^bjYRj
111
k=\
where CA,-, = (AAR,-, + AINV;,) - (AAP/, + AAE,-,)
0.0056
(0.034)'^
where
CA,-,
AAR„
AINV,v
AAP,
AAE,-,
ASSETS,,-
1
=
ASALES,, =
YR, =
FIRM, =
= current accruals for firm i in year t
=the change in accounts receivable for firm / from year t — I to t
=the change in inventory for firm / from year t—l to t
=the change in accounts payable for firm / from year t—l to t
=the change in accrued expense for firm /' from year t—l to t
total assets for sample firm / in year t — 1
the change in sales for firm / from year t—l to t
I for year 7 (7 = 1-3), and otherwise
1 for firm k (A' = 1-1 II), and otherwise
F-statistic=5.77,p = 0.003, adjusted R- =OMO, Durbin-Watson statistic =2.084
^ One-sample Ntests of the differences in the means.
" One-sample Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the differences in the medians.
^ Two-sample /-tests of the differences in the means.
Wilcoxon two-sample tests of the differences in the medians.
receivable and inventory and lower changes in accounts payable and accrued expenses for
the years preceding tax-rate increases.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the regression of Eq. (2).^ The estimated
discretionary accruals for each sample firm over the four-year period are separated on the
basis of whether they were incurred before or after the tax-rate increase. Before the tax rate
increase, the firms reported mean (median) discretionary current accruals of 0.98%
(0.75%) of total assets, whereas after the rate increase the firms reported mean (median)
discretionary accruals of 0.21%) (0.19%)) of total assets. Without knowing whether the
observations are normally distributed, the change in abnormal accruals is tested using a
The equation assumes that the residual is composed of a time effect and a firm effect. Because the equation is
a cross-sectional time-series regression, multicoUinearity among the regressors, firm-wise heteroscedasticity, and
serial correlation over time may plague parameter estimation (Baltagi, 1995). An examination of pairwise
correlations indicates that no two or more variables are highly correlated with each other. Furthermore, a plot of
the squared residuals against squared total assets and estimated dependent variable indicates absence of
systematic pattern. Thus, deflating sales by total assets appears to have corrected for heteroscedasticity caused by
differences in firm size. The Durbin-Watson statistic is close to two, indicating that first-order serial correlation of
the residuals does not appear to be a problem (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1998).
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Table 3
OLS regression of discretionary accruals on the timing of tax-rate increases and the control variables (/7=448)
Expected sign Coefficient /-Stat. p-va\uQ
Intercept
BEFORE,,
INDUSTRY,
SIZE,,
JV,
OWNERSHIP,
EXEMPTION,
0.0289
0.0103
0.0020
-0.0045
-0.0028
0.0017
-0.0020
0.183 0.604
2.125 0.019**
0.287 0.566
1.904 0.047**
0.851 0.382
0.195 0.664
0.835 0.414
F-statistic=7.20,/7 = 0.001, adjusted 7?-=0.112, Durbin-Watson statistic =2. 156
DA,v ^ Po + i5, BEFORE,, + /J^INDUSTRY, + /?,SIZE„ + p^JY, + /^.OWNERSHIP,
+ ^6EXEMPTION, + n„
where
DA,, = estimated discretionary accruals for firm / in year /
BEFORE,, = 1 if firm / is in the year before the tax rate increase, and otherwise
INDUSTRY, = 1 if firm / is in the manufacturing industry, and otherwise
SIZE,, = natural log of total assets for firm / in year t
JV, = 1 if firm / is a joint venture in year /, and otherwise
OWNERSHIP, = 1 if firm / is sourced from Hong Kong or Taiwan in year t, and otherwise
EXEMPTION, = 1 if the firm's parent company uses a tax exemption system, and otherwise
**Significant at the 5% level.
parametric t-test of the mean and a nonparametric Wilcoxon test of the median. Ahhough
the results of the ^tests and signed rank tests indicate that the central tendency is
significantly positive for the sample before the tax-rate increase, the results of the same
measures are not significantly different from zero for the sample after the tax-rate increase.
A comparison of the mean (median) accruals between the two groups indicates that the
differences in both the means and the medians are significant at the 5% level. Taken at face
value, these results suggest that the magnitude of accruals is related to the level of tax rate
in a way that is consistent with tax-motivated income shifting behavior.
Table 3 provides the results for Eq. (3), which formally tests the hypothesis of whether
discretionary accruals are higher in the periods before the tax-rate increase. The model is
significant at the 1% level, which indicates that it is well specified. All of the correlations
among the independent variables are below 0.597 and variance inflation-factor values are
all less than two, which indicate that multicollinearity is unlikely to have affected the
results. The BEFORE dummy measures the incremental ability to explain the remaining
cross-sectional, intertemporal variation in residuals from Eq. (2).
As expected, BEFORE is significantly and positively signed. '° The coefficient of
BEFORE indicates that firms in the years before the tax-rate increase report discretionary
accruals that are, on average, 1 .03% higher than the discretionary accruals that are reported
by firms in the years in which the tax rate increased. Illustrated in terms of economic
effects, ceteris paribus, a 15% spread in tax rates allows firms to save taxes that equate to
'" To eliminate potential understated standard errors in a pooled, cross-sectional regression, the model in Eq. (3)
was estimated separately for each of the two tax holiday periods (between years 2 and 3 and between years 5 and
6 in Fig. 1). The results are consistent with the pooled estimation.
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approximately 0.15% of their total assets. Although Chan and Mo (2000) find that firms
are most compliant in the tax-holiday period, the results of this study demonstrate that
firms have a strong incentive to minimize their tax burden even when they are in the tax-
holiday period. Furthermore, the coefficient of SIZE is significantly negative at the 5%
level, which suggests that larger firms may be more sensitive to political costs and thus
more likely to use accruals that decrease their financial-statement income (Watts &
Zimmerman, 1978).
5. Conclusion
Tax concessions are by far the most popular type of tax inducement to be employed in
developing economies. This study investigates whether foreign investors in China's
developing economy manage accounting earnings to take advantage of the lower tax rates
that are available during tax-holiday periods. Evidence of earnings management is
examined by focusing on discretionary current accruals, which are expected to have a
significant effect on taxable income. The study develops the hypothesis that firms will
make income-increasing accruals in the year before a tax-rate increase, and the results,
which indicate that firms adjust their discretionary accruals in anticipation of changes in
tax rates, are consistent with such income-shifting behavior. Evidence from this study may
be of interest to tax policymakers in enforcing tax rules that are designed to prevent
abusive tax avoidance. For example, given that changes in tax rates create incentives for
firms to record transactions in one period rather than another, government tax inspectors
should closely scrutinize the exact timing of transactions in the periods surrounding the
tax-rate revision. The results also have implications for external auditors, who often face
conflicting demands to give tax minimization advice on the one hand and to detect
material cases of client earnings management on the other.
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Abstract
This study examines the empirical vahdity of claims that the composition of boards of directors
and ownership structures affect firms' profitability ratios (ROE, ROA, MTB) using data from 87
European firms, which were foreign U.S. registrants during 2000-2001. Results indicate a strong
positive relation between the level of relational ownership and profitability ratios, and between the
portion of independent directors on the board and profitability ratios. No sfrong relation was found
between the portion of inside directors or level of managerial ownership and profitability in
continental European companies.
© 2006 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: International corporate governance; Profitability
1. Introduction
During the 1990s, the process of economic integration was heightened by the creation
of different unions (European Union, NAFTA, etc.), the collapse of the Soviet system, and
the surge in global economic activities. These include mergers among large corporations,
the flow of capital, goods, and services across national borders, the competitive pressures
of globalization, privatization, and the growth and diffusion of shareholding. All these
activities have created a need to understand national corporate-governance practices and
their association with the financial positions of the firms (Alexander & Archer, 2001;
Biddle & Saudagaran, 1991; Bushman & Lessard, 1992; Bushman & Smith, 2001;
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Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988, 2002; Hoskinsson, Yiu, & Kim, 2000). The theoretical and
empirical literature in corporate govemance considers the relationship between corporate
performance and ownership, or sti-ucture of boards of directors (BOARD), mostly using
only two of these variables at a time. For example, Hermalin and Weibach (1991) and
McAvoy, Cantor, Dana, and Peck (1983) study the correlation between board composition
and performance, while McConnel and Servaes (1990), Hermalin and Weibach (1991),
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) scrutinize
the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance.
In this study, I analyze the joint relationship between both ownership and composition
of the board and performance in different countries. The main objective of this paper is to
examine the empirical validity of the claims that the composition of the board and
ownership structure affects a firm's profitability after considering the mechanisms by
which a European company is directed and controlled (as described in European Corporate
Govemance Codes). The sample used for this study represents a set of continental
European companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges. The main contribution of such
empirical analysis lies in the area of relative efficacy of the govemance systems of major
world economies.
Additionally, decision-makers (investors and creditors) understand the importance of
the rules and norms of corporate govemance for the success of market economies.
According to the McKinsey Investor Opinion Survey (2000), the growing interest in
corporate govemance may reflect an understanding that equity investors, whether foreign
or domestic, are placing a high priority on the quality of corporate govemance when
making investment decisions. All other things being equal, investors are willing to pay
more for a company that is well govemed.
The recent dramatic acceleration in the globalization of capital markets has increased
the number of cross-listings. It is, therefore, more important than ever for the investors
who use financial reports of foreign companies to assess the association between
corporate-govemance mechanisms and performance (Bushman & Smith, 2001). While
there has been much work to date on the relationship between the composition of the board
of directors, ownership concentration, and profitability for U.S. publicly traded
companies,' little work has addressed similar issues for foreign firms that are U.S.
registrants.^ As American capital markets become more international, understanding
national govemance practices and their effects on the financial position of a firm gains
more relevance.
This paper also has the potential for broader implications. The concem of users of
accounting information with the govemance practices around the world is magnified by
the absence of harmonization of accounting standards. Knowledge of existing differences,
therefore, is important for policy debates. Studies like this one have the potential to foster
the creation of a successful global market by helping to establish the prerequisites for
accounting harmonization.
' Unfortunately, prior research did not establish a definite relation between corporate govemance and a firms'
performance.
" 48% of the listed companies on the NYSE and 43% on NASDAQ were foreign in 2003.
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The results presented here partially support the empirical validity of the claims that the
composition of the board of directors and ownership structure affect the firms' profitability
measures (ROE, ROA, MTB). As expected, the results of this study show a strong positive
relationship between profitability ratios and each of the two govemance factors: the
proportion of independent directors and level of institutional ownership. However, the
results do not show a strong relationship between the proportion of inside directors and
profitability in continental European companies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: prior research is discussed in
Section 2, European corporate-governance codes are analyzed and hypotheses are
developed in Section 3, and the model is described in Section 4. The description of
variables used in the test is also presented in Section 4. Section 5 describes the sample,
Section 6 examines the statistical results, and concluding remarks are provided in
Section 7.
2. Prior research
The extant literature on corporate govemance, which is mostly about U.S. firms,
considers the relationship between corporate ownership-structure, the board's of directors
composition, and corporate performance. A substantial stream of literature on corporate
govemance goes back to the argument of Berle and Means (1932) that corporate managers
lack accountability and therefore corporations need to establish monitoring systems to
oversee them. Such an argument was fUrther propagated by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
2.1. Prior research on the relation between board composition andfirm performance
Prior studies can be divided into two categories. The first category looks into the effect
of board composition on actions such as CEO replacement and tender-offer bids (Byrd &
Hickman, 1992; Weisbach, 1988). This approach, however, does not explain how board
composition affects firm performance. The second category examines the correlation
between board composition and firm performance, which allows examination of the firm's
"bottom line" but involves less tractable and noisy performance measures. Neither of these
categories of prior research established a consistent relationship between board
composition and the firms' performance. While Hermalin and Weibach (1991) and
McAvoy et al. (1983) report no significant same-year correlation between board
composition and performance, Yermack (1996) suggests that a high percentage of
independent directors leads to the worst performance, and Klein (1998) suggests that a
high percentage of outside directors has the same negative effect.
Scholars (Bowen, DuCharme, «& Shores, 1995; Harris, Lang, & Moeller, 1994) who
study govemance in Continental European Union Members (CEUM) suggest that the main
goal ofCEUM company managers is to satisfy various constituents of the firm. This leads
to significant differences in financial ratios and stock market valuation of accounting data
between CEUM and firms in the United States (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Joos &
Lang, 1994). In this respect, it is questionable whether the positive relationship between
outside directors and firm performance predicted by agency theory (Baysinger & Butler,
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1985; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Fama, 1980; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Ezzamel & Watson,
1993) will be supported in the CEUM. In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory
(Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1994) might be more applicable in this setting.
This would be consistent with the evidence that inside directors have a positive effect on
corporate R&D costs and better performance based on improved strategic innovation
(Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Kochhar & David, 1996).
There is no consensus in prior research as to the endogeneity of board composition. The
factors that affect board composition are not well understood and the composition of the
board is known to be related to a fum's ownership structure (firms with high inside
ownership have fewer independent directors (Bhagat & Black, 2001). Several empirical
tests were performed to address this issue with inconsistent results. Hermalin and
Weisbach (1988) and Bhagat and Black (2001) report that the proportion of independent
directors increases slightly following a year of poor performance. Klein (1998), on the
other hand, finds no such tendency whereas Denis and Sarin (1999) report that a successful
year is followed by a slight increase in the proportion of independent directors. Thus, the
factors driving board structure consist of a firm's performance, firm growth, industry
growth, or market globalization, but there is not a clear delineation of the relative weight
of each factor.
Additionally, it is argued that good governance is associated with role separation: i.e.,
the positions of chairman of the board and CEO are held by different individuals. Baliga,
Moyer, and Rao (1996), Berg and Smith (1978), and Brickley and Coles (1997) view the
power concentration as impeding the supervisory ability of the board, because a leader
faces a significant conflict of interest. Therefore, they advocate separation of the leadership
roles to increase the independence of the board and to eliminate a source of conflict.
2.2. Prior research on the relationship between corporate ownership and a firm's
performance
An extensive literature addresses the agency problems in connection with corporate
governance by looking at the relationship between ownership structure and performance.
Ownership is measured in several different ways such as managerial ownership (Cho,
1998), CEO ownership (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001), and block-holders ownership
(relational investors) (Jensen, 1986; Mikkelson & Partch, 1997). The last measurement has
a special importance in CEUM, because historically European companies have influential
stockholders who own large blocks of equity for long periods of time and who actively
monitor a firm's performance.
Managerial ownership is traditionally viewed as providing a direct economic incentive
for managers to engage in active monitoring, and in effect, aligning ownership and control
through meaningful directors' stock ownership (Bhagat & Carey, 1999), but perhaps
encouraging risk-taking (Demsetz, 1983). There is, however, no consensus as to the nature
of the relationship between ownership and performance. Himmelberg et al. (1999) provide
evidence that the ownership structure may be endogenously determined by a firm's
contracting environment, which differs across firms. Seyhun (1998) claims that managers
adjust their ownership to reflect the degree of divergence between market expectations and
insider information on a firm's future performance.
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In CEUM companies, managers have limited discretion due to relational investing.
Many scholars believe that relational investors serve as a substitute for corporate control
(Jensen, 1986; Mikkelson & Partch, 1997), because they own large stakes for long periods
of time and, thus, can overcome two problems: (1) the collective-action problem that
makes small shareholders passive and (2) the information-asymmetry problem that makes
small shareholders myopic. According to Jacobs (1991) and Porter (1992), a potential
concem for governance systems dominated by relational investors is the over emphasis on
short-term profitability. Thus, relational investing may be viewed as one of the
complementing govemance mechanisms that contribute to the monitoring of a firm's
performance. On the other hand, relational investing could discourage risk-taking because
those investors in Europe may very well be the company's creditors. Moreover, there is
some evidence that institutional investors have their own agency problems and, thus,
maximizing the value of the portfolios they manage may not be their primary aim (Black,
1992a, 1992b; Black & Coffee, 1994).
To determine the impact of block-equity holders on a firm's performance, the literature
considers different measurements of relational investing such as large block-holdings by
CEOs or family-owned companies. However, Mceachem (1975) and Holdemess and
Sheehan (1985) do not find strong evidence that firms with controlling shareholders are
more profitable than manager-controlled firms. An alternative measurement is majority or
control block-holding by outsiders, who may be institutional investors (Wahal &
McConnel, 1999), or others (Bhagat & Jefferis, 1991; Fleming, 1993). There is
considerable variation in the results here as well. While Mikkelson and Ruback (1985)
report that large, external block-holding affects the company's rate-of-retum positively,
McEachem (1975) finds weak evidence that firms with controlling shareholders are more
profitable than others. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) and Hermalin and Weibach
(1991) find the relationship between ownership and performance to be nonmonotonic.
They argue that, at low levels of inside ownership (below 5%), the incentive effect would
lead to a positive relation between ownership and performance. A negative relation with
performance is observed in the region between 5% and 25% inside ownership, due to the
entrenchment effect, and becomes positive again beyond the 25% ownership level. This is
due to the dominant effect of ownership incentives. However, McConnel and Servaes
(1990) claim that the above findings are not robust.
3. Corporate-governance codes in CEUM^
Generally, corporate govemance involves the mechanisms by which a business
enterprise is directed and controlled."^ It should be noted that the legal origins and
corporate-governance practices employed by CEUM are quite distinct from those used by
their American counterparts (Appendix A). The greatest distinctions in corporate-
govemance practices appear to result from differences in law rather than differences in
Internet addresses for govemance codes analyzed here can be seen in Appendix A.
Corporate govemance is distinct from the topics of business management and corporate responsibihty.
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the recommendations emanating from the corporate-governance codes discussed here.^
The codes^ tend to express a relatively common view of what good governance is and
how to achieve it. Notwithstanding legal differences, corporate-governance practices in
CEUM appear to be converging to more similarities than differences. While corporate-
govemance codes put forward by members of the EU investment community are voluntary
in nature, they have significant influence on corporate-government practices because of
the economic power in capital markets and strong investor's voting rights.
The CEUM codes of corporate governance can be categorized as seeking to improve
the value of shareholders' ownership by improving the quality of corporate-governance
mechanisms. Generally, the codes express a relatively small range of objectives, such as
the quality of governance improvement at the level of boards of directors, competitiveness
and access to capital, and performance improvement. As described below, the codes issued
by different EU nations are in general agreement on issues related to the importance of the
structure and composition of boards of directors, as well as ownership structure and its
influence on profitability.
3.1. The effect of ownership type on profitability in Europe
The laws and regulations concerning equitable treatment of shareholders, including
minority rights, vary between the United States and CEUM. In part, this reflects
differences in types of company ownership. For example, in Austria, Belgium, Germany,
and Italy, more than one half of listed industrial companies have large stockholders who
own at least 50% of the company. This phenomenon is far less common in the United
States. In continental Europe where ownership is less dispersed, control rights are not fiilly
separated from ownership. Whenever a large shareholder or consortium maintains a
control stake (by holding a majority of stock outright or by retaining disproportionate
voting rights or other preferences), concern is directed toward ensuring the fair treatment
of minority shareholders. These codes generally call for shareholders to be treated
equitably, avoiding or disclosing disproportional voting rights and the removal of barriers
to shareholder participation in general meetings, whether in person or by proxy.
The degree to which CEUM firms have relied on equity markets as funding sources also
varies significantly from the practice in the United States, although equity financing appears
to be gaining more importance in CEUM. The need to separate the capital and credit markets
has not been viewed as a prerequisite for financial stability. The German Federal government
does not have much direct influence on corporations or banks, except through govemment
ownership of banks, which has been held at high levels.^ In contrast, the financial and
industrial systems in France have been dominated by the central govemment, which
controls market and financial institutions and can ensure that capital is directed to priorities
set forth in "indicative planning" investments. There are many quasi-governmental
^ Every CEUM, except Austria, has at least one code mostly issued after 1997.
*' For the purpose of this study, a "corporate governance code" is defined as a non-binding set of principles,
standards, or best practices related to the internal governance of corporations, issued by a collective body that is
neither governmental nor regulatory in nature.
State governments {Lander) and regional bank associations own more than 50% of the banks.
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financial institutions, such as Caisse des Depots et Consignations
,
positioned between
depositors and borrowers. Traditionally, the French government has the highest level of
corporate shareholding in Europe through controlling banks. ^ Similarly, bank lending in
The Netherlands has been a far more important source of financing than stock markets.
With less traditional reliance on equity markets for financing, shareholding has been fairly
concentrated and stable over time. As a result, all CEUM accounting regimes are mostly
stakeholder oriented and insider dominated. Given this structure, the managers' objective
function is not necessarily the maximization of the company's stock prices and their
compensation is not typically sensitive to it. Thus, in the relational markets, with a
significant degree of uniformity in the basic elements of company law, corporate
governance, and accounting practices, I do not expect to find that managerial ownership
significantly impacts a company's profitability. This is the first hypothesis.
Hlo. The level of managerial ownership is not significantly related to the company's
profitability.
HI a. The level of relational investor ownership (block-holders and institufions^) in CEUM
companies is positively correlated with profitability.
Testing Hypotheses lo and la will exclude family-CEO-owned companies due to the
different structure of voting rights. According to a 2001 survey of companies in the Euro
Stoxx 50 by Die Wertpapier Spezialisten ("DWS," www.source.oecd.org), such companies
serve as an example of disproportional voting rights-such as multiple voting rights and
golden share rights-while utilizing non-voting shares and other limitations on non-voting
rights twice as often. In this regard, codes tend to support a one share, one vote approach,
although many favor some flexibility. For example, according to OECD Principle II.A,
"all shareholders of the same class should be treated equally." However, the annotation
explains that preference shares and participation certificates that lack voting rights may be
efficient ways of distributing risk and reward; it explains that Principle II is not meant to
present an absolute view in favor of one share, one vote in all circumstances (Annotation
to OECD Principle II.A). The Peters report (Netherlands) takes a view in line with the
flexible approach ofOECD Principle II, which is that while the general principle should be
one of "proportionality. . .between capital contribution and influence," priority shares and
certificates that result in disproportionate rights may be justified in certain circumstances,
including those involving a threatened change in control (Section 5.1).
In addition to the disproportional voting rights, family members in family-owned
companies are usually heavily represented on the board of directors and hold most key
managerial positions in the company. For this type of company, a strong positive
relationship between the profitability ratios and the ownership concentration should be
expected to focus on long-run goals of profitability. This leads to the second hypothesis.
H2o. Family ownership is positively correlated with a company's profitability.
^ A similar situation can be observed in Spain and Portugal.
'^ To measure the level of the relational ownership, I use two variables, such as % BLOCK, which represents the
level of large block-holdings by outsiders (excluding institutions), and % INST, which represents the level of
institutional ownership.
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3.2. Internal governance mechanisms in Europe
3.2.1. Board structure, roles, and responsibilities
As shown in Table 1, the use of a unitary versus a two-tier board structure is believed to
be a major difference between corporate governance in the United States and most CEUM.
While there are structural differences between two-tier (supervisory and managerial
boards) and unitary-board systems, there are similarities in actual board practices in that
both types of systems recognize a supervisory function and a managerial function.
However, the distinction between the two functions tends to be more formalized in the
two-tier structure, which appoints a separate executive body. Generally, both the unitary
board of directors and the supervisory board (in the two-tier structure) are elected by
shareholders. In some countries, employees are given the right to elect some supervisory
body members. Typically, both the unitary and supervisory boards appoint the
executives—the management board in the two-tier system, or a group of managers to
whom the board delegates authority in the unitary system. In addition, both the unitary
board and the supervisory board usually have the responsibility of ensuring the appropriate
functioning of the financial reporting and control systems as well as compliance with laws
and regulations. Each system has its own advantages. The one-tier system may result in a
closer relationship and smoother information flow between the supervisory and managerial
bodies. The two-tier system, on the other hand, encompasses a clearer formal separation of
the supervisory and executive roles. With the movement toward best practice, the benefits
that are uniquely attributed to each governance system appear to be lessening.
3.2.2. Board composition
The proposition that boards should consist mostly of independent directors has become
conventional wisdom in the United States (Bhagat & Black, 200 1 ; Hermalin & Weisbach,
1988); the insider-dominated board is seen as a device for management entrenchment. In
1998, the Council of Institutional Investors in the United States noted its preference for
two-thirds of a company's directors to be independent. While there are no such guidelines
Table 1
Predominant board and leadership structure
State Board Employees role Separation of Number Unions Mean for the
structure in supervisory supervision of companies power length of the
body and management American public
market experience
Austria Two-tier Yes Yes 2 Low 2
Belgium Unitary^ No Not required 2 Low 2.5
Denmark Two-tier Yes Yes 2 Low 12
France Unitary" No Not required 21 High 2.8
Germany Two-tier Yes Yes 12 High 2.8
Italy Unitary'' No Not required 10 High 6.4
Netherlands Two-tier Advisory Yes 32 Low 7.7
Portugal Unitary "^ No Not required 2 High 4.5
Spain Unitary No Not required 4 High 7.5
Other structures are also available.
Board of auditors is also required.
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in CEUM, corporate-governance codes place a significant emphasis on the need for the
board to ensure accountabiUty and to provide strategic guidance. With relational investors
monitoring management, the codes still advocate having independent directors to enhance
the monitoring. These codes invariably urge the appointment of truly "independent"
directors to the supervisory board. "Independence" generally involves an absence of close
family ties or business relationships with either company management or controlling
shareholder(s). In addition, these companies commonly appoint professors from leading
universities as well as former and current employees of the Ministry of Economics and
Finance to their boards. While members of these groups are considered outside directors,
they may not necessarily be independent. These individuals, however, who are highly
qualified, have the ability and interest to monitor the company's dynamics and to ensure
sustained profitability.
Another difference in corporate-governance practices between the United States and
CEUM is the role of employees in corporate governance. In Austria, Denmark, and
Germany, the employees of companies (of a certain size) have the right to elect some
members of the supervisory body in accordance with the codes in effect. In France,
company articles may provide employees with such a right. In addition, when the
employee's shareholding reaches 3%, French employees are given the right to nominate
one or more directors subject to certain exceptions. In some countries, including France
and The Netherlands, the employees' representatives may have the right to attend board
meetings, but may not vote. In all other CEUM firms (with the exception of certain Dutch
companies with self-selecting boards), it is the shareholders alone who elect all the
members of the supervisory body.
As noted earlier, the main goal of CEUM company managers is to satisfy various
constituents of the firm. The role of inside directors in a CEUM company is greatly
affected by the fact that relational investors, quasi-financial institutions, etc. have a very
strong monitoring role there and, as a result, the company's insiders act congruently with
the relational investor's interests. In this regard, I examine the relationship between the
board composition and profitability empirically.
H3a. The portion of independent directors and scholars on the board has a strong effect on
the profitability of the company.
H3b. The portion of inside directors does not have a strong effect on the profitability of the
company.
3.2.3. Power concentration on the board
Governance codes also frequently call for the positions of the chairman of the board
and the CEO (or managing director) to be held by different individuals. Codes that relate
to two-tier boards also emphasize the need for independence between the supervisory
and managerial bodies. In two-tier board systems, the distinct supervisory and
management boards are supposed to have their own separate leaderships. '° For example.
'° However, it is not uncommon for a retired senior executive to become the chairman of the supervisory board,
which may raise issues of independence.
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like the unitary board codes, the dual board codes tend to warn against the practice of
naming (more than one or two) retired managers to the supervisory board, because it may
undermine the supervisory board's independence. The leading role of the chair of the
supervisory body is similar in the unitary and the two-tier board systems. For example, as
the draft Cromme Commission Report suggests, "the chairman of the supervisory board
coordinates work within the supervisory board and chairs its meetings" (§ V.2). In both
board systems, it is not unusual for the chairman of the board of directors to also serve as
an executive of the company (managing director).
The practice varies from country to country. For instance, the dual code (Belgium)
emphasizes the need for "a clear division of responsibilities at the head of a company to
ensure a sound balance of power and authority." In France, for decades, the law applying
to unitary boards has required that the leadership positions be combined. The Vienot II
Report (France) suggested that the law be changed to allow greater flexibility in the
unitary board system so that corporations may choose between combining or separating
the offices of chairman and chief executive officer. This suggestion has since been
embodied in legislation promulgated in May 2001. By contrast, the Preda Report (Italy)
and the Olivencia Report (Spain) call for measures to balance the power of the
chairman/CEO, but that separating the roles is not among them (Preda Report, 5.2;
Olivencia Report, 3.2). Some authors, however, view this leadership structure as
impeding the supervisory ability of the board because of a significant conflict of interest
(Baliga et al., 1996; Berg & Smith, 1978; Bnckley & Coles, 1997).
H4. Power concentration (CEO=CH) negatively affects the supervisory ability of the
board and, thus, the profitability of the company.
4. Model and variables used in the model
To investigate the research question of how a given corporate-governance factor affects
the level of the company's performance ratios, I estimate the model as follows:
ECON.PERFjk = F(Govemance, Control)
The variables used in this study are discussed below and are summarized in Table 2.
4.1. Proxies for dependent variables
Three empirical proxies for performance are used in this study: return on assets,
return on equity, and market-to-book value of the company. The first two dependent
variables are accounting rates of return on total average assets and the book value of
owners equity for 2000 and 2001. Accounting-based performance measures are
historical reports not directly affected by changes in equity markets and have several
limitations. First, they are affected by accounting conventions for valuing assets and
revenue recognition. In particular, different methods are applied to value tangible and
intangible assets or income as an accrual-based measure, which could be manipulated.
Second, reported total assets consist of mixed attributes of current and historic costs,
186 V. Krivogorsky / The International Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 176-197
Table 2
Variables used in the test
Independent variables
Board structure: Companies included in the sample have unitary as well as two-tiered governance systems. Two-
tiered systems includes two layers of management, such as BOM—board of management and SB—supervisory
board or board of directors
%1ND1R—(total number of insiders in the board) /# TotalDIR
# TotalDIR—total number of directors in both tiers, when it applies
%INDEP—total number of independent directors /# Total_DIR
%GOV
—
(number of elite representatives on board) /(total # of directors), where a representative is coded as elite,
if he/she has highest qualification and experience serving at high government structures such as parliament,
ministry, or university)
Ownership
Outside shareholder concentration
"/oINSTN
—
(number of shares held by institutions) /(total number of common shares outstanding in 2000 and
2001 fiscal year ends)
%BLOCK—a total percentage of the firms' outstanding shares of block holders who hold at least 5% of the
outstanding shares and are not affiliated with management (excluding institutions)
Inside ownership/power concentration
CEO/0W—dummy variable to record the fact that the company is family-owned and CEO is the founder of the
firm
MNGOW—the cumulative percentage of ownership in the firm held by insiders managers), who serve on the
board (average number of shares owned by all directors /average number of common shares outstanding at
2001 fiscal year end)
CEO/CH—dummy variable to record the fact the CEO of the company is appointed as the chair of the board of
directors
Dependent variables
ROA, ROE—accounting returns on total average assets and the book value of the shareholders' invested capital
for 2000 and 2001
MTB—market to book ratio= price per share *# of shares outstanding/book value of equity
Control variables
AGE—number of years a given firm's stock has been traded at the NYSE or NASDAQ as of 2000 and 2001
GROWTH
—
growth rate computed as average percentage change in total assets for 2 years ending before the year
of interest
TDEB/TCAP—debt ratio = debt capital (noncurrent liabilities) /debt capital + equity capital
TASSET—logarithm of the company's total assets
while revenues are recorded at current dollars. The market-to-book ratio is used as an
alternative that is not affected by these limitations and company's performance shows
the extent to which expected future gains are not currently reflected on the books.
4.2. Independent variables
The set of independent variables can be divided into two categories: empirical proxies
used to measure BOARD composition and empirical proxies used to measure ownership
concentration. Proxy measures for the BOARD composition are: first, the percentage of
corporate insiders, measured by variable %INDIR, computed as the percentage number of
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inside directors to total number of directors. Second, to measure the presence of
"independenf directors on the BOARD, the variable %INDEPD is the percentage of
number of independent directors to number of total number of directors.*' Third, to
measure the presence of scholars on the BOARD, I use the %GOV variable computed as
number of scholars to total number of directors. Finally, the variable CHCEO captures the
jointness (CHCE0=1) or separation (CHCEO =0) of the chairman of the BOARD and
CEO.
The empirical proxies used to measure the ownership concentration are: (1)
MNGOW, measures the stockholding of companies' directors; (2) CEOOW, a dummy
variable for CEO/family ownership; (3) %rNST, percentage of stockholding by the
institutions; and (4) %BLOCK, percentage of stockholding by block-holders other than
institutional investors.
4.3. Control variables
The four control variables are as follows: (1) firm AGE, the length of time that the
firm's common stock has been traded in American public markets. This variable
proxies for the level of stress the company management is under to meet and comply
with public capital markets; (2) TDEB/TCAP, measures the capital structure of each
company.'"^ There are two reasons to control for leverage. Novaes and Zingales (1999)
show that the optimal choice of debt from the viewpoint of shareholders differs from
that of managers. Additionally, borrowing increases financial risk and the firm's credit
risk; (3) TASSET, the size variable is computed as the logarithm of total assets. The
importance of confroUing the firm's size stems from the results of the research (Fama &
French, 1995), which documents that small firms, on average, have lower ROE than
large firms; (4) GROWTH is computed as the difference in average percentage change
in total assets for 2 subsequent years prior to the year of interest.
5. Sample
Initially, this sample included 87 companies from nine European countries (Table 1),
which were members of the European Union in 1999. The sample contained all
companies from nine CEUM that are traded consecutively on the NYSE during 2000
and 2001.'^ The data from six companies were not consistently available and the final
sample includes only 81 companies. All companies included in the sample prepare their
financial statements according to IAS and file 20-F with the SEC. The information
'
' "Independence" generally involves an absence of close family ties or business relationships with company
management and controlling shareholder(s).
'^ (Source: Compustat). Because CEUM companies mostly rely on accounting measures, the degree of leverage
included in the tests should be logically measured in terms of accounting rather than market values.
'
"* Excluding financial institutions and insurances, because they operate under a very different set of rules.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median S.D.
ROE 0.99 0.062 9.55
ROA 0.07 0.02 1.08
MTB 3.66 2.06 6.19
%rNDIR 46.97 44.8 16.8
"/oINDEP 30.97 27.5 14.84
%GOV 44.29 6.88
%BLOCK 15.51 7.2 18.89
%INST 31.67 26.1 26.46
CHCEO 0.51 1 0.5
CEOOW 0.21 0.41
MNGOW 16.48 1.4 25.39
DEBT/CAP 51.06 35.54 138.14
GROWTH 0.42 0.04 1.7
TASSET 15,171.22 2786.55 26,788.63
AGE 6.16 4 7.49
related to the composition of their BOARDS are obtained from their proxy or annual
reports.
^"^'^^
6. Statistical results
6.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in this research. The
analysis of the results shows that the three dependent variables are not symmetrically
distributed and have a positive skewness. Thus I use median^^ for measurement of
performance, MdROE = 0062 and MdROA=002.
Independent variables related to the composition of the board of directors indicate
that the firms in the sample are dominated by insiders (mean %INDIR# = 46.9), with the
strong presence of institutions (mean %INST#=31.67). Percentage of independent
directors is about 30% (%INDEP= 30.97). About one half of the companies in the
sample have the same person holding the positions of CEO and chairman of the board
(mean CEOCH = 0.51), and 21% of the companies are family-CEO-owned. Managerial
ownership is also relatively high (mean MNGOW=16.8).
'"* Until 2001, some companies were still submitting 20-F as the paper file. In this case, the company web
sites were the primary sources of information, because Edgar does not contain electronically available annual
reports.
'^ More detailed information about companies and their characteristics are available upon request.
"" In this case, median better characterize the distribution, because it is less affected by extreme values.
V Krivogorsky / The International Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 176-197 189
Table 4
Correlation (Pearson)
ROE ROA MTB %INDIR %INDEPD %GOV %INSTN %BLOCK CHCEO CEO/OW MNGOW
ROE 1
ROA 0.96 1
MTB -0.05-0.06 1
%INDIR -0.09-0.12 0.07 1
%INDEP 0.07 0.10 0.03-0.21 1
%GOV 0.11 0.12-0.08-0.16 0.18 1
%INST 0.08 0.07 0.03 -0.17 0.09 0.03 1
%BLOCK -0.02 0.03-0.06 0.15 -0.32 -0.05 -0.29 1
CHCEO -0.11 -0.14 0.03 0.11 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.05 1
CEOOW -0.08-0.06 0.05 0.34 -0.34 -0.16 -0.18 0.35 0.11 1
MNGOW -0.10-0.08 0.04 0.42 -0.14 -0.10 -0.16 0.33 0.04 0.71 1
The companies in the sample have been trading their stocks in American pubhc markets
for 5 years on average with 20% having 1-2 years of experience and only 3.2% having 15
years or more.'''
6.2. Univariate tests
Table 4 reports Pearson product-moment correlations among all variables and shows
several significant correlation coefficients. First, the levels of institutional (%rNST) and
block-holder (%BLOCK) ownerships are negatively correlated (/- = — 0.29). Second, the
level of independent directors on the board is inversely related to CEO/family ownership
(/• = — 0.34) and to the level of insiders on the board (/= — 0.21). Third, companies with a
high level of inside directors (%INDIR) have a higher level of managerial ownership
(MNGOW), r = 0.42, and are more likely to be family-owned (r = 0.71). Furthermore, the
level of block-holder ownership has a positive relation with the level of managerial
ownership (r = 0.33).
6.3. Multivariate tests
Table 5 provides ordinary least-squares (OLS with robust standard errors)'^ regression
results for each of ROE, ROA, and MTB on the independent variables.'^ These variables
explain about 10% of the cross sectional variation in ROA, 17% of the cross-sectional
variation in ROE, and 24% of the cross sectional variations in MTB. Two of the models
are significantly different fi-om zero at the 0.05 significance level (Ffor mtb"'3.84, #[12,
' KLM Royal Dutch—44 years, Bennetton Group, Italy—23 years, Royal Dutch Petroleum—47 years, etc. The
highest surviving rate on the American public market belongs to Dutch companies (6 out of 32 companies with 10
or more years of experience).
The Shapiro-Wilk normality test was performed and the outliers with unusually large errors were omitted.
OLS was used on the remaining observations to produce a-trimmed least-squares estimate (Maddala, 1997,
pp. 305-08).
The multivariate tests run for 2 years separately yield similar results.
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Table 5
OLS regression (with robust standard errors)
ROE ROA MTB
Intercept ^ 0.09 0.92 2.09
(0 -0.64 (1.98*) -1.61
%INDIR p 0.00 0.00 0.04
(0 (-0.31) (-0.91) (2.27*)
%INDEP p 0.12 0.02 0.03
(0 (1.94*) (2.0*) -1.75
%GOV p 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0 -1.16 -0.74 (-0.35)
%INST p 0.07 0.06 0.03
it) (1.96*) (1.93*) (1.89**
%BLOCK p 0.00 0.00 -0.02
(0 (-0. 26) (-0.24) (-1.39)
CHCEO p -2.66 -0.34 0.68
(0 (-1.78**) (-1.9*) -1.33
CEOOW i? -0.60 -0.17 -2.18
(0 -0.59 (-0.57) (-2.32*)
MNGOW p 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0 (-0.5) 0.00 -0.87
TDEBT/TCAP p 0.00 0.00 0.01
it) (-0.19) (-0.11) -5.20
GROWTH p 0.01 0.02 -0.03
it) -0.41 -0.54 (-0.26)
TASSET p 0.00 0.00 0.00
it) -0.81 (1.88*) -0.05
AGE p 0.02 0.01 0.05
it) (3.81*) (2.39*) -1.42
^- p 0.17 0.11 0.24
Adj. R- p 0.09 0.07 0.18
# Observ. p 141.00 154.00 155.00
Significant at 0.05 level.
Significant at 0.1 level.
142]; Ffor ROE='2.23, df[\2, 128]), and the third equation represents a set of regression
coefficients that are statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10 significance
level (FforROA-1.5 #[12, 141]).
Consistent with HI, %INST is strongly and positively correlated with ROE (t=l.94,
P>[t] = 0.05) and ROA (^=1.93, P>[t] = 0.05), and %INST is positively correlated with
the MTB ratio (/= 1.89, P>[^] = 0.06). These results support the idea that in the European
market, which is characterized by a relatively weak market for corporate control, relational
investing serves as the complementing governance mechanism in monitoring a firm's
performance (Jensen, 1986; Mikkelson & Partch, 1997).
The results do not support the proposition regarding the strong association between
%BLOCK and any of the tested profitability ratios, which is consistent with Mceachem's
(1975) findings. A competing explanation is that relational investors have their own
agency problems and may not aim at maximizing the value of their portfolios (Black,
1992a, 1992b; Black & Coffee, 1994).
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As predicted in HI a, the level of managerial ownership does not significantly impact
the company's profitability. It is consistent with the institutional features of CEUM's
accounting regimes and in their stakeholders' orientation since more than half the listed
industrial companies have holders of stocks who account for 50% or more of the
company's ownership. Because control rights are not fully separated from ownership,
information asymmetry is reduced and relational investors act as a counterweight to
managers' decisions in cases when managers' and stakeholders' interests are not aligned.
Contrary to the prediction in H2, family-CEO ownership has strong and negative
correlation with MTB {t = — 2.32, /'>[^] = 0.02) and marginally negative correlation with
ROE. It is possible that family-CEO entrenchment is negatively affecting the company's
profitability.
As predicted by H3a, the percentage of independent directors on the board has a
significant positive correlation with the company's profitability (?roe=1-94 and
rROA^2.0) and only marginally with the MTB ratio (?mtb=1-75). These results suggest
that the theoretical predictions of agency theory on a positive relationship between outside
(independent) directors and firm performance (see for example Baysinger & Butler, 1985;
Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Fama, 1980; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Ezzamel & Watson, 1993) are
also applicable in the European environment as well.
Of the negative results, the presence of scholars on the BOARD (%GOV) does not have
a significant impact. The advertisements provided by the companies regarding scholars'
roles in govemance are mostly good marketing. Additionally, as predicted by H3b, the
percentage of inside directors does affect ROA or ROE, significantly, which is consistent
with the above discussed monitoring role of the relational investors associated with
managers' limited discretion in CEUM companies.
As H4 predicts, the power concentration in the company (CEOCH) is negatively
correlated with the company's profitability (/roe^— 1-78, P>[?] = 0.07, ?roa=— 1-9,
P>[r] = 0.04, /mtb = -2.32, P>[r] = 0.02), which is consistent with the proposition that
separation of leadership roles increases the independence of the BOARD and eliminates a
source of conflict (Baliga et al., 1996; Berg & Smith, 1978; Brickley & Coles, 1997).
The results of the test also show that company AGE is strongly associated with ROE
(r = 3.8, P>[?] = 0.0002) and ROA {t = 2A, P>[f] = 0.018), which is consistent with the
assumption that the longer a company survives in American capital markets, the more
likely it is able to meet shareholders' eamings expectations.
6.4. Robustness tests
6.4.1. Multicollinearity
To test for multicollinearity, I computed the variable inflation factor for each variable
with Pearson correlation greater than 0.30. The results show that there are no variables
included in the tests with VIF>3.78. Thus, multicollinearity does not to appear to be a
problem for the results.
6.4.2. Normality
To check the OLS residuals for consistency with normality, I use the Shapiro-Wilk test.
The results of the test identify the possible presence of a "fat tailed" error distribution.
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After excluding the observations with unusually large errors from the test, I still run the
regression with robust estimators.
6.4.3. GLS test
To produce more efficient estimators and evaluate the OLS results, I also use
generalized least-squares (GLS) regression. The Hausman test for equality of estimates
produced by two estimators was used to check for whether the random-effects model is
appropriate.^° The results of the Hausman test suggest that, under the null hypothesis of
zero correlation between the errors and the regressors, the random-effects model is
applicable and its GLS estimator is consistent and efficient (at a significance level a = 0.01
for ROA (x" = 7.74, Prob.>x- = 0.56, p = 0.32) and ROE (x- = 8.94, Prob.>;(^ = 0.48,
p = 0.29324). This suggests that, if the null hypothesis is true, both estimators should
produce similar results. The results and signs of the GLS test are consistent with those of
OLS for all profitability ratios. Therefore, the heteroscedasticity test concludes that the
results of the OLS regression are robust.
6.4.4. Nonmonotonic relationship
To test the claim of a nonmonotonic relation between corporate-governance
mechanisms and performance, I estimated a piecewise linear regression of the
relationship between the profitability ratios and ownership. In compliance with
Mork, Schleifer, and Vishny (1989), two kinks (5% and 25%) were chosen as the
points of the abrupt changes in the behavior of the relationship. Two independent
variables such as MNGOW and %rNST were chosen for the test. The results of the
test do not provide support for the idea that the nature of the relation between the level of
managerial or relational-investor ownership and a company's profitability changes from
positive to negative as the level of managerial or institutional ownership changes.
7. Concluding remarks
While there has been seemingly much evidence to date on the relations between the
composition of the BOARD of directors, ownership concentration, and profitability of
publicly traded U.S. companies, little work has been done to examine these issues for
foreign U.S. registrants. The globalization of the American public market, however,
creates a qualitatively new level of interest in understanding national govemance
practices and their effect on the financial position of a firm. So far there have been few
studies comparing European and U.S. corporate-governance practices. Such studies
could help us create and understand a successftil global market by helping to establish
the prerequisites for the harmonization of accounting practices.
My study has been an exploratory attempt to understand the nature of corporate
govemance in continental Europe. In this study, I use data from 81 European companies
(foreign U.S. registrants) representing a 2-year period (2000-2001) to examine the
^^ The random-effects model was chosen because the data are a drawn from a large population of U.S. foreign
registrants, so the fixed-effect approach is no longer reasonable.
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interrelationships between the composition of the boards of directors, ownership
concentration, and profitabihty of CEUM companies. The results indicate a strong
positive relation between the level of relational-investors ownership (%rNST) and
profitability ratios, as well as a strong, positive relation between the portion of independent
directors on the board and profitability ratios, but no strong relation between the portion of
inside directors or level of managerial ownership and profitability in European companies.
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Appendix A. List of corporate-governance codes relevant to the CEUM
A.l. Belgium
Federation of Belgian Companies ("VBO/FEB"), Corporate Governance Recom-
mendations (January 1998), www.vbo-feb.be, Belgian Banking and Finance Commis-
sion ("CBF'), Recommendations of the Belgian Banking and Finance Commission
(January 1998). (Now included as Part II of the Dual Code of the Brussels Stock
Exchange and the Belgian Banking and Finance Commission, "Corporate Governance
for Belgian Listed Companies," December 1998.) (www.cbfbe/pe/pec/en_ec01.htm).
Brussels Stock Exchange, Report of the Belgian Commission on Corporate Governance
(Cardon Report) (December 1998). (Now included as Part I of the Dual Code of the
Brussels Stock Exchange and the Belgian Banking and Finance Commission, "Corporate
Governance for Belgian Listed Companies," December 1998.) www.cbfbe/pe/pec/
en_ec01.htm, Fondation des Administrateurs ("FDA"), The Director's Charter (La Charte
de I'Administrateur) (January 2000), www.ecgn.org.
A. 2. Denmark
Danish Shareholders Association, Guidelines on Good Management of a Listed
Company (Corporate Governance) (February 2000), www.shareholders.dk. The Norby
Commission, Recommendations for Good Corporate Governance in Denmark (December
6, 2001), www.corporategovemance.dk.
A. 3. France
Conseil National du Patronat Fran^ais ("CNPF') and Association Fran^aise des
Entreprises Privees ("AFEP"), The Boards of Directors of Listed Companies in France
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(Vienot I) (July 1995), www.ecgn.org, Association Fran9aise de la Gestion Financiere
—
Association des Societes et Ponds Fran^ais d'Investissement ("AFG-ASFFF'), Recom-
mendations on Corporate Governance (Hellebuyck Commission Recommendations)
(June 1998, revised September 2001). www.afgasffi.com, association Fran9aise
des Entreprises Privees ("AFEP") and Mouvement des Entreprises de France
("MEDEF"), Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance (Vienot II) (July 1999),
www.ecgn.org.
A. 4. Germany
Berliner Initiativkreis (Berlin Initiative Group), German Code of Corporate Governance
(June 2000), www.gccg.de, Grundsatzkommission Corporate Governance ("GCF'
German Panel on Corporate Governance), Corporate Governance Rules for German
Quoted Companies (revised July 2000; first issued January 2000), www.corgov.de,
Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex/Govemment Commis-
sion German Corporate Govemance Code, Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex/
German Corporate Govemance Code (draft, December 17, 2001), (www.corporate-
govemancecode de) (German and English).
A. 5. Italy
Comitato per la Corporate Govemance delle Societa Quotate (Committee for the
Corporate Govemance of Listed Companies), Report and Code of Conduct (Preda Report)
(October 1999), www.borsaitalia.it.
A. 6. The Netherlands
Secretariat Committee on Corporate Govemance, Corporate Govemance in The
Netherlands—Forty Recommendations (Peters Report) (June 1997), www.ecgn.org,
Vereniging van Effectenbezitters ("VEB"), Ten Recommendations on Corporate Gover-
nance in The Netherlands (1997), www.vebbottomline.com, Stichting Corporate Gover-
nance Onderzoek voor Pensioenfondsen ("SCGOP") (Foundation for Corporate
Govemance Research for Pension Funds), Corporate Govemance Handbook of the
SCGOP (August 2001) (www.scgop.nl/downloads/Handbool^SCGORpdf).
A. 7. Portugal
Comissao do Mercado de Valores Mobiliarios (Securities Market Commission),
Recommendations on Corporate Govemance (November 1999), www.cmvm.pt.
A. 8. Spain
Comision Especial para el Estudio de un Codigo Etico de los Consejos de
Administracion de las Sociedades, El gobiemo de las sociedades cotizadas (Olivencia
Report) (Febmary 1998), (www.ecgn.org). English translation: Instituto Universitario
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Euroforum Escorial, The Governance of Spanish Companies (February 1998), instuniv
@euroforum.es.
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Norman B. Macintosh, Trevor Hopper (Eds.), Accounting, The Social and the
Political: Classics, Contemporary and Beyond, Elsevier, Oxford, UK, 2005, xiv+402
pages, USD 99.95, EUR 91.95, ISBN: 0-08-044725-2
This book is a collection of 35 previously published articles (in abridged form) selected
by a dozen participants at the International Forum on the Future of Management
Accounting, Control and Information Systems Research, held at Queen's University,
Canada, in May 2002. The participants were asked to select one or two personal favorites
among their own (co)authored articles. In addition, the participants also suggested articles
by other authors that they believe made significant contributions to accounting thought.
Finally, anonymous reviewers of a preliminary draft of the book also suggested articles
that were considered in making the final selection of 35 articles.
Based on the Acknowledgement section of the book, the 12 participants at the
conference were: R. Baker, S. Carmon (probably a typo; I assume this is S. Carmona), D.
Cooper, J. Dillard, M. Ezzamel, S. Jonsson, E. McGoun, R Pihlanto, V. Radcliffe, A.
Riccaboni, A. Richardson, and T. Shaerer. Including the two editors of this book (N.
Macintosh and T. Hopper), 21 of the 35 selected articles, or exactly 60%, are (co)authored
by these 14 people. Thus, although the editors admit that the selection of articles is highly
idiosyncratic, the book includes reasonable coverage of articles not (co)authored by those
who selected them (40% of the articles). In total, the 35 articles represent 48 contributors.
The selected articles deal with the role and impact of accounting on organizations and
society, broadly speaking. All but one article (i.e., Lukka and Mouritsen's 2002 European
Accounting Review article; Chapter 28, p. 305) are presented in the book in abridged form.
The editors state that the articles were culled to highlight their main message while
maintaining the integrity of the original content. I compared many of the trimmed articles
in this book with the unabridged originals and concluded that the stated objective of the
culling was mostly accomplished effectively. As a matter of fact, the culling was quite
"unusual" or definitely "unpredictable" in that sometimes the culled article started with the
content on, say, page 5 of the original article. In other words, the trimming was not done
along predictable lines of taking the introduction, some major sections of the body, and
then the conclusion of the original article. The book does not reveal who did the culling
(the editors, the authors, or both), but I submit that it was done competently.
Many articles, however, are quite substantially trimmed. For example. Chapter 32,
p. 353 (Oakes, Townley, and Cooper's 1998 Administrative Science Quarterly article)
would have been easier to understand had the Theory section not been so substantially
200 Book reviews
trimmed. Similarly, Chapter 32, but also other chapters that are based on qualitative
research, presents too little information about the research setting for the reader to be able
to flilly appreciate the remaining parts of the original article. And, the culling also has
some more mundane, practical implications that affect the readability of some chapters.
For example. Chapter 22 (Jonsson and Macintosh's 1997 (not 1977 as printed on p. 227)
Accounting Organizations and Society article) does not spell out the CATS, RATS, and
EARS acronyms because that section of Jonsson and Macintosh's original article was
culled. Because of this, I expect that the curious reader will want to check out the original
articles to obtain a more thorough and complete understanding of the abridged articles.
This raises the question whether it is worthwhile to bundle a collection of abridged
published articles in a book, and if so, which audience is likely to value it. With this book,
the editors target upper-division undergraduate and graduate students in professional
accounting programs and doctoral students. The editors also believe that the book will be
of interest to thoughtful, sophisticated professional accountants. In my opinion, the
audience most suited for this book consists of doctoral students who consider pursuing
research in this area. For them, the book provides a broad sampling of influential articles
presented in an accessible format. If the book turns out to whet their appetite, they can then
dig deeper by studying the original, unabridged articles in depth, as well as other articles in
this area and related literatures. However, for a seminar-type doctoral course on, say,
critical perspectives on accounting, I expect that an instructor is more likely to compose a
reader of original articles of his/her choice rather than using this book with a collection of
pre-selected abridged articles. For undergraduates and master's students in professional
accounting programs, the book probably is too specialized to be required reading, other
than perhaps for elective courses with this topical focus. Finally, I doubt that this book is
presented in a sufficiently accessible format for it to be of great interest to busy
practitioners. In summary, I believe that this book offers the best value for early-stage
doctoral students who are exploring avenues for research.
If I am correct in my assessment of the most likely target audience for this book, then I
believe that the work would have been even more valuable (beyond offering a broad
sampling of influential articles in accessible format) had it attempted to provide more
extensive introductions to each of the book's three sections (Classics, Contemporary, and
Beyond). The current introductions to each section are quite brief (fewer than 2 pages
each) and essentially "lisf the chapters for the section with little further discussion,
synthesis, integration, or perspective. After all, the articles are what they are, but it would
have been especially valuable for the readers, particularly the novices among them, to see
more perspective offered on the selected articles by the editors, both ofwhom are eminent
scholars in this area.
The articles (chapters) in this book are organized in three sections. First, the Classics
are seminal articles that introduced highly original ideas when first published that have
become a source for future research and theorizing. The Contemporaries are articles of
more recent vintage that have built on the foundations of the Classics and have extended
that body of knowledge. The Beyond section contains articles that are exemplary of
promising directions for further and future research on the roles and impacts of accounting
on organizations and society. The editors effectively slotted the 35 articles along these
lines. Although these lines are somewhat arbitrary, any other categorization I tried to think
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of (e.g., thought pieces vs. empirics-based investigations) was equally, if not more,
arbitrary (e.g., because many of the empirics-based investigations often introduce theories
that are not necessarily covered by the thought pieces). There is no magic to the book's
sections but, again, the implemented structure is as good, if not better, as any other way of
trying to organize this eclectic body of work represented by the 35 articles. And although I
would have liked to see a somewhat more extensive synthesis in each section's
introduction (see above), the editors definitely presented a convincing logic for their
chosen order of the articles in each section.
The editors could also have provided more perspective in the book's Postscript,
which in its current form only offers thoughtflil directions for, or conjectures about,
ftiture research (which the editors admit, they only did at the urging of the reviewers of
an earlier draft of the book). In addition to discussing the prospects, I would have liked
to see more of an attempt by the editors to offer their perspectives on what has been
accomplished. I do realize, however, that given the eclectic body of work represented in
the current book, such an editorial task would be quite challenging. (But it would also
be quite useful for the targeted novice researchers trying to get their hands around this
area of research.)
The conjectures in the Postscript essentially boil down to two points. First, the editors
conclude that research in social and political accounting thought has gained in importance,
and will continue to do so, finding a home in world-class journals. Second, this research
will continue to be eclectic, heterogeneous, and innovative (using linguistics-based
investigations, for example) in addressing important issues related to the roles and impacts
of accounting as a cultural discourse; the roles and impacts of accounting in the face of
increasing globalization; and the ethical side of accounting. In other words, the editors are
optimistic that heterogeneity in accounting research will prevail.
I certainly hope that the editors are correct in their speculation, although I must admit
that I am "cautiously" optimistic only. Considering the trend in the types of publications in
the so-called "top" accounting journals (Bonner, Hesford, Van der Stede, & Young, in
press), I see less, rather than more, heterogeneity in terms of the topics studied, the source
disciplines relied on, and the methods employed. My observation is that, clearly,
economics-based archival capital markets research appears to dominate these journals'
offerings, with the exception of Accounting Organizations and Society (AOS). It is,
therefore, no accident that 20 of the 35 articles (nearly 60%) in this book were previously
published in AOS. Another three articles are from Critical Perspectives on Accounting,
and there is only one article in this book from the other so-called "top" joumals (Chua's
1986 Accounting Review article in Chapter 6, p. 55). My cautious optimism is also tainted
by my observation that many schools, particularly European schools, recently have been
drawing up "lists" of publication outlets that their deans use for faculty evaluation and
promotion purposes. In a globally competitive quest for school rankings, these lists
invariably include the "top 3" North-American accounting joumals {The Accounting
Review, Journal ofAccounting Research, and Journal ofAccounting and Economics), but
none except one of the selected articles in this book came from these joumals. However,
given these observations, I do hope, like the editors, that there will be sufficient incentives
for faculty to continue to study the diverse roles of accounting in organizations and society
using eclectic and heterogeneous theories and methods. After all, as the editors state
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(p. 402), "thinking about accounting (. . .) as a neutral and objective window on reality
(...) [is] fatuously naive."
Finally, the editors often use the term management accounting, rather than just
accounting. Although most of the scholars involved in selecting the articles, and those
who have authored the articles, might view themselves as management accounting
researchers, the book deals with accounting thought more broadly. Many articles indeed
have a management accounting focus or flavor, but many chapters deal with important
issues that extend beyond the management accounting specialty area. Therefore, the
(probably unintentional) positioning of the book as management accounting is not
necessary and too limiting given the significance of social and political accounting
thought.
I enjoyed reading this book. I already had read some of the unabridged published
articles, but many I had not. As a scholar whose research is not square in this area, I found
the book to be quite illuminating.
Reference
Bonner, S. E., Hesford, J. W., Van der Stede, W. A., & Young, S. M. (in press). The most influential journals in
academic accounting. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 3 1
.
Wim A. Van der Stede
Leventhal School ofAccounting, University of Southern California,
Los Angeles. CA 90089-0441. USA
E-mail address: wim@marshall.usc.edu.
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Christopher S. Chapman (Ed.), Controlling strategy: Management, accounting and
performance measurement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, ISBN: 0-19-
928323-0, 191 pages, US$124.50
This is a collection of seven previously unpublished essays organized by Christopher
Chapman (Said Business School), which aims to develop our understanding of how
management-control systems (MCS) may actively build and sustain a valuable strategy.
The book presents a mix of essays relevant for both researchers and practitioners interested
in surveying the research produced in the area ofMCS and the implementation of strategy.
Discussions and conclusions in the first three essays derive from an ample literature
review. The other four essays report the result of studies based on various research
approaches (case studies, field study, and clinical research) and consequently may attract
more easily the attention of managers.
Discussions in each chapter improve our understanding of the relationship between
MCS and strategy. The summary and directions for future research at the end of most
chapters clearly map areas that remain unclear and, consequently, may deserve more
attention and research in the future. The four chapters that use qualitative research methods
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clearly explain the research method, which may interest researchers and academics. This is
clearly a book recommended for scholars and researchers who aim to understand the
relationship between MCS and strategy and to identify potential research projects in this
area of study.
The remainder of this review comments briefly on each chapter. The first chapter
defines the aim of the book, explains the context in which it is written, and summarizes
each chapter. I will develop these ideas a little fiirther and present my own view of each of
the seven following chapters.
The second chapter, by Robert H. Chenhall (Monash University and James Cook
University), discusses the role of MCS in formulating and implementing strategy,
distinguishing between the content approach and the process approach, and summarizes
how organizations could benefit fi^om using both approaches to deal with strategic change.
The third chapter, by Tony Davila (Stanford University and lESE Business School),
challenges the typical but unproven assumption that MCS are unsuited for companies in
turbulent environments that tend to damage innovation. The chapter analyses the evolution
of the MCS over the last decade and argues that while traditional MCS were imposing
standardization at all levels of organization and could eventually reject innovation at both
the operational and strategic levels, modem systems exist to support organizations in their
effort to respond and adapt to a changing environment. The tension between the
efficiency-focused control strategy and the innovation-focused control strategy is also
discussed. Finally, grounded in the literature, the author argues that MCS are useful not
only for companies facing highly controlled and stable environments but also for the
contemporary unstable business environment where it can enable innovative strategic
responses.
In the fourth chapter, Kim Langfield-Smith (Monash University) surveys the
literature and discusses several areas of research related to MCS: (1) The fit between
strategy, performance, and reward systems; (2) The relationship between capital
expenditure (CAPEX) decisions and business strategy. In this section the author
emphasizes the limited research despite the long-term implications of these decisions
and the contrast between the "traditional" CAPEX decision on individual projects based
on their NPV and the interactive use of control systems based on multiple-projects
analysis and their strategic impact. This subject is thoroughly discussed by Miller and
O'Leary in the last chapter; (3) The use of interactive controls in strategic change,
which reinforces the argument of Davila in the previous chapter that MCS may have a
positive impact on innovation and long-term performance; (4) The use of MCS in
conjunction with operational strategies such as TQM, JIT, flexible manufacturing,
business process re-engineering, and confinuous improvement. This subject is also
analyzed by Hansen and Mouritsen in the seventh chapter; (5) MCS and strategy in
interim relationships are recent topics that spark the interest of researchers as MCS may
play a role in deciding and managing interdependencies between organizations, such as
outsourcing, joint-ventures, and strategic alliances. The author shows that the network
company is clearly a new avenue of research; (6) and finally, the strategic style of
corporate headquarters and the MCS of business units. Much more could be said in
this section if the author extended the topic to multinationals and globalization, but the
conclusions about the rise of behavior and socialization controls across subsidiaries is
204 Book reviews
coincident to the recommendations of Bartlett and Ghoshal in their book, Managing
across Borders: TJte Transnational Solution, pubUshed in 1989 by Harvard Business
School Publishing.
The fifth chapter by, Christopher D. Ittner and David F. Larcker (University of
Pennsylvania), uses four case studies as evidence of the importance of using strategic
data analysis ( 1 ) to check the coherence of the business model used by a firm; (2) to
set non-financial targets that are associated with the creation of value; (3) to
understand the cause-effect relationship between drivers that enhance value creation;
and (4) to avoid subjectively weighing measures based on their assumed strategic
importance.
The anecdotal approach in this chapter is very effective for bringing out the importance
of data analysis for management decision and control. In spite of the potential benefits of
strategic data analysis, several surveys mentioned in the chapter indicate that most
companies with strategic measurement-performance systems do not perform these
analyses. As a consequence, the chapter follows with a discussion of the technical and
organizational barriers to strategic data analysis.
In contrast to previous chapters that surveyed the literature, the anecdotal analysis used
in the case studies and the discussion of the barriers to strategic data analysis are based on
extensive field research conducted by the authors in more than 60 companies and
supplemented with survey studies in a broad spectrum of public- and private-sector
organizations.
Thomas Ahrens (University of Warwick)' and Christopher S. Chapman (University of
Oxford), in chapter six, draw on practice theory to understand the strategic potential of
MCS. Their analysis is grounded in an in-depth longitudinal field study on a U.K.
restaurant chain where customer satisfaction was a key non-financial measure of
performance. They focus the analysis on routines and practices surrounding strategic
issues at all levels of the organization to demonstrate how strategy and day-to-day
operations interact. The analysis and conclusions are relevant for managers in their use of
management tools such as ABC, Balanced Scorecard, or Economic Value Added.
Chapter seven, by Allan Hansen and Jan Mouritsen (Copenhagen Business School),
starts arguing that Kaplan and Norton had a "pre-made" conceptualization of strategy when
developing the balanced scorecard (BSC), based on a "Porterian" fi^amework. The
environment and customers must be understood first and then it is possible to develop
internal processes along with leaming and growth activities. In contrast, Hansen and
Mouritsen argue that the strategy in relation to the BSC may emerge from inside as a result
of a particular organizational problem. In their four case studies, the environment and
customers were not the point of departure for developing the BSC but a very specific
internal problem: (1) In the first case, the cross-fijnctional integration was poor and the
value attached to the BSC was the capability for developing cross-functional
communication; (2) The second case is a highly creative company lacking planning and
the BSC was used for developing a planning culture; (3) In the third case the corporation
was experiencing very high growth but the development of new subsidiaries internation-
ally was showing a problem of variation in the execution of key processes in various
locations. The BSC became a tool for standardizing and benchmarking the subsidiaries; (4)
the fourth case is a company requiring improvement of efficiency in two major processes.
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The BSC was launched simuhaneously with a business process re-engineering project for
monitoring it.
The authors clearly show that organizational problems are fundamental issues located
in the history of each firm and that strategy became emergent rather than pre-defmable. It
is not evident, however, that the companies in these case studies implemented the BSC
with the four perspectives defined by Kaplan and Norton. Eventually, a modification of the
model-a Performance Scorecard or a Dashboard-that does not balance all the four
perspectives is used. Nevertheless, this does not invalidate the conclusion of this chapter
that strategy may come fi^om the inside-out instead of fi^om the outside-in as proposed by
Porter.
In the final chapter, Peter Miller (London School of Economics and Political Science)
and Ted O'Leary (Manchester Business School and University of Michigan) examine the
coordination mechanism of capital budgeting, an issue that has been neglected in the
investment-appraisal literature in accounting. They use the clinical research method
(based on Intel) to analyze the coordination and assess the practices of capital
investments to generate a particular technology, during the period fi^om May 1996 to
June 2000. The authors provide evidence of the usefulness of the technology road map
as a mechanism for inter-organizational coordination for the industry in general and for
Intel in particular.
My final comment is to say that I find the book an indispensable guide for scholars and
advanced students of accounting, strategy and management.
Joao C. Neves
ISEG, School ofEconomics and Management, Technical University ofLisbon, Portugal
E-mail address: Jc.neves(^sapo.pt.
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2006.04.004
Malcom Smith, Performance Measurement and Management. A Strategic Approach
to Management Accounting, Sage Publications, London, 302 pages, £24.99, ISBN 1-
4129-0763-2; ISBN 1-4129-0764-0 (pbk)
This book builds on the inadequacies and limits of traditional management-accounting
systems, and on the failure of financial accounting in supporting timely and effective
decision-making, to emphasize a major need for awareness of new developments in
performance measures. Those developments do not concern new techniques for data
analysis; rather they focus on the availability of traditional data from on-line sources, new
data from traditional sources, new attitudes towards data interpretation, and the
implementation of change. The new developments are grouped into five key themes:
(1) strategic goals, human resources; (2) customer focus; (3) employee creativity; (4)
processes; and (5) information systems. After describing the main emerging issues in
management accounting research (chapter 2), the need for a strategic approach is
emphasized and alternative fi^ameworks-such as strategic-management accounting, the
SWOT analysis, and the resource-based view of the firm-are examined (chapter 3).
Creative thinking and the development of a culture of innovation are described as crucial
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aspects of non-traditional approaches to problem solving (chapter 4). The knowledge of
the processes is another essential feature of decision support. In this context, new methods
of cost measurement and management (such as ABC, ABM, target costing, etc.) offer
opportunities for improving process analysis and process reengineering (chapter 6). A key
theme of the book concerns human resource issues, involving both customers and
employees (chapters 5 and 7). Product and customer profitability are examined from the
perspective of alternative measurement systems, such as total quality management, target
costing, and customer profitability. Employees are described as the "internal customers" of
the organization and their empowerment is viewed as the development of human relation
models (of which TQM is a typical example). Appropriate measures need to be adopted to
ensure that employees do not perform in a dysftinctional manner. Finally, to improve
human-resource management and process analysis and, more generally, to accomplish the
changing needs for decision support, new information systems are required (chapter 8).
The book underlines the need for a frilly integrated information system, embracing both
financial and non-financial indicators. In this context, the balanced scorecard is described
as being able to provide a partial solution. In cases of high uncertainty, the accuracy of
forecasts becomes crucial. In this context, risk-management techniques and predictive
models are suggested (chapter 9).
The book provides a wide description of new developments in performance-
measurement techniques, following the changing information needs of decision makers
within an organization. While fraditional management-accounting techniques are not
denied, the need for a revised focus is emphasized, moving towards a sfrategic approach to
management accounting. This change requires going beyond financial and short-term
information to include a wide set of performance measures.
This book deals with a relevant topic. Over the last 20 years, business corporations have
undergone massive transformations, which have forced them to redefine their sfrategies,
structures, and processes. In the resulting highly uncertain market environment, business
processes have been re-engineered according to various operational and business
philosophies. Philosophies such as Total Quality Management and Business Process Re-
engineering have been used to meet the resulting financial pressures by infusing
organizational culture with a set of customer-oriented "values". In this contemporary
business environment, organizational resources have to be organized and monitored in
order to achieve the goals, which underpin the corporate vision of the business. As such,
organizational leaders have to translate their broad mission and strategies into specific
objectives and measures, and to communicate them across the organization. In doing so,
they are increasingly relying on comprehensive, organization-wide, performance-
measurement systems. In this context, the conventional financially based performance
measures need to be substantially modified and integrated with broader non-financial
measures (by means of tools such as the balanced scorecard). The fraditional profit-related
measures are increasingly being coupled with performance indicators, which measure, for
instance, customer satisfaction, market share, numbers of rejects, extent of innovation,
employees empowerment, etc., and which extend the roles, tasks, and content of the
existing systems of accountability.
The book focuses on the previous debate by emphasizing the need to questioning the
appropriateness of existing systems and measures while exploring new opportunities. The
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potentialities and threats of new performance measures are analyzed and explained.
Evidence from case analysis is used to clarify and support the various issues discussed.
While providing a broad picture of new developments in performance-measurement
systems, not all techniques and approaches are described in great depth in this book. For
this reason, it cannot be seen as an introductory text, rather it is suitable for more advanced
readings. It is also suitable for business managers and professionals, as it gives a
comprehensive idea of the dynamic of performance measurement and management and the
latest advanced techniques, underlying the relevance of management initiatives for doing
things better.
While this book does not provide optimal solutions, it emphasizes the need for reviewing
and altering the existing systems and measures. Much importance is given to the innovation
processes. While new technologies, as well as the changing strategies and structures of the
firms, are affecting management accounting systems, performance measurement and
management should be designed and implemented to support a culture of innovation and
creativity to adequately manage the process of change. The relationship between
performance measures and product/process innovation is one of the key issues in the
book. Performance measurement should be irmovative while also promoting innovation
that takes into account the various drivers and implications of the innovation process.
Another emerging issue concerns the need to implement an integrated performance-
measurement system that embraces financial and non-financial measures, and leading and
lagging indicators. That system should be able to support a strategic approach to
management accounting, involving strategic decision-making, human-resource manage-
ment, process analysis, and innovation. While integrating various aspects of the business,
such a broad performance-measurement system should not ignore the need for accurate
forecasts and risk evaluation, especially during periods of high uncertainty. The
developments in performance-measurement practices provide new opportunities for
implementing an integrated system, which takes into account alternative scenarios and
the risks associated with variations in outcome.
While emphasizing the need for a fully integrated information system, the book does
not provide specific guidelines on how to define and implement that system. The aim of
the book is to improve the awareness of the new developments of performance
measurement, to question the existing information system, and to consider the relevance
of management initiatives for doing things better.
Angelo Riccaboni
University of Siena, Siena, Italy
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2006.04.005
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Abstract
This study investigates managers' motivations to engage in earnings management through
purposeful interventions in the setting of discretionary accruals, in the context of initial public
offerings (IPOs) in France. Firms issuing forecasts in their prospectuses are expected to differ from
nonforecasters in the level of earnings management during the year following the public offering.
Within the context of contracting theory, four research questions are addressed. First, are IPO firms
issuing forecasts more inclined to manage earnings 1 year after an IPO compared to nonforecasting
firms? Second, is a forecasting firm's level of earnings management conditioned by earnings-forecast
deviation? Third, is earnings management by IPO forecasting firms affected by contractual and
governance environments? Fourth, how do investors see through earnings management following
IPO earnings forecasts, i.e., how do stock market participants value earnings components (i.e.,
nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals)? Our findings document that in the year following an
IPO, the magnitude of earnings management is much higher for forecasters than for nonforecasters.
Results also show that a firm's accrual behavior is affected by earnings-forecast deviation, but the
relationship is moderated by contractual and governance constraints. Finally, it would appear that
French investors do not adequately readjust the relationship between reported earnings and a firm's
market value for the year in which earnings are subject to manipulations.
© 2006 Published by University of Illinois.
Keywords: Corporate governance; Accruals; Earnings management; Earnings valuation; Initial public offering;
Management forecasts
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1. Introduction
Our purpose in this article is to assess, in the context ofFrench IPOs, earnings quaUty and its
determinants, and how earnings quaUty affects stock market valuation. More specifically, four
research questions are addressed in this study. First, are IPO firms with forecasts more inclined
to manage earnings 1 year after the IPO compared with IPO firms not issuing forecasts? Second,
is forecasting firm's level ofearnings management conditioned by earnings-forecast deviation?
Third, is earnings management by EPO firms issuing forecasts affected by contractual and
govemance environments? Fourth, how do investors see through potential earnings manage-
ment following IPOs' eamings forecasts, i.e., how do stock market participants value earnings
components (i.e., nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals)?
Capital market information dynamics are ultimately driven by a country's govemance
regime as it affects both the relative benefits and costs of corporate reporting, as well as the
way capital market participants fijnction (Bushman & Smith, 2003). In other words, the
quality ofcorporate reporting for such things as eamings figures and the effectiveness ofits use
by stock market participants is an outcome of a country's govemance regime (Roe, 2003).
Value relevance of eamings and book value of equity are generally higher in countries with a
dominant market-oriented financing system and an Anglo-Saxon accounting orientation (Ali
& Hwang, 2000). However, it does appear that providing value-relevant information is not the
primary driver of accounting and disclosure in code-law countries such as France. We think
the French context offers a unique opportunity to investigate corporate financial reporting, and
in particular, eamings management.
Voluntary corporate disclosure is now perceived to be a strategic tool encompassing all
aspects of a firm's performance. Such evolution in corporate practices appears to be well
founded with empirical evidence suggesting that proactive disclosure policies provide many
benefits to a firm such as a lower cost ofcapital (e.g., Botosan, 1 997; Botosan & Harris, 2000;
Lev, 1992; Skinner, 1994). Prior studies suggest these benefits also apply to management
eamings forecasts. Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson, and Sefcik (1992) and Jog and McConomy
(2003) examine why some firms making an IPO in Canada include eamings forecasts in their
offering prospectuses and others do not. Their results suggest that voluntary forecasters tend to
reveal good news and that their forecast signals convey information to market participants.
Hence, the voluntary disclosure, including management forecasts, has a noticeable impact on
the degree of information asymmetry.
This study investigates, in the context of French IPOs, managers' motivations to engage in
eamings management through purposeful interventions in the setting of discretionary accmals.
Firms issuing forecasts in their prospectuses are expected to differ fi-om nonforecasters in their
levels of eamings management during the year following the public offering. Previous studies
report evidence that managers who release eamings forecasts before their firm goes public have
incentives to engage in eamings management to reach forecast targets subsequent to IPOs
(Gramlich & Sorensen, 2004; Kasznik, 1999; Magnan & Cormier, 1997).
Within the context of contracting theory, we characterize voluntary forecast disclosure as
a reporting environment where managers may be pressured to engage in eamings manage-
ment in the year following the IPO. For the period covered by the forecast, anecdotal
evidence suggests that managers may attempt to steer a firm's eamings toward the figure
contained in the prospectus since they believe their credibility, and potentially the firm's
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value, could be negatively affected by an unfavorable comparison. However, any attempt to
manage reported earnings would be constrained or magnified by a firm's contractual and
govemance environments: the independence of the board, the ownership structure, or
voluntary compliance to international accounting standards.
The last question we seek to answer is whether French investors put a different valuation
weight on earnings reported by firms potentially subject to manipulation through the use of
discretionary accruals, i.e., whether or not stock market participants value earnings compo-
nents differently (i.e., nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals).
Our results document that for the year following an IPO, the magnitude of earnings
management is much higher for forecasting firms than for nonforecasting firms. Results also
show earnings-forecast deviation influences a firm's accruals behavior, which is moderated
by a firm's contractual and govemance constraints. Finally, in the year eamings are more
likely to be subject to manipulations, i.e., the year following an IPO, our results suggest
French investors do not readjust the relationship between reported eamings and firm
valuation, suggesting they do not adequately see through eamings management.
The remainder ofthe paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description ofthe
institutional environment in which French firms evolve. The study's theoretical background
and research hypotheses are developed in Section 3. The method is presented in Section 4,
while results are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes and provides implications
of this study.
2. Institutional environment
In September 2000, the Amsterdam, Brussels, and Paris exchanges merged to form
Euronext, the first pan-European stock exchange. In 2002, two new stock exchanges, the
LIFE^ and the Portuguese Stock Exchange joined Euronext.
In France, the Autorite des Marches Financiers (or AMF), formerly the Commission des
Operations de Bourse (COB), was created by the Financial Security Act ofAugust 2003. The
AMF came out ofthe merger ofthe Conseil des Marches Financiers (CMF), the COB and the
Conseil de Discipline de la Gestion Financiere (CDGF). Its task is to monitor that companies
provide complete, relevant information on a timely basis and in an equitable manner to all
market participants (investors, financial analysts, and the general public). When practices
contravene with the General Market Regulations or professional obligations, the AMF (and
the COB pertaining to the current study) may conduct inspections and investigations and its
Sanction Commission may impose sanctions or penalties."
Until February 2005, Euronext Paris was made up ofthree regulated markets with different
listing criteria such as a firm's size and the level of free float (see Appendix A). The Premier
Marche (formally the official list) was dedicated to major companies in terms of market
The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange.
Firms may be subject to sanctions related to the conduct of their business activity (warning, orders to conform,
temporary or permanent prohibition on providing all or part of the services previously provided) as well as fines
up to €1.5 million or 10 times the unlawful profits earned. For instance, between 2000 and 2004, many
companies such as Pallas Stem, Waeles, Belvedere, Albert, Cofidur, Cocoon and Aurea were prosecuted by the
COB or the AMF for misinformation. In 2004, 40 companies were ordered by the President of the Court to release
missing financial data.
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capitalization. The Second Marche included medium-size companies, and the Nouveau
Marche was the segment with young and fast-growing companies. In France, there was also a
Marche Libre (OTC) for companies that were too young or too small to be listed on a more
regulated market.
In order to be listed in France, companies must fiilfill requirements ofEuronext Paris and
the French securities regulator.^ In short, a legal document, called the IPO prospectus, must
be produced which includes information such as firm investment objectives, policies, and
restrictions, fees and expenses, and how shares can be bought and sold. In their offering
documents, companies must disclose information about their future prospects, but the extent
and detail ofthe disclosure is at the company's discretion. In this context, some firms choose
to disclose earnings or sales forecasts while others decide not to disclose."^ If they do so, a
limited review must be conducted by the external auditor (COB Reglement No. 98-07;
International Organization of Securities Commissions, 1998).^ The difference in legal
liability systems between France and Anglo-Saxon countries constitutes an institutional
aspect that could influence the decision to issue earnings forecasts and earnings management
practices. Whereas Anglo-Saxon countries rely on a common-law system, France relies on
code law. In a code-law environment, obligations towards third parties are strictly defined
and delimited within the law. For example, this criterion does not strictly apply in the United
States where an aggrieved third-party beneficiary need prove only that the auditor was guilty
ofnegligence and that losses were sustained because ofreliance on the audited information.
A higher demand for corporate transparency by outside parties is especially expected when
the enforcement of contracts is high, and contracting parties do not have access to private
information (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004). Hope (2003) constructs a comprehensive
measure of enforcement based on five country-level factors (audit spending, insider-trading
laws, judicial efficiency, rule of law, and shareholder protection). Among their sample countries,
the United States presents the strongest enforcement, while France is among the countries
exhibiting the lowest enforcement. In a similar vein, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) show
that outsider economies with large stock markets, dispersed ownership, strong investor rights
and strong legal enforcement mitigate insiders' incentives to manage earnings. The reporting
context in France is less mle-oriented (prescriptive) than in the United States and less subject to
lawsuits or litigations. In that regard, Bushman et al. (2004) document that while the fi^equency
and comprehensiveness of interim financial reports is higher in France than in Gennany or in
Switzerland, it is still much lower than in Anglo-Saxon countries. Therefore, while the French
All the requirements are described in COB article number COB 98-0 1
.
"* In the COB aimual report of 1998, it is mentioned (page 46) that firms must disclose prospective information
over 3 years, but it can consist of detailed fmancial statements, wide-ranging, or broad information ("donnees
significatives generales"). Moreover, a document released by AMF in December 2001, entitled Instruction de
decembre 2001 prise en application du reglement No. 95-01 (page 5), mentions that ifthe prospectus includes a
development project with quantitative data, the information must be audited. That would mean that the inclusion
of such a statement is not mandatory.
The EU Prospectus Directive (the Prospectus Directive) effective by July 1, 2005 requires that fmancial
statements be prepared in accordance with International Accounting Standards (LAS/IFRS) and International
Standards on Auditing. The future prospects of the issuer for at least the current financial year must be given. If
profit forecasts are provided, they should be accompanied by a statement prepared by independent accountants or
auditors assessing that the forecast has been properly prepared on the basis stated and that the basis of accounting
is consistent with the issuer's accounting policies.
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financial markets are evolving toward more enforcement, we expect that this context may still
lead to optimistic earnings forecasts and subsequently to lower quality financial reporting, i.e., to
eamings management with the objective to reach these forecasts.
3. Earnings forecasts, earnings management and stocli market valuation: Development
of hypotheses
3.1. Earnings management: Forecasters/non-forecasters
In some countries, firms are allowed to voluntarily disclose eamings forecasts in their
Initial Public Offering (IPO) prospectuses. These countries include, among others, the
United Kingdom, Canada, France, and more recently the United States.'' In this study, we
view the voluntary inclusion of eamings forecasts in the IPO prospectus as a contractual
motivation for eamings management. Lees (1981) reports that managers' concerns over
inaccurate forecasts may lead to negative stock market reactions as investors view these
firms as unstable and risky.
Prior research documents evidence ofeamings management to avoid an eamings decline
and an eamings loss (Philips, Pincus & Rego, 2003). To avoid a negative eamings surprise,
Matsumoto (2002) finds that two mechanisms play an important role, i.e., downward-
guiding forecasts and positive, nondiscretionary accmals. Specifically, Matsumoto (2002)
finds that two mechanisms play an important role in avoiding eamings surprise, i.e.,
guiding forecasts downward or managing eamings upward. In this study, we examine the
role of voluntary inclusion of eamings forecasts in IPO prospectuses in the eamings
management of issuers. Kasznik (1999), Magnan and Cormier (1997), and Gramlich and
Sorensen (2004) find evidence that managers who release eamings forecasts in the IPO's
year manage reported eamings to meet their forecasts. Hence, voluntary disclosure of
eamings forecasts creates incentives for managers to manipulate eamings during the year
following the public offering. Indeed, firms who voluntarily include eamings forecasts in
their offering prospectuses are expected to differ fi-om nonforecasters in their level of
eamings management during the year following the public offering. The investigation of
eamings management in the new issues market is based on the estimation of discretionary
accmals (e.g., Dechow, 1994; Jones, 1991; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2001). This gives
rise to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Forecasting frnns are more likely to manage eamings one year after an IPO
compared to nonforecasting firms.
3.2. Earnings-forecast deviation
In France, firms issuing new stock through an IPO can include voluntary sales and
eamings forecasts in their prospectuses. While not audited in the traditional sense, these
In contrast, inclusion of an eamings forecast was almost nonexistent in U.S. markets before the American
Congress provided additional safe harbors in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 for parties
associated with good-faith projections (Baginski, Hassel, & Kimrpugh, 2002).
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forecasts are reviewed by the firm's auditors who then issue an opinion about the plausibihty
of the forecast assumptions. Hence, the decision by a firm to issue a forecast is by no means
trivial since audit and related fees can climb quite rapidly. However, benefits can also accrue
to a firm when it chooses to issue forecasts. Empirical evidence suggests that "forecasters
have good news to reveal about their future earnings and that forecast signals are valuation
relevanf (Clarkson et al., 1992, p. 601). By issuing a costly forecast signal, IPO firms are
giving investors a benchmark (i.e., threshold) against which they could assess future
earnings performance. As a result, both the firm and investors can be perceived as entering
into an implicit contract.
Earnings provide important information for investment decisions. Thus, executives have
strong incentives to manage earnings. Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) show how
thresholds and implicit contracts induce specific types ofearnings management. They observe
that three thresholds induce earnings management: to report positive profits; to sustain recent
performance; and to meet analysts' expectations. The positive-profit threshold proves
predominant. Failure to perform in accordance with the terms ofthe imphcit contract can have
many implications. First, the market value ofthe firm could be negatively affected. Second, the
firm's ability to raise fiinding in the fiiture could be hindered. Third, management's credibility
in fiiture dealings with investment bankers, commercial lenders, stockholders, and employees
would be impaired. Therefore, we expect that an earnings forecast will increase the extent of
earnings management during the period covered by the forecast.
However, both forecasting firms and nonforecasting firms may have incentives to improve
their financial picture before the IPO. Empirical results regarding the existence of accruals
management before the issue are mixed. Two studies report positive accruals for the period
around the IPO (Friedlan, 1994; Teoh & Rao, 1998). Another study does not fmd any
conclusive evidence of earnings management around the IPO (Aharony, Lin, & Loeb, 1993).
Furthermore, Teoh and Rao (1998) do not find any statistical evidence of earnings manage-
ment during the period before and following the IPO. In addition, Teoh, Wong, and Rao ( 1 999)
fmd evidence consistent with a scenario where firms either time an IPO immediately after a
year of unusually high cash flow or boost cash flows right before the IPO, and then utilize
accounting accmals to sustain reported net income in the year ofthe IPO. Results ofTeoh et al.
(1999) show that IPO firms attempt to manage investors' perceptions with discretionary
accruals.
Hence, forecasting firms and nonforecasting firms are not expected to differ in their
accruals behavior before an IPO, since their interests should be similar.
Hypothesis 2. A forecasting firm's level of earnings management will be higher if its
actual earnings are lower than expected.
3.3. Earnings-forecast deviation—contractual and governance environment
We posit that the possibility for managers to use accounting discretion to reduce earnings
forecast error depends on contractual and governance constraints imposed by (1) the
decision to comply with international accounting standards; (2) the degree of independence
of the board; (3) a high-quality auditor; (4) the ownership structure; (5) the ownership
retained by the entrepreneur; (6) firm's size; and (7) leverage.
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3.3.1. lAS/IFRS compliance
Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) argue that adopting high-quality accounting standards might
be a necessary condition for high-quahty information, but not necessarily a sufficient one.
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) document that adopting lAS/IFRS or U.S.-GAAP is a signal of
more transparency by firms and constitutes reporting incentives created by market forces.
They argue that firms electing either lAS/IFRS or U.S.-GAAP should earn economic
benefits in the form of a lower information-asymmetry component of the cost of capital.
Thus, consistent with the view that complying with international accounting standards is
likely to improve earnings quality, we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Earnings management to meet forecasts will be lower for firms complying
with lAS/lFRS standards.
3.3.2. External board
Several papers present evidence suggesting that effective governance and firm
performance increase with board of director independence (for example, see Brickley,
Coles, & Terry, 1994; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Weissbach, 1998). Others document a
negative link between outside directors and the incidence of financial fraud (see Dechow,
Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996). Moreover, the presence of an independent and competent board
of directors should limit a manager's ability to manage earnings at his/her own discretion
(Klein, 2002; Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2003). The independence of the board allows
directors to object to a manager's decision when they feel that the resulting financial
statements are not representative of the economic reality of the firm. Peasnell et al. (2003)
report evidence of a significant negative association between income-increasing accruals
and the proportion of outside board members. In the same vein, Klein (2002) documents a
negative relation between audit-committee independence and discretionary accruals. She
also finds a negative relationship between board independence and discretionary accruals.
Reductions in board or audit-committee independence are accompanied by large increases
in discretionary accruals. The most pronounced effects occur when either the board or the
audit committee is comprised of a minority of outside directors. These results suggest that
board independence is effective in monitoring the corporate financial-accounting process.
This allows us to draw our fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. Earnings management to meet earnings forecasts will be lower for firms
with a board of directors composed of a majority of extemal directors.
3.3.3. Auditor
There is theoretical as well as empirical support for the proposition that a Big4 audit is of
higher quality than a non-Big4 audit (e.g., Krishnan & Schauer, 2000; Pahnrose, 1988).
Moreover, there is also evidence that a high-quality audit translates into lower accmals
(Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo & Subramanyam, 1998; Davidson & Neu, 1993). In essence,
firms with Big4 auditors are found to report a greater discrepancy between eamings forecasts
and actual eamings than firms without a Big4 auditor. This indicates that higher quality audits
lead to less eamings management by firms to achieve forecasted eamings figures. In the
context ofthe present study, we hypothesize that firms audited by one ofthe four large national
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audit firms should exhibit a lower level ofearnings management compared with firms that are
not audited by one of these auditors.
Hypothesis 5. Earnings management to meet forecasts will be lower for firms audited by a
Big 4 auditor.
3.3.4. Ownership structure
Empirical evidence indicates that manager-controlled firms are more likely to adopt income-
increasing accounting practices than owner-controlled firms (Dempsey, Hunt, & Schroeder,
1993; Dhaliwal, Salamon, & Smith, 1982; Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995). The maximization of
the present value of bonus-plan payments is a likely outcome of such behavior (Holthausen,
Larcker & Sloan, 1995). hi this context, managers may see eamings management as a way to
maintain the value of their human capital in managerial labor markets (DeAngelo, 1988; Fama,
1980). It seems that the higher the percentage of stocks held by an entrepreneur, the less the
incentive to increase eamings through accruals management, hi that case, managers prefer to
focus on wealth maximization through share price appreciation (Dechow & Sloan, 1991;
Holthausen et al, 1995). However, the larger the extent of public ownership, the greater the
scmtiny given to a firm's reported eamings as the number of analysts increases. Such
consideration is likely to reduce managerial incentive to increase reported eamings. Accordingly,
we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6. Eamings management to meet forecasts will be reduced for firms with
closely held ownership.
3.4. Control variables (other contractual constraints)
Regardless of whether a firm has decided to include a forecast or not, a manager's abihty
and incentive to manage eamings is influenced by the firm's contractual environment, namely
its debt contracts, executive reward schemes, potential political costs (Watts & Zimmerman,
1990), ownership structure, ownership retention by initial controlling of stockholders (Dhali-
wal et al., 1982), and the independence of its auditors (Davidson & Neu, 1993). In the current
study, managers' compensation numbers are available for only 49 out of67 forecasting firms.
Accordingly, three contractual constraints are included in our eamings management expla-
natory model as control variables.^
3.4.1. Retained ownership
Chen, Firth, and Krishnan (2001) and Jog and McConomy (2003) argue that the larger
the number of inside shareholders, the smaller the problem if the forecasts are inaccurate.
Hence, the larger the percentage of ownership retained by the entrepreneur at the IPO
date, the less the incentive to manage eamings. We utilize the percentage of retained
ownership as a control variable and we expect a negative relationship with eamings
management.
^ Regressions are also estimated adding the variable "managers' compensation in percentage of total salary."
The coefficient is not significant for any regression model.
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3.4.2. Size
In the same vein, large firms are more likely to be targeted by pressure groups and lobbies for
wealth transfers, for example, through changes in tax laws. These factors would provide
incentives for firms to reduce eamings as they become publicly traded, hi a political cost context,
Jones (1991) in the United States and Magnan, Nadeau, and Cormier (1999) in Canada find
evidence that firms under import-relief investigations by the hidustrial Trade Commission (ITC)
seem to understate their eamings. Similarly, Cahan (1992) observes that firms under antitmst
investigations reduce their eamings by managing their accounting accruals. Therefore, we use
firm size as a control variable and we expect a negative relationship with accruals' management.
3.4.3. Leverage
On the other hand, managers in firms whose leverage is close to debt covenants may attempt to
improve eamings by selecting income-increasing accounting methods (Bowen, Noreen& Lacey,
1981). The larger a firm's leverage, the more likely the firm's manager is to select accounting
procedures that shift reported eamings fi^om future periods to the current period (Watts &
Zimmerman, 1990). Empirical evidence supports the use of a debt-assets ratio as a proxy for the
closeness to debt covenant constraints (Duke & Hunt, 1990; Press & Weintrop, 1990). hi France,
Coulombe and Tondeur (2001) document the existence of covenants concerning asset disposals,
dividend distribution, mergers and acquisitions, and new financing. However, in an IPO context,
a high leverage ratio can be associated with smaller equity financing. The higher a firm's level of
indebtedness, the less it relies on equity financing and the less managers need to attempt
managing investor perceptions with discretionary accmals. Since the actual impact ofleverage on
eamings management is unclear, no directional predictions are made for these variables.
3.5. Earnings management and stock market valuation
The level ofaccounting discretion given to managers can affect eamings figures. Cormier,
Magnan, and Zeghal (200 1 ) show that depreciation and provision expenses are much larger in
France compared to the United States. Prior research shows that in markets with high liquidity
and sophisticated investors (e.g., the U.S. markets), accmals are more value relevant than cash
flow from operations, in that the key purpose of financial statements is to provide usefiil
information to help investors assess a firm's performance (Sloan, 1996). Moreover, normal
accmals are more valued than discretionary accmals (Dechow, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996).
Balsam, Bartov, and Marquardt (2002) document a negative association between
unexpected discretionary accmals and abnormal retums around the 10-Q filing date for U.S.
firms. Furthermore, the price reaction ofsophisticated investors precedes that ofunsophisticated
ones. This result suggests that investors reassess eamings figures for U.S. markets.
In the Swiss context, considering the economic importance of dividends and taking into
account that dividends are based upon reported eamings, Cormier, Magnan, and Morard
(2000) find that all three components of reported eamings are positively related to firm
value and the coefficients fi"om all three components of eamings are quite similar. This
result is consistent with two alternative scenarios: managerial discretion improves the
ability of eamings to reflect economic value, or discretionary accmals are opportunistic, but
priced by an inefficient market (Subramanyam, 1 996). Under the first scenario, managers
improve value relevance of eamings by managing eamings and then communicating
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private information about the future profitability of the firm. In the second scenario,
discretionary accruals are seen as an opportunistic distortion of earnings. In that case, value
relevance of discretionary accruals provides evidence that the stock market is functionally
fixated on earnings. Consistent with this scenario, Teoh and Rao (1998) and Balsam et al.
(2002) find a negative relationship between discretionary accruals and post-issue stock
returns suggesting that investors naively fixate on pre-issue earnings without correcting for
discretionary accruals.
Therefore, either discretionary accruals improve the ability of earnings to reflect
economic value, or discretionary accruals are seen as an opportunistic distortion ofeamings
and are value irrelevant but priced by an inefficient market or unpriced in an efficient
market. Since the actual impact of discretionary accruals on French stock market valuation
is unclear, we refrain from making directional predictions, and thus no hypothesis will be
formulated.
4. Method
4.1. Sample
The sample is composed of 11 8 IPO firms listed on Euronext Paris between 2000 and
2002. To be included in the sample, firms must meet the following criteria:
I) The issue is an initial public offering of common stock, under a primary distribution;
Table 1
Sample Number
of Firms
Initial public offerings on the Paris Exchange during 2000--2002 period (138 in 2000, 59 in 200 land 29 226
in 2002)
Firms excluded because of the lack of accessible information (prospectus missing, incomplete) (63)163
Delisted, mergers and acquisitions 45
Sample of IPOs 118
IPO firms without eamings forecasts 40
IPO frnns with eamings forecasts 78
First market (18/23) (0 foresting firm) 18
Second market (22/33) (17 forecasting firms) 22
New Market (54/62) (41 forecasting firms) 54
OTC market (24/108) (20 forecasting firms) 24
(118/226) 118
Basic industries 10
General industries 8
Cyclical consumer goods 7
Non-cyclical consumer goods 8
Cyclical services 24
Non-cyclical services 7
Financial services 5
Information technology 49
118
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2) Annual reports for the year covered by the forecast, prior year, and the year following the
IPO are available on EURONEXT's web site, AMF database (SOPHIE), on the firm's
web site, or on WORLDSCOPE's database;
3) The prospectus is available on EURONEXT's web site or the AMF database (SOPHIE).
The sampling procedure yielded a sample of 118 IPO firms, 78 forecasting firms, and
40 nonforecasting firms (Table 1). A firm is classified as forecasting if it issues a precise
earnings forecast for the year following the IPO. Cyclical services (20%) and information
technology (42%) accounts for 62% of sample firms. No other industries are
predominant. Furthermore, none of the First market issuers issued forecasts in their
prospectus.^ Missing data were a problem for many firms listed on the OTC Market,
since we did not find relevant data for 84 out of 108 firms. For these firms, even when
the prospectuses are available, there are often missing or incomplete data (e.g., cash flow
fi-om operations).
4.2. Empirical models
4.2.1. Earnings management
We measure total accruals as the difference between net earnings and cash flow fi^om
operations.^ Corporate executives can engage in earnings management essentially by
altering or revising estimates employed in the computation of accruals. While a firm's
earnings also depend on its level of cash flow from operations, it is less likely that
executives will manipulate cash flow.'°
It is not evident how clients can be forced to pay unpaid balances sooner, and postponing
payments to employees and suppliers is bound to create numerous problems.
While a firm's total accruals are easily accessible from its financial statements, its
discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals are not directly observable and must be inferred
through an estimation model. Nondiscretionary accruals reflect a firm's economic en-
vironment or its underlying level of activity independent of strategic earnings management
We can refer to at least three factors that might influence the decision for First Market firms not to issue
forecasts: foreign exchange listings; ownership; and systematic risk. Two-thirds are cross-listed. The decision to
issue forecasts is taken in a larger perspective. The remaining sample firms are family controlled fums or
concentrated ownership firms. Furthermore, systematic risk (beta) is higher compared with other markets (mean
of 1.29 versus 1.02 . Cox (1985) documents that forecast error is higher for firms with higher beta. Therefore,
the likelihood of negative consequences for managers issuing forecasts would increase when systematic risk is
high. These factors are somewhat related to the level of information asymmetry. Clarkson et al. (1992), and Jog
and McConomy (2003) document that management forecasts reduce information asymmetry. Hence, it is likely
that information asymmetry is lower for large cross-listed firms, thus reducing the incentive for issuing
forecasts.
Collins and Hribar (2002) argue that the difference between net income and cash flow from operations is the
correct measure of total accruals and that the use of a balance-sheet approach may lead to a systematic bias in
discretionary-accruals estimation.
'° For example, while in general cash flow from operations should be less affected than net earnings by
managerial intervention in the accounting process, this is not the case in the oil and gas industry for the
accounting method choice between fiall cost and successful efforts (Cormier & Magnan, 2002).
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by its executives. For a given firm (/), current period (/) nondiscretionary accruals can be
modeled in the following manner:
Accruals,, = ai Change in Sales,, + a2 Cash Flow/,_i + a3 PPE„
+ a4 Negative Earnings (1/0) + s,, (1)
Eq. (1) implies that a fmn's current period total accruals (Accruals) are more or less
determined in a systematic manner by its current performance (Change in Sales), lagged cash
flow from operations (Cash Flow) and the level of its property, plant and equipm.ent (PPE). Prior
empirical evidence is consistent with such propositions. First, variation in sales is a proxy for a
firm's performance. Second, lagged cash flow from operations (i.e., cash from last period) is
assumed to systematically determine current period nondiscretionary accruals since changes in
cash flow and in accruals are correlated over time (Dechow, 1994). Third, the level ofproperty,
plant, and equipment serves to control for other nondiscretionary components such as the portion
of depreciation expenses, unconditional on a firm's performance or activity level, or upon
managerial discretion (Jones, 1991). Fourth, since there are many firms reporting negative
eamings in their IPO year (around 30%), we add a dummy variable net loss (1/0) to control for it.
Prior studies (e.g., Jones, 1991) estimate nondiscretionary accruals using time-series
observations for each sample firm. In the case of IPOs, the data are not available. We
estimate nondiscretionary accruals in the IPO year for a sample of 11 8 observations (R-
square: 18.2%; F-statistic: 6.852).''
Accruals,, =0.028 + 0.065 Change in Sales,, —0.288 Cash Flow from operations„_i
(0-156) (0.052) (0.017)
- 0.163 PPE,, - 0.090 Negative Earnings,,
(0.004) (0.001)
(2)
The coefficients from the above regression (variable scaled by total assets except the
dummy variable for net loss)'" are then used to compute fitted values (also called estimated
total accruals values) for firms issuing forecasts in the following way:
Estimated Accruals,, = ao + a i Change in Sales,, + ao Lagged Cash Flow„_i
+ cct, PPE/, + a4 Negative Earnings,, (3)
The resulting estimated accruals measure is then subtracted from the sample firms'
actual total accruals for forecasting firms to obtain an estimate of discretionary accruals.
" Coefficients are not substantially affected when we control for industry membership. Among industry
dummies, only one coefficient (cyclical services; /;< 0.004) is statistically significant at 0.10. Results are as
follows (/?-square: 24.8%, f-statistic: 3.888):
Accruals,, =0.050 + 0.050 Change in Sales,, -0.278 Cash Flow from operations,,,. |
C""^) (0,07.';) (0.014)
-0.121 PPE,, -0.072 Negative Earnings,,
(0.017) (0.001)
'" Estimating the regression scaling by lag total assets instead of current year total assets provides similar results.
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However, any measure of discretionary accruals is a noisy estimation, and testing for
earnings management using discretionary accruals can yield biased results ifthe measurement
error is correlated with the partitioning variable (i.e., forecasting firms). To assess the
reliability of our measure for discretionary accruals, we also estimate nondiscretionary
accruals using the model expressed in equation 1 based on the 98 nonfinancial French firms
listed on SBF120 for the year following the IPOs. Observations are split into three different
industry groupings: Consumer goods and services (a? =40); Industrials (« = 29); and
Technology and telecom (« = 29). Then, for the estimation of discretionary accruals, we
group our sample of IPO firms according to this industry classification: Consumer goods and
services (cyclical and noncyclical consumer goods, cyclical and noncyclical services, fmancial
services=51 firms); Industrials (basic and general industries^ 18 firms); and Technology and
telecom (information technology=49 firms).
The following regression is then performed for our two estimations of discretionary
accruals:
Discretionary accruals,, — go + g\ Earnings-forecast deviation,,
+ g2 Earnings-forecast deviation, * Positive Earnings-forecast deviation,,
+ gi Earnings-forecast deviation, * lAS/IFRS,,
+ g4 Earnings-forecast deviation, * External Board,,
+ gs Earnings-forecast deviation, * Auditor,,
+ ge Earnings-forecast deviation, * Concentrated Ownership,,
+ gj IAS/IFRS,Y + ggExtemal Board,, + ggAuditor,,
+ g\o Concentrated Ownership,, +gii Positive Earnings-forecast deviation,,
+ g\2 Retained Ownership,, + gnSize,, + gnLeverage,,
+ gi5 Second Market,, + g\(,OTC Market,, + e„
5. Independent variables
5.7. Earnings-forecast deviation
Prior literature considers the previous year's annual earnings as the target (e.g., Bartov,
1993; Francis et al., 1996; Magnan & Cormier, 1997; Wilde, 2005). In the current study, we
defme our earnings-target deviation as annual net earnings excluding abnormal accruals
less forecasted earnings, scaled by lagged assets. Our measure is similar to Magnan and
Cormier (1997) and Gramlich and Sorensen (2004). We predict a negative relationship
between earnings-forecast deviation and discretionary accruals. Earnings-forecast deviation
is computed as follows:
Earnings before discretionary accruals-Forecasted earnings
Absolute value of forecasted earnings
Earnings management behavior might differ between forecasting firms whose
underlying performance and activity level are below expectations, as well as those
222 D. Cormier, I. Martinez / The International Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 209-236
Table 2a
Descriptive statistics median accruals
Total accruals Discretionary accruals estimated Discretionary accruals estimated
with IPO firms with SBF120 firms
0.0004 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.016
0.029 -0.051* -0.008 -0.050 -0.085** -0.041
Total IPO with IPO with Total IPO with IPO with Total IPO with IPO with
sample forecasts no forecasts sample forecasts no sample forecasts no
forecasts forecasts
YPO,t-\ -0.037 -0.034 -0.044 _ _ _ _ _
IPO year -0.013 -0.012 -0.019
IPO, ?+l -0.049 -0.046 -0.054
Accruals are scaled by total assets.
* Significant at ;?< 0.050.
** Significant at /7< 0.0 10.
whose underlying performance is above expectations. For a sample of Canadian firms,
Magnan and Cormier (1997) show managers use discretionary accruals to mitigate earnings
forecast errors regardless of whether pre-managed earnings are less, or greater than the
earnings forecast; Gramlich and Sorensen (2004) find similar results for Danish firms.
Table 2b
Descriptive statistics forecasting firms median accruals in year following IPO based on earnings-forecast deviation
and contractual and governance environment
Total accruals Discretionary accruals Discretionary accruals
estimated with IPO firms estimated with SBF120 firms
Negative earnings-forecast deviation -0.028 -0.016 -0.018
Positive earnings-forecast deviation -0.062
r=0.150)
-0M9{t=l.l26T -0.095 (?=2.333f *
Negative earnings-forecast deviation -0.006 -0.026 (/=0.450) -0.115 (/=0.502)
—lAS/IFRS r=1.169)
Positive earnings-forecast deviation -0.121 -0.071 (0.184) -0.188 (?=0.171)
—lAS/IFRS ;=0.304)
Negative earnings-forecast deviation -0.027 -0.003 (r=0.078) -0.062 {t=0.755)
—extemal board /=0.157)
Positive earnings-forecast deviation -0.063 -0.067 (^=0.799) -0.105(^=0.800)
—extemal board /=0.550)
Negative earnings-forecast deviation -0.055 -0.063(^=1.277) -0.071 (r= 1.300)
—Big4 auditor ?= 1.379)
Positive earnings-forecast deviation -0.062 -0.071 (/=0.320) -0.114 (r=0.166)
—Big4 auditor ^?=0.699)
Negative earnings-forecast deviation -0.027 -0.016 (/=0.113) -0.027 (r=0.665)
—concentrated ownership /=0.508)
Positive earnings-forecast deviation -0.025 -0.069(^=0.323) -0.051 (r=0.326)
—concentrated ownership [/= 1.534)
Accruals are scaled by total assets.
* Significant at p< 0.10.
** Significant atp<0.050.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics independent variables
Forecasting Nonforecasting firms
firms
Mean Median Mean Median Mean
difference
P value
Earnings-forecast deviation (before discretionary accruals) -1.259 -0.893 - - -
discretionary accruals estimated with IPO firms
Earnings-forecast deviation (before adjusted discretionary -0.565 -0.396 - - -
accruals) discretionary accruals estimated with SBF120 firms
lAS/IFRS compliance 0.110 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.029
External board 0.431 0.000 0.648 1.000 0.000
Auditor 0.450 0.000 0.830 1.000 0.000
Concentrated ownership 0.599 0.610 0.488 0.466 0.000
Retained ownership 0.796 0.800 0.733 0.785 0.010
Total assets (millions
€) 537 22 19300 417 0.028
Leverage (total debt/total assets) 0.079 0.029 0.158 0.091 0.000
First market - - 0.500 0.000 -
Second market 0.200 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.181
New market 0.550 1.000 0.250 0.000 0.000
OTC market 0.250 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.001
These findings contrast with Kasznik (1999), who does not observe an earnings decrease in
the discretionary accruals of a U.S. sample. However, Kasznik's study is not restricted to
IPOs. Therefore, we add an interaction term (Positive forecast deviation) to capture the
difference in earnings management between forecasters who meet their earnings target and
those who do not. Positive forecast deviation is a dummy variable that takes a value of "1"
(zero) if the deviation is greater than zero (less than zero).
5.1.1. lAS/IFRS compliance
An indicator variable is utilized, taking a value of "1" if a firm is complying with lASB
standards, and otherwise.
5.1.1.1. External board. An indicator variable is utilized; taking a value of "1" if a firm's
board of directors is composed of a majority of external members, and "0" otherwise.
5.1.1.2. Auditor An indicator variable is utilized; taking a value of " 1 " if a firm is audited
by one of the "Big 4", and "0" otherwise.
5.1.1.3. Concentrated ownership (%). The variable Concentrated ownership is the
percentage of ownership held by an entrepreneur, a family, or by another firm, i.e., control
blocks of at least 5%.
5.1.1.4. Retained ownership (%). The percentage of retained ownership by the initial
controlling stockholder(s) following the IPO, taking into account the primary issue and any
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secondary sale that the controlHng stockholder may have made. The information is gathered
from the prospectus.
5.1.1.5. Size. Size is measured as the natural log of a firm's assets for the year during
which the share issue occurred.
5.1.1.6. Leverage. Leverage is measured as total debt/total asset for the year during which
the share issue occurred.
5.1.1.7. Market listing. Firms are either listed on the Second Market, New Market or
OTC Market. There are no IPO forecasting firms listed on the First Market. Therefore, we
add two dummy variables in the regression (n - 1 Market listing): an indicator variable
taking a value of"1" if a firm is listed in the Second Market, and "0" otherwise; an indicator
variable taking a value of "1" if a firm is listed in over-the-counter Market, and "0"
otherwise.
5.1.2. Stock market valuation
Consistent with Ohlson (1995) and Sloan (1996), the following model is used to explore
the effect of earnings management on the value-relevance of earnings components:
Stock Price,,, = l^o + P\ Book value per share, , + P2 Cash flow per share,
,
+ ^3 Discretionary accruals per share,
,
+ ^4 Nondiscretionary accruals per share, , + e,., (5)
6. Results
6.1. Earnings management
6.1.1. Univariate analyses
Table 2a exhibits some descriptive statistics on accruals for both forecasting and
nonforecasting firms. As expected, accrual pattems do not difi'er significantly between
forecasting and nonforecasting firms for the IPO year or for the previous year. We observe that
for the total sample, discretionary accruals in percentage of assets are almost nonexistent at
0.0004. However, consistent with Hypothesis 1, in the year following an IPO, the magnitude
of earnings management (discretionary accmals) is much higher for forecasters than for
nonforecasters (-0.051 versus -0.008; /7<0.10). The same pattem is observed when we
measure discretionary accruals based on SBF120 firms (-0.085 versus -0.041;/>=0.010).
Furthermore, as presented in Table 2b, for firms whose eamings are less than expected,
the magnitude of discretionary accruals (-0.016 if estimated with IPO firms and -0.018 if
measured with SFB120 firms) is much lower than for those firms that beat their eamings
forecasts (-0.069 and -0.095, respectively), the difference being significant (p= 0.084 and
/?= 0.020). The direction of the differences in accruals management between firms that beat
their forecasts and those who did not reach their target tends to provide some support for
Hypothesis 2; i.e., a forecasting firm's level of eamings management is higher if its actual
performance is lower than expected.
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Concerning the influence of contractual or governance constraints on earnings
management, results show that income-increasing behavior (in the presence of negative
Earnings-forecast Deviation) is reduced by the presence of a Big4 auditor (-0.063 versus
-0.016 for discretionary accruals (estimated with IPO firms) for all forecasting firms
(/> = 0.202 two-tailed) and -0.071 versus -0.018 for discretionary accruals estimated with
SBF120 (/? = 0.193 two-tailed). This is consistent with prior evidence that a high-quality
audit translates into lower accruals (Davidson and Neu, 1993; Becker et al., 1998) or more
negative accruals (Cormier et al., 2000). We also observe the same pattern for income-
increasing behavior in the presence of concentrated ownership, but only for total accruals
(-0.025 versus -0.062) {p=0.\\2 two-tailed). This is consistent with our Hypothesis 6;
i.e., the presence of closely held ownership is likely to reduce managerial incentive to
increase reported earnings. As for compliance with lAS/IFRSs and the independence of the
board of directors, we do not see any statistical difference in eamings management, nor in
the sign of forecast deviation.
In Table 3, we present statistics about independent variables and differences between
forecasting and nonforecasting firms. Compared with forecasting firms, nonforecasting
firms tend to comply more with lAS/IFRS, to be audited by a Big4 firm to a larger extent, to
have a board of directors controlled by external members, to be more indebted, and to be
bigger. Furthermore, forecasting firms exhibit more concentrated and retained ownership at
the IPO date than nonforecasting firms. Finally, while the New Market represents 55% ofour
sample of forecasting firms, it only represents 25% of our sample of nonforecasting firms.
6.1.2. Multivariate analyses
Table 4 shows the regression results on the determinants ofeamings management among
forecasting firms for our two measures of discretionary accruals. All four regressions are
well specified and statistically significant at conventional levels (F statistic p value). The
models are estimated using robust regression. We calculate standardized DFIT and exclude
all observations with DFIT> 1 (identified using the Belsley-Kuh-Welsch (1980) procedure,
Hair et al., 1998, p. 218). The models are then re-estimated with coefficient tests based on
White's t-statistics, since Breush-Pagan statistics show the presence of heteroscedasticity
(chi-square of 3.20,/? = 0.073).
We first estimate individual regressions on the relationship between Discretionary Accruals
(estimated with IPO firms) and Earnings-forecast deviation. Results document that a forecasting
firm's underlying Eamings-forecast Deviation is likely to manage its eamings figure.
The regression is statistically significant {F statistic p value = 0.004) with an adjusted R-
squared of 13.6%. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, forecasting firms whose eamings (eamings
before discretionary accmals) are less than predicted tend to increase their level of eamings
management (Coefficient: -0.022; /?<0.001),'^ a behavior that is not different from
forecasting firms with Positive Eamings-forecast deviation (Interaction term coefficient:
0.023; />=0.377). A forecasting firm's level of eamings management is lower if its actual
eamings are greater than expected. Our result suggests a symmetric behavior; i.e., a
Since Eamings-forecast Deviation has a negative (positive) sign when a firm does not (does) meet its forecast, a
negative (positive) regression coefficient implies positive (negative) accruals management; i.e. (—)(-)= (+) if
actualresults are below expectations; (-)(+)= (-) if actual results are above expectations.
226 D. Cormier, I. Martinez /The International Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 209-236
Table 4
Relation between earnings management and EPO firms: impact of earnings-forecast deviation and contractual and
governance environment
Dependent variable: discretionary accruals
Sign Discretionary accmals estimated Discretionary accruals estimated
with IPO firms with SBF120 firms
Positive eamings- Global model Positive eamings- Global model
forecast deviation forecast deviation
Intercept -0.001 (0.00 If -0.264 (0.338) 0.102(0.002) -0.718 (0.100)
Earnings-forecast deviation - -0.022 (0.001) -0.032 (0.001) -0.035 (0.003) -0.048 (0.002)
Earnings-forecast Deviation * ± 0.023 (0.377) 0.030 (0.342)
1/0* Positive
Eamings-forecast Deviation
Eamings-forecast + -0.044 (0.208) -0.111 (0.007)
Deviation *IAS/IFRS
Eamings-forecast Deviation * + -0.001 (0.613) 0.014 (0.237)
External board
Eamings-forecast + 0.034 (0.001) 0.024 (0.042)
Deviation * Auditor
Eamings-forecast Deviation * + 0.027 (0.028) 0.028 (0.075)
Concentrated ovmership
Main effect
lAS/IFRS Compliance ± -0.061 (0.210) -0.035 (0.614)
Extemal board ± 0.242(0.411) 0.015 (0.735)
Auditor ± -0.013 (0.679) 0.030 (0.509)
Concentrated ovwiership ± -0.010(0.778) 0.058 (0.252)
Positive eamings-forecast ± 0.010 (0.801)
deviation (1/0)
Control variables
Retained ownership - 0.076 (0.395) 0.245 (0.073)
Size - 0.008 (0.590) 0.021 (0.371)
Leverage ± -0.020 (0.875) -0.130(0.510)
Second Market ± 0.051 (0.190) 0.093(0.126)
OTC Market ± 0.021 (0.600) 0.068 (0.292)
N: 78 13.6% 16.9% 13.0% 20.6%
F-statistic p value 0.004 0.026 0.004 0.009
Number of outliers 3 obs. 4 obs. 2 obs. 1 obs.
One-tailed if specific prediction.
forecasting firm with actual activity level or performance greater than expected seems to
engage in decreasing eamings management. The sign of the forecast deviation does affect
management behavior regarding accruals. This finding is consistent with Magnan and
Cormier (1997) and Gramlich and Sorensen (2004), but contrasts with Kasznik (1999) who
does not observe eamings decreasing discretionary accruals for a U.S. sample.
In the third column ofTable 4, we present the results for the global model, including four
interaction terms with Eamings-forecast Deviation, the main effects, and other control
variables. The regression is statistically significant (F statistics p value = 0.026) and its
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adjusted R-square is 16.9%. Consistent with H2, there is a negative relationship between
Earnings-forecast Deviation (-0.032, /?< 0.001) and Discretionary Accruals. This
relationship is moderated for firms audited by a Big4 (0.034, /?< 0.001) and firms with a
Concentrated Ownership (0.027, /?< 0.050). Among control variables, only one variable has
a marginally significant coefficient: firms listed on the Second Market would exhibit more
earnings management than those listed on OTC Markets (0.05 1 ;/7 = 0. 190) or in New Market
(intercept =-0.001; p<0.00\). Results (not tabulated) remain similar if we restrict the
analysis to negative Earnings-forecast deviations (52 observations), except that, as expected,
the coefficient for Earnings-forecast deviation is slightly higher (-0.040;/? = 0.0 12).
In columns 5 and 6, we replicate analyses by changing our measure of discretionary
accruals. We are now estimating the nondiscretionary component of total accruals based on
firms listed on the SBF120 French Index. Results are quite similar to those where
nondiscretionary accruals are estimated based on IPO firms. Only two coefficients exhibit
different results. Surprisingly, the coefficient for the interaction term Earnings-forecast
Deviation * lAS/IFRS is negative as in the regression presented in column 4, but is now
significant (-0.111; /?<0.010). This would suggest that voluntary compliance with
international accounting standards increases the use of accounting discretion to manage
earnings. The second coefficient, now significant, concems Retained ownership (0.245;
p = 0.073). The more ownership retained at the IPO, the more inclined managers are to increase
earnings figures. This is also inconsistent with our expectation.
Furthermore, following Kasznik (1999) and Kothari et al. (2001), we compute an
adjusted proxy for discretionary accruals, {adjusted discretionary accruals (ADJDA)}, as
the difference between the original discretionary accruals (estimated with IPO firms) and the
median discretionary accruals for the nonforecaster group, matched with the sample firm of
forecasters, and scaled by total assets.
Earnings before ADJDA-Forecasted earnings
Absolute value of forecasted earnings
Results not tabulated are equivalent to those presented in column 4 of Table 4.
As another robustness check, we rely on DeAngelo's model (1986), using first
differences as an alternative model to the one estimated with IPO firms (including change in
Sales as a control variable). Results (not reported) are relatively consistent with those
presented in Table 4. The only difference is that the coefficient for interaction terms of
Auditor with Earnings-forecast Deviation is not significant anymore, while the term for
External Board interaction becomes significant. As a second sensitivity analysis, we re-
estimate the regression after dropping firms from the OTC Market, since these companies
are less regulated and their stocks are not traded as much as others. Results (not tabulated)
are similar to those provided in Table 4.
6.2. Selection bias
Selection bias occurs when information on the dependent variable for parts of
observations is missing. During the current study, while estimating the effect forecasts have
on earnings management, we faced this problem because many firms did not issue
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forecasts. Kasznik (1999) argues that an abnormal level of discretionary accruals might
motivate the issuance of a forecast, or both forecasts and discretionary accruals could be
simultaneously determined as part of an overall reporting strategy.
In the Heckman procedure (Heckman, 1979; Lee, 1983; Abdel-khalik, 1990), the
residuals of the selection-equation in a Probit/Logit analysis (Forecasting/Nonforecasting)
are used to construct a selection-bias control factor, i.e., the Inverse Mills ratio:
Expected value of forecasting/Nonforecasting
= a + ai Retained ownership + ai Size + as Leverage + a4 Second Market
+ as OTC Market + a^ Industry
For this procedure, we exclude observations from the First Market since these
observations are only for nonforecasting firms. In the second step of the Heckman
procedure, from the expected probability value, we use the selection-bias confrol factor
(Inverse Mills Ratio Lambda) as an additional independent variable that will control the
selection bias in earnings management regressions.
First, results presented in Table 5 show that firm size (-0.283; p<0.050), Leverage
(-0.608; p= 0.054), and to a lesser extent. Retained ownership (1.635; /)<0.100) are the
main factors that discriminate between a forecasting and a nonforecasting firm. Since the
New Market variable must be interpreted as a main effect in the intercept (5.397;/7= 0.022),
this means that firms listed on this Market are more inclined to release earnings forecasts.
This is consistent with descriptive statistics presented in Table 3. Second, no industry
coefficient was statistically significant at the conventional level of 0.10%.
''^
Since the Inverse Mills ratio is derived from a sample of firms that includes forecasting
and nonforecasting firms, we now estimate discretionary accruals' regressions with a
sample of 100 observations (forecasting and nonforecasting firms— 18 nonforecasting
firms from the First Market are dropped from the analysis). Once again, eamings-
management models are estimated using robust regressions. We calculate standardized
DFIT and exclude all observations with DFIT > 1 . The models are then re-estimated with
tests based on White's ^statistics, which is a necessary correction because Breush-Pagan
statistics show heteroscedasticity (Chi-square of 14.38, /?<0.001).
The variable Earnings-forecast deviation takes the value of zero for nonforecasting
firms. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, results presented in the fourth column of Table 5 show
that discretionary accruals are affected by the decision to issue forecasts (-0.089;
p = 0.029), even after confrolling for the self-selection bias (the Inverse Mills Ratio is not
statistically significant; coefficient of 0.006, /? = 0.655). These findings conform to
regression results presented in Table 4 restricted to forecasting firms.
In addition, consistent with Hypothesis 2, even after controlling for the decision to issue
forecasts, the coefficient of the variable Earnings-forecast deviation remains a significant
determinant of discretionary accruals (-0.013; p = 0.069). Results presented in the fifth
For the Logit estimation of the decision to issue forecasts, we also considered systematic risk (beta) in place ofthe
variables Second Market and OTC Market. The coefficient for beta is negatively significant (coefficient=— 0.994;
p<0.001), the significance of other variables' coefficients remains almost similar. However, results for discretionary-
accruals estimation are not affected by this change.
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Table 5
Relation between earnings management and IPO firms: impact of the decision to issue forecasts, earnings target
deviation, contractual and governance environment (excluding first market firms) on the line dependent variable:
discretionary accruals for forecasting and nonforecasting firms combined
Logit regression OLS regression
Discretionary Discretionary accruals
accruals estimated estimated with SBF120
with IPO firms firms
Sign Forecasting/ Earnings Global Earnings Global
nonforecasting^ forecast
variables
model forecast
variables
model
5.397 (0.022)'' 0.010 -0.039 0.046 0.088
(0.778) (0.525) (0.412) (0.416)
Retained ownership ± 1.635(0.098)
Size ± -0.283 (0.022)
Leverage ± -2.608 (0.054)
Second Market ± -0.040 (0.933)
OTC Market ± 0.864 (0.208)
Forecast I/O ± -0.089 -0.084 -0.155 -0.148
(0.029) (0.085) (0.015) (0.090)
Earnings-forecast deviation - -0.023 -0.044 -0.033 -0.040
(0.069) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003)
Earnings-forecast Deviation* I/O* Positive ± 0.016 0.034
earnings-forecast deviation (0.350) (0.292)
Positive earnings target deviation (I/O) ± -0.018
(0.671)
-0.014
(0.815)
Earnings-forecast deviation * lAS/IFRS + -0.005
(0.922)
-0.021
(0.754)
Earnings-forecast deviation * External + -0.001 -0.022
board (0.955) (0.506)
Earnings-forecast deviation * Auditor + 0.048
(0.002)
0.035
(0.000)
Earnings-forecast Deviation * Concentrated -1- 0.019 0.052
ownership (0.157) (0.049)
lAS/IFRS Comphance ± -0.046
(0.560)
-0.091
(0.437)
External board ± 0.030
(0.433)
0.022
(0.720)
Auditor ± 0.019
(0.683)
-0.167
(0.016)
Concentrated ownership ± 0.033
(0.475)
0.002
(0.981)
Inverse Mills ratio (Lambda) ± 0.006 0.006 -0.004 -0.002
(0.655) (0.733) (0.803) (0.548)
Nagelkerke i?-square (classification rate) 17.8% (82.3%)
Adjusted .R-square 8.7% 7.4% 11.3% 8.2%
F-statistic p value (0.025) (0.046) (0.023) 0.020
N 100 100 100 100 100
Number of outliers Oobs. 2 obs. 1 obs. 2 obs. 2 obs.
CoeflBcients for industry dummies not presented.
One-tailed if specific prediction.
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Table 6a
Descriptive statistics on the line earnings forecast error in year following IPO
Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard deviation
Earnings forecast error (% of assets) -0.290 1.520 0.190 0.069 0.290
Second market (17 fmns) -0.030 1.111 0.145 0.012 0.284
New market (41 firms) -0.290 1.520 0.225 0.123 0.315
OTC market (20 firms) -0.030 0.910 0.155 0.062 0.241
column of Table 5 for the global model are quite similar to those presented in Table 4
concerning the estimation of discretionary accruals restricted to forecasting firms. Since the
coefficients on the inverse Mills ratios are insignificant, this suggests our regression results
did not suffer significantly fi^om self-selection bias. We also notice that while factors like a
firm's size, leverage and market listing do not seem to affect earnings management (Table 4),
they do affect the decision to issue earnings forecasts.
hi the last two columns of Table 5, we replicate results for discretionary accruals
estimated with SBF120 firms. Results are essentially similar to those estimated with IPO
frrms, the only exception being that the coefficient for the interaction term Earnings-
forecast deviation * Concentrated ownership is now significant (0.052; /?< 0.050).
6.3. Accruals management—additional analyses
Magnan and Cormier (1997) and Gramlich and Sorensen (2004) show that managers of
IPO firms use discretionary accruals to mitigate earnings-forecast errors. Degeorge et al.
(1999) show how thresholds induce earnings management. In Table 6a, results suggest that
French IPO firms exhibit very optimistic earnings forecasts, since the mean eamings-
forecast errors exceed 19% of total assets (median = 6.9%). Lastly, we present in Table 6b
the relationship between earnings-target achievement (or missing) and earnings
Table 6b
Descriptive statistics on the line earnings forecast error" and earnings management
Discretionary Discretionary Working Depreciation**
accruals estimated accruals estimated capital
with IPO firms** with SBF120
firms**
accruals**
( 1 ) Surpass or just meet the target 0.012 -0.009 0.158 -0.044
(2) Miss the target -0.008 -0.012 0.161 -0.039
(3) Strongly miss the target -0.114 -0.198 0.019 -0.084
(1) and (2) mean difference/? value 0.535 0.954 0.967 0.692
(1) and (3) mean difference/? value 0.009 0.003 0.376 0.049
(2) and (3) mean difference/? value 0.000 0.001 0.156 0.003
( 1 ) Earnings forecast error First quartile 25%
ranging from -0.29 to 0.00 («= 13)
(2) Earnings forecast error >0 Second quartile 25%
and<0.070(«=27) to 50%
(3) Earnings forecast Third quartile 50%
error> 0.070 (« = 38) to 100%
(Forecasted Earnings - Net Eamings)/Total Assets.
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Table 7
Value relevance of earnings components
Dependent variable: stock price per share (3 months after year-end)
Explanatory variables IPO year IPO year t+ 1
Coefficient Nstatistic (p-va\uef Coefficient /-statistic (p-vahiof
Intercept
Equity per share
Cash flow from operations per share
Discretionary accruals per share
Nondiscretionary accruals per share
9.475 6.807 (0.000)
0.800 3.791 (0.000)
+ 2.092 1.925(0.029)
+ 3.101 3.329(0.000)
+ 2.800 2.885(0.002)
Adjusted/?- 25.1%;
F(p-value): 9.651 (0.000); N: US
6.756
0.648
2.566
3.061
1.571
Adjusted R-
F (p-value):
6.483 (0.000)
4.116(0.000)
4.027 (0.000)
4.870 (0.000)
2.226 (0.014)
: 40.3%%;
19.40 (0.000); iV: 118
One-tailed if specific prediction.
management. Results suggest that managers utilize accounting discretion to reduce the
difference between the threshold induced by earnings forecasts and actual earnings. It
appears that earnings management has reduced forecast error since we find significant
differences in discretionary accruals between firms that surpass, just meet, or just miss the
target compared with fums that missed or strongly missed the target. It seems that earnings
management helped firms attain their target or get close to it. Finally, it would appear that
managers use depreciation expense more than working-capital accruals in their attempt to
reach their eamings target.
6.4. Eamings management and valuation analysis
As a complementary analysis, we assess how French investors readjust the relationship
between reported eamings and stock prices when eamings are subject to manipulations.
Reported eamings are partitioned into three components: Cash flow firom operations,
Table 8
Value relevance of eamings components forecasters/nonforecasters
Dependent variable: stock price per share (3 months after year-end)
Explanatory variables IPO year t+ 1
Coefficient /-statistic ( ;7-value)^
6.318 5.667 0.000
0.766 4.092 0.000
-t- 2.429 3.391 0.000
+ 3.857 4.698 0.000
+ 1.655 1.908 0.029
±
-1.I6I -1.148 0.254
± 1.272 0.997 0.321
Adjusted R' 41.4%;
F (/;-value): 13.729 (0.000); A^: 118
Intercept
Equity per share
Cash flow from operations per share
Discretionary accruals per share
Nondiscretionary accruals per share
Discretionary accruals per share * Forecast 1/0
Nondiscretionary accruals per share * Forecast 1/0
'^ One-tailed if specific prediction.
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discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary accruals. In this section, we only present results
for models of discretionary accruals estimated with IPO firms since we obtain equivalent
results with SBF 120 estimation.
First, Table 7 documents the usefulness of earnings components for pricing the stock of
French firms. The results are quite similar for the IPO year and the following year, even
though we would expect discretionary accruals to differ between the two years. In the year
following the EPO, firms are more subject to earnings management since these firms issued
earnings forecasts in the IPO year. This result would indicate that French investors do not
see through earnings manipulation and do not change the earnings multiple to assess stock
market value. To further explore that finding, in Table 8, we split discretionary and
nondiscretionary accruals for forecasting and nonforecasting firms. Both coefficients for
interaction terms (Accruals * Forecasting firm) are not statistically significant at
conventional levels, suggesting that earnings management has no impact on the market
valuation of earnings components.
This result is consistent with two alternative scenarios (Subramanyam, 1996): either
managers improve value relevance of earnings by managing earnings and then
communicating private information about future profitability of the firm; or discretionary
accruals provide evidence that the stock market is functionally fixated on earnings in a
relatively low-enforcement context.
7. Discussion and conclusion
Although IPO firms may be tempted to engage in earnings management in order to increase
the offering price before going public, when issuing a forecast they rely on a more complex
signal for their valuation. Their motivation to "manipulate" eamings before the offering is
tempered by their stated goal to achieve a certain level of profitability in the period following
the forecast. Due to the nature of self-reversing in accounting accruals, too much
"manipulation" before issuing shares may actually hinder a firm's effort to meet its forecast.
Earnings-management practices in forecasting and nonforecasting firms are thus expected to
differ in the period immediately following the share issue. Differences in earnings-
management behavior are driven by: (1) the need to achieve publicly announced goals; (2) the
closeness of a firm's underlying performance to its publicly announced forecast; and (3) the
nature of a firm's contractual and governance constraints, especially cost related to leverage,
independence of the board, audit quality, and ownership. Results in this study support-to
some extent-the relevance of all three factors in explaining earnings-management behaviors
of forecasting IPO firms.
Moreover, concerning the impact of accruals' management on the quality of eamings
figures for market valuation, our results suggest that French market participants assign
value to discretionary accrual. This is consistent with two altemative scenarios: managerial
discretion improves the ability of eamings to reflect economic value, or discretionary
accruals are opportunistic but priced by an efficient market.
The results of this study provide some support for positive-accounting theory in a unique
environment with forecasts identified as a form of implicit contract between a firm and its
contracting partners. Furthermore, coefficients of determination obtained fi"om regression
analyses indicate that some contractual and govemance constraints may play a major role in
D. Cormier, I. Martinez / The Internationa] Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 209-236 233
a firm's accounting policy when there are strong incentives for managers to engage in
earnings management. Our findings also highlight the importance of accounting-based
signals in an IPO context and suggest that additional scrutiny be given to financial
statements of IPO firms. As we mentioned earlier, the French reporting context is less rule-
oriented and less subject to lawsuits and litigations than its U.S. counterpart, which makes it
conducive to earnings management. However, financial markets are increasingly regulated
in France and in Europe. This should lead to more reliable financial reporting in the future.
In light of the findings in this study, it seems that earnings-management models developed
essentially in Anglo-Saxon countries apply to the French context as well, at least in regard
to the IPO.
As in all other earnings-management studies, the present study relies on specific
measures of discretionary accruals that may not completely capture the underlying
phenomenon. Future research may want to consider field investigations as a way ofmaking
the results of this study more tangible. Such investigations would also allow for a better
specification of the relationship between contractual and govemance constraints, and
earnings management. It would also be interesting to extend the sample to a longer period,
particularly beyond 2005, now that French firms are required to comply with lAS/IFRS. As
another limitation, we posit that firms issuing forecasts want to meet or beat their forecasts
one year later; however, managers may instead revise their forecasts in the following year.
This has been taken into account.
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Appendix A. Euronext Paris Stock Exchange—characteristics of different markets
Euronext Paris Companies listed Listing criteria
Premier Marche Large companies based in Minimum market capitalization €700/800 million, 25%
(First Market) France or other countries of equity offered to the public.
Second Marche Medium-size companies and large Minimum market capitalization €12/15 million, 10% of
(Second Market) companies prior to transfer to the equity offered to the public.
Premier Marche
Nouveau Marche High growth potential companies Minimum shareholders' equity €1.5 million, 100,000
(New Market) based in France or other countries shares to be offered to the public in an amount of at least
€5 million, with at least half of these resulting from a
capital increase, 20% of equity offered to public.
Source: www.euronext.com.
Starting from February 2005, a single list "Eurolist" is adopted to replace the three regulated markets. The
Premier Marche, Second Marche and Nouveau Marche. Companies on Eurolist are identified by market
capitalization: Small caps (market capitalization below €150 million), mid-caps (€150 million to €1 billion) and
large caps (over €1 billion). They are subject to a single set of listing and disclosure rules reflecting the regulatory
context in Europe. Finally, a new unregulated market called "Altemext" was created on May 2005 to meet the
needs of small and midsized companies seeking simplified access to the stock market.
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1. Introduction
A growing number of countries have adopted International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRSs) developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (lASB),
and other countries plan to adopt or converge with IFRSs in the future. One goal of
international accounting convergence is the comparability of financial statements across
countries. Adoption of a common set of accounting standards is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition to achieve this goal. Accountants in different countries also must
interpret and apply the common standards similarly.
Gray (1988) develops a theoretical fi"amework of the influence of culture on accounting
that posits causal relations between cultural (societal) values, four accounting values, and
four dimensions of national accounting systems as shown in Fig. 1 . Gray completes the
theory by developing directional hypotheses that relate cultural values to each of the four
accounting values, and by predicting how different cultural areas will rank on each of the
accounting values. The framework predicts, for example, that a country that ranks high on
the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance will rank high on the accounting value of
secrecy, which will result in less disclosure being provided in financial reports in that
country. The framework implies that cultural differences could cause accountants fi-om
different countries to apply a common accounting standard differently, thus possibly
affecting the cross-national comparability of financial statements.
Of the four accounting values listed in Fig. 1, conservatism and secrecy most directly
affect the nature of the information provided in corporate financial reports through their
influence on the measurement of assets and profits (conservatism) and the disclosure of
information (secrecy).* Cross-national differences in conservatism and secrecy have the
potential to adversely affect the international comparability of financial statements.
The basic question addressed in this study is: "Do differences in culture cause
accountants in different countries to interpret and apply the same financial reporting
standards differently?" To date, the only study to specifically address this question is
Doupnik and Richter's (2004), and they do so only with respect to the influence of
conservatism on accountants' interpretation of accounting standards, in the Anglo and
Germanic cultural areas.
The primary objectives of the current study are to test Gray's secrecy hypothesis with
respect to its implications for accountants' interpretations of common-disclosure rules and
to extend tests of Gray's conservatism hypothesis to a cultural area that has not yet been
examined. To achieve these objectives, we use the approach taken by Doupnik and Richter
(2004) and ask a sample of accountants in an Anglo country (United States) and a more-
developed Latin country (Brazil) to interpret verbal probability expressions used in IFRSs
as thresholds for both recognition and disclosure decisions.
Through its influence on the accounting value of secrecy, we obtain strong support for
the hypothesis that culture affects the interpretation of verbal probability expressions used
in establishing the threshold for disclosures. Our results also provide support for the
hypothesis that, through its influence on the accounting value of conservatism, culture
Professionalism and uniformity primarily influence the authority for accounting standards and their
enforcement.
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Fig. 1 . Culture and accounting systems in practice.
affects the interpretation ofverbal probability expressions used in establishing the threshold
for recognizing elements that increase income. These results are consistent with those
obtained by Doupnik and Richter (2004) and suggest that Gray's conservatism hypothesis
applies when comparing recognition decisions made by accountants in the Anglo and more-
developed Latin cultural areas.
We also conduct additional analyses to explore the possibility that Brazilian accountants
working for Big 4 public accounting firms possess Anglo cultural values, which cause them
to interpret probability expressions in a manner similar to U.S. accountants. We find no
support for this; differences in the interpretation of probability expressions between U.S.
and Big 4 Brazilian accountants are similar to differences between U.S. and Brazilian
accountants in general.
This study contributes to the literature on both theoretical and practical levels. It adds to
the body of research that has empirically tested various parts of Gray's theoretical
framework by extending this research to a previously unexamined cultural area and by
testing Gray's secrecy hypothesis at the individual accountant level. The results provide
additional evidence supporting Gray's theory. On a practical level, the results of this study
have negative implications for the consistency with which a common accounting standard
might be applied across cultural areas, which could adversely affect the cross-national
comparability of financial statements. This applies to the interpretation of both disclosure
and recognition standards. Moreover, affiliation with Big 4 accounting fums does not
appear to affect this result.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We describe Gray's theoretical
fi"amework for culture's influence on accounting and summarize prior research testing the
fi-amework in the next Section. In Section 3, we develop hypotheses and describe the
criteria used to select countries to test them. We describe the research instrument and
method used to gather data in Section 4. In Section 5, we report results, and in the fmal
section, we summarize and conclude.
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2. Review of the theoretical framework and empirical tests of the framework
2.7. Theory of the influence of culture on accounting
Fig. 1 presents Gray's framework for the relation between cultural values (identified by
Hofstede (1980))," four accounting values, and four dimensions of national accounting
systems. Gray (1988, p. 8) describes the four accounting values as follows:
Professionalism versus Statutory Control — a preference for the exercise of individual
professional judgment and the maintenance of professional self-regulation as opposed
to compliance with prescriptive legal requirements and statutory control.
Uniformity versus Flexibility— a preference for the enforcement of uniform
accounting practices between companies and for the consistent use of such practices
over time as opposed to flexibility in accordance with the perceived circumstances of
individual companies.
Conservatism versus Optimism— a preference for a cautious approach to measurement
so as to cope with the uncertainty of future events as opposed to a more optimistic,
laissez-faire, risk-taking approach.
Secrecy versus Transparency— a preference for confidentiality and the restriction of
disclosure of information about the business only to those who are closely involved with
its management and financing as opposed to a more transparent, open and publicly
accountable approach.
In identifying the dimensions that characterize accounting systems, Gray distinguishes
between the statutory authority for accounting systems, and their enforcement, and the
measurement and disclosure characteristics ofaccounting systems. The accounting values of
Professionalism and Uniformity are posited to influence the authority for accounting rules
and their enforcement; Conservatism influences the manner in which assets and profits are
measured; and Secrecy affects the extent to which information is likely to be disclosed.
Gray's theoretical framework suggests that shared cultural values within a society lead
to shared accounting values which in turn influence the nature of a nation's accounting
system. Gray develops very specific directional hypotheses as to how Hofstede's (1980)
cultural values affect the four accounting values, and Radebaugh and Gray (2002)
incorporate long-term orientation into these hypotheses." Conservatism and secrecy most
directly affect the measurement and disclosure of information in financial reports and
^ The cultural (societal) values identified by Hofstede (1980) are: Power distance (the extent to which unequal
power distribution in organizations is accepted); Individualism (the level of interdependence among individuals in a
society); Uncertainty avoidance (the degree to which individuals in a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty
and ambiguity); and Masculinity (the extent to which a society emphasizes performance and achievement).
Hofstede and Bond (1988) add a fifth cultural dimension, originally referred to as Confiacian Dynamism, to
the four dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980). This dimension, later renamed as Long-term Orientation, was
originally developed through the use of a Chinese Value Survey.
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therefore are the accounting values that have the greatest potential to affect the cross-
national comparability of financial statements. We limit our discussion to Gray's
conservatism and secrecy hypotheses.
Gray (1988, p. 8) describes conservatism as "a preference for a cautious approach to
measurement." Conservatism implies a tendency to defer recognition of assets and
items that increase net income (revenues, profits, gains) and a tendency to accelerate
the recognition of liabilities and items that decrease net income (expenses, losses).
Gray's conservatism hypothesis as expanded by Radebaugh and Gray to include long-
term orientation is developed as follows (Radebaugh and Gray, 2002, p. 47, emphasis
added):
To what extent then can conservatism be linked to societal value dimensions?
Conserx'atism can be linked perhaps most closely with the uncertainty-avoidance
dimension and the short-term versus long-term orientation. A preference for more
conservative measures of profits and assets is consistent with strong uncertainty
avoidance that stems from a concern with security and a perceived need to adopt a
cautious approach to cope with the uncertainty of fiiture events. A less conservative
approach to measurement is also consistent with a short-term orientation where
quick results are expected and hence a more optimistic approach is adopted relative
to conserving resources and investing for long-term results. There also seems to be
a link, if less strong, between high levels of individualism and masculinity, on the
one hand, and weak uncertainty avoidance on the other, to the extent that an
emphasis on individual achievement and performance is likely to foster a less
conservative approach to measurement.
Gray (1988, p. 8) describes the accounting value of secrecy as "a preference for
confidentiality and the restriction of disclosure of information about the business." Secrecy
manifests itself through a tendency to restrict the disclosure of information available to
outsiders. The secrecy hypothesis is developed as follows (Radebaugh and Gray, 2002, p. 48,
emphasis added):
To what extent then can secrecy be linked to societal value dimensions? A
preference for secrecy is consistent with strong uncertainty avoidance because the
latter stems from the need to restrict the disclosure of information to outsiders to
avoid conflict and competition and to preserve security. A close relationship
between secrecy and power distance also seems likely in that high power-distance
societies are likely to be characterized by the restriction of information to preserve
power inequalities. Secrecy is also consistent with a preference for collectivism, as
opposed to individualism, in that its concern is for the interests of those most
closely involved with the firm rather than external parties. A long-term orientation
also suggests a preference for secrecy that is consistent with the need to conserve
resources within the firm and ensure that frinds are available for investment
relative to the demands of shareholders and employees for higher payments. A
significant but possibly less important link with masculinity also seems likely to
the extent there will be a greater tendency to publicize such achievements and
success.
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Fig. 2. Accounting systems: measurement and disclosure.
Hofstede (1980) identifies ten cultural areas with distinctly different patterns of
cultural values. Gray applies his hypotheses to these cultural areas by positioning them
along an optimism/conservatism continuum and a secrecy/transparency continuum, as
shown in Fig. 2. The Anglo cultural area is hypothesized to be at the extreme optimism
end and the extreme transparency end of these continua. Several cultural areas (more-
developed Latin, Japan, Near Eastern, and less-developed Latin) are placed at the
extreme conservatism end of the optimism/conservatism continuum and the Less-
developed Latin area is placed at the extreme secrecy end of the secrecy/transparency
continuum.
2.2. Empirical tests of Gray's framework
Gray's theoretical framework is universal in that it identifies culture as a source of the
differences in accounting systems that exist across all countries and cultural areas. Determining
the extent to which the theory holds is ofacademic interest but has practical implications as well.
Doupnik and Tsakumis (2004) provide a comprehensive review of the literature that has
examined one or more relations embodied in Gray's theoretical framework. The majority of
studies testing Gray's framework use archival data at the country level to examine the
relation between Hofstede 's cultural dimensions and one or more aspects of national
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accounting systems. Most of this research focuses on Gray's secrecy hypothesis, examining
the relation between cultural values and disclosures provided in corporate financial reports
(Gray & Vint, 1995; Hope, 2002; Jaggi & Low, 2000; Wingate, 1997; Zarzeski, 1996).
Three studies also examine Gray's conservatism hypothesis, studying the link between
culture and measurement of assets and profits at the country level (Eddie, 1 990; Salter &
Niswander, 1995; Sudarwan & Fogarty, 1996). Country-level tests generally support the
secrecy hypothesis but tests of the conservatism hypothesis yield mixed results.
Several studies have examined one or more aspects of Gray's framework using
accountants' opinions as the data for analysis. Roberts and Salter (1999) conducted an
opinion survey of accountants in 23 countries to test Gray's uniformity hypothesis.
MacArthur (1996, 1999) examined comment letters submitted to the lASC on E32,
"Comparability of Financial Statements," to determine whether preferences expressed by
letter writers from different countries were consistent with Gray's hypotheses. These
studies provide support for some of the relations between culture and accounting values
posited by Gray, but not for others.
Two studies have used Gray's framework as the theoretical basis for investigating the
influence of culture on accountants' interpretation and application of accounting standards
(Doupnik & Richter, 2004; Shultz & Lopez, 2001). Schultz and Lopez (2001) use Gray
(1988) and other literature to hypothesize that a country's legal system, major source of
financing, and level of uncertainty avoidance cause differences in estimates of warranty
expense made by accountants across countries. Consistent with their hypothesis, they find
accountants in France and Germany (code-law legal system, nonequity-based financing
system, and high uncertainty avoidance countries) estimate warranty expense more
conservatively than U.S. accountants (common law, equity-based financing, and low
uncertainty avoidance country). Schultz and Lopez (2001) did not test the influence of
culture alone on warranty estimates. Their theoretical development and research design
does not allow them to separate the impact of culture from the influence of legal systems
and sources of financing on such estimates.
Doupnik and Richter (2004) is the only study pubhshed to date that focuses solely on the
influence of culture on the interpretation and application of accounting standards. They use
verbal probabihty expressions used in IFRSs as thresholds for recognizing assets and income
as proxies for accounting standards. From Gray's theory they develop hypotheses with respect
to how the accounting value of conservatism and the context in which verbal probability
expressions are used interact to influence accountants' interpretations of those expressions.'*
Through a survey of accountants in the United States and Germany, they test and find
substantial support for their hypotheses. Consistent with Gray's framework that suggests
German accountants are more conservative than U.S. accountants, German subjects tend to
assign higher (lower) numerical probabihties than U.S. subjects to expressions used as the
threshold for recognizing an asset (hability) or an increase (decrease) in income.
"* For example, they posit that when a probability expression such as "probable" is used to establish the
threshold for recognition of an asset or an increase in income, accountants in more conservative countries will
assign a higher numerical probability to that term to defer recognition. Conversely, when a probability expression
is used to establish the threshold for recognition of a liability or decrease in income, accountants in more
conservative countries will assign a lower numerical probability to the expression to accelerate recognition.
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Doupnik and Richter (2004) find differences in the interpretation of accounting
standards consistent with Gray's conservatism hypothesis using accountants from countries
that are representative of two cultural areas: Anglo (United States) and Germanic
(Germany). Gray's framework predicts differences across all cultural areas. The current
study extends previous research to the more-developed Latin cultural area, an area that has
not been subject to extensive study in the accounting domain. This study also adds to the
stream of research that tests aspects of Gray's theory by examining the implications of his
secrecy hypothesis for accountants' interpretation of accounting disclosure standards.
3. Research question, hypotheses, and country selection
3.1. Research question and hypotheses
The basic question we address in this study is: Do differences in culture cause
accountants in different countries to interpret and apply the same financial reporting
standards differently? To address this question we need to identify countries that are likely
to have significant differences in cultural values and therefore are likely to have
significantly different accounting values. We also need to identify accounting standards that
require accountants to exercise their judgment, which could be influenced by their
accounting values. For practical reasons, we are especially interested in the effect culture
might have on accountants' interpretation and application of IFRSs.
Verbal probability expressions are used in several IFRSs to estabUsh the threshold for
disclosure of information or recognition of an accounting element. For example, IAS 37 uses
the expression "remote" to establish the threshold for the disclosure ofa contingent liabiUty and
"probable" to establish the threshold for recognition of a provision. Probability expressions
used as recognition thresholds are used to establish the threshold for income-increasing items
(e.g., Z^iS 75 requires recognition ofrevenue when economic benefits are "probable") as well as
income-decreasing items (e.g., IAS II requires recognition of a loss on construction contracts
when the loss is "probable"). Doupnik and Richter (2004) successfully used requirements in
EFRSs that rely on verbal probability expressions to represent accounting standards that require
the apphcation ofjudgment. We follow a similar approach in the current study.
Because verbal probability expressions are used to establish the threshold for
recognition of various accounting elements, the level of conservatism shared by
accountants in a country should influence the interpretation of those expressions. This
leads to the following conservatism hypotheses (based on Gray's framework):
HI. Accountants in a country that scores higher in terms of uncertainty avoidance and long-
term orientation and lower in terms of individualism and masculinity will assign a higher
numerical probability to verbal probability expressions that determine the threshold for
recognition ofitems that increase net income than accountants in a country that scores lower on
uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation and higher on individualism and masculinity.
H2. Accountants in a country that scores higher in terms of uncertainty avoidance and
long-term orientation and lower in terms of individualism and masculinity will assign a
lower numerical probability to verbal probability expressions that determine the threshold
for recognition of items that decrease net income than accountants in a country that scores
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lower on uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation and higher on individualism and
masculinity.
Because verbal probability expressions also are used to establish the threshold for the
disclosure of various items of information, the level of secrecy shared by accountants in a
country should influence the manner in which those expressions are interpreted.^ Gray's
framework applied in this context leads to the following secrecy hypothesis:
H3. Accountants in a country that scores higher in terms of uncertainty avoidance, power
distance, and long-term orientation and lower in terms of individualism and masculinity will
assign a higher numerical probability to verbal probability expressions that determine the
threshold for the disclosure of an item of information than accountants in a country that
scores lower on uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and long-term orientation and higher
on individualism and masculinity.
To test the conservatism and secrecy hypotheses we identify two countries likely to
differ significantly on the accounting values of conservatism and secrecy.
3.2. Country selection
As noted earlier. Gray places the Anglo cultural area at the extreme optimism end of a
conservatism/optimism continuum, and at the extreme transparency end of a secrecy/
transparency continuum. Countries from this cultural area, which includes the United
States, are natural candidates for inclusion in studies examining the impact of culture on
accounting, as they act as a type of experimental confrol. Countries from any other cultural
area are expected to exhibit a higher level ofboth conservatism and secrecy. We selected the
United States to represent the Anglo culture.
To extend previous research beyond a comparison of counfries from the Anglo and
Germanic cultural areas, we looked for an economically significant non-Germanic country
in a region of the world where little cultural accounting research has been conducted. Prior
studies investigating the impact of culture on accountants' judgments have focused on
accountants in the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific.^ As a region, Latin America has
been relatively neglected in this stream of research.^
Brazil is the largest country in Latin America in area, population, and economic
importance.^ While the Brazilian stock market is small compared to those in the United
" For example, IAS 37, "Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets," indicates that a contingent
liability should be disclosed unless the likelihood of an outflow of resources is remote (para. 28).
^ The subjects comprising this body of research come from: Ausfralia and China (Gul & Tsui, 1993), United
States and Taiwan (Ho & Chang, 1994; Kames, Sterner, Welker, & Wu, 1990), United States and Germany
(Agacer & Doupnik, 1991; Doupnik & Richter, 2003, 2004), United States, France and Germany (Schultz &
Lopez, 2001), Australia, India, and Malaysia (Patel, Harrison, & McKinnon, 2002), and United States and seven
European countries (Arnold, Bemardi, & Neidermeyer, 2001).
^ Cohen, Pant, and Sharp's (1995) study of the influence of culture on auditors' ethical perceptions includes
subjects from the U.S., Japan, and undisclosed countries in Latin America. Among the 23 countries surveyed by
Roberts and Salter (1999), in addition to the U.S. and Canada, 11 countries are in Europe, eight are in Asia-
Pacific, and two are Latin American (Brazil and Mexico).
^ Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world in terms of area and population, and has the ninth largest
economy measured in terms of purchasing power parity-adjusted GDP (World Bank, 2003). Brazil is the ninth
most popular destination for foreign direct investment; third among developing countries (United Nations, 2001).
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Table 1
Hofstede's Index Scores for Brazil and the United States
Cultural value Brazil United States
Power distance 69 > 40
Uncertainty avoidance 76 > 46
Individualism 38 < 91
Masculinity 49 < 62
Long-term orientation^ 65 > 29
Source: Hofstede (1980).
' Hofstede (2001).
States and other developed countries, it is the largest in Latin America, and many Brazilian
firms cross-list on foreign stock exchanges.^ Among Latin American countries, Brazilian
companies generally comprise the largest component in international stock mutual funds/
°
The comparability of Brazilian financial statements with those of United States and other
Anglo companies arguably is an important harmonization objective, making Brazil a
worthy subject for cross-cultural accounting research. '
'
The Brazilian accounting system can be characterized as law-based with taxation
exerting a strong influence. Until the early 1990s, the country was wracked with high rates
of inflation and financial statements were required to be adjusted for changes in the general
price level. As is true in many countries, the Big 4 firms dominate the auditing industry.
According to Hofstede (1980), Brazil is one ofthe countries comprising a more-developed
Latin cultural area. Gray places the more-developed Latin area at the extreme conservatism
end of the conservatism/optimism continuum and on the secrecy side of the secrecy/
transparency continuum. Table 1 presents Hofstede's (1980) indices for Brazil and the United
States. Brazil ranks substantially higher than the United States on uncertainty avoidance and
long-term orientation, substantially lower on individualism, and somewhat lower on
masculinity, all ofwhich would indicate stronger conservatism among Brazilian accountants.
These relationships, along with Brazil's higher rank on power distance, also suggest that
Brazilian accountants will exhibit a higher level of secrecy than U.S. accountants.
With the exception oflong-term orientation, Hofstede's index scores were developed in the
1970s. Although Hofstede suggests that culture remains relatively constant over time, there
has been no comprehensive replication ofhis original study to verify that this is so. In addition,
Hofstede's index scores are based on a survey ofIBM employees, most ofwhom presumably
In June 2005, 96 Brazilian companies had ADRs in the United States. A list of foreign companies with ADRs
in the United States is available on the Bank of New York website at www.adrbny.com.
"^ As examples, on March 31, 2005, Brazil comprised 53.2 percent of the holdings in the Fidelity Latin America
Fund and 57.5 percent of the holdings in the Merrill Lynch Latin America Fund (Mexico was second at 36.7%
and 3 1 .9%, respectively); among Latin American countries, Brazil represented the greatest percentage of holdings
by Vanguard's International Growth, International Value, and Emerging Markets Stock Index funds.
" Mexico is the second most important economy in Latin America and would be an interesting country to
include in a study that examines the impact of culture on the interpretation of probability expressions. However,
because of the geographic proximity between Mexico and the United States and the significant economic and
cultural interaction between the two countries, we believe Brazil is likely to have greater cultural distance from
the United States and therefore represents a better comparison country to test Gray's model. We defer the
inclusion of Mexico in cross-cultural studies to fiiture research.
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were not accountants. Whether differences in index scores obtained from IBM employees are
appUcable to professional accountants is an open question. Montagna (1986) questions
whether Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance index is necessarily valid for accountants
suggesting that U.S. accountants are more likely to avoid uncertainty situations than members
ofother U.S. professions. Culture is the treatment variable in the current study, but it cannot be
manipulated. To verify that U.S. and Brazilian accountants differ on cultural values in the
direction identified by Hofstede, we incorporate Hofstede's Values Survey Module (VSM)
into our research instrument and administer it to the accountants participating in the study. '"
3.3. Influence ofBig 4 firm affiliation
Soeters and Schreuder (1988) hypothesize that through self-selection and/or
socialization Dutch accountants working for (at that time) Big 8 public accounting firms
will possess values consistent with the Anglo culture. They administer Hofstede's VSM to a
sample of Dutch accountants working for Dutch and Big 8 accounting firms and find
evidence that supports their hypothesis.
If the self-selection/socialization hypothesis accurately describes Brazilian accountants,
we could expect Big 4 Brazilian accountants to possess cultural values more similar to U.S.
accountants than the general population of Brazilian accountants. This should result in the
Big 4 Brazilian accountants and U.S. accountants being more similar in accounting values,
which in turn should mean that there will be no significant differences in the interpretation
of probability expressions.
To explore this possibility, we split the Brazilian sample into those accountants employed
by Big 4 firms and those employed by other firms and we retest our hypotheses by comparing
the probability expression interpretations of U.S. and Big 4 Brazihan accountants.
4. Methodology
To test the hypotheses, we selected 11 excerpts containing five different verbal
probability expressions from seven different IFRSs (shown in the Appendix). We included
the excerpts in a research instrument in which professional accountants in the United States
and Brazil were asked to assign a numerical probability on a scale of 0% to 1 00% to each
verbal probability expression. The excerpts cover a wide variety of accounting contexts in
which probability expressions are used.
To ensure that the U.S. and Brazilian respondents differed on Hofstede's cultural values
and in the direction expected, Hofstede's VSM as revised in 1 994 was included as part ofthe
research instrument.'^ Hofstede (1994) cautions that "(i)ndexes calculated with the old and
new formulas are not necessarily the same! However, the old and new formulas should
produce approximately the same score differences between countries."
The research instrument consisted of four parts: (1) instructions, including two non-
accounting examples; (2) excerpts from IFRSs; (3) Hofstede's VSM; and (4) demographic
In two recent accounting studies researchers independently verified the cultural characteristics of the countries
under study by incorporating Hofstede's VSM into their research materials (Patel, 2003; Patel et al., 2002).
Hofstede's VSM can be obtained from www.geert-hofstede.com and may be freely used for research purposes.
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Table 2
Portuguese-language translations of IAS probability expressions
Probability expression Portuguese translation
Probable Provavel
Reasonable assurance Razoavel seguran9a
Reasonable certainty Razoavel certeza
No longer probable Nao seja provavel
Remote Remoto/remota
questions. Instructions and demographic questions were first written in English, translated
into Portuguese, and then translated back into English to ensure equivalence with the
original. We used "VSM-Portugues," the Portuguese translation of Hofstede's VSM, to
include VSM questions in the Portuguese version of the research instrument.''*
To the extent available, we used Portuguese translations of International Accounting
Standards (Normas Internacionais de Contabilidade) prepared by the Brazihan Institute of
Accountants (IBRACON, 1998). Although IAS 37 and IAS 38 became effective in 1999,
IBRACON had not yet translated these standards into Portuguese at the time data were
gathered for this study. We included excerpts containing three probabihty expressions from
these standards in the questionnaire: probable, virtually certain, and remote. "Probable" is
used in other standards and is consistently translated by IBRACON as provavel, so we used
this translation in our instrument. "Remote" and "virtually certain" previously had not been
translated by IBRACON. We literally translated these expressions as remoto/remota and
virtualmente certolcerta and asked a small group ofpublic accountants in Sao Paulo to verify
that these were appropriate translations. This group agreed that remoto/remota was the best
translation ofremote, but did not believe that virtualmente was an expression likely to be used
in a Portuguese-language Brazilian accounting standard. The group suggested praticamente
(practically) certo/certa as an adequate translation that would be more readily interpretable by
Brazilian accountants. As a result, we included praticamente certo/certa in the Portuguese
language version of the questionnaire. Subsequent to data collection, IBRACON published
its translation ofIAS 37 and IAS 38. "Remote" is translated as remoto/remota, but contrary to
the expectations of our expert group "virtually certain" is translated as virtualmente certo/
certa. Because our translation of "virtually certain" is inconsistent with that of IBRACON,
and therefore would not be used by Brazilian accountants applying IFRSs, we exclude data
related to "virtually certain" and praticamente certo/certa from our analysis.
Excerpts were presented in the same random order in each version of the questionnaire.
Table 2 shows the Portuguese-language translations of the LAS probability expressions
examined.
In the United States, the English-language version of the instrument was distributed to
members of the audit staff in offices of intemational (Big 4) and local public accounting
firms in the southeastern United States. In Brazil, the Portuguese-language version was
distributed to audit staff members in offices of intemational and local public accounting
firms in the state of Sao Paulo, and to public accountants participating in a continuing
education seminar at the University of Sao Paulo.
'^ VSM-Portugues uses the Portuguese spoken in Portugal, which differs in some ways from the Portuguese
spoken in Brazil. We made changes to restate several phrases in Brazilian Portuguese.
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Table 3
Response rates and respondent profiles
Brazil United States
Sample
Number of respondents
Response rate
Big 4
Other
Mean age (in years)
Mean years of professional experience as accountant
Nationality at birth same as country of residence
200 200
77 107
38.5% 53.5%
42 75
35 32
30.7 29.6
9.1 6.7
98.7% 93.5%
The independent variable in this study is culture, with two levels — Anglo and more-
developed Latin. We use muhiple probability expressions from IFRSs to address each
hypothesis, resulting in multiple dependent variables. We test our hypotheses using
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), grouping probability expressions according
to hypothesis. For those groups of expressions in which MANOVA indicates a significant
global difference between the two nationalities, we then conduct univariate tests (ANOVA)
to identify probability expressions for which significant differences exist.
5. Results
5.7. Responses
Table 3 reports response rates and respondent profiles. The response rate was higher in
the United States than in Brazil. Each group of respondents had an average of more than
Table 4
Cultural value scores from VSM for sample of professional accountants in Brazil and the United States
Panel A: Full sample of Brazilian and U.S. respondent;
Cultural value Brazil United States Direction of difference consistent
n= ll /7=107 with Hofstede's Scores
Power distance 16 > 4 Yes
Uncertainty avoidance 55 > 28 Yes
Individuahsm 97 < 115 Yes
Masculinity 49 > 32 No
Long-term orientation 69 > 38 Yes
Panel B: Brazilian sample split into respondents employed by Big 4 firms and other fums
Cultural value Other firms Big 4 firms
n = 35 H=42
Power distance 16 > 15
Uncertainty avoidance 60 > 51
Individualism 87 < 105
Masculinity 61 > 39
Long-term orientation 70 > 68
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6 years of professional experience. A larger percentage of U.S. respondents is employed by
Big 4 firms. Almost all respondents were bom in the country in which they work suggesting
that the respondent groups are representative of their national cultures.
5.2. Cultural value scores
Panel A of Table 4 reports cultural-value scores for our two groups of respondents. The
scores derived from our VSM are different from those obtained by Hofstede (1980) (reported
in Table 1).'^ However, with the exception of masculinity, the direction of differences on our
VSM scores between Brazilian and U.S. accountants is consistent with the direction of
differences in Hofstede's indices for these two countries. As noted eariier, Gray (1988) and
Radebaugh and Gray (2002) view uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation as having
the greatest influence on conservatism, and these two values along with power distance and
individuaUsm are viewed as having a close relationship with secrecy. Our sample ofBraziUan
accountants has substantially higher scores on power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and
long-term orientation and a somewhat lower score on individuahsm than the U.S. accountants
in our sample. Only our VSM results for mascuUnity differ in direction from Hofstede's
indices. Because Gray believes that masculinity has only a weak relation with the accounting
values ofconservatism and secrecy, we conclude that the cultural value scores obtained from
our survey participants are consistent with our assumptions that Brazil is a higher conservatism
and a higher secrecy culture than the United States. Based on the VSM scores we obtain, our
BraziUan sample ofaccountants should exhibit greater conservatism and secrecy than the U.S.
sample of accountants when interpreting verbal probabihty expressions used in IFRSs.
5.3. Tests of hypotheses
Table 5 summarizes our specific expectations with regard to whether U.S. or Brazilian
accountants will assign a higher mean probability to the verbal probability expressions
included in the research instrument. Probability expressions are grouped according to
hypothesis. For example, IAS 18 indicates that revenue should be recognized when "it is
probable that economic benefits associated with the transaction will flow to the enterprise"
(para. 14). In this context, "probable" is used as a threshold for the recognition ofan item that
increases income. If Brazilian accountants are more conservative and they want to defer
income recognition, they should require a higher numericalprobability (on a 0-100% scale)
to meet the threshold "probable." The responses to this excerpt are used in testing HI related
to the recognition of increases in income. Five additional excerpts relate to this hypothesis.
As a fiirther example, IAS 11 indicates that a loss on a construction contract should be
recognized "when it is probable that total contract costs will exceed total contract revenue"
(para. 36). In this context, "probable" is used as the threshold for the recognition of an item
'^ As noted earlier, Hofstede warns that administration of the VSM revised in 1994 will not necessarily result in
scores similar to those he obtained from his original survey. Thus, the fact that our VSM results differ from
Hofstede's is not surprising. Indeed, Soeters and Schreuder (1988) administered the original VSM to a group of
Dutch accountants and obtained scores that were different from Hofstede's. In the extreme case they obtained a
negative score on uncertainty avoidance. Thus, replication of Hofstede's scores using accountants is not
necessarily to be expected.
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Table 5
Expectations for differences in mean numerical probabilities between Brazilian (BR) and U.S. (US) professional
accountants in the interpretation of in-context probability expressions
IAS# Probability expression Context Impact on income Expectation
HI: Recognition of increases in income
8 Probable Revenue + BR>US
20 Reasonable assurance Government grants + BR>US
1 1 Probable Construction contracts + BR>US
1 7 Reasonably certain Leases + BR>US
38 Probable Development costs + BR>US
12 Probable Deferred tax asset + BR>US
H2: Recognition ofdecreases in income
1 1 Probable Construction contract loss - US>BR
12 No longer probable Deferred tax asset - US>BR
37 Probable Provision - US>BR
H5: Disclosure
37 Remote Contingent liability none BR>US
37 Probable Contingent asset none BR>US
that decreases income. If Brazilian accountants are more conservative and they have a
preference to accelerate the recognition of a decrease in income, they should require a lower
numerical probability to meet the "probable" threshold. This excerpt, along with two
others, is used in testing H2 related to recognition of decreases in income.
With respect to the verbal probability expressions used in making disclosure decisions,
regardless of whether the disclosure involves an asset (gain) or a liability (loss), we expect
Brazilian accountants to establish higher numerical probability thresholds in order to defer
or avoid making the disclosure. Responses to the IFRS excerpts related to the disclosure of
contingent liabilities and contingent assets are used to test H3.
Table 6 reports the mean numerical probabilities assigned by the U.S. and Brazilian
accountants to the 11 verbal probability expressions from selected IFRSs.' We use
MANOVA to determine whether a significant global difference exists between the U.S. and
Brazilian respondents across the set of probability expressions relating to each hypothesis.
We then examine responses to individual expressions to determine whether the direction of
differences is consistent with our hypothesis and which expressions contribute to the
differences between the two groups.
5.3.1. Tests of conservatism hypotheses — HI and H2
MANOVA indicates a significant difference (p = .044) between the two groups of
accountants across the six verbal probability expressions that relate to the recognition of
increases in income. Panel A of Table 6 shows that differences in the mean probabilities
assigned by the two groups occur in the predicted direction for four of the six expressions
and univariate tests (ANOVA) indicate significant differences (p<.05) in three cases. Two
'^ Although the research instrument includes excerpts involving 13 probability expressions, as noted earlier, we
do not analyze the expression pair virtually certainlpraticamente certo(a) included in two excerpts because of
improper translation.
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Table 6
Mean numerical probabilities assigned by Brazilian and U.S. professional accountants and results of statistical tests
Panel A: Full respondent sample
IAS# Expression (context) Brazil United States Direction F Sig.
n =n n = l07 expected
HI: Recognition ofincreases in income
Multivariate test
Univariate tests
18
20
11
17
38
12
Probable (revenue)
Reasonable assurance (gov't grants)
Probable (construction contracts)
Reasonable certainty (leases)
Probable (development costs)
Probable (deferred tax asset)
78.43 > 73.58
70.53 < 75.15
77.65 > 74.94
76.29 < 78.88
78.49 > 74.13
76.56 > 71.95
yes
no
yes
no
yes
yes
2.217 .044**
3.831
3.407
1.383
1.244
2.883
3.045
.026**
.034**
.121
.133
.046**
.042**
H2: Recognition ofdecreases in income
Multivariate test
Univariate tests
11
12
37
Probable (construction contract loss) 73.19 > 71.56
No longer probable 44.57 > 42.96
(deferred tax asset)
Probable (provision) 64.81 > 64.32
no
no
.191 .903
.403 .263
.178 .337
.035 .426
H3: Disclosure
Multivariate test
Univariate tests
37
37
Remote (contingent liability)
Probable (contingent asset)
13.031 .000***
23.88 > 12.67 yes 23.971 .000***
74.31 > 71.79 yes .862 .177
Panel B: Reduced respondent sample
IAS# Expression (context) Brazil
« = 60
United States Expected F
n = 99 direction
Sig.
HI: Recognition of increases in income
Multivariate test
Univariate tests
18
20
11
17
38
12
Probable (revenue) 80.50 > 75.18
Reasonable assurance (gov't grants) 75.26 < 76.73
Probable (construction contracts) 79.17 > 75.24
Reasonable certainty (leases) 76.50 < 80.96
Probable (development costs) 83.15 > 75.07
Probable (deferred tax asset) 80.33 > 72.97
4.660 .000***
yes 4.952 .014**
no .438 .255
yes 2.895 .046**
no 4.180 .022**
yes 12.920 .000***
yes 10.550 .001***
H2: Recognition ofdecreases in income
Multivariate test
Univariate tests
11
12
37
Probable (construction contract loss) 74.58
No longer probable 46.43
(deferred tax asset)
Probable (provision) 65.85
71.99
43.30
> 65.33
no
no
.528 .663
1.045 .155
.549 .230
.041 .420
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Table 6 {continued)
IAS# Expression (context) Brazil United Expected F Sig.
/) = 60 States/) = 99 direction
H3: Disclosure
Multivariate test 14.969 .000***
Univariate tests
37 Remote (contingent liability) 21.88 > 12.71 yes 26.486 .000***
37 Probable (contingent asset) 78.28 > 73.09 yes 4.413 .019**
Univariate test results (Sig.) are 1 -tailed.
Statistically significant coefficients are denoted by: *** less than 0.01, ** less than 0.05, *** less than 0.10.
differences are in the opposite direction ofwhat was expected and one ofthese differences is
significant at conventional levels (/><.05).
MANOVA indicates that there is no significant difference (p = .903) between the two
groups across the three expressions comprising H2. The differences in the mean probabilities
on the three expressions related to H2 are all in the opposite direction ofwhat was predicted.
However, none of the differences is statistically significant.
5.3.2. Test of secrecy hypothesis — H3
MANOVA indicates a significant difference (p = .000) between the two groups across the
two expressions related to H3. Table 6 indicates that the differences in mean responses
between the two groups occurs in the expected direction for both ofthe excerpts related to H3.
The difference in mean numerical probabilities assigned to the term "remote" is large and
highly significant. These results are consistent with the expectation that Brazilian accountants
have a higher level of accounting secrecy and are less willing to provide disclosures.
A number of respondents provided responses to one or more expressions that are
inconsistent with the range of probability commonly associated with those expressions. This
phenomenon may indicate a lack of understanding or a lack of attention by respondents. For
example, several respondents associated a probability of 50% or higher with the word
"remote," whereas others assigned a probability of less than 50% to the expressions
"reasonable assurance," "reasonable certainty," or "probable." The responses ofthese subjects
were removed from the data set and statistical tests were conducted on the reduced sample.
The results reported in Panel B ofTable 6 on the reduced sample are generally consistent with
those from the fiill sample. There is stronger support forH 1 and H3 and still no support for H2.
5.4. Influence ofBig 4 firm affiliation
To explore the possibility that Brazilian accountants working for Big 4 firms have
accounting values similar to U.S. accountants, which in turn affects their interpretation of
probability expressions, we split the Brazilian sample into those accountants employed by Big
4 firms and those employed by other firms. We calculate cultural value indices for both groups
and we retest our hypotheses by comparing the probability expression interpretations of U.S.
and Big 4 Brazilian accountants. Panel B of Table 4 reports cultural value scores for the two
subsets ofBrazilian accountants. For each cultural dimension, the Big 4 Brazilian accountants'
score is closer to that of the U.S. accountants than the scores obtained for the Brazilians
working for other firms. However, the difference in scores between the Big 4 Brazilians and
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Other Firm Brazilians is relatively small for power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-
term orientation. Individualism and masculinity are the only cultural dimensions on which the
Big 4 accountants move considerably closer to the United States' score. '^
Table 7 reports the results of statistical tests comparing the responses of Big 4 Brazilian
accountants and U.S. accountants. Panel A reports results without removing those subjects
who provided inconsistent responses; Panel B reports the results of tests after removing those
who provided inconsistent responses on one or more cases. Significant differences reported in
Panels A and B of Table 7 are generally consistent with those reported in Panels A and B of
Table 6. The Big 4 Brazilian accountants (both ftill and reduced samples) differ significantly
fi"om the U.S. accountants in their interpretation of "probable" when used in the contexts of
recognizing revenues, development costs, deferred tax assets, and disclosing contingent
assets, and in their interpretation of "remote" when used as the threshold for disclosing
contingent liabilities. We also compare the mean responses ofBig 4 and Other Firm Brazihan
accountants and find only one significant difference between the two groups (not included in
the tables). The Big 4 Brazilian accountants actually exhibit a higher level of conservatism
than the Other Firm Brazilian accountants by assigning a higher numerical value to "probable"
when used in the context of recognizing development costs as an asset. Thus, we find no
evidence that employment by a Big 4 firm dampens the relative conservatism or secrecy
exhibited by Brazilian accountants in interpreting probability expressions.
6. Summary and conclusions
We examined Gray's conservatism and secrecy hypotheses in the context of interpreting
verbal probability expressions used as recognition and disclosure thresholds in IFRSs. We
obtain substantial support for the hypothesis that, through its influence on the accounting
value of conservatism, culture affects the interpretation of verbal probability expressions
used to establish the threshold for recognizing increases in income. This is consistent with
the results obtained by Doupnik and Richter (2004) and provides evidence of the
generalizability of Gray's conservatism hypothesis to the more-developed Latin cultural
area. We also obtain strong support for the hypothesis that, through its influence on the
accounting value of secrecy, culture affects the interpretation of verbal probability
expressions used to establish the threshold for when disclosures should be made. Future
research investigating these hypotheses in other cultural areas is necessary before we can
conclude that Gray's theory as applied to the interpretation of accounting standards by
individual accountants is universally valid.
The practical implications of these results are important in that they suggest that
national cultural values can affect accountants' interpretation of probability expressions
used in IFRSs, and as a result, differences in cultural values across countries could lead
to differences in recognition and disclosure decisions based on those interpretations.
Application of accounting standards that include probability expressions as recognition or
disclosure thresholds necessarily involves considerable accountant judgment. The
generalizability of this study's findings to other areas requiring accountant judgment,
'^ Because cultural dimension scores are measured only at the group level, and not at the individual level, it is
not possible to evaluate the statistical significance of the differences in scores.
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Table 7
Mean numerical probabilities assigned by Brazilian accountants employed by big four firms and U.S. professional
accountants and results of tests
Panel A: Full sample of Big Four Brazilian and U.S. respondents
IAS# Expression (context) Brazil
«=42
United States Expected F
77=107 Direction
Sig.
HI: Recognition of increases in income
Multivariate test
Univariate tests
18 Probable (revenue)
20 Reasonable assurance (gov't grants)
1
1
Probable (construction contracts)
17 Reasonable certainty (leases)
38 Probable (development costs)
12 Probable (deferred tax asset)
H2: Recognition ofdecreases in income
Multivariate test
Univariate tests
1 Probable (construction contract loss)
1
2
No longer probable
(deferred tax asset)
37 Probable (provision)
H3: Disclosure
Multivariate test
Univariate tests
37 Remote (contingent liability)
37 Probable (contingent asset)
3.269 .005***
78.81 > 73.58 yes 3.117 .040**
71.70 < 75.15 no 1.231 .135
79.21 > 74.94 yes 2.720 .051*
76.50 < 78.88 no .694 .203
82.45 > 74.13 yes 9.075 .002***
79.67 > 71.95 yes 8.117
1.409
.003***
.243
76.45 > 7156 no 3.032 .042**
47.64 > 42.96 no 1.071 .152
64.76 > 64.32 no .024
18.488
.439
.000***
25.05 > 12.67 yes 35.223 .000***
76.48 > 71.79 yes 2.448 .060*
Panel B: Reduced sample of Big Four Brazilian and U.S. respondents
IAS# Expression (context) Brazil
77 = 35
United States Expected
77 = 99 direction
Sig.
HI: Recognition ofincreases in income
Multivariate test
Univariate tests
1 8 Probable (revenue)
20 Reasonable assurance (gov't grants)
1 Probable (construction contracts)
17 Reasonable certainty (leases)
38 Probable (development costs)
12 Probable (deferred tax asset)
3.381 .000*
79.71 > 75.18 yes 2.475 .059*
77.76 > 76.73 yes .154 .348
78.77 > 75.24 yes 1.566 .107
77.51 < 80.96 no 1.838 .089*
84.51 > 75.07 yes 11.764 .001***
78.77 > 72.97 yes 4.360 .020**
H2: Recognition ofdecreases in income
Multivariate test
Univariate tests
11 Probable (construction contract loss) 75.46
12 No longer probable (deferred tax asset) 48.31
37 Probable (provision) 63.43
1.232 .301
71.99 no 1.332 .126
43.30 no .996 .160
65.33 yes .408 .250
(continued on next page)
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Table 7 (continued)
Panel B: Reduced sample of Big Four Brazilian and U.S. Respondents
IAS# Expression (context) Brazil
«=42
United States
/7 = 107
Expected
Direction
F Sig.
H3: Disclosure
Multivariate test 20.152 .000***
Univariate tests
37 Remote (contingent liability) 24.49 > 12.71 yes 39.360 .000***
37 Probable (contingent asset) 77.63 > 73.09 yes 2.376 .063*
Univariate test results (Sig.) are 1 -tailed.
Statistically significant coefficients are denoted by: *** less than 0.01, ** less than 0.05, * less than 0.10.
such as estimation of bad debts, is unknown but represents an important area of future
research.
We do not find that Brazihan accountants employed by Big 4 pubhc accounting firms
exhibit less conservatism or less secrecy in their interpretations of probability expressions
than accountants in non-Big 4 firms. This result implies that, at least in Brazil, we cannot
assume that affiliation with a Big 4 firm by itself will mitigate the effect that culture
otherwise might have on differences in interpretation of probability expressions. Future
research might examine whether this result obtains in other cultures and in other
contexts.
Financial reporting decisions based on probability thresholds are a function of two
factors: (1) interpretation of the probability expression threshold, and (2) analysis of facts
and circumstances to determine whether the probability threshold has been achieved. This
study and prior research has focused on the first factor, whether national culture affects
interpretation of probability thresholds. Future research might investigate the second
component of the decision process; whether the accounting values of conservatism and
secrecy systematically influence the manner in which accountants in different countries
interpret the facts of a particular case. Either factor could lead to different financial
reporting decisions being made in similar facts and circumstances, thereby reducing the
cross-national comparability of financial reporting.
This study drew samples fi-om specific regions within the United States and Brazil. To
the extent that regional differences exist with respect to cultural and/or accounting
values, the results may not be generalizable to other regions. In terms of practical
implications, this is less of a problem in Brazil, because approximately 40% of Brazilian
GDP is generated in the state of Sao Paulo. Examining whether differences in
accountants' values exist across regions of the United States could be an interesting topic
for ftiture research.
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Appendix A. IAS excerpts containing verbal probability expressions
IAS 18 Revenue
"Revenue from the sale of goods should be recognized when it is probable that the
economic benefits associated with the transaction will flow to the enterprise."
In this context, probable corresponds to a probability
greater than what percentage?
%
IAS 20 Accounting for Government Grants
"A government grant is not recognized as income until there is reasonable assurance
that the enterprise will comply with the conditions attaching to it, and that the grant will
be received. Receipt of a grant does not of itself provide conclusive evidence that the
conditions attaching to the grant have been or will be fulfilled."
In this context, reasonable assurance corresponds to a probability
greater than what percentage?
%
IAS 11 Construction Contracts
"When the outcome of a construction contract can be estimated reliably, contract
revenue and contract costs associated with the construction contract should be recog-
nized as revenue and expenses respectively by reference to the stage of completion of
the contract activity at the balance sheet date (percentage of completion method)."
"In the case of a cost plus contract, the outcome of a construction contract can be esti-
mated reliably when all the following conditions are satisfied:
a) it is probable that the economic benefits associated with the contract will flow to the
enterprise, and
b) the contract costs attributable to the contract can be clearly identified and measured
reliably."
%In this context, probable corresponds to a probability
greater than what percentage?
"When it is probable that total (construction) contract costs will exceed total contract
revenue, the expected loss should be recognized as an expense immediately."
In this context, probable corresponds to a probability
greater than what percentage?
%
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IAS 17 Leases
"When a lease is classified as a finance lease, an asset and a liability are recognized at
the inception of the lease at an amount equal to the fair value of the leased property. A
finance lease gives rise to a depreciation expense for the depreciable asset. If there is
reasonable certainty that the lessee will obtain ownership by the end of the lease term,
the asset should be depreciated over the useful hfe of the asset (even if this is longer than
the lease term)."
In this context, reasonable certainty corresponds to a probability
greater than what percentage?
%
LAS 38 Development Costs as an Intangible Asset
"An intangible asset arising from development (or from the development phase of an
internal project) should be recognized if, and only if, it is probable that future economic
benefits that are attributable to the asset will flow to the enterprise."
In this context, probable corresponds to a probability
greater than what percentage?
%
IAS 12 Deferred Tax Assets
"Deferred tax assets are the amounts of income taxes recoverable in future periods. A
deferred tax asset should be recognized for the carryforward of unused tax losses and un-
used tax credits to the extent that it is probable that future taxable profit will be avail-
able against which the unused tax losses and unused tax credits can be utilized."
In this context, probable corresponds to a probability
greater than what percentage?
%
"The carrying amount of a deferred tax asset should be reviewed at each balance sheet
date. An enterprise should reduce the carrying amount of a deferred tax asset to the ex-
tent it is no longer probable that sufficient taxable profit will be available to allow the
benefit of the deferred tax asset to be utilized."
In this context, no longer probable corresponds to a probability
less than what percentage?
%
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IAS 38 Useful Life of an Intangible Asset
"An intangible asset should be amortized over its useful life. For an intangible asset
that is a legal right (such as a copyright or patent), the useful life of the intangible
asset should not exceed the period of the legal right unless the legal right is renewable
and the renewal is virtually certain."
In this context, virtually certain corresponds to a probability
greater than what percentage?
%
IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets
Provisions
"A provision is a liability of uncertain timing or amount. A provision (liability) and
related expense should be recognized when it is probable that an outflow of resources
embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation. For the purpose
of this Standard, an outflow of resources or other event is regarded as probable if it is
more likely than not to occur, i.e., the probability that the event will occur is greater
than the probability that it will not."
In this context, probable corresponds to a probability
greater than what percentage?
%
Contingent Liabilities
"A contingent liability is a possible obligation whose existence will be confirmed only
by the occurrence or non-occurrence of one or more uncertain future events. Unless
the possibility of any outflow of resources is remote, an enterprise should disclose
for each class of contingent liability a brief description of the nature of the contingent
liability and, if practicable, an estimate of its financial effect."
In this context, remote corresponds to a probability
less than what percentage?
%
Contingent Assets
"A contingent asset is a possible asset whose existence will be confirmed only by the
occurrence or non-occurrence of one or more uncertain future events not wholly within
the control of the enterprise."
"If the inflow of economic benefits from the contingent asset is probable, an enterprise
should disclose a brief description of the nature of the contingent asset and, where prac-
ticable, an estimate of its financial effect."
In this context, probable corresponds to a probability
greater than what percentage ?
%
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"If, for a contingent asset, it has become virtually certain that an inflow of economic
benefits will arise, the asset and the related income are recognized in the financial
statements."
In this context, virtually certain corresponds to a probability
greater than what percentage?
%
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Abstract
This study, which examines the association between board monitoring and the level of voluntary
disclosure, finds new evidence that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors on the
board are associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure. Although board size and CEO duality
are not associated with voluntary disclosure, boards with a majority of independent directors have
significantly higher levels of voluntary disclosure than firms with balanced boards. Notably, we find
that the presence of an extemal governance mechanism, the regulatory environment, enhances the
strength of the association between the proportion of independent directors and the level of voluntary
disclosure. This association is some two to three times greater under a "disclosure-based" regulatory
regime than under a "merit-based" regulatory regime.
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1. Introduction
Jensen and Meckling (1976) introduced the concept of misalignment of interests
between owners and managers of firms when the ownership and control elements are not
coincident as agency theory. The theory suggests that the potential conflict, coupled with
the inability of owners to write costless perfect contracts and monitor the managers,
inherently reduces the value of the firm as an economic entity. As such, the need for
* This paper was presented at the 2005 Illinois International Accounting Conference in Kobe, Japan.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: 48rknsn@gmail.com (S.M. Courtenay).
0020-7063/$30.00 © 2006 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2006.07.001
E.C.M. Cheng, S.M. Courtenay / The International Journal ofAccounting 4 1 (2006) 262-289 263
effective corporate-governance mechanisms in monitoring managerial actions in favor of
shareholders' interests becomes a matter of necessity. Corporate govemance is aptly
defined by Denis and McConnell (2002, pp. 1-2) as "...the set of mechanisms - both
institutional and market-based - that induce the self-interested controllers of a company. .
.
to make decisions that maximize the value of the company to its owners. . .."
This study examines the association between two key facets of firm-specific corporate
govemance in a "disclosure-based" regulatory regime: the board of directors and the level of
voluntary disclosure. ' Under a disclosure-based regulatory framework, market participants
are expected to determine the merits of a firm's actions whereas in a "merit-based" regulatory
fi-amework, regulators decide on the propriety offirm transactions. Since voluntary disclosure
is subject to managerial discretion, there is a need to align the information-disclosure
tendencies offirms with the interests ofshareholders. While mandated regulation ofdisclosure
is a possible solution, management would have less discretion in disclosing selectively, and
there is insufficient evidence on the benefits ofregulating disclosure (Healy & Palepu, 2001).
In effect, even if regulation of disclosure is effective, there is still the concern of which
disclosures should be mandated, and which should be voluntary." Thus, there is a need for an
internal, as well as an external, monitoring mechanism to ensure sufficient disclosure.
We also examine the effect ofdifferent regulatory regimes on the board's role in supporting
and monitoring voluntary disclosure. As suggested in Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen
(1983), directors (particularly outside directors) have reputational capital that is affected by
their abiUty to discharge their monitoring duties. Iftheir "monitoring duties" are influenced by
the regulatory regime's emphasis on any particular mechanism of govemance and/or
protection of investor rights, the board may attune its monitoring emphasis accordingly.
The sample consists of 1 04 firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX) in the year
2000. A motivation for choosing this sample is that Singapore is a growing, but small,
developed financial market with recent corporate reform demanding a richer disclosure
environment and stronger corporate-govemance practices.^ More importantly, the size of the
Singapore market allows the development ofa self-constructed voluntary disclosure index that
not only eliminates the subjectivity and potential bias of analyst perceptions of voluntary
disclosure, such as the Association ofInvestment Management and Research (AIMR) ratings,
but also allows the results to be generalized.
Using a direct measure ofvoluntary disclosure, we fmd that boards with a larger proportion
of independent, nonexecutive directors (our proxy for board-monitoring effectiveness) are
significantly and positively associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure. This is a
notable contribution to the research on board monitoring, as it demonstrates for the first time
the link between board independence and a direct measure ofvoluntary disclosure that can be
generalized to the overall market. In addition, the results also indicate that firms with boards
with a majority (>50%) of independent directors have higher levels of voluntary disclosure
' There are few empirical studies (e.g., Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Wilhams, 2002) that provide evidence of a
significant positive association between board and/or committee characteristics and disclosure.
" Voluntary disclosure of information by firms has favorable informational effects such as reducing information
asymmetry (Heflin, Shaw, & Wild, 2001; Welker, 1995), reduction in the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Botosan
& Plumlee, 2002), and enabling the market to incorporate more future earnings news into current returns
(Lundholm & Myers, 2002; Miller & Piotroski, 2000; Luo et al., in press).
Corporate Finance Committee (Singapore) 1998. Report of the Corporate Finance Committee.
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than firms with boards that do not have a majority of independent directors. We also
demonstrate that the level of independence suggested by the Singaporean regulator (33%)
does not provide a monitoring capacity that is supportive of higher levels of voluntary
disclosure. Another contribution of this study is to examine the degree of influence that the
regulatory regime has on board monitoring and voluntary disclosure. We find that the positive
association between the proportion ofindependent directors and voluntary disclosure is highly
significant and about two to three times stronger under a disclosure-based regulatory regime
than under a merit-based regulatory regime. This is also a noteworthy finding, as it provides
some initial evidence on the influence ofregulatory philosophy on board monitoring. We also
show that board size and CEO duality are not associated with the level ofvoluntary disclosure,
and we perform a test for the presence of endogenous bias.
The rest ofthe study is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the primary motivation for
the study, relevant prior research, and the hypotheses; Section 3 describes the data and
methodology while Section 4 presents the empirical results and sensitivity analyses. Section 5
concludes the study with final comments, limitations of the study and suggestions for future
research.
2. Research motivations, prior researcli and hypothesis development
2.7. Board monitoring
As discussed in John and Senbet (1998), the effectiveness of a board in monitoring
management is determined by its composition, independence, and size. Composition and
independence are closely related, since board independence increases as the proportion of
independent, outside directors increases. Fama (1980) views outside directors as referees
whose task is to ensure that the board, as the ultimate internal monitor of managerial
decision-making, protects the interests of the security holders. Fama and Jensen (1983)
suggest that boards composed of a higher proportion of independent, outside directors
(directors not involved in the direct operations of the firm) have greater control (ratification
and monitoring) over managerial decisions. Independent directors have incentives to
exercise their decision control in order to maintain reputational capital. However, with
regard to outside or non-executive directors, a distinction between those who are affiliated
with management through family or business relations ("grey" directors)"* and those who
are truly independent (no relationship with management) is necessary." Although there is
no direct theory pertaining to the role of grey directors on the monitoring effectiveness of
the board, Carcello and Neal (1997) find a negative relationship between the percentage of
executive and grey directors members on the audit committee and the likelihood of
receiving an unqualified opinion. This supports the Fama and Jensen (1983) contention that
More specifically, s. 201B(2) of the Singapore Companies Act indicates that a director's independence would
be compromised if he or she has familial relations with a corporate officer or if he or she has any business,
financial or other relation with the company that would interfere with the exercise of objective judgment in
boardroom affairs.
" Appendix la of the SGX listing manual suggests that independent non-executive directors should be free of
any material business or financial connection with the firm.
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a board's monitoring effectiveness should increase (decrease) with the proportion of
independent (grey) outside directors.
Empirically, independent directors are found to impact a range of board decisions, such
as the firing of nonperforming CEOs (Weisbach, 1988), resistance to greenmail payments
(Kosnik, 1987) and the negotiation of tender offers (Byrd & Hickman, 1992). Beasley
(1996) found that boards with higher proportions of outside directors have less likelihood of
financial-statement fi^aud, while Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney ( 1 996) found that firms with
boards dominated by management are more likely to incur accounting-enforcement actions
by the SEC. Other empirical studies have found that firms with boards consisting of a
higher proportion of outside directors result in less earnings management (Chtourou,
Bedard, & Courteau, 2001; Klein, 2002; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2000; Xie, Davidson, &
Dadalt, 2001), have larger earnings response coefficients (Andersen, Deli, & Gillan, 2003)
and exhibit greater reporting conservatism (Beekes, Pope, & Young, 2002).
With regard to the impact of board composition on management's disclosure tendencies,
the evidence is limited and mixed. Within the Williamson ( 1 984) transaction-cost framework,
the primary purpose of the board is to provide governance protection to the stockholders, and
that voting representation on the board should include those constituencies with exposed
residual claims that cannot be safeguarded by either arms-length market transactions or other
bilateral arrangements (e.g., loan covenants). Thus, shareholders, as the risk beneficiaries,
need representation on the board that is independent of management to shield their poorly
defined assets from expropriation. Williamson (1984) argues that the specificity of asset
transactions may create information asymmetries that can be mitigated by disclosure. Such
disclosure provides greater transparency and enables investors to better anticipate future
transactions for valuation purposes. Since disclosure is selective, the board is instrumental in
constructing additional checks against managerial concealment and distortion, such as audit
and other committees composed of independent directors.
Forker (1992) found no association between the fineness ofmandatory disclosure of stock
options and the proportion of non-executive directors. Ho and Wong (2001), using a direct
measure of voluntary disclosure based on analyst perception, were unable to confirm a
significant relation between the level of voluntary disclosure and board independence. Eng
and Mak's (2003) direct measure of nonmandatory disclosure is significantly and negatively
associated with the percentage of independent directors. Gul and Leung (2002) document a
significant negative association between a direct measure of voluntary disclosure and the
percentage of "expert" nonexecutive directors (proxied by multiple board memberships).
These results run counter to the Williamson (1984) framework and the intuition that greater
board independence is linked to more transparency and better monitoring. However, the Gul
and Leung (2002) and Eng and Mak (2003) studies predate the Asian financial crisis and the
ensuing call for increased corporate governance and transparency. In addition, Eng and Mak's
(2003) non-executive director variable is described as the percentage of outside directors on
the board, and is not linked to a regulatory definition that would exclude grey directors. Thus,
their unexpected results could be attributed to the inclusion of grey directors in the outside-
director variable. While the Gul and Leung (2002) study considers the effect of grey directors
on board monitoring, their unanticipated results may arise from using a noisy proxy for
director expertise (multiple directorships) that has been found to be significantly and
negatively associated with firm value (Mak, Sequeira, 8c Yeo, 2003).
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Alternatively, Leung and Horwitz (2004) showed a significant and positive association
between voluntary segment disclosure and board independence, but only for firms with low
(<25%) director ownership. Chen and Jaggi (2000) found a positive association between a
firm's mandatory financial disclosures and the proportion of independent nonexecutive
directors, and Williams (2002) found a positive association between the proportion of
independent directors and firms' discretionary decisions to increase the level of
independence on the audit committee above the suggested minimum.
Currently, there is no empirical research that has successfully linked board independence
significantly and positively to a direct measure ofvoluntary disclosure. In fact, the few studies
in this area that use a direct measure of voluntary disclosure have provided counterintuitive
and unexpected results. While one could speculate that greater board independence obviates
the need for higher levels ofdisclosure, there is no theory ofthe firm to support this contention.
The Williamson (1984) theoretical framework and some supportive empirical evidence
suggest that a board's monitoring effectiveness is related to its composition, and should be
manifested in the level of firm transparency. We state the first hypothesis in alternative form:
HI. There is a positive association between the proportion of independent nonexecutive
directors and the level of voluntary disclosure.
With respect to the size of the board, John and Senbet (1998) suggest that while the
board's monitoring capacities increase as the number of members on the board increases,
this benefit may be offset by the incremental cost of poorer communication and decision-
making efficiencies that are often associated with large groups. Thus, with dispersed
opinions and non-cohesiveness in viewpoints, a board that is too large may actually have
diminished monitoring capabilities. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) were
consistent with this notion. Empirically, Yermack (1996) found that firm valuation is
negatively related to the size of the board. Thus, there is no preponderance of theory or
empirical evidence to suggest a relation between board size and levels of voluntary
disclosure, and it remains an empirical issue. The second hypothesis in relation to board
size and management voluntary disclosure is stated in the null:
H2. There is no association between board size and the level of voluntary disclosure.
2.2. Corporate governance and disclosure in Singapore
According to Denis and McConnell (2002), external corporate governance mechanisms
include the market for corporate control and the regulatory system. In Singapore, the extemal
govemance mechanism is largely reliant on regulatory bodies such as the Monetary Authority
of Singapore, because corporate takeovers are virtually nonexistent (Mak & Chng, 2000). In
1 998 the Corporate Finance Committee (CFC) issued a consultative paper ^ that recommended
a change from a merit-based philosophy of market regulation to that of a disclosure-based
philosophy in which market participants evaluate firm reporting practices. The Corporate
Govemance Committee (CGC) and the Disclosure and Accounting Standards Committee
(DASC) issued separate reports in 2001 recommending improvements to current corporate
Corporate Finance Committee (Singapore) 1998. Report of the Corporate Finance Committee.
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governance^ as well as corporate disclosure practices.*^ Generally, the idea of more
independent boards as well as more voluntary disclosure is stressed in both reports. Until
1999, Singapore relied on a predominantly merit-based philosophy to regulation, where
regulators review and preside over firm transactions and decisions, lowering market incentives
for voluntary disclosure. However, as discussed in the CFC report, a regulatory regime of this
type effectively ignores the market's information efficiency. The CFC recommended a change
from an authority-based regulatory framework to a disclosure-or market-based regulatory
framework similar to that in the United States or the United Kingdom. In a framework of this
kind, investors and shareholders determine the level of approval over firm transactions and
activities, and enhanced disclosure becomes a necessity for the market to monitor company
affairs. To ensure active participation in a disclosure-based regime, the CFC recommended an
amendment to the Companies Act that would legally require companies to comply with GAAP,
and that legal remedies, such as civil action for damages to investors, should be utilized to
punish managers and directors of companies that do not exercise due care and diligence.
As information disclosure provides key decision inputs, the CFC called for a
comprehensive and legally stated obligation to disclose, and recommended a "checklist
approach" in conjunction with a "general-test approach" in defming a firm's prospectus and all
continuing disclosure obligations. A checklist approach mandates specific disclosure items
under detailed rules.*^ In contrast, the general-test approach prescribes that companies should
disclose all information that market participants require to make informed investment
decisions. ' ° The general-test approach thus adopts a "true and fair^' view to determine whether
management has met the disclosure obligations. While the checkhst approach simplifies
compliance, it is difficult to determine what disclosure should be mandated. The general test
approach overcomes this problem by placing the responsibility to disclose all other relevant
information upon management. Thus, the CFC calls for a joint approach in prescribing
disclosure obligations in Singapore similar to that in the United Kingdom ' ' and Hong Kong. '
"
Corporate disclosure levels among Singaporean firms, while ahead of fellow East Asian
countries, still significantly lag markets such as the United States and the United Kingdom
(Mak & Chng, 2000). In a PWC (1997) survey '\ it was found that 27% of companies have
disclosure levels that met minimum required standards, 51% of firms exceed minimum
standards marginally, while only 11%) of firms strive for full disclosure. Since managerial
discretion is involved in the content and timing of voluntary disclosure, the market must
rely on other monitoring mechanisms to elicit disclosure from management above the
^ Corporate Governance Committee (Singapore) 2001 . Report ofthe Committee and Code ofCorporate Governance.
^ Disclosure and Accounting Standards Committee (Singapore) 2001 . Report ofthe Disclosure and Accounting
Standards Committee.
^ The United States is one example of a securities market employing such an approach. The Securities Act 1933
Section 10 details specific information to be disclosed.
'" Countries using such an approach include Australia where Corporations Law Section 1022 sets out the general
test for prospectuses while Corporations Law Sections 1001 A, 100 IB, lOOlC, and 100 ID sets out the rules for
continuing disclosure.
'
' Financial Services Act section 1 46 details the general disclosure test which supplements the detailed list of
requirements in the Public Offers of Securities Regulations 1995.
'" The Third Schedule to the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance sets out the general disclosure test and detailed
requirements.
'^ PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) 1997. Survey of Corporate Governance in Singapore.
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minimum requirements. The board's monitoring role encompasses financial reporting, and
a more effective board should result in higher levels of disclosure by management.
2.3. Effects of the regulatory regime on board monitoring
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) state that the legal or regulatory
system is a fundamental corporate-governance mechanism and a basic determinant of how
corporate finance and corporate governance will evolve. Although changes in extemal
govemance mechanisms (i.e., regulatory change) have been examined, the focus has been on
the extent and efficacy of voluntary disclosure (Brown, Taylor, & Walter, 1999) and on board
monitoring and firm performance (Hossain, Prevost, & Rao, 2001). Neither of these papers
found significant results that could be attributed to a change in the regulatory environment. As
noted earlier, scant research has examined the relationship between board monitoring and
voluntary disclosure, and little is known about the effects of regulatory change on this
relationship. Denis and McConnell (2002) suggest that examining the interrelationships
between extemal and intemal corporate govemance mechanisms can provide a more complete
understanding offirm-specific intemal govemance mechanisms such as the board. Changes in
the extemal regulatory regime are likely to impact firm intemal govemance, and board
monitoring may change across different regulatory regimes in response to regulatory emphasis.
Since a shift in regulatory philosophy is in process in Singapore, this presents an attractive
opportunity to examine the effects of regulatory change on intemal govemance mechanisms.
In Singapore, the change in regulatory philosophy emphasizes increased board
independence (one-third minimum), as well as the reduction of information asymmetry and
increased transparency through enhanced voluntary disclosure. Ifthe extemal regulatory regime
significantly influences the monitoring role of the board within firms, it is likely that board
monitoring of management's voluntary disclosure tendencies is stronger under a disclosure-
based regulatory regime than under a merit-based regulatory regime. Fama (1980) suggests that
independent directors are instmmental to ensuring the survival of the firm, and that they are
motivated by the retention and enhancement of their reputational capital. Thus in a regulatory
environment that encourages enhanced transparency and disclosure, independent directors are
likely to promote higher levels of managerial disclosure to advance their reputation. Thus we
examine if boards with greater monitoring capacities are associated with higher levels of
voluntary disclosure, and the extent that the regulatory environment can influence board
monitoring. This leads to the following hypothesis stated in the altemative form:
H3. The association between theproportion ofindependent nonexecutive directors and the
level of voluntary disclosure is stronger in a disclosure-based regulatory regime than in a
merit-based regulatory regime.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
The sample used in the study consists offirms listed on the SGX at the end ofthe year 2000.
We selected the year 2000 because it is reasonably representative of the disclosure-based
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regulatory regime as well as for the availability of empirical proxies for both firm voluntary-
disclosure levels and board monitoring. Two years after the CFC recommendations for a
disclosure-based regulatory regime (made towards the end of 1 998), the year 2000, would have
been impacted by the recommendations on markets and firm policies. With regard to firm
voluntary-disclosure levels, prior studies have examined the economic effects of disclosure
using disclosure indices based on analysts' assessment of fum disclosure.'"* However, as
suggested by Botosan (1997), a sample of firms based on such measures is likely biased
towards larger and heavily followed firms, and there may not be sufficient variation in firm
characteristics to conduct powerful statistical tests. Moreover, given that Singapore firms do not
have the extensive analyst coverage ofU.S. firms, a sufficiently large and representative sample
based on analyst scores is not available. Other professional firms such as Standard and Poor's
provide evaluations of companies' corporate governance and disclosure practices'
,
but these
are often provided upon company request, introducing a self-selection bias into the sample. We
utilize a self-constmcted empirical measure that sufficiently captures the cross-sectional
variation of voluntary-disclosure levels over our sample of firms, as in Botosan (1997).
We hand-collect voluntary disclosure data fi^om the fiscal 2000 annual report for 1 1 5 firms. ' ^
Board variables are obtained fi^om the Corporate Govemance and Intellectual Capital (CGIC)
database,'^ and control variables are obtained fi^om additional databases as necessary. Some
firms are dropped from the sample in this process as a result of missing data. The final sample
consists of 1 04 firms listed on the SGX spanning seven industries. \n Table 1
,
panelA details the
firm-selection process and panel B shows the distribution of sample firms by industry.
3.2. Voluntary disclosure index
Our direct measure of voluntary disclosure is a self-constructed index (DSCORE) that is
based on a voluntary-disclosure checklist developed in Luo, Courtenay, and Hossain (in
press) and administered on the sample firms' fiscal year 2000 annual reports. The checklist
is based on relevant disclosure requirements of Singapore companies, a review of relevant
literature'*^, the preliminary screening criteria by the Institute of Certified Public
Accountants of Singapore for the Annual Report Awards 200 1 , and the framework for
enhancing disclosure under the Steering Committee Report of the Business Reporting
Research Project by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in 2001.
Additionally, individuals with specific knowledge of Singapore accounting practices and
disclosure issues evaluated the checklist to eliminate any mandatory items. The final
disclosure checklist consists of three broad categories: business data (40 individual items).
For example, Lang and Lundholm (1993), Lundholm and Myers (2002), and Heflin, Shaw, and Wild (2001)
used the AIMR disclosure index.
' Standard and Poor's Corporate Govemance Scores, Criteria, Methodology and Definitions, July 2002.
'^ The final sample excludes 24 firms in the finance sector due to differing reporting requirements. To minimize
the effect of capital transactions on voluntary disclosure, 247 firms were eliminated that were listed since the end
of fiscal 1995.
'^ The CGIC database is a web-based public access database maintained by the Singapore Management
University. It contains corporate govemance data as well as intellectual capital data on SGX listed firms from
1998 to 2002. The url: http://www.research.smu.edu.sg/faculty/cgic.
'^ Botosan (1997), Cooke (1989), Hossain, Tan, and Adams (1994).
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Table 1
Summary of sample selection and distribution of sample firms by industry
Panel A: Sample selection process
Firms listed on both SGX Main Board and SESDAQ at 31 Dec 2000 480
Less:
Finance sector firms 24
Firms listed after fiscal 1995 247
Firms with incomplete data 95
Preliminary sample 115
Less:
Firms with less than 120 trading days in fiscal year 2001 10
Final Sample 104
Percentage of non-finance sector SGX firms in sample 23%
Panel B: Distribution of firms in sample by industry
Commerce 1
8
Construction 5
Transportation/Storage/Communication 9
Manufacturing 33
Multi-Industry 19
Property 7
Hotels and Services 13
Total 104
management's discussion and analysis (13 individual items) and forward-looking
information (19 individual items). '^ These three broad categories of voluntary disclosure
were identified as important investment decision-making information by investors and
financial analysts. As compared to Botosan's (1997) disclosure checklist over a single
industry, our sample spans seven industries, which means the scores must be adjusted for
industry-specific effects, e.g., proprietary cost, on disclosure levels. Following Lundholm
and Myers (2002) and Luo et al. (in press), the individual disclosure scores were adjusted
by first ranking each firm's disclosure level within its own industry in the sample and then
expressing the rankings in percentiles as follows: (Rank in industry- l)/(Number of firms
in industry- 1). The adjusted disclosure index (ADSCORE) ranges fi^om zero to one, with
zero being the lowest ranking firm in the industry and one being the highest-ranking firm in
the industry. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of DSCORE and ADSCORE for the
sample of 104 firms. The mean DSCORE is 28.91 and the standard deviation is about nine
points with the maximum and minimum scores 43 points apart, which is qualitatively
As suggested in Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), extant voluntary-disclosure theories are broad enough to allow
the interpretation of "voluntary disclosure /evef' as "voluntary disclosure quantity" and "voluntary disclosure
quality''. As such, in scoring the individual firm's annual report, the idea of quantity and quality must be
incorporated. To do so, a score of "1" ("0") is awarded for the presence (absence) of a disclosure item. Since this
method of scoring only captures quantity, a further score of "1" is awarded to the same disclosure item if
quantitative guidance is given as well. As quantitative guidance is expected to enhance investment evaluation, it is
perceived to increase the quality of the disclosure. This scoring system effectively incorporates the notion of
quantity and quality in assessing the levels of voluntary disclosure of the sample of firms.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics for DSCORE and ADSCORE in 2000
Measure n Mean SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max
DSCORE" 104 28.91 8.73 9.00
ADSCORE^ 104 0.4956 0.3105 0.0000
22.75
0.1955
29.00
0.5263
35.00
0.7656
52.00
1.0000
" DSCORE is the self-constructed firm-disclosure index based on a corporate voluntary disclosure checklist,
designed to capture non-mandated firm disclosures. The checklist consists of three broad categories: business data
(40 items), management's discussion and analysis (13 items) and forward-looking information (19 items). The
checklist was administered on the sample firms' FY 2000 annual reports.
'' ADSCORE is the industry-adjusted voluntary-disclosure index, where the firms are first ranked within their
own industry classifications based on the raw disclosure score (DSCORE). The ranked scores are then subsequently
converted into percentiles via the formula: (Rank in industry- l)/(Number of firms in industry- 1).
similar to the variation in scores reported in Botosan (1997). The mean ADSCORE is
0.4956 with a standard deviation of 0.3105, suggesting enough variation within the sample
for meaningful analysis. Pearson and Spearman's rho correlations between DSCORE and
ADSCORE are 0.882 and 0.904, respectively, and are both significant at 1% (not reported),
indicating that the industry-adjusted disclosure level score captures largely the same
variation in disclosure levels in the cross-section of firms as DSCORE.
3.2.1. Validity of the voluntary disclosure index
While a self-constructed voluntary disclosure index is useful in capturing cross-sectional
variation in disclosure levels, it requires subjective assessments by personnel administering the
disclosure checkhst (Botosan, 1997). Therefore, various tests are performed to assess the
validity of the self-constructed index in capturing disclosure levels and the robustness of the
index to the degree ofsubjective inference ofindividuals administering the disclosure checklist.
The broad components ofthe index, i.e., business data (DSBUS), management's discussion
and analysis (DSMDA) and forward-looking information (DSFLS) are examined for internal
consistency. Disclosure strategies of a firm are expected to be similar along all avenues, i.e., a
firm choosing to disclose more with respect to its business operations and strategies would be
reasonably expected to disclose more with respect to its future prospects (Botosan, 1997).
Panel A of Table 3 presents both pair-wise parametric and non-parametric correlation
coefficients between all the components ofDSCORE and their correlations withDSCORE. As
expected, all the components ofDSCORE are highly correlated with each other and also with
DSCORE (p-value<0.01), indicating that the disclosure index consistently captures
disclosure tendencies across different forms of disclosures in the annual reports.
Prior research has documented consistent relationships between the level of disclosure
and various firm characteristics such as size, profitability, degree of leverage, analyst
coverage, inside block ownership and listing status.^^ In addition, we add government
ownership to the analysis, of significant government ownership in various industries is a
characteristic ofthe Singapore corporate landscape.^' The impact ofgovernment ownership
^° See, for example, Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Lang and Lundhohn (1993, 1996), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000),
Harris and MuUer (1999), Mok, Lam, and Cheung (1992), and Finkelstein (1992).
"' Some examples are Keppel Land (Property), Singapore Telecommunications (Telecom), Singapore Airlines
(Transportation), Keppel Corporation (Multi-Industry), Singapore Press Holdings (Media Comm), Singapore
Petroleum Corporation (Petroleum Manufacturing).
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on firm-disclosure policies is not clear. While the presence of a large state owner may
impede management's propensity to disclose, government-owned corporations may
disclose more to reflect the state's commitment to transparency and corporate-govemance
reform.
Correlation analysis was performed between the disclosure level index and the various
firm characteristics mentioned above. Firm size was proxied by MVAL, the market value of
common stock, and TOTAST, the book value of total assets of each firm. Profitability was
proxied by each firm's 3-year average retum-on-assets (ROA) prior to year 2000. Leverage,
LEV, was measured as a firm's long-term debt-to-equity ratio and ANALYST is the number
of analysts following a firm in the year 2000. Inside block ownership, INSOWN, is a binary
variable where a "1" ("0") indicates the presence (absence) of an inside block owner.
Government ownership, GLC, is a binary variable where a "1" ("0") indicates the presence
(absence) of government ownership. The listing status, LSTSTA, is a binary variable where
a "1" ("0") indicates a listing on the Main Board (SESDAQ) of the SGX. MVAL, TOTAST,
ROA, and LEV were obtained fi-om the COMPUSTAT (Global) database as of the end of
fiscal 2000, while ANALYST is obtained fi-om the histitutional Brokers' Estimates (I/B/E/S)
database. INSOWN is obtained from the annual reports ofeach firm for the fiscal year ended
2000. If any of the top five shareholders are individuals in management positions or on the
board of directors, or are corporations whose shareholdings are substantially held by
management or directors of the firm, the firm will be classified as having an inside block
owner"" GLC classification is also obtained from the fiscal year 2000 annual reports. If the
government's corporate investment arm, Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd, is present as a
substantial shareholder, or is present via cross-holding, the firm is classified as having
govemment ownership."" Significant positive relationships are expected for TOTAST,
MVAL, ROA, LEV, ANALYST, and LSTSTA, while a negative relationship is expected for
INSOWN. Although the relationship of disclosure with GLC is expected to be significant,
no direction for the relationship is predicted.
Panel B of Table 3 presents the Pearson (parametric) and Spearman (non-parametric)
correlation-coefficient measures. From the correlation analysis, MVAL, TOTAST, ROA,
ANALYST, and INSOWN all have significant (p-value<0.01) and positive relationships
with DSCORE as expected. GLC is also positively significant (/?-value <0.01), indicating
that govemment controlled firms tend to be more transparent in their disclosure as a result
of the government's support of better govemance and disclosure policies. The coefficient
for LEV (-) is unexpected, but insignificant. Singaporean firms tend to obtain more short-
tem financing from bankers, thus reducing the need for more disclosure in anticipation of
raising equity capital. LSTSTA is also insignificant although positively related to DSCORE.
A plausible explanation is that the LSTSTA variable differentiated firms on the basis of
whether they are listed on the Main Board or SESDAQ of the SGX, which are two listing
boards on the same exchange. While Main Board listed firms may be expected to be
subjected to more stringent requirements, the disclosure characteristics ofthe firms listed on
^^ Following the definition in the Singapore Companies Act (s. 88), where a substantial shareholder is defined as
one with 5% or more voting shares in the company.
"^ The status is cross-checked against Temasek Corporation's corporate website where listings of government-
linked corporations are available.
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the two boards may not be that different as compared to other studies where the firms are
Usted on different exchanges or in different countries. Apart fi"om some unexpected resuhs
that are explainable by institutional differences, the correlation analysis ofDSCORE with
various firm characteristics supports the reliability of the measure in differentiating the
firms in the sample by their disclosure levels.
In addition to the statistical analysis, an audit was performed on a sample of 20 (19%)
randomly selected firms fi^om the original sample of 104 to ensure thatDSCORE is robust to
being administered by different individuals. The voluntary disclosure checklist was redone
on the year 2000 armual reports ofthese frnns by different personnel. The audited scores for
each firm were compared with the original scores. Out of a total of 1440 data points for the
20 firms, 160 exceptions (11%) were found. A Wilcoxon paired sign ranked test between
the original scores and the audited scores demonstrates that there is no significant difference
(/7-value= 0.324). The Spearman's rho between the audited scores and the original scores
was 0.489 (p-value < 0.01), indicating that the two sets of scores capture similar variation in
disclosure levels, indicating that the DSCORE measure is relatively robust to the
subjectivity of individual scorers.
A salient feature of our direct measure of voluntary disclosure is that it is neither based
on analyst perception nor is it a result of a company request for a review oftheir govemance
mechanisms and transparency. However, if our disclosure index is valid, it should be
positively correlated to measures of transparency that have been developed by investment
advisory firms. As noted earlier, the analyst coverage of Singapore companies is not
extensive, and the number of companies that have been rated for corporate govemance or
transparency is small. We obtained the scores of43 Singapore companies that were rated for
their disclosure tendencies by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) as part of their
overall corporate-governance rankings. Of the rated companies, 19 were included in our
sample, and the correlation (not reported) between ADSCORE and the CLSA transparency
rating was positive and significant (/7-value< 0.0001).
hi summary, the validity of DSCORE in capturing the voluntary-disclosure levels of
firms is supported by our analyses which show (1) the internal consistencies among the
various components of DSCORE; (2) the significant correlations between DSCORE and
various key firm characteristics; (3) the audit ofDSCORE by different personnel, and (4)
the correlation between ADSCORE and an external transparency rating.
3.3. Board variables
All data relating to board characteristics and composition are collected fi-om the CGIC
database, which is based on board disclosures in the year-end annual report. The
classification of directors into independent (IND), grey {GREY), and executive (EXED)
follows that of the CGIC database. Executive directors are current employees of the frnn
and independent directors are not related to the firm in any material aspect apart from being
a board member. Grey directors are directors who are not current officers of a firm, but have
existing relations (e.g., familial, material financial, or business) with a firm that might
compromise independence.
Table 4 presents sample statistics on board-composition characteristics. Board size
ranges fi-om a minimum of four members to a maximum of 13 members with a mean of
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics for board composition characteristics in 2000''
Variable n Mean SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max No. of firms
(% of sample)
Board size (5S/Z£) 104 7.712 1.889 4.000 6.000 8.000 9.000 13.000
Number of independent directors 104 2.750 1.113 0.000 2.000 3.000 3.000 8.000
{IND)
Number of "grey" directors 104 2.048 2.209 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.000 9.000
(GREY)
Number of executive directors 104 2.913 1.684 0.000 2.000 2.000 4.000 7.000
(EXED)
Proportion of independent 104 0.369 0.137 0.000 0.282 0.375 0.429 0.833
directors {IND%)
Proportion of "grey" directors 104 0.243 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.900
{GREY%)
Number of firms with a majority of 104 11(0.106)
independent directors (MAJIND)
Numberoffirms with>33%of 104 68(0.654)
independent directors {IND33%)
Number of firms with a majority 104 13(0.125)
of "grey" directors (MAJGREY)
Number of firms with a majority of 104 28(0.269)
executive directors (MAJEXED)
Number of firms not dominated by 104 52(0.500)
any group of directors
Number of firms where the same 104 30 (0.286)
person is both the CEO and
Chairman (DUALITY)
^ Data for the board composition characteristics were obtained from the Corporate Govemance and hitellectual
Capital (CGIC) database maintained by the Singapore Management University.
about eight members, similar to those reported in Mak and Chng (2000) who found that the
average board size in 1998 and 1999 was seven with a range of 4-15 members. With
respect to board composition, the average proportion of executive, grey, and independent
directors in our (Mak & Chng's, 2000) sample consists of about 39% (42%) of executive
directors, 24% (27%) of grey directors and 37% (30%) of independent directors.
With regard to board majority, the statistics reveal that 52 firms (50%) of the sample do
not have any type of director with a majority of seats on the board.""* Ofthe firms that have a
majority of a group of directors, 11 (10.6%) have a majority of independent directors, 13
(12.5%) have a majority of grey directors, and 28 (26.9%) have a majority of executive
directors. In the recent corporate-governance recommendations set forth by a private-sector
led committee formed by the Singapore Ministry of Finance"^^, it was suggested that a
"strong independent element" is associated with boards with a minimum of one-third (33%)
independent directors. As shown in Table 4, 68 firms (65%) already have boards consisting
of 33% or more independent directors.
By majority, it is meant that the board is composed of more than 50% of any particular type of directors, i.e.
independent directors, grey directors, or executive directors.
~^ Corporate Govemance Committee (Singapore) 2001. Report of the Committee and Code of Corporate
Governance.
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Table 5
Sample firm descriptive statistics for 2000^
n Mean SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max No. of firms
MK4Z. (in million $) 104 944.7 4261.7 14.0 54.2 134.0 300.2 37754.5 -
ror/15r( in millions) 104 1323.5 4423.4 17.0 121.5 299.5 770.3 38371.7 -
S/lIfS (in million $) 104 298.7 815.3 4.7 40.6 100.1 196.8 5726.5 -
ANALYST 104 5.4 8.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 6.4 28.5 -
ROA(%) 104 1.24 7.11 -23.63 -1.15 1.56 4.26 18.63 -
GROWTH{%) 104 2.97 14.60 -36.21 -5.15 1.03 9.82 53.81 -
LEV(%) 104 58.63 77.19 0.00 11.50 45.05 87.59 466.14 -
INSOWN 104 - - _____ 62
GLC 104 - - - - - - - 11
LSTSTA 104 - - _____ 95
^ MVAL and TOTASTare the market value ofcommon stock and the book value of total assets of each firm as at
the end of FY2000. ROA is the 3-year average return on assets prior to year 2000. GROWTH is the 3-year average
growth in total assets prior to year 2000. LEVis the long-term debt-to-equity ratio as at the end of fiscal year 2000.
MVAL, TOTAST ROA, GROWTH and LEVare obtained from COMPUSTAT (Global). ANALYST xs the number of
analysts following a firm in 2000 and is obtained from I/B/E/S. INSOWN is a dummy variable indicating the
presence of an inside block owner. An inside block owner is defmed as any person who is in management, on the
board of directors, or is a corporation whose shareholdings are substantially (>5%) held by management of the
firm, and is classified as one ofthe top five substantial shareholders in the FY2000 annual reports. GLC is a dummy
variable indicating the presence of government ownership. A firm is classified as having government ownership if
the Singapore government's corporate investment arm, Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd, is present as a substantial
(>5%) shareholder. LSTSTA is a dummy variable indicating if a firm is listed on the Main Board ("1") or the
SESDAQ ("0") listing board of the Singapore Exchange (SGX).
3.4. Firm characteristics
Table 5 presents the sample firm descriptive statistics. The sample includes a wide range
of firm sizes by measures of MVAL, TOTAST, and SALES. The largest (smallest) firm has
MVAL, TOTAST, and 5'^I£'5 values of $3,775 ($14) million, $3,837 ($17) million, and $572
($5) million, respectively. In terms of analyst following, the mean (median) number of
analysts per firm is 5.4 (1.0), implying a distribution that is highly skewed to the right. A
closer examination reveals that as many as 49 firms receive no analyst coverage, in contrast
with Botosan (1997), where mean firm coverage was 11.5 and all firms receive some
analyst coverage. In terms of firm performance and growth, the statistics also suggest a
wide amount of variation within the sample. The sample also includes 62 firms with an
inside block owner, 1 1 government-linked firms and 95 Main Board listed firms.
3.5. Methodology
To determine if better board monitoring or board size is associated with enhanced
voluntary disclosure as hypothesized in HI and H2, we estimate the following general
cross-sectional model:
DISCi = a +^ PpBOARDi,, -f^ -y^^CONTROLu, + e, (1)
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where DISC represents: DSCORE (raw disclosure-level scores), DRANK (within sample
disclosure-level percentiles) and ADSCORE (industry-adjusted disclosure-level percen-
tiles); BOARD represents: BSIZE (board size), IND% (proportion of independent directors),
MAJIND (indicator variable where "1" indicates boards with a majority of independent
directors, "0" otherwise), M^JGiJ^T (indicator variable where "1" indicates boards with a
majority of grey directors, "0" otherwise), MAJEXED (indicator variable where "1"
indicates boards with a majority of executive directors, "0" otherwise) and DUALITY
(indicator variable where " 1 " indicates boards where the role of chairman and CEO is held
by the same person, "0" otherwise); CONTROL represents: INSOWN (indicator variable
where "1" indicates the presence of an inside block owner, "0" otherwise), LNMVAL (the
log-transformed firm size), ROA (3-year average return on total assets), LEV (long-term
debt-to-equity ratio), GLC (indicator variable where "1" indicates government ownership,
"0" otherwise).
DISC is the voluntary disclosure level of firms proxied by the voluntary-disclosure index
DSCORE. In addition, the ranked percentiles ofthe index (DRANK) and the industry-adjusted
percentile ranks (ADSCORE) are also used in separate regressions."^ BOARD represents the
board-composition characteristics (e.g. BSIZE, IND%, etc.) described in Section 3.3.
DUALITY is a binary variable included to control for the leadership structure of the board,
where "1" indicates a board with the CEO also the chairperson and "0" indicates boards where
there is a separation of the two roles. As suggested (e.g., Andersen, Deli, & Gillan, 2003;
Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1 996; Goyal & Park, 2002; Jensen, 1 993), boards with CEOs also
the chairperson are generally expected to exhibit weaker monitoring capabilities. In the
context ofdisclosure however, results have been mixed. While Forker ( 1 992) found a negative
association between duality and the quality of share-option disclosure, Ho and Wong (2001)
show no association between duaUty and voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, Gul and
Leung (2002) document a significant and negative relationship between duality and voluntary
disclosure. As such, the direction of the association between DUALITY and voluntary
disclosure is not predicted a priori.
To control for other determinants of disclosure, significant covariates of disclosure are
included as CONTROL variables. As discussed in Section 3.2.1, cross-sectional firm
disclosures are expected to increase with firm size, firm profitability, leverage and analyst
following (e.g. Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Harris & MuUer, 1999; Lang & Lundholm, 1993,
1996; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). EarUer correlation results (Table 3, panel B) show that
govemment ownership results in increased disclosure. Thus, the logarithmic transformation
oiMVAL, together with ROA, LEV, and GLC are included as relevant control variables (see
Section 3.2.1). ANALYST v/as not included, given the high correlation with firm size
(/•= 0.789), as it is likely to induce multicollinearity among the control variables. In
addition, inside block ownership (INSOWN) is also included. While inside block ownership
may align management's interest with that of outside shareholders, Finkelstein (1992)
suggests that block ownership entrenches management. As discussed in Denis and
The DRANK measure follows that of Botosan (1997). It measures the relative levels of disclosure of the firms
within the sample. The ADSCORE measure essentially measures the relative levels of disclosure of the sample
firms within the same industry.
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McConnell (2002), there are significant private benefits associated with block ownership.^^
Should management become entrenched as a result of block ownership and choose to
maximize their private benefits associated with being an inside block owner, they may
consequently disclose less information to maintain significant information asymmetry
between themselves and outside shareholders to avoid external monitoring. Thus, the
relationship between inside block ownership and disclosure is expected to be negative, in
line with the correlation results (Table 3, panel B). While some prior research such as Chen
and Jaggi (2000) and Hossain, Tan, and Adams (1994) suggest that audit firm size may have
an impact on the disclosure policies of management, we do not control for the size/
reputation of the audit firm as about 95% of the sample are audited by the "Big 5."
4. Empirical results and analysis
4.1. Regression results for year 2000
Four separate cross-sectional regression models pertaining to the general model 1 were
fitted to test hypotheses HI and H2. Table 6 details the regression results. Models 1 and 2
include BSIZE, IND%, and DUALITY as the BOARD variables, and the CONTROL
variables INSOWN, LNMVAL, ROA, LEV, and GLC are added in model 2. In model 1, both
BSIZE and IND% were positive and significant (/?-value<0.05) in all three specifications
of voluntary-disclosure levels (DSCORE, DRANK and ADSCORE). However in model 2,
BSIZE was no longer significant while IND% was still significant (p-value < 0.05). The
results suggest that firms with boards consisting of a larger proportion of independent
directors are associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure, supporting HI. The
results for IND% contrast with the results fi"om the Eng and Mak (2003) paper that is based
on 1995 Singapore data. They found an unanticipated negative and significant association
between board independence and voluntary disclosure. The differing results could be
caused by their variable (OUTDIR) used to proxy for board monitoring/independence. This
variable is not described other than in the descriptive statistics (57% of board members),
and differs Irom the descriptive statistics of board independence (Singapore data) in Mak
and Chng (2000) for 1998 and 1999. They report descriptive statistics for independent
directors (30%) and grey directors (27%) that are similar to the data in our study. As board
composition does not change quickly (Denis & Sarin, 1 999), it appears that the results in
Eng and Mak (2003) may be driven by an inclusion of grey directors in the outside director
variable used to proxy for board independence. BSIZE is insignificant in model 2 when
control variables are included supporting the null hypothesis that board size does not affect
disclosure level. In models 1 and 2, DUALITYwas largely insignificant, consistent with the
findings in Ho and Wong (2001), but in contrast to Gul and Leung (2002). Because
DUALITYand BSIZE are likely to be affected by the magnitude ofIND%, the models were
re-estimated with only DUALITYand BSIZE as the board variables. If the results are driven
by IND%, then the coefficients for these variables should be significant. The results (not
^' For instance, Barclay and Holdemess (1989) found that block trades are commonly priced at significant
premiums to the market price, thus indicating that block owners expect benefits that are not available to other
shareholders.
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reported) show that the two variables are insignificant in the individual re-estimations. With
respect to the CONTROL variables in model 2, INSOWN was negative and significant (p-
value<0.05) in all specifications of disclosure level while LNMVAL and ROA were
significant (p-value < 0.05) in the variants of model (2) with DSCORE and DRANK as the
dependent variables. However, LEVand GLC were not significant.
hi models (3) and (4), the effects ofboards that are dominated by a majority (greater than
50%) of independent directors (MAJIND), grey directors (MAJGREY) and executive
directors (MAJEXED) on firm voluntary disclosure policies were examined. MAJIND,
MAJGREY, and MAJEXED are dummy variables where "1" indicates a firm with boards
dominated by independent, grey, or executive directors and "0" otherwise. The base group
consists of firms with boards not dominated by any particular type of directors. Consistent
with models 1 and 2, a positive coefficient is expected for MAJIND. As there is no explicit
theory on how grey directors and executive directors are expected to affect board
monitoring, the effects ofMAJGREYand MAJEXED on firm voluntary-disclosure level are
not predicted a priori. The CONTROL variables are omitted fi^om the estimation of model 3
but included in model 4. MAJIND was positive and significant (p-value < 0.05) in all
variants of modelS 3 and 4 while MAJGREY and MAJEXED were not significant. The
results for all other variables were similar to those of models 1 and 2.
The results of models 3 and 4 indicate that firms with boards dominated by a majority of
independent directors have significantly higher levels of voluntary disclosure as compared to
balanced boards. As discussed in Section 3.4, the Singapore code of corporate governance
established in 2001 suggested that boards are effectively independent when at least one-third
(33%) of the board consists of independent directors. To examine this particular definition of
board independence, MAJIND was replaced with another dummy variable, IND33%^^, in
models 3 and 4. In the re-estimations of models 3 and 4 (results not reported), IND33% was
positive but insignificant in all of the models, suggesting that boards with 33% independent
directors do not exhibit sufficient monitoring over managers' disclosure tendencies as
compared to boards that have a clear majority of independent directors.
The analyses suggest that boards with better monitoring ability, proxied by the proportion of
independent directors, are associated with a higher level ofvoluntary disclosure, consistent with
HI. In addition, firms with independent-director-dominated boards have significantly higher
levels ofvoluntary disclosure, while fuins with executive-director-dominated boards appear to
have lower levels of voluntary disclosure, though the result is not statistically significant.
4.2. The endogeneity of board composition
Limited prior research has implied that the proportion of independent directors may be
endogenously determined. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) suggest that firms tend to have
higher proportions of independent directors after a period of poor performance, leading to
an endogenously determined board composition. Should the endogeneity adversely bias the
OLS models used in this study, it would be difficult to interpret the associafion between
board monitoring and voluntary disclosure. To examine this possibility, a specification test
^^ For the dummy variable IND33%, "1" indicates a firm with boards having at least one-third or 33% of
independent directors and "0" otherwise.
280 E.C.M. Cheng, S.M. Courtenay / The International Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 262-289
H b:
2 -* ?: <^
T) o -
(N __ 1/-1
^P^^
• o • o • O
_; —' o
in
r<-) O _^ -* 2 ON <N 00 "^ g
00 5 OS Co
"^ o rt ^
o o 2 o
o t~- r- (N) "*
<^ (N ~" >ni On Sl^^^^^S
<^ ^ <^ ON
S s ^ §
"^ o 5 — sf ro r:
"or-,,
^ o (^ r-t~~- ii —
'^ r^
r~~ oO '^ Ono r: o"
I
O fs] ON
,
in s t^ ;r u-)
rr, t~^ «^ '^O ri ^ oo
~^ oo JN _
^ "^ ^, <^ ICJ s?
•^ <N f^ ON CD O
•^ o r;; S <^ o
^ o 2 S 12 S
^^
f^ in <^
_
m ^ —
'
_^ o ^ —
^ o <^ o
•^ )-i ^ ^
I
'—'_;'—'
C^ , , ^^ „^
in
o
d
1
in
o id
m
od
NO
in
in
d
o
od
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
< o
d in
NO
o
o
o
'I-
NO
(NO
o
Q 1 o o
§ (N
^
S
Ov
rn o
o
o
+
o
od
NO
+
ood
^ on'
I I I I
I I I I
+ + + +
Vi SI.
< 1*,
E.C.M. Cheng. S.M. Courtenay / The Internationa] Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 262-289 281
is used to investigate the extent of endogenous bias in model 2 (Hausman, 1978). Although
the test requires the empirical modeling of the proportion of independent directors (IND%),
there is not a well-developed theoretical model. Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2000) suggest
that the proportion of independent board members is associated with board size (BSIZE),
inside block ownership (INSOWN), firm size (LNMVAL), leverage {LEV), and past
corporate performance (ROA). We add the 1999 proportion of independent directors
(IND99%) as Denis and Sarin ( 1 999) found that board composition changes slowly over
time, and the lagged variable IND99% should exhibit explanatory power over IND%. For
the Hausman test procedure, IND% is regressed upon these variables.
The endogenous model of independent director composition is specified as:
IND%, =pQ + p^BSIZE, + PjINSOWN, + P^LNMVALi + (^^LEVi
+(i^ROAi + p(,IND99%i + Ei.
The model (results not reported) exhibits significant explanatory power with an adjusted R-
square of 55.3% (F-statistic/?-value< 0.000). ROA and IND99% are highly significant with
BSIZE marginally significant at the 10% level oftwo-tailed significance. INSOWN, LNMVAL,
and LEV arc not significant. The OLS residuals obtained fi*om Eq. (2) are included as an
additional explanatory variable in the re-estimation of all variants ofmodel 2 in Table 6. Ifthe
Eq. (2) residuals are non-zero and significant in the model 2 re-estimation, then there is the
likely presence of an endogenous bias. The results (not reported) indicate that the residuals
Notes to Table 6:
" All the regressions are based on the general model: DZSC, =a + X^^^, PpBOARDjp + X;*=i y^CONTROLj^ + e,
where DISC represents cross-sectional voluntary-disclosure levels, BOARD represents key board composition
variables, and CONTROL represents non-board related determinants of management voluntary disclosure.
'' DSCORE is the raw voluntary-disclosure levels index. DRANK is the ranked percentiles of each firm's index
score. It is obtained by first ranking all firms in the sample on the basis ofDSCORE and then converting the ranks
into percentiles. ADSCORE is the industry-adjusted ranked percentiles of each firm's index score.
'^ BSIZE is the board size as measured by the number of members on each firm's board. IND% is the proportion
of independent directors on the board. MAJIND is an indicator variable where "1" represents firms with boards
consisting of a majority (>50%) of independent directors and "0" otherwise. MAJGREY is an indicator variable
where "1" represents firms with boards consisting of a majority of grey directors and "0" otherwise. MAJEXED is
an indicator variable where "1" represents firms with boards consisting of a majority of executive directors and
"0" otherwise. DUALITY k an indicator variable where "1" represents boards without a separation of the roles of
CEO and board chairman and "0" otherwise. All board-related variables are obtained fi^om the Corporate
Governance and Intellectual Capital (CGIC) database maintained by the Singapore Management University.
INSOWN is a dummy variable indicating the presence of an inside block owner. An inside block owner is defined
as any person who is in management, on the board of directors, or is a corporation whose shareholdings are
substantially (>5%) held by management of the firm, and is classified as one of the top five substantial
shareholders in the FY2000 annual reports. LNMVAL is the logarithmic transformation of the firm's market value
of common shares as at the end of their fiscal year 2000. ROA is the 3-year average retum-on-total assets of the
firm prior to their 2000 fiscal year. LEV is the long-term debt-to-equity ratio at the end of fiscal year 2000. GLC is
a dummy variable indicating the presence of government ownership. A firm is classified as having government
ownership if the Singapore government's corporate investment arm, Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd, is present as a
substantial (>5%) shareholder.
** The coefficient estimates are presented with their p-values in parentheses. One-tailed p-values are reported for
coefficients with predicted directions while two-tailed p-values are reported for coefficients without a priori
predictions.
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Table 7
Descriptive statistics for disclosure and board-composition characteristics in 1998^
Variable n Mean SD Mm 25% 50% 75% Max No. of firms
(% of sample)
DSCORE 104 24.33 7.52 7.00 19.75 23.50 29.00 52.00
ADSCORE 104 0.47 0.31 0.00 0.20 0.47 0.74 1.00
Board size {BSIZE) 104 7.796 2.290 4.000 6.000 8.000 9.000 17.000
Number of independent 104 2.767 1.131 0.000 2.000 2.000 3.000 7.000
directors (IND)
Number of "grey" directors 104 2.068 2.406 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.000 14.000
{GREY)
Number of executive directors 104 2.961 1.754 0.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 7.000
(EXED)
Proportion of independent 104 0.370 0.146 0.000 0.261 0.333 0.429 0.800
directors (INDVo)
Proportion of "grey" directors 104 0.239 0.223 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.833
{GREY%)
Proportion of executive 104 0.392 0.208 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.563 0.778
directors {EXED%)
Number of firms with a 104 12(0.115)
majority of Independent
directors {MAJIND)
Number of firms with 104 63 (0.605)
>33% of Independent
directors {IND33%)
Number of firms with a 104 12(0.115)
majority of "Grey"
directors (MAJGREY)
Number of firms with a 104 30 (0.288)
majority of Executive
directors (MAJEXED)
Number of firms not 104 50 (0.481)
dominated by any
group of directors
Number of firms 104 31 (0.295)
where the same
person is both the
CEO and Chairman
(DUALITY)
^ Data for the board-composition characteristics were obtained from the Corporate Governance and Intellectual
Capital (CGIC) database maintained by the Singapore Management University. DSCORE is the self-constructed firm-
disclosure index based on a corporate voluntary-disclosure checklist, designed to capture non-mandated fmn
disclosures. The checklist consists of three broad categories; business data (40 items), management's discussion and
analysis (13 items) and forward-looking information (19 items). The checklist was administered on the sample firms'
FY 1998 annual reports. ADSCORE is the industry-adjusted voluntary-disclosure index, where the firms are first
ranked within their own industry classifications based on the raw disclosure score (DSCORE). The ranked scores are
then subsequently converted into percentiles via the formula: (Rank in industry - 1 )/(Number offirms in industry - 1 ).
from Eq. (2) are not significant in any ofthe models, suggesting that the original results are not
affected by an endogenous bias. Following Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2000), the DSCORE,
DRANK, and ADSCORE variants of model 2 were also re-estimated via two-stage least
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squares (2SLS) using the predicted IND% from Eq. (2) as an instrument variable forIND% in
the models. The results (not reported) ofthe 2SLS estimations are similar to the original OLS
results in Table 6. These results are limited to the extent that our instrumental variables meet the
assumptions ofbeing truly exogenous to the dependent variable (Larcker & Rusticus, 2005).
4.3. Analysis of the effect of the regulatory regime on the board monitoring ofdisclosure
As discussed in Section 3, the transition of the Singapore regulatory regime from a
predominantly merit-based philosophy to a predominantly disclosure-based philosophy
was expected to be substantially in process by the year 2000. As the Corporate Finance
Committee's final recommendations were made towards the end of 1998, board
composition and voluntary-disclosure tendencies prior to the year 1999 would be based
on a predominantly merit-based philosophy, reflecting the current regulatory regime. Thus,
1998 board composition and voluntary-disclosure level is used to proxy for the outcomes of
the predominantly merit-based regulatory regime.
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics of the disclosure-level index"^^, DSCORE and
ADSCORE as well as the board variables for the same sample of firms in 1998. Comparing
the DSCORE measures between 1998 and 2000, the sample appears to have increased
voluntary disclosure levels from 1998 to 2000. The mean DSCORE in 2000, 28.91 (from
Table 2), is significantly higher when compared to 24.33 in 1998, with both the paired
sample Mest and Wilcoxon sign-test significant (p-value < 0.05). With respect to board-
composition characteristics, board composition did not change significantly from 1998 to
2000, with the average proportion of about 37% for both years, supporting Denis and
Sarin's (1999) contention that board composition evolves slowly over time.
To examine H3, cross-sectional regressions pertaining to model 2 in Table 6 are
estimated for the same sample of firms in 1998, when a predominantly merit-based
regulatory philosophy was prevalent. A pooled sample regression (1998 and 2000) was also
estimated with an additional variable, YEAR ("1" indicating 2000 and "0" indicating 1998),
to control for the effect of the different years.^^ The pooled sample regression model is:
DISCi = Pq + P^BSIZEi + p2lND%i + p^DUALITYi + P^INSOWN,
+ P^LNMVALi + plROAi + ^jLEVi + p^ GLCi + ji^ YEARi + 8, (3
)
where DISC represents the voluntary disclosure level of firms proxied by DSCORE,
DRANK, and ADSCORE.
Table 8 presents the regression results for 1998, 2000 and the pooled sample. In 1998,
none of the independent variables significantly explain the cross-sectional variation in
firms' voluntary-disclosure tendencies. Only LNMVAL was significant at the 10% level of
The disclosure-level index, DSCORE, is obtained by applying the same voluntary-disclosure checklist
described in Section 3.2 to the same sample of firms' fiscal year 1998 annual reports. The index was validated via
the same procedure in Section 3.2.1.
^° The variable YEAR can also be interpreted to control for the disclosure tendencies of firms across a
predominantly merit-based regulatory regime (1998) and a predominantly disclosure-based regulatory regime
(2000).
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one-tailed significance across all specifications of voluntary disclosure. INSOWN was
moderately significant at the 10% level for the DRANK and ADSCORE models, while GLC
was significant (/?-value < 0.05) in the DSCORE model. IND% was not significant in any of
the models, suggesting that the expected relationships between disclosure and its
determinants were weaker in 1998 due to the prevalent philosophy of merit-based
regulation with less emphasis on voluntary disclosure. In contrast, IND% was highly
significant (p-value < 0.05) in the 2000 regressions. The coefficient estimate of IND% in
the 2000 models is about three times larger than that of the 1998 models with DSCORE as
the dependent variable and about two times larger in the DRANK and ADSCORE models.
This comparison provides limited evidence that boards with a higher degree of
independence are associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure from firms in
2000 but not in 1998, implying that the monitoring role of the board is influenced by the
prevailing external regulatory regime.
With respect to the pooled sample regressions, the results are largely similar to those of
the 2000 regressions except that ROA was insignificant in all models. The highly significant
and positive coefficient for the YEAR variable (p-value < 0.05) in the DSCORE model was
consistent with the earlier finding that on average, firms in 2000 were disclosing more than
firms in 1998. However, the insignificance of the YEAR variable in the DRANK and
ADSCORE models indicates that while firms as a group disclosed more voluntary
information in 2000 as compared to 1998, the voluntary-disclosure levels relative to other
firms in the sample (DRANK) and to other firms in the same industry (ADSCORE) did not
Notes to Table 8:
^ The year 1 998 proxies for a predominantly merit-based regulatory regime while the year 2000 proxies for a
predominantly disclosure-based regulatory regime. As the research objective is to examine if the role of the board
in monitoring management voluntary-disclosure policies changes across regimes, the cross-sectional regression
models are based on model 2 in Table 6 where the proportion of independent directors (IND%) is a continuous
variable. The model is as follows: DISC, ^ fiQ + ^^BSIZE, + PjlND^/o, + Pj,DUALITY, + P^INSOWN, +
P^LNMVALi + I^^ROA, + P-jLEV, + P^GLCi + ^^YEAR, + e, where DISC represents the cross-sectional volun-
tary disclosure levels.
'' DSCORE is the raw voluntary disclosure level index. DRANK is the ranked percentiles of each firm's index
score. It is obtained by first ranking all firms in the sample on the basis ofDSCORE and then converting the ranks
into percentiles. ADSCORE is the industry-adjusted ranked percentiles of each firm's index score.
^ BSIZE is the board size as measured by the number of members on each firm's board. IND% is the proportion
of independent directors on the board. DUALITY i?, an indicator variable where "1" represents boards without a
separation of the roles of CEO and board chairman and "0" otherwise. All board-related variables are obtained
from the Corporate Governance and Intellectual Capital (CGIC) database maintained by the Singapore
Management University. INSOWN is a dummy variable indicating the presence of an inside block owner. An
inside block owner is defined as any person who is in management, on the board of directors, or is a corporation
whose shareholdings are substantially (>5%) held by management of the firm, and is classified as one of the top
five substantial shareholders in the FY2000 annual reports. LNMVAL is the logarithmic transformation of the
firm's market value of common shares at the end of their fiscal year 2000. ROA is the 3-year average return on
total assets of the firm prior to their 2000 fiscal year. LEVh the long-term debt to equity ratio at the end of fiscal
year 2000. GLC is a dummy variable indicating the presence of government ownership. A firm is classified as
having government ownership if the Singapore government's corporate investment arm, Temasek Holdings Pte
Ltd is present as a substantial (>5%) shareholder.
The coefficient estimates are presented with their p-values in parentheses. One-tailed /?-values are reported for
coefficients with predicted directions while two-tailed /^-values are reported for coefficients without a priori
predictions.
286 E.C.M. Cheng, S.M. Courtenay / The International Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 262-289
appear to change significantly over time. In other words, all firms were raising their
voluntary-disclosure levels from 1998 to 2000. To further examine the earlier result that
boards exhibit stronger monitoring over voluntary-disclosure tendencies in 2000 than in
1998, IND% was interacted with YEAR in the pooled regression sample and all models re-
estimated. If the marginal effect of the board on firm voluntary disclosure is stronger in
2000, a positive and significant coefficient will be obtained on the interaction term. In the
re-estimation (not reported) the interaction term was positive but insignificant in the
models. Upon examination, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of the interaction term
approaches ten. In addition, the Pearson Correlation (Spearman rho) between the
interaction variable and YEAR was 0.886 (0.912), indicating a high degree of correlation.
While the differential effect ofIND% on voluntary disclosure between 1998 and 2000 is not
statistically significant in this analysis, this result may arise from multicollinearity.^'
5. Conclusion
We examined the effects of the role of the board of directors, board size, and duality in
monitoring and influencing the level of voluntary disclosure made by management over
two different regulatory regimes. Noteworthy contributions of this study to the current body
of governance and disclosure research are that it (1) provides initial empirical evidence of a
positive association between board independence and a direct measure of voluntary
disclosure that can be generalized to the overall market, (2) documents that an external
governance mechanism (regulatory regime) can influence the firm's internal-governance
mechanism (board of directors) in their monitoring capacity, and (3) demonstrates that
board size and CEO duality are not associated with the level of voluntary disclosure.
We confirm a significant and positive association between the proportion of independent
non-executive directors and a direct measure of voluntary disclosure. The results also show
that firms with boards dominated by a majority of independent directors have significantly
higher levels ofvoluntary disclosure as compared to firms with boards without a majority of
independent directors. Notably, these results do not hold when the CCDG-suggested level
of director independence (33%) is examined. We also provide evidence that boards
dominated by a majority of executive directors are associated with lower levels ofvoluntary
disclosure, although the result is not statistically significant. These results are of interest to
regulators as they demonsfrate that the suggested regulatory level of board independence
does not appear to be high enough to provide the desired level of monitoring, and that CEO
duahty does not necessarily need to be abolished.
An important finding is the result obtained from examining the effect of the external
regulatory regime on the board's monitoring of firm disclosure. The results show that the
strength of association between board independence and voluntary disclosure under a
disclosure-based model of regulation is about two to three times stronger than under a
merit-based model of regulation, suggesting that the board's monitoring of firm disclosure
is more active under a disclosure-based regime. These results provide evidence that firms
^
' To reduce the degree of correlation between the interaction term and YEAR, IND% was mean-centered and
interacted with YEAR. However, the VIF was still too high, and the correlation between the centered interaction
term and YEAR was about 0.75.
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may voluntarily disclose more information in reaction to a regulatory regime change, and
imply that when external regulatory bodies emphasize firm governance, boards accordingly
align their monitoring objectives to those of the extemal regulatory body.
As usual, there are some limitations to the research. Although we assume that the
regulatory change is an exogenous event, the extent to which the regulator promotes change
through GLCs could create an endogenous bias. However, there are only 1 1 GLCs in the
sample and the variable has been insignificant in all but one of the estimated models.
While this study was able to examine the relation between board monitoring and
voluntary disclosure across two different external-governance philosophies, it is still based
on a single geographic market. Although our results are generalizable to the Singapore
market, these results may not obtain in other markets. Additionally, our analysis is dependent
upon the ability of the disclosure index to differentiate the level of disclosure. Although we
have demonstrated the internal and extemal validity of the index, measurement error may
still exist.
The use of a self-constructed voluntary-disclosure index is sufficient in capturing cross-
sectional variation in firm disclosure. However, data collection is tedious, resulting in
modest samples. For example, the data collection task to obtain a cross-sectional sample for
a similar representation of U.S. companies (23% or 3700 firms) that could be generalized to
the U.S. market would be, at best, onerous. While an alternative is to use professional
analyst's assessments of corporate disclosure, these measures are likely to bias the sample
towards firms that are larger and have higher levels of disclosure. Absent a straightforward
proxy for voluntary disclosure, obtaining a large unbiased sample that can be generalized
remains a significant challenge to disclosure-based studies.
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1. Introduction
Using a sample of listed firms in Singapore, the study by Cheng and Courtenay (2006-this
issue) shows that firms with higher proportion of independent directors or with independent
directors being the majority on the board have higher levels of voluntary disclosure. On the
other hand, board size and CEO duality are not associated with voluntary disclosure.
Moreover, the study also shows that Singapore's switch from a "disclosure-based"
regulatory regime to a "merit-based" regime enhances the strength of the association
between the proportion of independent directors and the level of voluntary disclosure. The
authors take this association as evidence that extemal regulatory environment interacts with
internal govemance mechanisms to influence the corporate disclosure policy.
2. Contributions
I think the paper makes important contributions to the accounting literature of disclosure
in at least two aspects. First, independent directors form an important ingredient of
corporate govemance mechanism. Whether this mechanism is just a token or can be
effective is subject to debate. In the United States, non-executive directors are known to
play a larger role in monitoring managers than do inside board members (e.g., Weisbach,
1988). However, legal studies such as that by Roe (2002) point out that corporate
govemance depends not only on laws and regulations, but also on the structure and
operations of other institutions such as laws firms, the accounting profession, investment
banks, enforcement mechanisms, and the courts. Thus, whether independent directors make
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any difference in countries with varying institutional environments becomes an important
issue. Since disclosure is an important accounting-related function, the association between
independent directors and disclosure in different countries is a timely research question in
accounting. Unlike previous studies, this one does not report mixed evidence regarding the
impact of board composition on management's disclosure tendencies.
The second contribution of the paper is its adoption of a single-country setting (i.e.,
Singapore) to examine the relation between board structure and voluntary disclosure. The
country-specific setting allows the authors to derive a finer measure of corporate disclosure,
rather than the crude country-level measures such as the index officed by the Center for
International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) which is used in many cross-
country studies. In addition, the country-specific setting also allows the authors to include
the change in regulatory regime in their research design. Namely, in 1999, Singaporean
regulators changed the financial reporting framework from an authority-based framework
to a disclosure- or market-based regulatory framework similar to systems in the U.S. or the
U.K. Under the new framework, investors and shareholders determine the level of approval
over firm transactions and activities, and enhanced disclosure becomes a necessity for the
market to monitor company affairs. Whether this change in the regulatory framework
affects the association between independent directors and disclosure is an interesting issue
that is difficult to conduct using a cross-country setting.
3. Issues in methodology
3.1. Common determinants of board structure and disclosure
The most important methodological issue that requires some thought is understanding
the common determinants of board structure and disclosure. These common determinants
might contribute to the correlation between independent directors and disclosure. Two
possible common determinants come to mind: external financing needs and influence of
overseas investors.
Extemal financing needs are likely to be a common determinant because, previous
studies find that firms with greater extemal financing needs have better corporate
govemance (e.g., Dumev & Kim, 2005).' Thus, those firms are also likely to seek a more
independent-board structure. On the other hand, other studies also show that firms in
industries with greater extemal financing needs have higher voluntary disclosure levels
(e.g., Francis, Khurama, & Pereira, 2003). Thus, it is likely that the correlation between
board independence and disclosure could be due to the needs for extemal financing.
The second possible common determinant is the interaction with overseas markets.
Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan (2004) find a positive association between the Standard
and Poor's disclosure scores of non-U. S. companies and interactions with overseas
markets, especially with the U.S. The interactions are measured by cross-listing in the U.S.,
investment flows from and to the U.S., exports to U.S., etc. It is likely that the intemational
exchanges and flow of information will also lead to more independence in the corporate
The reason is that good corporate govemance reduces cost of equity capital.
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boards. Thus, the market interaction variables could determine both board independence
and disclosure, resulting in another common determinant.
One possible approach to resolving the above noted confounds is to test the change in
disclosure as a function of change in the portion of independent directors. However, the
feasibility of this approach depends on both variables having enough variation. Another
solution is to include measures of market interactions (e.g., cross-listing in the U.S.) as
control variables.
3.2. The effect of regulatory regime
The study shows (Table 8) that the coefficient on the percentage of independent directors
is significant in 2000 but insignificant in 1998. A formal test of the different effect in the
2 years can be performed by using a pooled sample of both years in the regression, with
YEAR*END% (both variables are defined in Table 8) included as an additional independent
variable. The coefficient on this variable will highlight the incremental effect of rND%
under the disclosure-based regime.
4. Conclusions
Overall, I think the study makes a contribution to the international research of corporate
disclosure. Being a country-specific study, there is a usual caveat about the generalizability
of this study's findings to other countries with different market envirormients. That is,
whether the results are specific to Singapore is uncertain. Thus, testing the similar issues
using data fi"om other countries is a useful topic for fiiture research.
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1. Introduction
We appreciate the discussion provided by Professor Chen, and thank him for his insight
into the problematical area of the measurement of voluntary disclosure and how it may be
linked to the monitoring capacities of the board of directors.
2. Issues in methodology
2.1. Common determinants of board structure and disclosure
The discussant suggests that there may be other influences on the level of voluntary
disclosure that have not been considered in the empirical model estimation; in particular, he
refers to external financing needs and the influence ofoverseas investors through cross-listing
on other exchanges, especially the USA exchanges. Additionally, it is intimated that exports to
capital markets such as those of the USA may influence the level ofboard independence and
thus, voluntary disclosure.
We address these methodological concerns as follows: (1) With respect to the positive
relation between extemal financing and voluntary disclosure, we were carefiil to exclude from
our sample all firms that were listed during the period 1 996-2000, as shown in Table 1 , Panel A.
Additionally, there were no significant secondary issues during this period of time, which was
due primarily to the present and then lingering effects of the Asian financial crisis. We did not
mention this point regarding significant secondary offerings and regret that lack of disclosure.
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0020-7063/$30.00 © 2006 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2006.07.003
294 E.C.M. Cheng, S.M. Courtenay / The International Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 293-294
(2) With respect to the positive disclosure effects ofcross-hsting of firms on overseas markets,
our sample has few instances of such cross-listings. While the sample is a representative cross-
section of Singaporean companies, few Singaporean companies are listed on exchanges in the
USA, and none in the sample have a USA cross-listing. The only significant cross-listing (1
firm) is on the Australian Exchange.
We feel that these sample-specific characteristics allow us to infer that the level ofvoluntary
disclosure in our sample firms is positively and significantly associated with our board
monitoring proxy.
2.2. The effect of regulatory regime
Professor Chen has proposed that we use the interaction term YEAR*rND% as a separate
independent variable in the pooled regression of 1998 and 2000 data to highlight the
differential effect of the regulatory regime on voluntary disclosure. We believe that intro-
ducing the interaction term into the modeling in such a manner would not facilitate inter-
pretation of the results. It is known that interaction terms may introduce multicollinearity, as
was found when we estimated a model with the interaction term YEAR*rND% using the
pooled 1998 and 2000 data. We note that the interaction term was positive but insignificant in
the models," and this result may arise fi"om multicollinearity."
3. Conclusion
We accept the caveats of the study provided by Professor Chen and we appreciate his
acknowledgment of the contribution that our paper makes.
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Abstract
This study investigates the effect of board independence on performance across different
strategies. Using moderated regression analyses, the resuhs confirm our hypothesis that board
independence has a significantly more positive effect on performance for firms pursuing a strategy of
cost efficiency than for those pursuing a strategy of innovafion. The results of this study indicate that
consideration of firms' competitive strategy can provide a better understanding of the relationship
between board independence and firm performance.
© 2006 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Corporate governance, a system by which firms are directed and controlled in order to
ensure their continuity in business, is the responsibility of senior management and the board
of directors (The UK Financial Reporting Council & The London Stock Exchange, 1991).
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Accordingly, the various reforms that have been introduced in recent years to promote
sound corporate governance include: requiring a majority of board members to be inde-
pendent; tightening the standards for determining a member's independence; creating
committees composed predominantly of outside directors with professional qualifications;
reducing the number of board members in order to facilitate more effective decision
making; minimizing management's control over the appointment of board and committee
members; and encouraging the review of performance of the board and of each board
member.
Despite the widely-held belief that sound corporate govemance is the foundation of a
firm's long-term success, empirical studies examining the relationship between corporate
govemance and performance have generated inconsistent findings. Some studies provide
evidence that corporate govemance has a positive effect on performance (e.g., Brickley,
Coles, & Terry, 1994; Brickley & James, 1987; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Chung, Wright, &
Kedia, 2003; Hossain, Cahan, & Adams, 2000; Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, & Davidson,
1992; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Weisbach, 1988). However, other studies, report a
negative association between corporate govemance and firm performance (e.g., Bathala &
Rao, 1995; Hutchinson, 2002) or find that corporate govemance does not have any impact
on performance (e.g., Park & Shin, 2003; Prevost, Rao, & Hossain, 2002; Singh &
Davidson, 2003; Young, 2003).
There are several possible explanations for these inconsistencies. First, Young (2003)
argues that methodological differences may at least in part explain them, given that some
studies use publicly available data to measure corporate govemance variables while others
use survey data. Second, it is possible that the choice of performance variables might also
play a role in explaining the mixed results. Some studies use accounting-based performance
measures such as Return on Assets, Return on Equity, or Asset Turnover, (e.g., Hutchinson
& Gul, 2004; Park & Shin, 2003; Singh & Davidson, 2003) while others use market-based
performance measures such as Stock Retum or Market Value of Equities (e.g., Baysinger &
Butler, 1985; Brickley et al., 1994; Cotter, Shivdasani, & Zenner, 1997; McWilliams & Sen,
1997).
Third, a recent study by Hutchinson and Gul (2004) provides evidence that good
corporate govemance moderates the negative relationship between a firm's opportunity for
growth and its performance. Insights gleaned from this research suggest that the impact of
corporate govemance variables on firms' performance should be evaluated in relation to
their contextual variables. It is, therefore, possible that addressing the role of contextual
variables could provide an opportunity to expand our understanding of the relationship
between corporate govemance and firm performance.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of board independence-one of the
most widely used proxies for good govemance-on performance across different strategies
^ The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Toronto Stock Exchange Corporate Govemance Guidelines of 1996,
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Govemance (1999),
Nasdaq Corporate Govemance Rule Proposal of 2003, are just a few examples of numerous codes of best
practices proposed and adopted by national stock exchanges, professional organizations, legal practitioners, and
busmess leaders promotmg sound corporate govemance.
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using a contingency perspective. Employing insights gained from strategy and accounting
literature, we predict that board independence affects the relationship between competitive
strategy and performance more positively for firms pursuing a strategy of cost efficiency
than for those pursuing a strategy of innovation.
Given that firms that pursue a strategy of cost efficiency emphasize tight cost controls,
they will benefit more from board independence than will firms pursuing a strategy of
innovation. Boards of directors which are more independent from management tend to
perform management-monitoring activities more effectively. This will in turn minimize the
chance of getting managers engaged in opportunistic behavior and discipline them to run
the firm more efficiently. However, it might also limit managers' ability to pursue the
creative and innovative courses of actions that are crucial to firms whose survival depends
on innovation. Furthermore, the tendency of outside directors to use outcome control might
further increase efficiency but at the same time cause management to be reluctant to invest
in risky but strategically important activities—activities that increase the firms' ability to be
innovative.
Overall, the results are consistent with our predictions. We found that the effect of board
independence on performance is significantly more positive for firms pursuing a sfrategy of
cost efficiency than for firms pursuing a strategy of innovation. These findings suggest that
the relationship between board independence and performance can be better understood by
taking into consideration the firms' business strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature
and the hypothesis. Section 3 presents the research method, and Section 4 analyzes the data
and results. Finally, Section 5 comments on the main results and the limitations of the
research, and recommends a direction for future research in this area.
2. Related literature and hypothesis
Agency theory has been the most dominant approach to investigating the relationship
between board independence and performance. This theory suggests that asymmetries of
information and objectives between the principal (shareholders) and the agent (manage-
ment) impose costs on the principal when an agent with discretionary authority takes
actions in his/her own interest rather than the principal's best interest. According to the
theory, firms might minimize agency costs by establishing appropriate monitoring systems
and using boards of directors to effectively supervise managers (Byrd & Hickman, 1992;
Fama & Jensen, 1983). Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that manager-monitoring activities
of the board will be more effective when they are dominated by independent-outside
directors.
Wagner, Stimpert, and Fubana (1999) report that the most significant trend in corporate
board governance in the U.S.A. over the last two decades has been an increase in the
proportion of outside directors. This trend of including more outsiders on the board has
aimed at making boards more independent from management. Westphal (1999) proposes
that managers are under considerable pressure to conform to the wishes of corporate
insiders. This author argues that for corporations to provide effective supervision of
managers, boards of directors should consist mostly of outside directors. Hossain et al.
(2000) assert that the value of outside directors is related to their ability to judge firm
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performance objectively—inside directors may lack this quality, which limits their effec-
tiveness as corporate monitors.
While the relationship between board independence and firm performance has long
been the focus of research, empirical findings regarding the effects of the former on the
latter have been inconclusive. For example, Chung et al. (2003) examine whether board
independence improves firm performance through capital and R&D expenditures. Using
data fi-om Compustat Industrial File and Lexis/Nexis Services, they find that capital and
R&D expenditures do have a positive impact on firm performance, but only for firms
which have a high proportion of outside directors. They conclude that board indepen-
dence affects performance positively through the ability of outside directors to provide
effective management-monitor activities. Using data fi^om New Zealand, Hossain et al.
(2000) also find a positive relationship between higher levels of board independence and
firm performance. In contrast, Bathala and Rao (1995) report a negative correlation
between board independence and performance. Other studies by Prevost et al. (2002) and
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) do not find a statistically significant relationship between
the two.
The lack of empirical support for the predicted relationship between board independence
and performance calls the applicability of the existing approach to this phenomenon into
question. Most previous studies in this area employ a universal approach by investigating
the direct effect of corporate governance on performance as independent fi^om other
variables. However, Hutchinson and Gul (2004) argue that the effects of corporate
govemance on performance should be jointly investigated with firms' contextual variables.
Following this suggestion, we adopt a contingency approach in evaluating the relationship
between board independence and performance across firms' competitive strategies.
Porter (1985) argues that a firm must have a clear competitive strategy in order to
compete effectively and gain sustainable competitive advantage. He proposes that a firm
can choose to become the provider of the lowest-price products in an industry (cost-
efficiency strategy) or to become the provider of unique and innovative products (inno-
vation strategy). Firms that adopt a strategy of cost efficiency focus their efforts on
controlling costs by emphasizing the aggressive construction of efficient scale facilities; the
vigorous pursuit of cost reduction fi-om experience, tight cost and overhead control; the
avoidance of marginal customer accounts; and cost minimization in areas like research and
development, service, sales personnel, and advertising (Porter, 1985).
Westphal (1999) proposes that outsider-dominated boards will effectively limit the
chance of managers' engaging in opportunistic behavior by imposing restrictions to ensure
that they do not act in their own self-interest if that is inconsistent with shareholders'
interest. These restrictions may also discipline managers to run firms more efficiently. More
outside directors will put the boards in a better position to challenge management and
negotiate with it and, in extreme cases, enable it to terminate managers' employment
(Dallas, 2001). In addition, outside directors tend to rely on outcome measures or financial
controls in evaluating management due to their lack of specific, insider information about
the firm (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Zahra & Pearce, 1998). Govindarajan and Fisher
(1990) argue that outcome control is most appropriately used by firms that employ cost-
efficiency strategies. It is argued that these firms tend to produce standard products through
the performance of routine and highly programmable tasks and that their knowledge of
L. Gani, J. Jermias / The International Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 295-314 299
means and ends is relatively high. By using outcome control, these firms could increase
efficiency by eliminating the need to incur additional expenses to enhance the transparency
of managers' behavior.
By contrast, firms that adopt a strategy of innovation tend to select one or more attributes
that many buyers in an industry perceive as important and uniquely position themselves to
meet the demand for these attributes by producing innovative products (Porter, 1985). To
support this strategy, it is essential that firms invest heavily in research and development
activities (Mia & Clarke, 1999) and give their managers the freedom to pursue creative and
innovative courses of action in order to thrive and succeed. Therefore, manager-monitoring
activities ofboards might work against achieving these firms' performance goals because the
restrictions imposed might limit managers' ability to make decisions that are crucial to the
firms' long term success (Robinson & Mcdougall, 2001; Simerly & Li, 2000). Moreover,
because they lack the specific inside knowledge about the firm, outside directors tend to rely
on outcome control in evaluating management. This limits the board's ability to discriminate
between financial outcomes that are the result of bad decision making on the part of
management and fmancial outcomes that are due to factors beyond management's control.
Researchers have argued that the use of outcome control tends to shift the responsibility for
poor results arising from factors beyond managements' control from shareholders to
management and thereby cause management to adopt more risk-averse strategies (e.g.,
Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Zahra, 1996). As a result, managers
become reluctant to pursue risky projects such as investments in long-term projects and
research and development activities, both ofwhich are crucial to firms pursuing a strategy of
innovation.
As indicated, the impact ofboard independence on performance differs across different
strategies. The increased level of board independence will lead to more effective
management supervisions by the board. Monitoring will cause managers to run their firms
more efficiently, and therefore, will be beneficial for cost-efficiency firms. For innovative
firms, however, monitoring by the board might impede managers' ability to be creative
and innovative which are crucial for the firms to thrive and succeed. As such, board
independence will have a more pronounced positive effect on firm performance for cost-
efficiency firms than for innovative firms. Specifically, our research will test the
following hypothesis:
The impact of board independence on performance will vary across different
strategies such that the impact will be more positiveforfirms pursuing a strategy of
cost efficiency than for those pursuing a strategy of innovation.
3. Research method
We use a Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) to test the hypothesis. Gerdin and
Greve (2004) assert that the MRA is a commonly used statistical technique for studies
predicting that the impact of the moderator variable on the dependent variables fluctuates
across different levels of independent variables. In a similar vein, Hartmann and Moers
(1999) argue that MRA is the appropriate statistical technique by which to test hypotheses
involving interaction terms because it is " a specific application of multiple regression
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analysis, in which the regression equation contains an interaction term" (Hartmann &
Moers, 1999, p. 293). Therefore, we use the following MRA model to test the hypothesis:
Perform, = 7o + 7iIND/ + 72STRA/ + 73STRA,*IND, + 74LOGTA/
+ 75LEV,- + 760WN5%,- + 77BSIZE, + 78IOS,- + 79CEO/ + £,• ( 1
)
Where,
Perform, performance of firm i determined by ROE and ROI
IND, the ratio of external members to total members on the board of directors of firm /
STRA, an indicator equal to 1 for firms pursuing a strategy of innovation and equal to
for firms pursuing a strategy of cost efficiency
LOGTA,log of total assets of firm /
LEV, debt to equity ratio of firm i
0WN5%,-
the percentage of stock owned by 5% or more shareholders of firm /
BSIZE, the number of directors on the board of firm /
lOS, the ratio of gross property, plant and equipment to the market value of firm /
CEO, an indicator equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board, otherwise 0.
We test our hypothesis with the estimated coefficients on IND, and STRA*D«JD. The
coefficient on IND represents the linear relationship between the level of board
independence and performance. We predict that this coefficient will be positive. The
coefficient on STRA*IND represents the effects of increasing the level of board indepen-
dence on the overall relationship between STRA and performance. We predict that this
coefficient will be negative. * The hypothesis developed in this study will be confirmed if
the estimated coefficient on STRA*IND (73) is significantly negative and both the
coefficients on IND (71), and the sum of the coefficients on IND and STRA*IND are
positive.
3.]. Sample selection
The sample consists of firms in the manufacturing industry (SIC 2000 and SIC 3000)
which were listed in the Compustat S&P 500 database for the period 1997-2001. The
manufacturing industry was selected for the research sample because firms in this industry
tend to employ different types of strategies in order to compete effectively. As explained by
Meric, Weidman, Welsh, and Meric (2002), firms in this industry have been facing fierce
competition both domestically and internationally and they therefore need to have a clear
strategy in order to compete effectively and to capture local and world market shares.
Conditioned on the STRA being equal to 1 for innovative firms and for cost-efficiency firms, the negative
coefficient on STRA*rND indicates that the impact of board independence on performance will be less positive
for innovative firms than for cost-efficiency firms. This is because the impact of board independence on
performance for innovative firms is represented by the sum of the coefficients on FND, and STRA*rND. For cost
efficiency firms, however, the impact of board independence on performance is represented by the coefficient on
IND.
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Ownership data and information about boards of directors was obtained from proxy
statements retrieved from EDGAR electronic filing system database. The sample is
restricted to firms that provided complete data for five consecutive years (1997-2001) for
each of the following: assets; liabilities; shareholders equity; net income; cost of goods
sold; research and development expenses; property; plant and equipment; market value;
number of outstanding shares; number of directors on the boards; number of outside
directors on the boards; number of shares owned by 5% or more shareholders; and the status
of the CEO on corporate boards.
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection. We eliminate 271 firms because they are listed
in non-manufacturing industries and 1 20 firms because they provide incomplete data. We
use data from the year 1 997 to classify our sample firms into cost efficiency and innovation
strategies. Our final sample consists of 436 firm-year observations (109 firms for 4 years).
3.2. Variable measurements
The following variables were constructed using the raw data from Compustat S&P 500
and information found in the proxy statements which the firms filed through the EDGAR
database.
3.2.1. Competitive strategy (STRA)
To measure competitive strategy, we adopt the approach introduced by Singh and
Agarwal (2002). A firm's competitive strategy is determined by a hierarchical cluster
analysis of the following variables: R&D Intensity (ratio of research and development
expenses to total sales revenues), Asset Utilization Efficiency (ratio of total sales revenues
Table 1
Sample selection for Compustat S&P 500 firms in manufacturing industry
Panel A: Selection of firms
Total number of firms listed in Compustat S&P 500 500
Less:
Non-manufacturing firms:
- Mineral industries (SIC 1000-1499) 20
- Construction industries (SIC 1500-1799) 4
- Transportation, communications and utilities (SIC 4000-4999) 64
- Wholesale trade (SIC 5000-5 1 99) 11
- Retail trade (SIC 5200-5999) 39
- Financial, insurance, and real estate industries (SIC 6000-6799) 81
- Service industries (SIC 7000-8999) 49
- Other industries (SIC 9000-9999) 3 (271)
Sample before data restrictions 229
Incomplete data for five consecutive years (1997-2001) 46
Unable to obtain data fi-om proxy statements 74 (120)
Total 109
Panel B: Sampled firms according to their competitive strategy
Strategy of innovation 46
Strategy of cost efficiency 63
Total 109
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to total assets), and Premium Price Capability (ratio of gross margin to total sales revenues).
The selected variables represent the unique features of Porter's strategic archetypes.
The two essential dimensions of a business strategy put forth in the Porter's (1985)
model are "the search for new or unique products enabling firms to charge premium price"
and "asset utilization efficiency". The variables used in the cluster analysis reflect these
dimensions. For instance, the intensity of a firm's R&D activity indicates the strategic
importance of innovation to that firm. Firms that invest heavily in R&D are most likely
trying to compete on the basis of innovative products and services. Consequently, we
expect that firms pursuing a strategy of innovation will have higher ratios ofR&D Intensity
than firms pursuing a cost-efficiency strategy.
Asset Utilization Efficiency indicates how strategically important operational efficiency
is to a firm. Firms pursuing a strategy of cost efficiency tend to operate in a stable
environment, produce standard products, and employ standardized operating procedures.
Therefore, these fums tend to enjoy a high level of stability and a high degree of operational
efficiency. In contrast, firms pursuing a strategy of innovation tend to face more uncertainty
in generating revenues since they are betting on products that have not yet established their
niche in the marketplace (Biggadike, 1979). Thus, we predict that firms pursuing a strategy
of cost efficiency will have higher ratios of asset utilization efficiency than firms pursuing a
strategy of innovation.
Premium Price Capability indicates frnns' ability to charge their customers premium
prices. As firms pursuing a strategy of innovation tend to offer unique products and services,
they are able to charge these prices (Lynn, 1994). Therefore, we expect that firms pursuing a
strategy of innovation will score higher in the Premium Price Capability dimension as
compared to fums pursuing a strategy of cost efficiency. Previous studies that use cluster
analyses to classify firms into their competitive strategy include Marlin, Huonker, and Sun
(2002), Singh and Agarwal (2002), Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998), and Lassar and
Kerr (1996).
Two distinct clusters were extracted fi^om a hierarchical cluster analysis. Cluster one
consists of46 firms and cluster two consists of 63 firms. T-tests were performed to compare
the two clusters in terms ofR&D Intensity, Asset Utilization Efficiency and Premium Price
Capability. Consistent with our expectation, the results of these tests indicate that compared
to cluster two, cluster one has significantly higher scores for R&D Intensity and Premium
Price Capability, but significantly lower scores for Asset Utilization Efficiency. Conse-
quently, we consider firms in cluster one to be those that pursue a strategy of innovation and
firms in cluster two to be those that pursue a strategy of cost efficiency.
3.2.2. Board independence (IND)
Board independence is measured as the ratio of outside directors to total number of
directors on the board. Outside directors are those whose principal occupations are not with
the company as indicated in the proxy statements. Current or past employees ofthe firm that
are on the board are considered inside directors.
3.2.3. Performance (ROE and ROI)
Various measures have been used in the literature to represent firm performance. While
market-based measures tend to be more objective than accounting-based measures, they are
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also affected by many uncontrollable factors. Hutchinson and Gul (2004) argue that
accounting-based performance measures reflect the results of managers' actions and are
therefore preferable to market-based measures when investigating the relationship between
corporate governance variables and firm performance. Since the purpose of this study is to
investigate the effect of competitive strategy on the relationship between board indepen-
dence and performance, we use return on equity (ROE) and retum on investment (ROI) to
measure firm performance. Retum on equity is measured as income before extraordinary
items divided by total equity, while retum on investment is measured as income before
extraordinary items divided by total invested capital (the sum of long term debt, minority
interest, and common shareholder equity).
3.2.4. Control variables
We control for firm size (LOGTA), leverage (LEV), large shareholders (0WN5%), board
size (BSIZE), investment opportunity set (lOS), and whether or not the CEO is also the
chairman of the board of directors (CEO). A number of authors (e.g., Frank & Goyal, 2003;
Ramaswamy, 2001) have suggested that firm size might influence firm performance.
Accordingly, firm size has been used extensively as a control variable in the empirical analysis
of firm performance. We use logarithm function of total assets as the indicator of fum size.
Leverage influences firm performance through monitoring activities by debt holders, and we
measure it as total liabilities divided by total equity. Previous studies (e.g., Core, Holthausen,
& Larker, 1999; Cyert, Kang, & Kumar, 2002) indicate that large shareholders also affect firm
performance because they are able to monitor the CEO in order to mitigate agency problems
and increase efficiency. We measure large shareholders as the ratio of stock owned by 5% or
more shareholders to total number of common shares outstanding. The size of the board of
directors might also affect firm performance through the relative influence of the CEO on
various board sizes. Yermack (1996) argues that larger boards are less effective and more
susceptible to the influence ofthe CEO. However, Dallas (200 1 ) argues that a larger board size
brings more resources to firms and therefore might improve their performance. We use the
total number ofdirectors on the board to measure board size. Investment opportunity set (lOS)
might affect performance because of the need for fums with a high level of investment
opportunity (lOS) to incur higher monitoring costs (Anderson, Francis, & Stokes, 1993). We
use the ratio of gross property, plant and equipment (at historical cost) to the market value of
the fum (market value of equity plus book value of liabihties) to measure the investment
opportunity set. Finally, we control for the relative influence ofthe CEO on a board ofdirectors
by using a dummy variable to represent whether or not the CEO also serves as the chairman of
the board. Gul and Leung (2004) suggest that CEOs who also serve as board chairmen could
diminish the boards' ability to exercise effective control over management and thereby
negatively affect performance.
4. Data analysis and result
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics about the variables used in this study. The average
ratio of outside directors to total number of directors on the board is 70.3% with a maximum
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Median Minimum Maximum
ROE 0.115 0.443 0.147 -6.194 1.410
ROI 0.088 0.306 0.105 -5.240 0.520
IND 0.703 0.207 0.750 0.250 0.933
STRA 0.422 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000
STRA*IND 0.412 0.372 0.000 0.000 1.000
LOGTA 3.671 0.548 3.651 2.054 5.173
LEV 1.564 1.455 1.162 0.033 8.897
OWN5% 0.167 0.157 0.143 0.000 0.698
BSIZE 10.176 2.747 10.000 4.000 18.000
lOS 0.394 1.985 0.155 0.003 33.066
CEO 0.789 0.401 1.000 0.000 1.000
ROE is return on equity as measured by net profit after tax before extra-ordinary items divided by common
shareholder equity; ROI is return on investment as measured by net profit after tax before extra-ordinary items
divided by total invested capital (the sum of long term debt, minority interest and common shareholder equity);
IND is the board independence as measured by number ofoutside directors divided by total number of directors on
the board; STRA is an indicator of a fum's competitive strategy and equal to 1 ft)r innovative firms and for cost-
efficiency firms; STRA*[ND is the interaction between STRA and IND; LOGTA is the size ofthe fum as measured
by a logarithmic fimction of the firm's total assets; LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total shareholders equity;
0WN5% is the ratio ofnumber ofshares owned by large shareholders (more than 5%) to total outstanding common
shares; BSIZE is the number of directors on the board; lOS is investment opportunity set as measured by the ratio
of gross property, plant and equipment (at historical cost) to the market value of the firm (market value of equity
plus book value of liabilities); and CEO is an indicator ofwhether or not a firm's CEO is also the chair of the board
of director (CEO is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board and otherwise).
of 93.3% and a minimum of25%. The average size of the boards is 10.18 with a maximum
of 18 and a minimum of 4. The average proportion of total shares owned by large
shareholders of the sample firms is 16.7%, with a maximum of 69.8% and a minimum of
0%. The firms' average size (as measured by a logarithmic function of the firms' total
assets) is 3.67, ROE is 11.5%, ROI is 8.8%, lOS is 39.4%, and leverage is 156.4%.
Table 3 shows the Pearson's correlation for all variables used in this study. The two
performance variables (ROE and ROI) are highly correlated (r=0.917; /?< 0.001), indi-
cating that they measure the same construct. Board independence (IND) has positive and
significant correlations with both ROE and ROI (r=0.165; p<OM\; and r=0.104;
/? = 0.018 for ROE and ROI respectively), indicating that firms benefit from the presence of
outside directors. Business strategy (STRA) has negative and significant correlations with
firm size (LOGTA, r=-0.165; p<0.00l), leverage (LEV, r=-0.280; ;7<0.001), and
board size (BSIZE, r=-0.199; /?<0.001). The negative correlations indicate that firms
pursuing a strategy of innovation tend to be smaller, use less debt financing, and have
smaller board size as compared to firms pursuing a strategy of cost efficiency. The
interaction between strategy and independence (STRA*IND) is negative and marginally
significant for ROE (r= -0.1 16; /? = 0.087) and negative but not significant for ROI (r=
-0.092; p = 0.114). This negative correlation between STRA*IND and performance
provides early support for the hypothesized relationship between these two variables.
Board independence (IND) is also positively and significantly correlated with leverage
(LEV, r=0.170;/?<0.001), board size (BSIZE, r=0.147;/? = 0.001), and CEO (r=0.212;
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/?< = 0.001). The positive correlations indicate that larger board size, specially when the
CEO is also the chair of the board, generally reflects more independent boards.^
Furthermore, Table 3 also shows that the size of the firms (LOGTA) is positively and
significantly correlated with leverage (LEV, r=0.321;/?<0.001) and board size (BSIZE,
r=0.585; /7<0.001), but negatively and significantly correlated with large shareholders
(0WN5%, r=-0.258;p<0.001) and CEO (r=-0.123;;?= 0.005). Leverage has positive
correlations with large shareholders (0WN5%, r=0.144;/? = 0.001), board size (BSIZE,
r=0.302; ;?<0.001), and CEO (r=0.112; p = 0.011). CEO also has a positive and
significant correlation with large shareholders (0WN5%, r=0. 117;/? = 0.009), but has a
negative and marginally significant correlation with board size (BSIZE, r=- 0.087;
p = 0.054).
4.2. Hypothesis testing
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the regression analyses for ROE and ROI as the
dependent variables, respectively. Regressions 1 and 3 (with the interaction variable
STRA*IND) show the interactive effect of business strategy and board independence on
performance, while regressions 2 and 4 (without the interaction variable STRA*IND)
report the main effects of the independent variables on performance. Collinearity diagnostic
tests were simultaneously performed with the regression tests. The variance inflation factor
(VIF) is reported for each variable to demonstrate the stability of the MRA model. The
variance in the regression coefficient increases as the VIF increases, which indicate that the
estimate is unstable.^ Furthermore, we compute the White-corrected /-statistics to adjust for
potential heteroskedasticity in our data.^ Since the results are consistent across both
specifications, this paper discusses only the results reported in Table 4 (based on ROE as a
measure of performance).
We use regression 1 to test the hypothesis that the impact of board independence on
performance will vary across different strategies and that the relationship will be more
It is interesting to note that boards are more independent when the CEO is also the chair of the board. This is
counter-intuitive since the concentrated decision making power as a result of CEO duality is likely to affect the
board considerably. One possible explanation for this result is that the CEO who is also the chairman of the board
tries to mitigate the negative image of the CEO duality by nominating more outside directors to the board. Based
on data from Hong Kong listed companies, Gul and Leung (2004) also report a positive association between CEO
duality and board independence.
'^ Dielman (2001) proposes that any individual VIF larger than 10 indicates that multicoUinearity may be
influencing the least-squares estimates of the regression coefficients. Table 4 (regression 1) indicates that two of
the independent variables (STRA and STRA*IND) have VIF larger than 10. In regression 2 (without the
interaction terms), however, all the independent variables, including STRA, have VIF less than 2. It seems that the
high VIF value for STRA and STRA*IND is due to the interaction terms (STRA*IND) included in regression 1.
Hartmann and Moers (1999) argue that although the lower order effects (i.e., STRA and IND) and their
interaction term (i.e., STRA*IND) in moderated regression analyses (MRA) are likely to be correlated, the fact
that the coefficient of the interaction term in MRA is insensitive to changes in scale origins of the independent
variables, multicoUinearity between the independent variables and the interaction terms should not be a problem
when applying MRA.
^ The White-corrected /-statistics and the corresponding p-values were obtained by using the HETCOV option
on the OLS command in SHAZAM statistical software.
L. Gani, J. Jermias / The International Journal ofAccounting 41 (2006) 295-314 307
Table 4
Regression of return on equity on firms' competitive strategy, board independence, total assets, leverage, large
shareholders, board size, investment opportunity set, and CEO
Variable Prediction Results
Regression
Coefficient
1 (with STRA*IND)
White's lvalues VIF
Regression 2 (without STRA*IND)
Coefficient White's ^values VIF
P (p-values)" P (/7-values)"
Intercept 7 0.031 0.212 (0.832) 0.039 0.248 (0.804)
IND + 0.413 2.928 (0.004) 2.271 0.301 1.725(0.086) 1.234
STRA ? 0.153 1.758(0.079) 13.386 0.013 0.377 (0.706) 1.116
STRA*IND - -0.225 -2.824 (0.005) 12.398
ASSET + 0.077 1.822(0.069) 1.840 0.075 1.780(0.076) 1.834
LEV + 0.020 1.493(0.136) 1.404 0.021 1.595(0.111) 1.387
0WN5% + -0.023 -0.184(0.854) 1.171 -0.026 -0.208 (0.836) 1.170
BSIZE ? 0.016 2.104(0.036) 1.595 0.015 2.057 (0.040) 1.589
lOS - -0.012 -2.842 (0.005) 1.035 -0.011 -2.007 (0.045) 1.017
CEO - -0.045 -1.005(0.316) 1.153 -0.044 -0.989 (0.323) 1.153
R' 0.194 0.190
Adjusted R^ 0.137 0.136
F 3.998 (0.001) 4.163 (0.001)
The dependent variable is return on equity as measured by net profit after tax before extra-ordinary items divided
by common shareholder equity; IND is the board independence as measured by number of outside directors
divided by total number of directors on the board; STRA is an indicator of a firm's competitive strategy and equal
to 1 for iimovative fums and for cost-efficiency fums; STRA*IND is the interaction between STRA and IND;
LOGTA is the size of the firm as measured by a logarithmic fiinction of the firm's total assets; LEV is the ratio of
total liabilities to total shareholders equity; 0WN5% is the ratio ofnumber of shares owned by large shareholders
(more than 5%) to total outstanding common shares; BSIZE is the number of directors on the board; lOS is
investment opportunity set as measured by the ratio ofgross property, plant and equipment (at historical cost) to the
market value of the firm (market value of equity plus book value of liabilities); and CEO is an indicator ofwhether
a firm's CEO is also the chair of the board of director (CEO is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board
and otherwise).
" The /7-values are based on two-tailed tests, except in cases of a directional prediction, where we use a one-
tailed test.
positive for cost efficiency than for innovation firms. The F-statistics are highly significant
(F=3.998;/)<0.001). The results indicate that the coefficient on STRA*IND is significantly
negative (i3=- 0.225; /=- 2.824,/? = 0.005) and that both the coefficient on IND (0.413) and
the sum of the coefficients on IND and STRA*IND (0.413-0.225 = 0.188) are positive.
Conditioned on STRA being equal to 1 for innovation firms and to for cost-efficiency firms,
the relationship between board independence and performance for cost-efficiency firms is
represented by the coefficient on IND. For innovation firms, the relationship between board
independence and performance is represented by the sum of the coefficients on IND and
STRA*IND. The results therefore indicate that the relationship between board independence
and performance is stronger for cost-efficiency firms (IND =0.4 13) than for innovation firms
(0.413 IND -0.225 STRA*IND = 0.188). These results are consistent with the hypothesis
developed for this study. They support the view that for innovation firms, the benefits of
outside directors' manager-monitoring activities is compensated by the tendency that the
monitoring activities by the board limit managers' ability to pursue risky but strategically
important activities.
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Table 5
Regression ofreturn on investment on firms' competitive strategy, board independence, total assets, leverage, large
shareholders, board size, investment opportunity set, and CEO
Variable Prediction Results
Regression 3 (with STRA*IND) Regression 4
Coefficient
(without STRA*n
White's r-values
sTD)
Coefficient White's ^-values VIE VIE
P (p-values)" P (p-values)''
Intercept 7 0.008 0.051 (0.959) 0.055 0.403 (0.687)
IND + 0.227 2.481 (0.015) 2.271 0.160 1.274(0.203) 1.234
STRA 7 0.113 2.096 (0.038) 13.386 0.014 0.474 (0.636) 1.116
STRA*IND - -0.134 -2.680 (0.008) 12.398
ASSET + 0.053 2.315(0.022) 1.840 0.052 1.956(0.052) 1.834
LEV + 0.001 0.075 (0.940) 1.404 0.001 0.061 (0.952) 1.387
0WN5% + -0.007 -0.065 (0.948) 1.171 -0.009 -0.081 (0.935) 1.170
BSIZE 7 0.013 2.037 (0.042) 1.595 0.013 1.907(0.057) 1.589
lOS - -0.011 -2.864 (0.005) 1.035 -0.011 -2.162(0.031) 1.017
CEO 7 -0.037 -0.978 (0.329) 1.153 -0.037 -0.967 (0.334) 1.153
R- 0.241 0.236
Adjusted I^ 0.198 0.191
F 3.087 (0.001) 3.002 (0.001)
The dependent variable is return on investment as measured by net profit after tax before extra-ordinary items
divided by total invested capital (the sum of long term debt, minority interest and common shareholder equity);
IND is the board independence as measured by number of outside directors divided by total number ofdirectors on
the board; STRA is an indicator of a firm's competitive strategy and equal to 1 for innovative firms and for cost-
efficiency firms; STRA*IND is the interaction between STRA and IND; LOGTA is the size ofthe firm as measured
by a logarithmic fiinction of the firm's total assets; LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total shareholders equity;
OWN5% is the ratio ofnumber of shares owned by large shareholders (more than 5%) to total outstanding common
shares; BSIZE is the number of directors on the board; lOS is investment opportunity set as measured by the ratio
of gross property, plant and equipment (at historical cost) to the market value of the firm (market value of equity
plus book value of habilities); and CEO is an indicator of whether a firm's CEO is also the chair of the board of
director (CEO is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board and otherwise).
^ The jO-values are based on two-tailed tests, except in cases of a directional prediction, where we use a one-
tailed test.
With respect to the control variables, the results indicate that the coefficients on
LOGTA and BSIZE are positive and significant while the coefficient on lOS is negative
and significant. The positive and significant coefficient on LOGTA indicates that firm
size has a positive impact on performance. The positive and significant coefficient on
BSIZE is consistent with the view that more members bring more resources to the
firms, which results in better performance. The negative and significant coefficient on
lOS suggests that a higher investment opportunity set is associated with the need to
incur higher monitoring costs, which results in lower performance (Anderson et al.,
1993).
To compare our results with previous studies, we run regression 2 to investigate the
direct effects of board independence on performance. The results indicate that the
coefficient on IND (yO, is positive but only marginally significant (/= 1.725; p = 0.0S6).
Given that the relationship between board independence and performance differs for cost-
efficiency firms as compared to innovation firms (as indicated by the results using
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regression 1), the inclusion of the interaction variable (STRA*rND) provides a better
picture ofthe relationship between board independence and performance. It is interesting to
note that the coefficient on STRA for regression 2 is positive but not significant, while this
coefficient is positive and marginally significant according to regression 1. The non-
significant coefficient on STRA for regression 2 indicates that the performance of
innovation firms is not significantly different from that of cost-efficiency firms across all
levels of board independence.
To verify that the relationship between board independence and performance differs
significantly across strategies, we perform additional analyses by splitting the sample firms
into cost efficiency and innovation sub-groups and run the regressions for each category.
Table 6 reports the results of this procedure.
Table 6 indicates that the relationship between board independence and performance
varies across different strategies. For firms pursuing a strategy of cost efficiency (regression
5), the relationship is positive and highly significant, while for firms pursuing a strategy of
innovation (regression 6), the relationship is positive but not significant. To investigate
whether the relationship between board independence and performance is significantly
Table 6
Regression of return on equity on firms' competitive strategy, board independence, total assets, leverage, large
shareholders, board size, investment opportunity set, and CEO based on split sample of strategy of cost efficiency
and strategy of innovation
Variable Prediction Results
Regression 5 Regression 6
(strategy of cost efficiency) (strategy of innovation)
Coefficient White's ^-values VIF Coefficient White's /-values VIF
P ( p-valuesf H (p-values)"
Intercept 7 0.006 0.046 (0.964) -0.058 -0.189(0.850)
IND + 0.380 3.592 (0.001) 1.370 0.228 1.274(0.203) 1.152
ASSET + 0.039 2.842 (0.005) 1.729 0.084 (0.052) 1.958 1.978
LEV + 0.047 4.345 (0.001) 1.300 -0.024 -0.837 (0.403) 1.301
OWN5% + -0.109 -1.076(0.283) 1.128 0.220 0.830 (0.407) 1.318
BSIZE 7 0.001 0.213 (0.831) 1.510 0.035 2.408(0.017) 1.571
lOS - -0.161 -2.869 (0.004) 1.192 -0.012 -1.152(0.251) 1.046
CEO ? -0.041 -1.006(0.316) 1.203 -0.044 -0.548 (0.584) 1.119
R- 0.263 0.165
Adjusted R" 0.232 0.142
F 5.468 (0.001) 1.993 (0.038)
The dependent variable is retum on equity as measured by net profit after tax before extra-ordinary items divided
by common shareholder equity; IND is the board independence as measured by number of outside directors
divided by total number of directors on the board; LOGTA is the size of the firm as measured by a logarithmic
function of the firm's total assets; LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total shareholders equity; OWN5% is the
ratio ofnumber of shares ovraed by large shareholders (more than 5%) to total outstanding common shares; BSIZE
is the number of directors on the board; lOS is investment opportunity set as measured by the ratio of gross
property, plant and equipment (at historical cost) to the market value of the firm (market value of equity plus book
value of liabilities); and CEO is an indicator ofwhether a firm's CEO is also the chair ofthe board ofdu^ector (CEO
is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board and otherwise).
The p-values are based on two-tailed tests, except in cases of a directional prediction, where we use a one-
tailed test.
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Fig. 1. The Effect of Board Independence on Performance across Different Strategies. The graph shows predicted
values ofROE based on the regression estimates reported in Table 4 (regression 2). The values ofROE for firms
that pursue a strategy of innovation are the sum of the estimated coefficients for the intercept, END, STRA, and
STRA*END. The values of ROE for firms that pursue a strategy of cost efficiency are the sum of the estimated
coefficients for the intercept and IND.
different for cost-efficiency firms than for innovation firms, we perform a Z-test as
proposed by Chen and Popovich (2002).^ We obtain a z-score of 2.592, which is greater
than the critical value of 2.58 for an a-level of 0.01. This result indicates that the
relationship between board independence and performance for firms pursuing a strategy of
cost efficiency is significantly more positive than for firms pursuing a strategy of
innovation. This result is consistent with those reported in Table 4.
The relationship between board independence and firm performance across different
strategies can be better illustrated in graphical terms. Fig. 1 shows the predicted values of
ROE as a fiinction of firms' competitive strategy and board independence based on the
regression estimates reported on Table 4 (regression 2).
As shown in Fig. 1 , the relationship between board independence and performance is
positive for both cost-efficiency and innovation firms. However, this relationship is
stronger for cost-efficiency firms than for innovation firms. Conditioned on the STRA
being equal to 1 for firms pursuing a strategy of innovation and to for firms pursuing a
strategy of cost efficiency, the ROE values for cost-efficiency firms are the sum of the
estimated coefficients for the intercept and fND, and the ROE values for innovation firms
are the sum of the estimated coefficients for the intercept, IND, STRA, and STRA*rND.
Fig. 1 shows that when board independence is at the minimum level (25% outside
directors on the boards in our sample), innovation firms perform better than cost-
Chen and Popovitch (2002) propose that to examine whether the correlation in sub-group A differs fi-om that
in sub-group B, a Z-test can be performed using the following formula: Z where both
\/l/K-3) + l/(Hb-3)'
and Zrb are the Fisher's Z-values for sub-group A and sub-group B, respectively and «a ^^d «t, are sample sizes of
sub-group A and sub-group B, respectively.
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efficiency firms. However, as the level of board independence increases, the performance
advantage of innovation firms over cost-efficiency firms decreases. The positive slopes
for both innovation firms and cost-efficiency firms suggest that increasing the level of
board independence will result in improved performance. However, the performance
implication of board independence is stronger for cost-efficiency firms than for
innovation firms.
5. Summary and discussion
In this paper, we investigate the effect of board independence on performance across
different strategies. The results are consistent with our hypothesis that firms which pursue a
strategy of cost efficiency benefit more from an increased level ofboard independence than
firms that pursue a strategy of innovation.
These results suggest that firms for which efficiency is critical to success will benefit
more from the boards' management-monitoring activities than firms for which innovation
is critical to success. The benefit of the boards' management-monitoring activities in terms
of increased efficiency will be compensated by the tendency of these activities to limit
managers' ability to implement creative and innovative decisions. This might be the reason
why the interaction terms of board independence and competitive strategy are significantly
negative.
The results have important policy and practical implications. Although they support
recent reforms aiming to tighten requirements for board independence and thereby facilitate
more effective board supervision of managers (e.g., OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance, 1999; The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; Toronto Stock Exchange Corporate
Governance Guidelines of 1996), the impact of this increased independence on
performance might not be the same for all firms. Additionally, the focus on manager-
monitoring roles indicated by recent legal reforms regarding corporate boards may have
caused board members to ignore their strategic-management and relational roles (Baysinger
& Butler, 1985). Outside directors who gain greater knowledge and experience of external
affairs can more viably reduce uncertainties surrounding the formulation and implemen-
tation of strategy (Dallas, 2001) and more effectively deal with uncertainties involving
firms' customers, competitors, suppliers, technology, and economic circumstances (Pearce
& Zahra, 1 992). Therefore, firms that pursue a strategy of innovation might emphasize
board members' strategic-management and relational roles more than their management-
monitoring role.
The results of this study suggest that board independence should not be thought of as a
panacea which can increase performance for all firms, as has been implied by the recent
reforms regarding board structures, composition, and practices. Rather, the results suggest
that management need to consider their firm's competitive strategy in determining the level
of board independence since the impact of board independence on performance varies
systematically across different strategies.
However, the results of this study should be interpreted in light of two limitations. First,
this study uses data from manufacturing sectors. Further research is required in order to
determine whether the results of this study can be extended to other industries. Second,
although the results show that the relationship between board independence and
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performance differs across business strategies, other variables might also affect this
relationship. Future research might consider other variables such as leadership style and
board members' expertise when investigating the relationship between board independence
and performance.
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John Innes (Ed.), Handbook of Management Accounting, 3rd edition. CIMA
Publishing, Oxford (2004). xxviii + 970 pages, 183.71 euros, ISBN: 7506 6518 1
1. Introduction
This book focuses on management accounting research findings in a form and style that
is easily understandable, especially for practitioners. It alerts the reader to the rate ofchange
in management accounting knowledge. Practitioners need to monitor the developments in
management accounting in other organizations to ensure that the best tools and techniques
are adopted by their own respective organizations.
The most important themes of the book are: cost commitment during the design process
and external focus of management accounting.
The book discusses 10 techniques which play a usefiil role during the design process: (1)
strategic management accounting, (2) competitor analysis, (3) research and development
performance measurement, (4) product life-cycle costing, (5) target costing, (6) functional
costing, (7) cost tables, (8) cost management, (9) environment-related management
accounting, and (10) design.
The book also presents ten strategic elements for the external focus of management
accounting: (1) strategic financial management, (2) competitor analysis, (3) research and
development performance measurement, (4) target costing, (5) environment-related
management accounting, (6) outsourcing, (7) value chain analysis, (8) design, (9)
performance measurement, and (10) benchmarking. These techniques are grouped into five
sections: introduction, planning, costing, decision-making, and control. Topics in each
section have been well covered.
2. Part A—introduction
The introduction includes topics which cover strategic management accounting and its
application in small businesses.
3. Part B
—
planning
"Planning" consists of 12 chapters that relate to the planning process. These chapters
alert practitioners to the crucial elements that need to be considered at the planning stage.
These include introduction to variance analysis, competitor analysis, and evaluating
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research and development activities. Readers are also exposed to different types ofbudgets,
including cash, capital, zero-based, and activity-based budgeting. To help readers
understand activity-based budgeting, three detailed case studies are provided. This section
ends with a chapter on changes in management accounting, which offers some knowledge
and exposure on why and how management accounting changes to the readers.
4. Part C
—
costing
"Costing", the third part of the book, has 1 1 chapters. Beginning with standard costing
and new costing-related techniques, these chapters expose readers to the different types of
costing methods. The definition, principal, problems, and advantages of each technique are
explained in separate chapters. This arrangement helps readers focus on required areas and
related sub-sections. Case studies are also provided as an appendix to the chapter on
activity-based costing (ABC). Readers may be surprised by the new techniques that are
available such as energy and fiinctional costing methods. The book highlights the
advantages of product life-cycle and its necessity, especially in the current, quick changing
environment. These topics illustrate the broad coverage of this book which should appeal to
readers fi-om different academic backgrounds and organizations.
5. Part D—decision making
The section on decision making has sixteen chapters. The first provides an introduction
to cost management, which exposes readers to the elements oftraditional cost management.
ABC, ABCM, ABM, and ABB are all explained well in one chapter to minimize confusion.
Detailed case studies provide examples of ABM and ABC in practice. Several new and
important techniques such as business process re-engineering (BPR), throughput
accounting, outsourcing, and value-chain analysis are included. Readers are exposed to
several techniques that need to be considered during the decision-making process. Two
chapters focus on issues related to decision making on pricing and transfer pricing. This
section also relates to other current and important types of decision making and
management accounting such as the environment, shareholder value, supply chain, product
design, and human resources. It alerts readers to the need for a wide range of factors and
techniques in any decision making process.
6. Part E—control
The last part ofthe book has ten chapters dealing with different types of financial-control
and performance measures. Readers are given an overview of financial control methods and
their importance in the current, rapidly changing business environment. Both financial and
nonfinancial measures are introduced. A case study highlighting the importance and
usefulness of developing a nonfinancial measurement system is provided in one of the
chapters. The development of "Tableau de Bord", business intelligence tools, benchmark-
ing, and balanced performance measurement system chapters follow. Three chapters help
the reader understand the numerous ways to measure the performance oftheir organizations
by alerting practitioners that they cannot rely on only one particular performance-
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measurement tool. This section provides information that can help an organization remain
innovative and competitive.
7. General opinion
The book frequently refers readers to other related chapters, for example, on page 13:
"However, the two costing techniques which will be highlighted in relation to sfrategic
management accounting are target costing (chapter 24) and cost tables (chapter 26)".
Empirical evidence to support certain points is also referred. For example, the importance of
planning and strategy in the "real-world" is supported by empirical studies on small
businesses (pages 29-31). The book also highlights the issues of a particular technique by
referring the reader to previous survey findings or research conducted on the topic. Detailed
"real" case studies are also included in several chapters—for example, there are three
selected case studies in chapter 14.
One aim of the book is to introduce the readers to the latest and most important tools and
techniques such as the impact of the global economy on strategic monitoring and
competitor analysis. Variance is looked at in a more relevant way, highlighting broad sets
and main ways to achieve each issue in several chapters.
Diagrams are used liberally to enhance discussion. They provide an overview as well as
a better understanding. Chapters 12 ("zero-based budgeting") and 13 ("activity-based
budgeting") are well organized and explained. Reasons for advancing new techniques and
methods over traditional ones are fully explained, which allows readers to choose
techniques that best suit their organization.
There are, however, several sections in the book that might be difficult for some readers
to understand, especially those without an accounting background. For example, the
explanation of opportunity costs and net present value (NPV) in chapters 3 ("strategic
management accounting in the small business") and 5 ("strategic financial management"),
respectively, are not clearly explained. These points could be better understood if simple
examples were provided.
Although the book is good about referring the reader from one chapter to another for
ftirther explanation, sometimes an infroductory explanation on a particular issue is essential
in the chapter when it is first mentioned. The explanation should at least include comparison
between the earlier mentioned issue/tool, its advantages, history, and usage rather than just
mentioning it and leaving it to be explained in a much later chapter. This would help readers
grasp the basic view of the issue/tool in the chapter in which it is first mentioned.
8. Conclusion
The editor and authors of this book on management accounting have in general made an
extensive effort to tackle a wide range of fraditional and new management-accounting
techniques. It is a well-organized book covering five important elements of management
accounting. Since most readers would not have time to read the book straight through, the
division of the book into five sections which are then subdivided into chapters will help
readers go straight to the issue/tool that interests them. Most importantly, the book's
greatest contribution is the rich knowledge on management accounting techniques it
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provides to practitioners, who may be with or without accounting knowledge. Hence, I
would highly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in understanding any
techniques in management accounting.
Suzana Sulaiman
Faculty ofAccountancy,
Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), Malaysia
doi:10.1016/j.mtacc.2006.07.008
Corporate Finance—Theory and Practice, Pierre Vernimmen, Pascal Quiry,
Maurizio Dallocchio, Yann Le Fur, Antonio Salvi. Dalloz/Wiley, Paris/London
(2005). 1030 pages, $85.00, €60.00, ISBN: 2-247-06391-8
Does the world need another corporate finance book? This one, at least, is different. In
great contrast with such leading texts as Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe (2004) or Brealey,
Myers, and Allen (2005), Corporate Finance—Theory and Practice puts financial
statement analysis at the core of the exposition. In this, the book sticks to the tradition of the
French corporate finance manual written by Pierre Vernimmen in the 1 970s, of which it is
an offspring. The first of the four sections is entirely about financial statement analysis. The
rest of the structure follows standard texts, with an exposition of net present value theory,
risk, and corporate financial policies. Two other distinctive features of the book are its
emphasis on institutional details, and its European focus (two of the authors work in a
French bank, and the other two teach in an Italian business school).
For anyone who teaches corporate finance to European audiences, the promise of a text
that highlights some of the institutional background is welcome. And recent accounting
scandals have underscored that accounting is at the core of financial practice.
Is the promise fulfilled? The answer is mixed. The authors' decision to start out with
financial statement analysis has some pedagogical costs. For example, I am uncomfortable
with the fact that the first discussion of the time value ofmoney occurs in chapter 16. In my
teaching experience, starting with general principles and working down to the details of fi^ee
cash flow calculation works best. In the same vein, Section 1 contains normative statements
on what the right financial structure is. But how is a student to react upon discovering the
Modigliani-Miller irrelevance propositions some 20 chapters later? To some extent, these
are minor quibbles, as Section 1 could be read after the other three—but then, the book
should come with a user's manual explaining how different readers could best make use of
it (students enrolled in a course, self-study students, practitioners needing a quickly
accessible reference). Altematively, the book structure should be altered.
More troubling is the order of presentation within the sections. For example, accruals are
first defined in chapter 7 ("How to cope with the most complex points in financial
accounts," p. 94). It is not clear why accruals (surely not a "complex" concept) are not
defmed in one of the six preceding chapters devoted to cash flows, eamings, etc. Perhaps
these quirks can be attributed to the fact that the four authors divided up the work and did
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not pay sufficient attention to structure. It is to be hoped that this will be fixed in future
editions.
The theoretical parts are not the book's primary strength. The presentation of some key
concepts is downright cryptic. What is a novice to make of the following highlighted
passage (p. 444)?
The cost of capital is not the weighted average of two separate costs. The overall
riskiness of the company is represented by the cost of capital, whose two key
components are debt and equity. The costs of equity and debt are a fiinction of the
risk of the assets, the cost of overall capital and the respective weighting of each.
None of the authors is a native English speaker, and proper editing might have helped.
But in places, the lack of clarity has nothing to do with language. It is not clear to me why
the MM II formula, which has the ratio of debt to equity as an argument, is illustrated by a
graph using the ratio of debt to total firm value as its horizontal axis (p. 663). This is sure to
cause great bewilderment for first-time students of this central concept. Sometimes, the
theoretical discussions indicate a lack of familiarity with academic finance. For example,
the capital structure discussion features a laudable attempt at reviewing recent academic
studies on the topic. But the choice of the academic studies reviewed is idiosyncratic and
does not represent the current consensus of the profession. Why spend,so much time on
Ross' incentive-signaling model (1977) when it has long been rejected by the empirical
literature? Finally, some statements are simply incorrect: "According to the semi-strong
efficiency hypothesis, the abnormal return should be observable only on the day when the
information becomes public." (p. 279). In fact, the semi-strong form of the efficient-market
hypothesis does not rule out price reactions to privately informed trades before the event (all
it rules out is underreaction or overreaction to the release of public information).
Clearly, the book's authors do not claim to be at the fi-ontier of finance knowledge. But
even for very concrete corporate valuation issues, this apparent detachment from theory can
become problematic. Consider the computation of an unlevered beta—clearly a top-rate
concem for many practitioners. On pp. 445-446, the authors give formulas for unlevered
betas, without justification. That would be fine if there were a consensus in the profession
on this issue. In fact, as Richard Ruback's recent work (2002) makes clear, the issue is quite
a bit more complex.
Even the practice-oriented sections (the book's distinctive feature) are not always
crystal-clear. Sometimes it is hard for the reader (or at least me) to figure out whether a
sentence is a prescription or a description. For example, on p. 815 the authors state a
"principle" according to which "when control of a listed company changes hands, minority
shareholders receive the same premium as that paid to the majority shareholder." It is hard
to infer from the surrounding discussion whether this principle (i) is an accurate description
of the empirical reality, (ii) is an accurate description of the legal principles governing such
transactions in European economies, or (iii) is just a principle that some market participants
think is desirable.
Given the announced emphasis on practice and the volume taken up by financial
statement analysis in the book, I would have expected in-depth discussions of creative
accounting
—
perhaps a case study. But the book only offers a few passing mentions and a
table listing dubious practices, without real discussion.
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One of the book's targets are practitioners, who will not have the time to read it from
cover to cover and will use it as a reference. How useful are they likely to find this book? In
my view, Section 1 on financial analysis is the book's main sfrength, and its emphasis on
practice will appeal to practitioners. It offers a nice complement to the classic corporate
finance texts. The book comes with an accompanying website and a newsletter, both of
which are useful. It remains in need of a better index: the index entry on "behavioral
finance" picks up a discussion of behavioral studies for cash management.
This book is clearly different from the well-established corporate-finance texts. It is
unlikely to displace them. The discussion of financial statement analysis will come as a
useful complement. For the rest of finance, most readers will be better served by existing
textbooks.
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Ethics, Governance and Accountability: A Professional Perspective, S. Dellaportas,
K. Gibson, R. Alagiah, M. Hutchinson, P. Leung, D. Van Homrigh. John Wiley and
Sons Australia, Milton (Qld) (2005). 363 pp., £27.95 / €46.20, ISBN: 0-470-80499-8
This textbook emphasizes that ethics need to be an essential feature if a firm is to achieve
a sound business environment and long-run accountability. It builds on two main
observations. First, lapses in ethical behavior seem to have caused many of the high-profile
corporate collapses and financial scandals; second, even apparently good governance
systems have been unable to prevent such scandals. Accounting professionals find
themselves at the heart of this ethics crisis, which seriously deteriorates the public trust.
The book advocates the necessary reinforcement of ethics in accounting education. It
generally addresses students from graduate (or upper undergraduate) programs in
commerce and business administration, and more specifically students in a professional
accounting program. References and practical illustrations are mainly related to Australian
and U.S.A. settings. The approach is practitioner-oriented, combining concise presentations
of theories, concepts, or frameworks, along with practical experiences and cases. Each
chapter announces learning objectives and ends with a summary, key terms, understanding
questions, and a practical case study. The textbook is structured in two parts. Part 1
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(Chapters 1-4) deals with the concept of ethics at the level of individuals. Part 2 (Chapters
5-12) addresses ethics questions in a regulatory and corporate environment.
Chapter 1 introduces the framework for ethics in a business context. In this framework,
stakeholders - whether capital providers, customers or the public at large - have
expectations of companies regarding, for instance, a product's safety or financial-reporting
quality. The authors provide real-world examples of unethical behavior by companies,
professional accountants, auditors, or CFOs, and then discuss the sources of threats to
ethical behavior, hi parallel to the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and IFAC (2003)
recommendations, they briefly depict recent efforts by Ausfralian authorities to restore
credibility and public confidence in financial reports.
Chapter 2 provides general background on what an ethical decision can be, and explains
the different stages an individual goes through in the process of cognitive moral reasoning.
Three well-accepted theories of ethics and their limitations are addressed: utilitarianism,
rights, and justice. Each theory is exposed and an insightful parallel is made between
stakeholders' natural rights and implied accountants' duties; i.e. that the right to truth
imposes a moral obligation on accountants to ensure that financial statements are true and
fair. The question of moral judgment is then covered following Kohlberg's model of
cognitive development. Referring to cognitive accounting research, the authors point out
that - confrary to other tertiary educated professions - the level of moral reasoning among
accountants is not higher than that of the general population of adults. They blame a [too
much] rule-based accounting education that potentially atrophies professional judgment
and the ability of auditors to resist a client's pressure.
Chapter 3 is an institutional and normative presentation of the Ausfralian accounting
profession, based on the CPA Ausfralia and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
Australia (2002) Joint Code of Professional Conduct, which has a structure and
fundamental principles developed to parallel the IFAC (2003) Proposed Revised Code of
Ethics for Professional Accountants. The code, which places professional accountants in a
specific - sometimes hard to stand - triadic position between his/her client (or employer)
and the public emphasizes the notion of public interest. But, despite intentions, the authors
conclude that the code of conduct has been primarily used to serve the economic welfare of
the profession rather than the public interest. This relative failure of the self-regulation
process is attributed to a lack of ethical reasoning or behavior.
After explaining the main steps of the conventional decision-making process, chapter 4
details the ethical process of the American Accounting Association (1990), which was
adopted by Australian professional accountants in 2002. A key development in this chapter
is the hierarchy of ethical decision making developed in regard to previous points: (1)
compliance with laws, (2) compliance with professional obligations and duties (e.g. the
Code of Professional Conduct), and (3) reliance on individual moral reasoning in
accordance with philosophical and normative theories of ethics. Based on this hierarchy, the
authors try to enhance professional accountants' ethical reasoning by showing that mere
compliance does not necessarily ensure that a decision has ethical value. For this purpose,
they discuss benchmarks of fundamental ethical values (general core values, principles of
professional conduct). Although largely based on utilitarian ethical principles, the AAA
model is presented as a structured and rational tool likely to offer professionals practical
guidance for resolving ethical questions.
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Chapter 5 initiates Part 2, on corporate and regulatory factors, by introducing the concept
of corporate governance. The approach taken is the shareholder-based - hence rather
restrictive - owner-manager agency framework. The chapter discusses recent achievements
and governance guidelines for Australian public companies, including board-monitoring
effectiveness, the enhancement of audit quality, the promotion of ethical behavior by codes
of conduct, and finally, the recognition of other stakeholders'' interests through social
responsibilities or human capital. One regrets that these "other stakeholders" (customers,
suppliers, employees, lenders, the public at large, etc.) receive little consideration in the
shareholder-based approach of corporate govemance. A clear message (p. 126), however, is
that effective corporate govemance remains contingent on the promotion of core ethical
values such as trust, integrity, openness, responsibility, accountability and mutual respect
by top managers and directors. The monitoring function of corporate govemance is then
depicted following the usual distinction of intemal (board, sub-committees, remuneration
packages) and extemal (auditors, goveming bodies, debt covenants) devices. Lack of due
care from boards, audit committees, or auditors is illustrated with the high-profile corporate
failures of Enron, and HIH Insurance in Australia.
Chapter 6 introduces forensic accounting. The perspective shifts from the ex ante
prevention of conflict by corporate govemance mechanisms to their ex post settlement by
litigation, arbitration or disciplinary process. The chapter first describes the Australian
environment for forensic accountants, and then discusses the different types of forensic
services, distinguishing between reactive and proactive ones. Reactive services encompass
fraditional investigations in a conflicting situation, whereas proactive ones stand in a
collaborative perspective (e.g. security consulting, valuation services in business
negotiations, fraud prevention) and take a growing share of forensic departments' missions.
Chapter 7 reviews creative accounting techniques and related red flags that should be
watched in an auditing perspective. Creative accounting, the use of accounting flexibility to
provide misleading information in a compliant framework, involves a cmcial ethical
dilemma regarding the ethical decision-making hierarchy developed in Chapter 4.
Therefore, although technically and practically insightfiil, this chapter would have
benefited from fiarther development of two notable aspects: the core ethical values and
the quality attributes of financial reporting that are commonly breached by creative
accountants; and the fact that academic research often documents relations between
monitoring and/or audit-quality characteristics and financial-reporting quality, and
specifically, earnings-management proxies.
Chapters 8 and 9 extend corporate accountability to the domains of social and
environmental responsibilities. The argument first explains the shift ofthe ethical paradigm
from purely utilitarianism to social justice and sustainability, and then presents social and
envirormiental accounting as issues cenfral to ethical decision making. Chapter 8 introduces
the broad concept of social and environmental accountability as it applies to stakeholder
theory, social legitimacy, and the political economy of organizations. The value relevance
of corporate social/environmental disclosures is discussed in terms of partiality (only "good
news" reported), finality (maximization of shareholder value?), and the risk that such
information serves only propaganda or lobbying activities of corporations. Although
"social audif services developed by accounting fums are not specifically addressed.
Chapter 8 describes common social accounting methods and reporting practices as a mix of
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quantified (financial or not) and narrative information; the major resulting difficulty being
that of benchmarking and comparing this social information across firms.
Chapter 9 introduces environmental issues by explaining the paradoxes between
economic and environmental considerations. For example, when companies use free
natural assets, the corresponding cost is not accounted for. Thus market competitiveness
leads to spoiling environmental resources. In other words, business corporate equity differs
from environmental ("intergenerational") fairness. This raises environmental ethical
dilemmas and the concept of sustainability. The chapter then discusses the two antagonist
approaches to preserve environmental assets: regulation (e.g., environmental laws and
taxes) and market mechanisms (e.g., property rights or tradable pollution permits likely to
enhance companies' responsibility in the use of natural assets.) Examples and limitations of
both approaches are exposed, highlighting the potentially negative ethical consequences of
pollution-permits mechanisms. The chapter ends by discussing the validity of different
ethical judgments with respect to environmental issues, and by stressing the role of
environmental reporting in ethical decision making.
Chapter 1 provides normative coverage of the key independence duty that applies to
professional accountants. It builds on principal-agent theory to justify independent audits
both in fact and in appearance, and then extensively refers to the Australian Joint Code of
Professional Conduct and IFAC's code of ethics to present in detail the threats to
independence (self-interest, self-review, familiarity, and intimidation) and related
safeguards.
The final two chapters of this textbook address the conflicts of interests that
accountants may face as external (Chapter 11) or salaried (Chapter 12) professionals.
The approach remains largely normative. Chapter 11 deals with client-centered conflicts
related to tax consulting, professional fees, and dismissal pressures. Chapter 12 focuses
on employer-centered conflicts and related ethical dilemmas, with special attention to
the problem of whistle blowing by employed accountants; a structured decision process
for internal and external whistle blowing is proposed. The chapter then examines the
role of cultural perspectives based on the idea that business ethics is markedly different
across cultures, as illustrated by corruption and bribery indexes worldwide. In
conclusion, the authors advocate the development of a strong, ethical, corporate
culture, which relies on corporate codes of conduct and is supported by the "tone at the
top," set by managers.
Students will find that this textbook provides a useful and comprehensive overview of
major ethical issues. The writing is clear and accessible, and numerous examples make the
presentation of ethical concepts quite attractive. One problem to note relates to the
separation between Part 1 (ethics at the level of individuals) and Part 2 (ethics in a
corporate/regulatory environment), when, in reality, the underlying issues may overlap. As
a rule, the reader's progression through the book may not necessarily be straightforward.
For instance. Chapter 10 on independence would be better placed after Chapter 3 which
introduces codes of conduct; Chapters 11 and 12 are also strongly rooted in issues of
individual ethical behavior by accountants. Since the book is aimed at fijture professional
accountants, the dominantly normative approach and tone seem appropriate. Conceming
the role of governance and auditing structures with respect to financial reporting quality
surrogates (e.g. fi-audulent reporting, restatements, earnings management), or the relations
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between creative accounting and firm performance, brief allusions to the findings of
positive empirical research would have been insightful.
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Abstract
This study explores the effects of investor-protection on reported earnings quahty assessed on the
basis of four accounting-based earnings attributes (accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings
predictability, and earnings smoothness). We test the hypothesis that favorable values of each earnings
attribute (considered individually) occur in countries whose institutional characteristics provide
relatively strong investor-protection. The results based on K-means cluster analysis of institutional
characteristics are mixed. Earnings smoothness is less prevalent in strong investor-protection
countries, as hypothesized. However both accruals quality and earnings predictability are better in
countries whose institutional characteristics are relatively weak. No association is found between
investor-protection and earnings persistence, except that countries with low ownership concentration
appear to have high earnings persistence. The results based on regression analysis are consistent with
those based on the cluster analysis. These results imply that conclusions about the impact of
institutional characteristics on earnings quality depend on how earnings quality is measured.
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1. Introduction
A major motivation for accounting research is providing evidence on the usefiilness of
earnings. Of particular interest in recent years has been the quahty of accounting reports,
particularly the quality of earnings. In September 1998 Arthur Levitt, then Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), presented 'The Numbers Game" at New York
University, in which he highlighted the escalating problem with the quality of financial
reporting in filings with the SEC. Accounting quality has also received a great deal of
attention following a significant increase in the incidence of earnings restatements (GAO,
2003), several high-profile bankruptcy filings by firms accused of accounting irregularities
(e.g., Worldcom and Enron), and the demise of Arthur Andersen.
Earnings quality is of major importance to users of financial information as well as to
practitioners, regulators, and accounting researchers since earnings is widely believed to be
the premier information item provided in financial statements (Lev, 1989). Schipper and
Vincent (2003) contend that poor earnings quality is detrimental to investors and other
financial statement users. Low-quality earnings can lead to a misallocation of capital and
may also generate inappropriate outcomes for contracts that use accounting data as inputs.
Teets (2002) suggests that earnings quality is influenced by prevailing standards as well
as by managers' accounting choices. Since managerial discretion plays an important role in
financial reporting, several international studies (e.g., Ali & Hwang, 2000; Ashbaugh &
LaFond, 2003; Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; DeFond, Hung, & Trezevant, 2004; Hung,
2001 ; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003) have examined whether differences in the properties
of earnings across countries are associated with the legal protection afforded outside
investors from expropriation by controlling shareholders or managers.
The extent of investor-protection varies greatly around the world. Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) state that in some countries such as the United States, Japan, and Germany, the law
protects the rights of at least some investors and the courts are relatively willing to enforce
these laws. But even in these countries, the legal system leaves managers and controlling
owners with considerable discretion to manage reported earnings in order to mask true firm
performance and to conceal their private control benefits fi^om outsiders. In most of the rest
of the world, the extent of investor-protection is less and the judicial system works less well
as courts consider only the clearest violations of investor rights. As a result, legal protection
alone becomes insufficient and accounting information such as earnings cannot reflect
"true" economic performance.
Previous research related to a linkage between investor-protection and earnings quality
is relatively scarce. Most prior studies have focused on the effect of investor-protection on
earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003), value relevance of earnings (Ali & Hwang, 2000;
Hung, 2001 ), and informativeness of reported earnings (Ball et al., 2000). Leuz et al. (2003)
find less earnings management in countries with stronger investor-protection. Bhattacharya,
Daouk, and Welker (2003) find that an increase in overall earnings opacity in a country is
linked to an increase in the cost of equity and a decrease in trading in the stock market of
that country. Ali and Hwang (2000) document that earnings in the United States is more
value relevant than earnings in other countries because of the differences in country-
specific factors. Hung (2001) concludes that shareholder protection improves the effect-
iveness of accrual accounting. Ball et al. (2000) document that an important difference
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between common-law and code-law countries is the manner of resolving information
asymmetry between managers and potential users of accounting income, including debt and
equity investors, employees, suppliers, and customers. These prior studies show the im-
portance of an individual country's investor-protection on the quality of accounting in-
formation. However, they focus on one attribute of earnings such as smoothness or value
relevance. This study extends prior research by exploring the effects of investor-protection on
four accounting-based measures of earnings quality: accruals quality, eamings persistence,
earnings predictability, and eamings smoothness.
We examine the hypothesis that favorable values of each eamings attribute (considered
individually) occur in countries whose institutional characteristics provide relatively strong
investor-protection. The results, based on K-means cluster analysis between institutional
characteristics and eamings attributes, are mixed. Eamings smoothness appears to be less
prevalent in countries whose institutional characteristics are strong. However, high accmals
quality and high predictive ability of eamings are more likely to be found in countries
whose institutional characteristics are weak. In addition, the results show no effect of
differential institutional characteristics on eamings persistence, except that countries with
low ownership concentration appear to have high eamings persistence. The results based on
regression analysis are consistent with those based on the cluster analysis. Given the mixed
results on the association between institutional characteristics and eamings attributes, it
would appear that conclusions about eamings quality depend on how it is defined.
This study contributes to the accounting literature in the following ways. First, prior
research has focused on cross-country differences in the properties of eamings (e.g., Alford,
Jones, Leftwich, & Zmijewski, 1993; Ali & Hwang, 2000; Ball et al., 2000) using one
aspect of eamings attributes. This study is one of the first to explore cross-country
differences in the properties of reported eamings using four accounting-based eamings
attributes to draw conclusions about eamings quality. Second, this study extends prior
studies such as DeFond et al. (2004), Ashbaugh and LaFond (2003), Leuz et al. (2003),
Bhattacharya et al. (2003), Hung (2001), Ball et al. (2000), and Ali and Hwang (2000) by
investigating the effects of investor-protection on accounting-based eamings attributes and
eamings quality. Finally, our findings have implications for security analysts, regulators,
standard setters, and other accounting-information users in enhancing their understanding
of legal institutional differences and their impact on the properties of reported eamings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion of
measures of earnings-quality, and Section 3 describes the investor-protection proxies.
Section 4 contains the research design, and Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6
summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. Measures of earnings quality
"Quality of eamings" is a multidimensional concept and there is no agreed-upon
definition in the literature. Schipper and Vincent (2003) propose a number of eamings-
quality constmcts, including three derived fi^om the time-series properties of eamings:
persistence, predictive ability, and variability. In the empirical literature, studies such as
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2003), among
others, use accmals quality to draw conclusions about eamings quality and view eamings to
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be of higher quahty if accruals quahty is high. Dechow and Dichev (2002), Penman and
Zhang (2002), and Richardson (2003) view earnings to be of higher quahty when earnings
is more persistent. Bricker, Previts, Robinson, and Young (1995) and Mikhail, Walther, and
Willis (2003) define earnings quality as the extent to which a firm's past earnings is
associated with its future cash flows, where high earnings quality occurs when a firm's
earnings has high predictability. Some studies such as Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003) and
Ball and Shivakumar (2004) view earnings to be of higher quality when earnings man-
agement is low and bad news is recognized in a timely fashion.
Based on this prior literature, this study uses the following earnings attributes as
indicators of high earnings quality: (1) accmals quality, which refers to the extent to which
accruals map into the related cash flow realization: when accruals shift or adjust the
recognition of cash flows over time so that the adjusted earnings better measures firm
performance and better predicts the ftiture earnings and cash flows; (2) earnings persistence,
which refers to the extent to which an innovation (unexpectedness) in the eamings series
causes investors to revise their future eamings expectations; (3) eamings predictability,
which refers to the ability of eamings to predict future eamings;' and (4) eamings
smoothness, which refers to the use of accmals to smooth eamings: low smoothness means
that a firm's management has not engaged in smoothing practices."
2.]. Accruals quality
Several measures to assess eamings quality indicate that eamings which maps more
closely into cash is more desirable (e.g., Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2004;
Harris, Huh, & Fairfield, 2000). The gap between eamings and cash is fi^om accmals. One
role of accmals is to shift or adjust the recognition of cash flows over time so that the
adjusted numbers (eamings) better measure firm performance. However, accmals require
assumptions and estimates of ftiture cash flows. Thus, accmals are the product of
judgments, estimates, and allocations. Dechow and Dichev (2002) (hereafter, DD) develop
a measure of accmals quality and argue that the quality of accmals and eamings is
decreasing in the magnitude of estimation error in accmals. The DD model uses firm-
specific regressions of changes in working capital on last year, present, and one-year ahead
cash flows from operations and defines accmals quality as a standard deviation of the
residual from this firm-specific regression.
However, McNichols (2002) proposes a modified DD (2002) model, arguing that the
changes in sales revenue and property, plant, and equipment are important in forming
expectations about current accmals, over and above the effects of operating cash flows. She
shows that applying variables from the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney,
' Since eamings predictability refers to the ability of past eamings to predict future eamings (Lipe, 1990), it is
linked to a specific task, and is a decreasing function of the variance of eamings innovations. Hence, there is a
possible contradiction between the persistence and predictive ability of eamings (i.e., eamings that are of high
quality on the persistence dimension may be of low quality on the predictive ability dimension).
" Management can engage in eamings smoothing practices by introducing transitory components to the income
series in order to decrease time-series variability and increase eamings predictability (Schipper & Vincent, 2003).
In addition, former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt (1998) holds that managers smooth eamings because they
believe investors prefer smoothly increasing eamings.
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1995) into the cross-sectional DD model significantly increases its explanatory power and
thus reduces measurement error. The accrual-estimation errors using a residual (e,) are
measured from the following equation:
= bo + b\* — \- bi*
:
Total Asset/ ,-1 TotalAssety,-i " TotalAsset/ ,-
+ bs*
TotalAsset/,-
1
Total Assety,,-
Total Asset/.,- 1 -''
Where:
TCAj,f Firmy's total current accruals in year t. (ACAy ,- ACLy ,- ACashy ,+ ASTDEBTy ,+
ATP,,).
Total Asset/,- 1 Firmy's total assets in year t- 1 (#G107).
CFO/„ Firmy's cash flow from operations in year t. This CFO is calculated as net income
before extraordinary items (#G378) less total accruals (TA).^
AREVy^Firmy's change in total revenue between year /- 1 and /.
PPE,,, Firmy's property, plant, and equipment in year t (#G639).
TAy„ Firm y's total accruals in year t. (ACA^,,- ACL,,- ACashy„+ ASTDEBTy„+
ATP,„-Dep,„).
CA/„ Firmy's current assets in year t (#G638).
CL,„ Firmy's current liabilities in year t (#G650).
Cashy,, Firmy's cash in year t (#G628).
STDEBTy,, Firmy's debt in current liabilities in year t (#G132).
TPy„ Firmy's taxes payable in year t (#G161).
Depy,, Firmy's depreciation and amortization expenses in year / (#G399).
This study employs the modified DD model proposed by McNichols (2002) and
assumes that uncertainty in accruals (proxied by the standard deviation of the residual) is
best captured by this model. The measure of accruals quality is based on this standard
deviation of estimated residual ((T(ey,), hereafter, Stdresid) from Eq. (1) as it refers to the
extent to which working-capital accruals map into operating cash flow realizations. Large
(small) values of Stdresid correspond to lower (higher) accruals quality and lower (higher)
earnings quality.
^ Variable CFO is available as a data item for U.S. firms as it is required by SFAS No. 95, but not for all non-U. S.
firms. Consistent with Leuz et al. (2003) and Bhattacharya et al. (2003), this study uses the indirect (balance sheet)
approach to estimate accruals rather than the direct (statement of cash flows) approach. Although the indirect
approach may suffer from measurement error in accruals, especially for firms with merger and acquisition activity or
discontinued operations (Hribar and Collins, 2002), it allows for a larger sample of firms across countries than is
possible in the direct approach. In fact, many of sample countries in this study do not require the preparation or
presentation of a statement of cash flows.
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2.2. Earnings persistence
Kormendi and Lipe (1987) use firm-level regressions of current earnings on last year's
earnings to estimate the slope-coefficient estimates of earnings persistence. This study
employs the measure in Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and uses the following equation:
Earn,,
^
Earn,,-!
, ,
'
=a + (3,* ^''' +Vjj (2)
TotalAssetS/,,-1 Total Assety.,
Where:
Earn, , Firm's y net income before extraordinary items in year t (#G378).
Earuy ,_ 1 Firm'sy net income before extraordinary items in year t- 1.
The measure capturing earnings persistence is based on the slope-coefficient estimate
(6i, hereafter, Persist) from Eq. (2). Values of 6i close to one (or greater than one) indicate
highly persistent earnings while values close to zero imply highly transitory earnings.
Persistent earnings are viewed as higher quality, while transitory earnings are viewed as
lower quality.
2.3. Earnings predictability
Lipe (1990) provides a measure of earnings predictability as it is reflected in the variance
of the earnings shocks (as variance increases, the predictability decreases). Francis et al.
(2004) follow his study by measuring earnings predictability using the square root of the
estimated error-variance from the earnings-persistence equation. In this study, earnings
predictability is calculated using the square root of the error variance from Eq. (2).
Predictability is:
Pred,, = ^a^v.,) (3)
Where:
<y~iyj,t) Estimated-error variance of firm y in year t, calculated from Eq. (2).
Large values of Pred imply less predictable earnings. More predictable earnings are
viewed as higher quality, while less predictable earnings are viewed as lower quality.
2.4. Earnings smoothness
Wysocki (2004) suggests a measure of earnings quality using closeness-to-cash as a
benchmark because it provides a direct benchmark for the absolute magnitude of
"economic income." He states that while discretionary-accruals models control for firm and
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industry characteristics, they fail to identify a benchmark for the underlying "economic
income" that is being managed. Leuz et al. (2003) suggest a possible solution to this
problem by introducing a closeness-to-cash benchmark for underlying "economic income"
using absolute working-capital accruals as a measure of earnings management and then
scaling this measure by absolute cash flow from operations. They also define earnings
smoothness as the ratio of the firm-level standard deviations of operating income and
operating cash flow (both scaled by lagged total assets). Bowen, Rajgopal, and
Venkatachalam (2003) measure earnings smoothness as the standard deviation of operating
cash flows divided by the standard deviation of earnings. Similarly, Francis et al. (2004)
measure earnings smoothness as the ratio of standard deviation of net income before
extraordinary items divided by beginning total assets to the standard deviation of cash flow
from operations divided by beginning total assets. Since all these measures of smoothness
are closely related, we adopt the one proposed by Bowen et al. (2003).
a(CFO,,/TotalAssets,,-,)
...
Smooth/, =-—-—^———
—
—
-
(4)
c7(Eam/ ,/TotalAssetS/ ,-1
)
Where:
a Firmy's standard deviation
CFOjj Firm 7 's operating cash flows in year t (indirect approach)
(T(Eamy,) Firmy's net income before extraordinary items in year t (#G378).
Ratios in excess of one indicate more variability in operating cash flows relative to the
variability of eamings, which implies the use of accruals to smooth earnings. Thus, large
(small) values ofSmooth indicate more (less) eamings smoothness and low (high) eamings
quality.
3. Investor-protection
Investor-protection is defined as the protection of outside investors by the en-
forcement of regulations and laws (Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002) or as a key institutional
factor affecting firm policy choices such as shareholder voting rights and financial
system policies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997).
La Porta et al. (2000) indicate that protected shareholder rights include those to receive
dividends on pro-rata terms, to vote for directors, to participate in shareholders' meetings,
to subscribe to new issues of securities on the same terms as the insiders, to sue directors or
the majority for suspected expropriation, and to call extraordinary shareholders' meetings.
If there is no investor-protection, insiders can steal a firm's profits by manipulating
accounting numbers. For example, insiders can use their financial reporting discretion to
(1) overstate eamings and conceal unfavorable eamings realizations (i.e., losses) that
would prompt outsider interference, and (2) understate eamings in years of good
performance by creating reserves for ftiture periods, effectively making reported eamings
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less variable than the firm's true economic performance (Leuz et al., 2003).'* Hence,
investors should understand the differences in laws and the effectiveness of investors'
enforcement across countries in order to protect their rights and make sure that the returns
on their investments will not be expropriated by the controlling shareholders or managers
(La Porta et al., 2000).
This study employs eight institutional characteristics from La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), and La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) and defines
them as investor-protection proxies: (1) antidirector rights, (2) efficiency of the judicial
system, (3) rule of law, (4) corruption index, (5) ratio ofthe stock market capitalization held by
minorities to gross domestic product, (6) ratio of the number of domestic firms to the
population, (7) ratio of the number of initial public offerings of equity to the population, and
(8) ownership concentration. La Porta et al. ( 1 998) use proxies 2,3, and 4 to measure the level
of legal enforcement in different countries. Leuz et al. (2003) use proxies 5, 6, and 7 to proxy
the importance ofequity markets across countries. However, this study considers these proxies
individually and uses them to characterize the sample countries into three distinct clusters
using K-means cluster analysis. The following sections explain how prior research has
characterized these eight proxies.
5.7. Antidirector rights
Following La Porta et al. (1998), this study defines the variable InvRights using an index
aggregating shareholder rights. This index is formed by adding one when (1) the country
allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to
deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders' meeting, (3) cumulative voting or
proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) an
oppressed-minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital
that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting is less than or
equal to 10% (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be
waived only by shareholders' vote. The index ranges from zero to six, with higher scores
implying stronger antidirector rights and better investor-protection.
3.2. Law enforcement: efficiency of the judicial system
Based on La Porta et al. (1998, 2000, 2004), JudicSys is an index representing the
average of investors' assessment of conditions of the judicial system in each country
between 1980 and 1983. The index ranges from zero to 10, with higher scores implying
greater legal enforcement and better investor-protection.
3.3. Law enforcement: rule of law
Based on Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004) and La Porta et al. (2004), RuleofLaw
is an index representing the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the
* The term "insiders" refers to both managers and conlrolhng shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000).
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rules of society in the year 2000. These include perceptions of the incidence of both violent
and non violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the
enforceability of contracts. This estimate ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher scores
implying greater legal enforcement and better investor-protection.
3.4. Law enforcement: corniption index
Based on Kaufrnann et al. (2004) and La Porta et al. (2004), Corruption is an index
measuring the exercise of public power for private gain in year 2000. This index
captures aspects ranging from the frequency of additional payments to get things done
to the effects of corruption on the business environment. The index ranges from -2.5 to
2.5, with higher scores implying greater legal enforcement and better investor-
protection.
3.5. Importance of equity market: external cap/GDP ratio
Based on La Porta et al. (2004), ExtCap, (External Cap/GDP) ratio is the ratio of
the stock market capitalization held by minorities to gross domestic product for the
period of 1996 to 2000. The stock market capitalization held by minorities is
computed as the product of the aggregate stock market capitalization and the average
percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the 10
largest nonfmancial, privately owned domestic firms in a given country. This study
uses this ratio to measure the importance of the equity market in each country, with
higher values indicating a greater importance of the stock market and better investor-
protection.
3.6. Importance of equity market: domestic firms/pop ratio
Based on La Porta et al. (2004), DoFirms equals Domestic Firms/Pop ratio is the ratio of
the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its population (in millions) for the
period of 1996-2000. Higher values indicate a greater importance of the stock market and
better investor-protection.
3. 7. Importance of equity market: IPOs/GDP ratio
Based on La Porta et al. (2004), IPOs equals IPOs/GDP ratio is the ratio of equity issued
by newly listed fums in a given country (in thousands) to its gross domestic product
(in millions) for the period of 1996-2000. Higher values indicate a greater importance
of the stock market and better investor-protection.
3.8. Ownership concentration
Following La Porta et al. (2004), Ownership is ownership concentration measured as the
average percentage ofcommon shares owned by the top three shareholders in the 10 largest
nonfmancial, privately owned domestic firms in a country. A firm is considered privately
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owned if the State is not a known shareholder in it. Lower values of Ownership correspond
to better investor-protection.
4. Research design
The accounting-and-investor-protection-variable definitions appear in Appendix A. This
study examines whether investor-protection affects the earnings quality of firms around the
world. The hypothesis, stated in its alternative form, is as follows:
HI. Firms in strong investor-protection countries have more favorable values of each
earnings attribute than firms in weak investor-protection countries.
Table 1
Sample: firm-year observations
Country Legal origin 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 N %
Australia English 110 121 165 197 219 236 242 1290
Canada English 221 232 240 279 291 297 287 1847
Hong Kong English 43 46 81 86 90 98 99 543
India English 75 77 107 192 191 192 185 1019
Malaysia English 135 188 345 383 395 425 431 2302
Singapore English 95 98 145 183 227 269 285 1302
South Afi-ica English 21 21 43 46 49 48 50 278
Thailand English 104 142 212 222 223 225 229 1357
United Kingdom English 284 380 458 483 522 546 557 3230
USA English 1530 1621 1685 1859 1895 1901 1889 12,380
2618 2926 3481 3930 4102 4237 4254 25,548 44.3%
Belgium French 32 45 52 58 77 80 80 424
Brazil French 39 40 97 104 105 105 105 595
Chile French 17 19 78 79 80 80 80 433
France French 159 224 288 345 410 437 436 2299
Greece French 9 26 45 56 60 61 59 316
Indonesia French 59 88 136 153 161 171 184 952
Italy French 41 80 90 99 142 159 160 771
Mexico French 29 34 53 53 58 60 60 347
Netherlands French 64 95 99 106 124 129 129 746
Philippines French 17 29 90 93 90 92 94 505
Spain French 46 70 73 84 91 93 94 551
512 750 1101 1230 1398 1467 1481 7939 13.8%
Austria German 23 34 38 41 46 50 49 281
Germany German 146 213 271 361 472 491 467 2421
Japan German 2109 2218 2295 2371 2442 2488 2538 16,461
South Korea German 14 15 74 99 154 189 203 748
Switzerland German 79 102 120 122 144 150 152 869
Taiwan German 23 52 142 152 163 182 195 909
2394 2634 2940 3146 3421 3550 3604 21,689 37.6%
Denmark Scandinavian 31 49 54 66 84 85 87 456
Finland Scandinavian 29 48 59 76 89 95 95 491
Norway Scandinavian 33 46 68 81 98 100 101 527
Sweden Scandinavian 36 78 121 154 186 188 197 960
129 221 302 377 457 468 480 2434 4.2%
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4.1. Data and sample selection
The study selects all firm-year observations in all countries that have the required
financial data to estimate all empirical models. All data are fi^om the Global Vantage
Industry Research and Industry Active Files for the fiscal years 1994 to 2003. Since the
computation of the accruals-quality measure requires lagged and future data, the sample
period is reduced to the period 1996 to 2002. The sample is restricted to industrial firms and
excludes all firms with SIC codes 6000-6999 and 9000-9999, as in Barth, Beaver, Hand,
and Landsman (1999), and Leuz et al. (2003). This restriction also increases the
homogeneity of the sample and improves comparability of the results across countries. The
study begins with the 49 countries in La Porta et al.'s (1998) sample, and eliminates
countries with fewer than 200 firm-year observations to compute each of the firm-level
variables in the analysis. Finally, this study trims the top and bottom 1% of the sample with
respect to change in total assets, total current accruals, and change in net income before
extraordinary items, all scaled by lagged total assets. These restrictions result in a final
sample of 57,610 firm-year observations drawn fi^om 31 countries.
Table 1 shows all firm-year observations sorted by legal origin over the period. The first
and second highest firm-year observations are from English and German legal-origin
countries (44.3% and 37.6%, respectively). An inspection of specific countries indicates
that nearly 55.7% of the sample consists of firm-year observations from the United
Kingdom (3230 observations), Japan (16,461 observations), and the United States (12,380
observations).^
4.2. Methodology
4.2.1. K-means cluster analysis
This study takes the following steps to test hypothesis 1 . First, countries are grouped by
investor-protection levels using a K-means cluster analysis based on MacQueen (1967).^
Second, each of the four earnings attributes is measured for the companies in the sample
using a pooled regression per country per year in order to get 2 1 7 country-year accounting
observations, calculated fi-om a product of 3 1 countries and 7 years. These 2 1 7 country-year
earnings-attribute observations are then averaged by country. Then, this country-mean
value is assigned to its investor-protection cluster. The study investigates the hypothesis
that clusters with low levels of investor-protection should have relatively less favorable
values of these attributes.^
When a study's tests are based on pooled firm-year observations, the dominance of these observations, as well
as their strong correlation with code/common-law institutional distinctions, could affect a study's primary tests.
However, this study should not be affected because the research design is based on pooled results of firm-year
observations per country per year, consistent with most country-year investor-protection observations.
'' K-means clustering is one of the simplest unsupervised learning algorithms that solves the clustering problem
by classifying a given data set into a certain number of clusters. The algorithm is composed of the following steps:
(1) place K points into the space represented by the objects that are being clustered, (2) assign each object to the
group that has the closest centroid, (3) recalculate the positions of the K centroids when all objects have been
assigned, (4) repeat steps 2 and 3 until the centroids no longer move.
Less favorable values of the four earnings attributes are low accruals quality, low earnings persistence, less
predictable earnings, and high earnings smoothness.
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4.2.2. Regression analysis
This study uses regression analysis to examine the relation between each of the earnings
attributes and investor-protection as follows:
Rank(Eamings Attribute)^
Rank(Eamings Attribute)^
Rank(Earnings Attribute)^
Rank(Earnings Attribute)^,
Rank(Eamings Attribute)^ :
Rank(Eamings Attribute)^ =
Rank(Eamings Attribute)^ -
Rank(Eamings Attribute) , =
• a + jSiInvRightSy, + ControlVariable,, + gy,
-- a + j8| JudicSySy, + ControlVariable/, + 8/,
a + jSjRuleofLaW// + ControlVariable/, + ejt
a + jSiCorruptiony, + ControlVariable/, + ey,
a + P^ExtCapjj + ControlVariab ley, + ej,
a + jS|DoFirms/, + ControlVariable/, + S/,
a + )S,IPOs// + ControlVariable/, + £/;
a + jSjOwnershipy, + ControlVariable/, + Sy,
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
Where:
Earnings attribute Stdresid, Persist, Pred, or Smooth
ControlVariable The country's public enforcement from La Porta et al. (2004). The
variable is measured as the mean of four underlying indices: Supervisor
Characteristics, Investigative Powers, Orders, and Criminals. The variable ranges
between zero (weak public enforcement) and one (strong public enforcement).
The public-enforcement variable is included to control for the impact of public
enforcement on earnings attributes. Bushman and Piotroski (2006) find that stronger
public-enforcement aspects of securities law discourage "optimism" by slowing
recognition of good news in earnings relative to firms in countries with weak public
enforcement aspects. Thus, this study includes the public enforcement variable as a
control variable for all equations.
Following Leuz et al. (2003), we rank-transform the earnings attributes. High values
of Persist correspond to high earnings quality. By contrast, high values of Stdresid,
Pred, and Smooth are indicative of poor earnings quality. To be consistent across
the four attributes, we rank Persist in ascending order and the other three variables in
descending order, so that high ranks imply high earnings quality. In the regression
models, the coefficient jS| captures the impact of an investor-protection variable on an
earnings attribute. Since high-quality earnings are likely in strong investor-protection
countries, we expect Pi to be positive.
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5. Empirical results
5.1. Sample means
This section provides sample means for both institutional characteristics and earnings
attributes. Table 2 presents results for the institutional variables, and Table 3 provides
descriptive statistics on the earnings-attributes variables.
Table 2, Panel A, provides mean institutional characteristics of each sample country for
the period 1996 to 2002. Not surprisingly, the highest level of investor-protection can be
found in developed countries including the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia,
Sweden, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Norway.
Table 2, Panel B, presents correlations among the institutional variables. High values of
the first seven institutional variables are indicative of strong investor-protection, and we
expect these variables to be positively correlated. Also, high values of ownership
concentration indicate weak protection, and hence we expect negative correlation between
this variable and the others. The results reported in Table 2, Panel B, show that the
correlation coefficients between institutional characteristics have the expected signs.
Table 3, Panel A, presents the average values of the main accounting variables used to
calculate each of the earnings attributes, scaled by lagged total assets. Table 3, Panel B,
provides means of the four earnings-attributes variables. We report means for both the raw
and ranked variables. As discussed previously, the earnings-persistence measure is ranked
in ascending order and the other three attributes are ranked in descending order, so that high
ranks indicate high earnings quality.
Table 3, Panel C, presents correlation coefficients between earnings attributes. Again,
the Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in the upper half and the Spearman-rank
correlation coefficients are presented in the lower half The prior research reviewed in
Section 2 suggests that high values of Persist and low values of Stdresid, Pred, and Smooth
are indicative of high earnings quality. However, the correlation matrix indicates that
Smooth has an unexpected negative correlation with Stdresid and Pred. The impact of
this unexpected result is discussed later in this section.
5.2. Cluster analysis
In this section, we first report results for the K-means cluster analysis of institutional
variables. This is followed by an analysis of the earnings attributes for these clusters.
We use eight institutional variables to group sample countries with similar institutional
characteristics. These proxies are standardized to z-scores and three distinct clusters are
identified through a K-means cluster analysis. This approach is similar to that of Leuz et al.
(2003), except that this study uses the most recent La Porta et al. data (2004) and does not
include a disclosure index as disclosure is likely to be highly correlated with the earnings
attributes. Table 4, Panel A, reports means of the investor-protection variables for each
cluster and tests of differences between clusters. The first cluster is characterized by
extensive outsider rights, strong legal enforcement, larger stock markets, and low
ownership concentration. The second and third clusters are characterized by lower outsider
rights, weaker legal enforcement, smaller stock markets, and higher ownership
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Table 4
Institutional clusters
Panel A: mean values of institutional characteristics by cluster
Institutional variables Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
-Antidirector rights
Tests of differences between clusters
-Efficiency of judicial system
Tests of differences between clusters
-Rule of law
Tests of differences between clusters
-Corruption index
Tests of differences between clusters
-External Cap/GDP ratio
Tests of differences between clusters
-Domestic firms/pop ratio
Tests of differences between clusters
-IPOs/GDP ratio
Tests of differences between clusters
-Ownership concentration
Tests of differences between clusters
4.43 2.64 2.80
CI vs. C2*** C2vs. C3 CI vs. C3***
9.89 8.73 5.90
CI vs. C2*** C2vs. C3*** CI vs. C3***
1.95 1.68 0,13
CI vs. C2*** C2vs. C3*** CI vs. C3***
2.10 1.70 -0.01
CI vs. C2*** C2 vs. /---J*** CI vs. C3***
0.96 0.54 0.30
CI vs. C2*** C2vs. C3*** CI vs. (^3***
64.04 22.11 10.14
CI vs. C2*** C2vs. C3*** CI vs. Q2***
8.61 3.37 2.85
CI vs. r'2*** C2vs. C3 CI vs. C3***
0.34 0.39 0.55
CI vs. C2*** C2vs. C3*** CI vs. C3***
Outsider features « Insider features
Panel B: Cluster membership of countries (sorted in alphabet order)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2
Australia (CM)
Canada (CM)
Hong Kong (CM)
Singapore (CM)
Sweden (CD)
UK (CM)
USA (CM)
Austria (CD)
Belgium (CD)
Chile (CD)
Denmark (CD)
Finland (CD)
France (CD)
Germany (CD)
Japan (CD)
Netherlands (CD)
Norway (CD)
South Korea (CD)
Spain (CD)
Switzerland (CD)
Taiwan (CD)
Cluster 3
Brazil (CD)
Greece (CD)
India (CM)
Indonesia (CD)
Italy (CD)
Malaysia (CM)
Mexico (CD)
Philippines (CD)
South Africa (CM)
Thailand (CM)
The table presents results from a k-means cluster analysis using three distinct clusters and eight investor-protection
proxies from La Porta et al. (2004). See Table 1 for details. The investor-protection proxies are standardized to
z-scores when this study performs a k-means cluster analysis. Panel A reports the means of the investor-
protection variables by cluster Panel B reports the cluster membership for the 3 1 sample countries based on the
cluster analysis performed on the proxies in Panel A. CD (CM) indicates a code-law (common-law) tradition.
Panel C reports a comparison of the cluster membership of countries in this study and that in Leuz et al. (2003).
***, **, * denote 1% significance, 5% significance, and 10% significance, respectively (two-tailed).
concentration. Thus, the first cluster is referred to as "outsider economies" and the other two
clusters are referred to as "insider economies," with the distinction that countries in the
second cluster have significantly better legal enforcement, larger stock markets, and lower
ownership concentration than those in the third cluster.
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Table 5
Institutional clusters and earnings attributes
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Panel A: Mean accruals quality rank by investor-protection cluster [mean country ranks are presented in
parentheses]
Singapore (13.43) Japan (29.57) Mexico (27.00)
UK (10.86) Chile (28.71) Brazil (25.86)
Canada (10.86) Switzerland (24.00) Italy (23.57)
Hong Kong (9.00) Austria (22.43) India (21.57)
Sweden (8.57) Taiwan (21.43) Greece (20.14)
USA (7.57) Spain (19.57) Thailand (15.86)
Australia (5.00) South Korea (18.00) South Africa (15.14)
Belgium (17.29) Philippines (14.71)
Finland (17.00) Malaysia (10.00)
France (16.00) Indonesia (4.00)
Denmark (15.14)
Netherlands (11.86) •
Norway (7.71)
Germany (4.14)
Mean-rank values 9.33 18.06^ 17.79®
Cluster rank 3rd 1st 2nd
Panel B: Mean earnings-persistence rank by investor-protection cluster [mean country
parentheses]
USA (22.14)
Sweden (18.71)
UK (18.29)
Canada (17.29)
Singapore (14.71)
Australia (8.86)
Hong Kong (6.57)
ranks are presented in
Mean-rank values
Cluster rank
15.22
3rd
Netherlands (22.14) India (25.86)
Finland (20.43) Greece (19.43)
Taiwan (20.43) Malaysia (16.29)
Chile (19.86) Brazil (15.43)
Germany (19.00) Indonesia (14.43)
France (18.86) Philippines (13.57)
Japan (17.14) Thailand (13.29)
Switzerland (16.43) Italy (12.71)
Denmark (16.43) Mexico (10.43)
Spain (16.14) South Africa (9.43)
South Korea (15.86)
Belgium (13.29)
Austria (11.71)
Norway (10.86)
17.04 15.09
1st 2nd
Panel C: Mean earnings-predictahilit}' rank by investor-protection cluster [mean country ranks are presented in
parentheses]
Singapore (17.71)
Sweden (9.43)
UK (8.57)
Canada (6.43)
Hong Kong (5.71)
USA (3.71)
Australia (3.57)
Japan (30.57)
Chile (25.86)
Switzerland (22.86)
Spain (22.86)
Taiwan (2 1 .00)
Austria (19.71)
France (19.43)
South Korea (18.71)
India (27.00)
Greece (23.14)
Italy (22.00)
Brazil (21.71)
Thailand (19.14)
Mexico (18.00)
Malaysia (17.43)
Indonesia (12.71)
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Table 5 {continued)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Panel C: Mean earnings-predictahilit}' rank by investoi'-protection cluster [mean countiy ranks are presented in
parentheses]
Belgium (16.71) Philippines (11.71)
Finland (16.57) South Africa (9.86)
Netherlands (16.14)
Denmark (14.57)
Germany (9.86)
Norway (3.29)
Mean-rank values 7.88 18.44"' 18.27""
Cluster rank 3rd 1st 2nd
Panel D: Mean earnings-smoothness rank by investor--protection cluster [mean countiy ranks are presented in
parentheses]
USA (29.00) Norway (23.14) Philippines (19.57)
UK (26.14) Netherlands (19.86) Malaysia (18.29)
Canada (23.86) Taiwan (17.43) Indonesia (16.43)
Hong Kong (23.57) Finland (17.57) Mexico (14.29)
Australia (21.43) Switzerland (16.29) Brazil (14.14)
Sweden (21.14) Germany (15.86) Thailand (14.00)
Singapore (13.00) Denmark (15.00) India (13.29)
Mean-rank values
Cluster rank
22.59
1st
France (13.57)
Belgium (13.00)
Austria (12.86)
Chile (12.43)
South Korea (9.43)
Japan (9.00)
Spain (6.14)
14.40'"
2nd
South Africa (12.57)
Italy (7.57)
Greece (6.14)
13.63"'
3rd
The table presents mean values of four accounting-based earnings attributes across three distinct investor-
protection clusters based on the cluster analysis reported in Table 4. Panels A-D report mean earnings attribute
ranks for sample countries in each cluster. Mean rank for each country is the average of country year ranks for the
country. Countries within each cluster are sorted by their ranks. For all earnings attributes, high ranks correspond to
high earnings quality.
Note: @ indicates that Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 means are significantly different from the Cluster 1 mean at the 0.01
level. The difference between Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 means is not statistically significant (Panels A, C and D); The
differences between cluster means are not statistically significant (Panel B).
Table 4, Panel B, presents cluster membership of the sample countries across the three
clusters. Interestingly, all countries (except Sweden) in the first cluster are common law
while all countries in the second cluster are code law. This is consistent with the existence of
institutional complementarities found in most finance literature. The third cluster consists of
both common-law and code-law countries. Malaysia and Thailand, whose standards derive
from common-law sources (USA, UK, and IAS) are placed in the third cluster consistent
with their poor financial-reporting quality documented by Ball et al. (2003).^
** With a few exceptions (Malaysia, Norway, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, and Sweden), the cluster
membership of countries in this study is similar to that obtained by Leuz et al. (2003). The difference between our
results and those of Leuz et al. (2003) may reflect the development of countries' investor-protection levels.
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Table 5, Panels A through D, presents mean values of the four ranked earnings attributes
across the three investor-protection clusters identified in Table 4. In these panels, countries
within each cluster are sorted by the mean-rank scores of the earnings attribute being
presented. The results (not tabulated) are qualitatively similar when we use raw variables,
rather than ranks. Table 5, Panel A, reports accruals-quality rankings. The countries with
the highest accruals-quality rankings (Japan followed by Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Italy,
Switzerland, India, and Austria) are members of Clusters 2 and 3. Several Cluster 1
countries (Australia, USA, Sweden, and Hong Kong) have among the lowest average-
accruals-quality scores in the sample. The mean rank for Cluster 1 is significantly less than
the mean ranks for both Clusters 2 and 3. The results contradict the hypothesis that investor-
protection is positively associated with accruals quality.
Table 5, Panel B, provides earnings persistence scores for countries in each of the three
clusters. India (Cluster 3) has the highest average-eamings-persistence rank of 25.86,
followed by Netherlands, USA, Finland, Taiwan, Chile, Greece, and Sweden. Earnings
quality in these countries is the highest, according to the persistence measure. Hong Kong
(Cluster 1) has the lowest score of 6.57, followed by Australia, South Africa, Mexico,
Norway, and Austria. The average cluster ranks are similar in magnitude and not
significantly different from each other Thus no conclusions can be drawn about how
investor-protection affects earnings persistence.
Table 5, Panel C, presents the analysis of earnings-predictability rankings. Japan has the
highest average-eamings-predictability score, followed by India, Chile, Greece, Switzer-
land, Spain, Italy, and Brazil. These countries, which have the highest earnings quality
according to the predictability measure, are all members of Clusters 2 and 3. The countries
from Cluster 1 are all ranked extremely low based on their earnings-predictability scores.
The mean-rank score for Cluster 1 is significantly lower than those for Clusters 2 and 3.
These results indicate that investor-protection is not positively associated with earnings
predictability.
Table 5, Panel D, provides the rankings of earnings smoothness for the 31 sample
countries by cluster. The United States has the highest mean-eamings-smoothness rank, and
several other Cluster 1 countries (UK, Canada, Hong Kong, Australia, and Sweden) are
near the top of the rankings. The counfries with the lowest mean ranks - Greece, followed
by Spain, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and Chile - are all members of Clusters 2 and 3. The
mean Cluster 1 rank (22.59) is significantly higher than both the mean Cluster 2 (14.40) and
the mean Cluster 3 (13.63) ranks. Moreover, the ordering ofmean cluster ranks corresponds
to the ordering of the clusters. Since high ranks correspond to low smoothness, our
evidence implies that investor-protection is negatively associated with earnings
smoothness.
5.3. Regression results
Table 6, Panels A through D, reports multiple regressions of the four ranked-eamings
attributes on investor-protection. The results in Panel A indicate that accruals quality is
negatively associated with judicial system (p<.01), rule of law (p<.01), corruption
(p<.01), and the number of domestic firms {p<.05). The other institutional variables are
insignificant.
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Table 6, Panel B, reports multiple regressions with earnings-persistence rank as the
dependent variable. The results indicate that earnings persistence is not associated with
most institutional variables. The coefficient on ownership concentration is negative and
significant (p<.Ol). This suggests that high levels of ownership concentration adversely
affect earnings quality, as measured by earnings persistence.
Table 6, Panel C, reports the results for regressions of earnings-predictability ranks on
the institutional variables. These results indicate that earnings predictability is negatively
associated with judicial system (/?<.01), rule of law (/?<.01), corruption {p<.0\), external
capitalization {p<.05), the number of domestic firms {p<.05), and the number of IPOs
(p<AO). This suggests that earnings predictability is high in low investor-protection
countries, and contradicts the hypothesis that earnings quality, as measured by earnings
predictability, is positively associated with investor-protection.
Table 6, Panel D, reports regression results for earnings smoothness. Earnings-
smoothness rank is positively associated with judicial system (/7<.01), rule of law (p<.0\),
corruption {p<.Ol), extemal capitalization (p<.01), and the number of domestic firms
(p<.05), and negatively associated with ownership concentration {p<.Ol). Since higher
ranks correspond to less smoothness, our results confirm that managers are less likely to
smooth earnings in countries with relatively strong investor-protection.
5.4. Sensitivit}' tests
Our results are robust across the following alternative specifications: (1) using rank-
transformed, rather than raw, investor-protection variables; (2) scaling the accounting
variables by average, rather than lagged, total assets; (3) excluding change in taxes payable
in the computation of accruals; and (4) using the Wysocki (2005) accruals model to measure
accruals quality.
6. Summary and conclusions
This study explores the relationship between four measures of earnings quality and
investor-protection, hypothesizing that favorable values of each earnings attribute
(considered individually) occur in countries whose institutional characteristics provide
relatively strong investor-protection. The results, based on K-means cluster analysis
between institutional characteristics and earnings attributes, are mixed. When earnings
quality is measured based on earnings smoothness, the results are consistent with the
study's hypothesis since earnings is less smooth in countries whose institutional
characteristics are strong. The results for accruals quality and earnings predictability are,
however, inconsistent with the hypothesis, since countries with strong investor-protection
have less favorable values of these measures than weak investor-protection countries.
Finally, no relationship is evident between investor-protection and earnings persistence.
Thus no clear conclusions can be drawn about how investor-protection affects earnings
quality. The regression results are similar to those of the cluster analysis.
There are several possible reasons for the mixed results obtained here. Although the
earnings attributes have been widely used in empirical studies of U.S. data, they may not be
well-specified when applied to international data. Second, variation in firm size and
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industry membership across countries may lead to substantially different incentives and
opportunities for earnings management in these countries. Finally, factors other than
investor-protection may influence earnings quality. One such factor is the extent to which
stakeholders rely on accounting reports in their decision making. Accounting numbers are
extensively used for contracting in the developed countries, and managers have more to
gain through earnings management. This contracting role of accounting numbers may
explain why earnings quality, measured by accruals quality and earnings predictability,
appears to be relatively low in the developed nations.
The findings of this study provide some, though limited, insights into cross-country
differences in earnings attributes and the linkage between these earnings attributes and the
protection of investors' rights. One important implication of our study is that conclusions
about earnings quality depend critically on how earnings quality is defined. Another
possible implication is that factors other than investor-protection may significantly
influence the characteristics of international accounting data. Thus investors and other
financial-information users should not assume that a country's investor-protection features
necessarily signal the reliability ofaccounting reports issued by its firms. Finally, our results
suggest that commonly-used earnings attributes such as accruals quality and earnings
persistence may not convey earnings quality in an international context. Future research
that develops globally appropriate earnings-quality measures is necessary.
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Appendix A. Variable definitions
A.l. Accounting variable definitions
Stdresid = Accruals quality; the standard deviation of the estimated residuals fi^om
pooled firm-year regressions per country and year of changes in working capital on last
year, present, and one-year ahead cash flows from operations.
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Persist = Earnings persistence; the slope-coefficient estimates from pooled firm-year
regressions per country and year of current earnings on last year earnings.
Earn, , ^ Earn, i
a + d,*-
—
—^ + v, (2)
TotalAssets,-
1
TotalAsset,
Pred = Earnings predictability; the square root of the error variance from the earnings-
persistence equation.
Pred,,= sJ(J-M, (3)
Smooth = Earnings smoothness; the ratio of the country-year standard deviation of
operating cash flows to the standard deviation of earnings.
^ .
(T(CFO,,/TotalAsset,,-i) ,..
Smooth/ , = -^-—^^—— —- (4)
(7(Eamy., /TotalAsset/-.,-
1
)
A. 2. Investor-protection variable definitions
InvRights The antidirector rights index constructed by La Porta et al. (1998). This index is
formed by adding one when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their
proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares
prior to the general shareholders' meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional
representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed-
minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital
that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting is
less than or equal to 10% (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have
preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders' vote. The index
ranges from zero to six, with higher scores for stronger shareholder rights.
JudicSys Efficiency of the judicial system from La Porta et al. (1998). Investors'
assessment of conditions of the country's judicial system between 1980 and
1983. Index ranges from zero to 10 with higher scores implying greater law
enforcement.
RuIeofLaw The extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of
society in year 2000. These include perceptions of the incidence of both violent
and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and
the enforceability of contracts, with higher scores implying greater law
enforcement. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2004).
Corruption Index measuring the exercise of public power for private gain in the year
2000. It captures aspects ranging from the frequency of additional payments to
get things done to the effects of corruption on the business environment, with
higher scores implying greater law enforcement. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2004).
ExtCap Extemal Cap/GDP ratio. The average ratio of stock market capitalization held by
small shareholders to gross domestic product for the period 1996-2000. This ratio
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is based on La Porta et al. (2004) and used to measure the importance ofthe equity
market in each country, with the higher values indicating the greater importance of
the stock market.
DoFirms Domestic Firms/Pop ratio is the ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a
given country to its population (in millions) for the period 1 996-2000. This ratio
is based on La Porta et al. (2004) and used to measure the importance of the
equity market in each country, with the higher values indicating the greater
importance of the stock market. Source: International Finance Corporation:
Emerging Markets Database (2001) and World Bank (2001).
IPOs IPOs/GDP ratio is the ratio of the equity issued by newly-listed firms in a given
country (in thousands) to its gross domestic product (in millions) for the period of
1996-2000. This ratio is based on La Porta et al. (2004) and used to measure the
importance of the equity market in each country, with the higher values indicating
the greater importance of the stock market. Source: Securities Data Corporation,
World Bank (2001).
Ownership The ownership concentration is measured as the average percentage of
common shares owned by the top three shareholders in the 10 largest
nonfmancial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given country. A firm is
considered privately owned if the State is not a known shareholder in it. This
variable is based on La Porta et al. (2004) and measures legal protection, with
higher values indicative of poor legal protection. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Hartland-Peel (1996) for Kenya, Bloomberg and
various annual reports for Ecuador, Jordan, and Uruguay.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, Boonlert-U-Thai, Meek, and Nabar (BMN) attempt to draw a connection
between earnings quality and investor protection. It considers four different measures of
earnings-quality attributes and eight measures of investor protection. The earnings-quality
measures used are accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earn-
ings smoothness. The investor protection variables are anti-director rights, efficiency of
judicial system, rule of law, corruption index, importance of equity market (external/
minority capital/GDP ratio), importance of equity market (number of domestic firms/
country's population), importance of equity market (IPOs/GDP ratio), and ownership
concentration of the 1 largest firms in the country.
The results of the paper show that earnings smoothness is less prevalent in strong
investor-protection countries. However, both accruals quality and earnings predictability
are better in countries when investor-protection arrangements are relatively weak. No
association is found between investor protection and earnings persistence, except that
countries with low ownership concentration appear to have high earnings persistence. The
implication that the authors draw from the results is that the impact of institutional
characteristics relating to investor protection on earnings quality depends on how earnings
quality is measured. On the whole, the paper lays down a framework for further research
into the relation between earnings quality and the institutional characteristics that promote
E-mail address: a.r.rahman@niassey.ac.nz.
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or hinder investor protection. In this regard, Bushman and Smith (200 1 ) propose that cross-
country research is necessary to investigate the relation between accounting information
and corporate governance arrangements.
In this review, I first identify the significant contributions of this paper and then move to
critique it. This critique is designed more for aiding future research than to change the
current paper. For the critique, I take the following steps. I raise some questions regarding
how the paper deals with certain key issues. I assess the paper using these questions. In my
assessments, I make suggestions for fiiture research. I conclude with a summary of my
discussion.
2. Contributions
BMN attempt to empirically examine the connection between earnings-quality attributes
and investor-protection arrangements at a cross-country level. This endeavour is timely, as
it can provide useful information for policy makers in assessing whether or not global
accounting standards alone will be sufficient for harmonizing accounting practices around
the world. Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) through their study on East Asian countries, note
that the dichotomous legal-origins variable (common vs. code law) has limited capacity to
explain the variations in the quality of accounting information across countries. They
suggest that researchers should look beyond the legal environment and accounting
standards to identify the institutional determinants of financial accounting information
quality. They also feel that it is incomplete and misleading to classify countries in terms of
their accounting standards, or even their standard-setting arrangements, without giving
substantial weight to the institutional and firm specific influences that affect preparers'
incentives. Similar concerns are expressed by Rahman, Perera, and Ganesh (2002) who find
that although regulatory similarities did bring accounting practices closer, there are firm-
specific impediments that keep the accounting practices of countries from converging fully.
In addition, they find that differences in country business and economic environment and
policies also hinder convergence. Although investor protection is one of many issues that
the previous papers identified as important for policy making, it is perhaps the most
important issue that affects the investment climate in the emerging markets of the world.
Without adequate investor protection, as BMN acknowledge, there would be little
appreciation for the need for good quality accounting information. For example, if the
judicial system does not recognize accounting informafion for legal decisions then both the
preparers and users of financial accounting information will not regard quality of
accounting information as an important matter for business decisions. This would lead to a
decline in the supply of such information. In this regard, I commend the authors for
bringing up the issue of relating accounting quality vis-a-vis earnings-quality attributes
with investor-protection mechanisms.
In terms of methodological contribution, the authors have provided an empirical
research framework, and identified well-accepted accounting-based earnings-quality
measures and investor protection measures from the extant literature for use in their
fi-amework. They also have meticulously computed the earnings-quality measures and
investor-protection measures. The authors' efforts in identifying and computing several
measures of earnings quality to add robustness to their results is noteworthy. First, the
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authors had to search a reasonably extensile Hterature on earnings quahty to identify and
justify the selection of the earnings-quality measures. Second, each of the earnings-quality
measures required careful and painstaking computations. A sample size of 3 1 countries
meant that these computations had to be repeated many times.
Overall, this paper makes two important contributions. First, it has identified an
important issue for further research, that of considering investor-protection mechanisms
that affect the quality of accounting in a country. With the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) and the Intemational Accounting Standards Board (lASB) continuing to
align their standards, and the EU and many non-EU countries adopting the Intemational
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in recent years, it is logical to proceed towards
investigating other variables that act as impediments to global harmonization of accounting
practices.
Second, this paper acts as a guide for future research for developing methodologies to
investigate the relation between investor protection and accounting quality at an
intemational level. The previous accounting literature examines this issue in detail only
at the single-country level, mostly by examining issues such as audit quality, board
govemance, and usefulness of specific accounting standards. At the intemational level only
broad measures have been taken to deal with this matter. For example, Morck, Yeung, and
Yu (2000), after finding certain regularities in stock-price synchronicity in certain countries,
contended that stock prices in countries with strong investor-protection arrangements move
more with firm specific information and prices in weak investor protection countries move
more with macroeconomic information. Others have focused on the effect of specific
investor-protection mechanisms on specific earnings-quality issues e.g., eamings
management (Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003), value relevance of eamings (Ali and
Hwang, 2000; Hung, 2001), and informativeness of reported eamings (Ball, Kothari, &
Robin, 2000). This study extends prior research by exploring the effects of eight investor-
protection mechanisms on four accounting-based measures of eamings quality.
I feel that the steps taken by BMN lay the foundation for future research in the area of
accounting-information quality and investor protection on a cross-country basis. In this
regard, it provides a useful framework for further research. BMN also provide intuitive
ideas for the selection of eamings quality and investor-protection proxies for intemational
accounting research, using proxies used in single-country studies.
3. Critique
In this section, I identify some key issues by raising questions such that we can critically
appreciate what has been done in this paper. I then recommend ways and means ofextending
the contributions of this paper in future research. I attempt to highlight the issue that future
research should proceed to appreciate the meaning of specific proxies chosen in this research
and examine the relation between these proxies in greater detail. I argue that these proxies
tend to portray different facets ofthe two main variables, and these proxies may relate to each
other in different ways based on what they represent. We may, of course, contend that many
of the specific proxies have already been examined in single-country contexts. Yet, I would
argue that as accounting standards are becoming global it requires researchers to understand
the implications of the single-country research results in multi-countries contexts. Such
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research is needed because ofthe investor protection and other institutional idiosyncrasies of
the countries using those standards. This is important especially in the emerging markets
where institutional weaknesses cause serious stock market uncertainties such as that of the
Asian financial crisis. A point to note is that some of the single-country variables, such as
ownership structure of firms, may relate differently with the accounting numbers across
countries because ofthe institutional and business-arrangement variations in those countries.
The questions I ask for my critique and, my discussion for these questions are below:
1. Does this study have a clear purpose?
The objective of the paper is stated in the abstract in the following manner: "This study
explores the effects of investor protection on reported earnings quality assessed on the basis
of four accounting-based earnings attributes (accruals quality, earnings persistence,
earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness)." Although the general thrust of the paper
is appreciable, this objective is quite broad for a specific empirical piece. It attempts to draw
a connection between two very complex variables without looking into the essence and
characteristics of these variables. It also suggests a very broad form of research, that of
"exploring" the effects of one variable on another. A point that this paper overlooks is that
the dependent variables chosen, attributes of quality of eamings, are firm-specific proxies
of earnings quality, whereas the independent variables chosen are a mix of country, market,
and firm-specific variables. This reduces the explanatory power of variables that vary
across firms. It is advisable that fiiture research use firm-level data to measure firm-level
investor-protection measures and country-and market-level data to measure country
institutional-and business-practices differences. Also, some of the independent variables
could be interdependent or competing to provide investor protection.
The current paper has a very broad focus in terms of laying down the scope ofthe study. It
has a "catch-all" type approach. Since different proxies may possess different features ofthe
underlying variable, fiiture studies should attempt to focus on specific proxies based on what
they represent for their respective variables. Such focus is also important for pinpointing
problems regarding issues, such as contradictory results, that need to be further resolved.
2. Is the motivation for the paper strong enough?
There seems to be no research question or problem identified in the paper to suggest that
there is a need for this study. However, my reading of the literature on investor protection
and accounting makes me believe that there is a need for this type of study. Also, with the
rapid convergence towards a set of global accounting standards, there is a need for
examining other forms of impediments that the accounting profession may face while
converging the accounting practices of firms of different countries. Securities analysts
would also like to ensure that once accounting standards are very similar they would be
getting accounting numbers that are similar in meaning for firms across different countries.
I suggest that fiiture research should identify the need for examining the relation between
accounting numbers and investor-protection variables that vary across countries.
3. Have the authors chosen a clear line of thinking or a theory to explain their views?
The absence of a research problem or a primary research question in the paper has lead to
an absence of a clear line of thinking or a theory to explain the relationships between the
various proxies of the two variables, accounting eamings quality and investor protection.
The authors have assessed the literature and have argued that a relation exists between the
two variables; however, they stop short of identifying the strand of research to which they
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are contributing. The general area of research within which their study is located is
corporate governance. Corporate-governance literature has two strands: one sees corporate
governance as guiding and improving the performance of managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983;
Hart, 1995) and the other regards it as ftilfilling an investor-protection function (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997). From BMN's literature review, I would place their paper in the second
strand. They could have used the literature in this strand to explain how each or some of the
investor-protection proxies relate to the different attributes of earnings. This would allow
them to draw clear hypotheses for each of the relationships they have examined.
Without a theory for why relationships between earnings quality and investor protection
exists, it is hard to draw clear causal links between the different proxies of investor
protection and earnings quality. The blanket use of several investor-protection proxies and
various proxies of earnings quality (i.e., earnings attributes) does not necessarily convey
meaningful answers for the nature of the relationship between these proxies or the two
variables. Without a clear a priori reasoning, causality between the dependent and
independent variables can only be conjectured and not hypothesized. Also, the statistical
measures provided can at best serve as measures of association, and at times it is hard to tell
what those associations mean. Having made this remark, I believe that with the variety of
aspects of investor protection and earnings quality that have been identified in the literature,
it is difficult to place arguments for each ofthe proxies and test their relationships in a single
paper. Once again, I would like to point out that this paper has highlighted the need for such
tests and the identification of proxies of the two variables from the extant literature. In that
sense, it has opened up a process for further research on the relationship between investor
protection and earnings quality. As mentioned in the introduction to the paper, the authors
are only "exploring" the relationships. Future research can expose further details of these
relationships and also provide coherent explanations for the relationships. The authors also
suggest that the purpose of this study is to examine the "linkage" between investor
protection and reported earnings quality. The term "linkage" and "explore" leave sufficient
room for further investigation by other researchers.
Clear theoretical frameworks will also allow the researchers to evaluate which of the
corporate-governance variables vis-d-vis investor-protection variables would have a direct
impact on accounting quality and which of them would act as catalysts or mitigating
variables. For example, corporate-governance variables such as quality of auditor at the
firm level or a strong accounting regulatory system at the country level have direct
influences on the quality ofaccounting earnings of firms, whereas, independent directors on
the board at the firm level and an effective litigation mechanism at the country level would
act as indirect mitigating variables as they would mainly influence the more accounting-
related variables, such as quality of auditor, in promoting good quality accounting.
4. Have the hypotheses been reasonably motivated?
The paper has only one hypothesis: "Firms in strong investor-protection countries have
more favorable values of each earnings attribute than firms in weak investor-protection
countries." It suggests that the authors are hypothesizing the same association between all
the earnings-quality proxies on the one side and all the investor protection proxies on the
other side. Given the complexities of the variables, earnings quality and investor protection,
this hypothesis can be regarded as a conjecture rather than a hypothesis. However, within
the main thrust of this study, i.e., the study being an exploration, this hypothesis could be
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regarded as a starting point for further research. Future research should focus developing or
adopting a theory for this strand of research and focus on the specifics of the relationships.
This would lead to developing specific hypotheses for specific relationships between
different aspects of investor protection and accounting earnings quality.
With clarity of thought it will be easier to understand the results of future research. Also,
explanations could be clearly drawn for unsubstantiated hypotheses. In specifying detailed
hypotheses, the authors will have to review single-country research in specific areas of
accounting such as audit quality and earnings management. Also, researchers would have to
explain what other mitigating or intervening factors would affect the links that exist at the firm
level. For example, at the firm level certain characteristics ofauditing may reduce discretionary
accruals in a strong investor-protection country, but the same relationship may not exist in
weak investor-protection countries. Why such varying behaviors exist in different countries
would have to be explained through a priori arguments before setting up the hypotheses.
Although in this paper the authors do not provide detailed hypotheses, it is noticeable
through their eight research models that they do appreciate that there may be proxy-specific
linkages between earnings quality and investor protection.
5. Is there a coherent research model that addresses the hypotheses?
The paper proposes eight research models based on eight proxies of investor protection.
When multiplied by the number of proxies of earnings quality (four in total), the number of
models is in fact 32. Without sufficient discussion on the efficacy of the investor-protection
proxies in promoting earnings quality, it is difficult to assess what the results of these
models will indicate. Overall, the authors contend that earnings quality is driven by
investor-protection mechanisms. The same sense is maintained in the corporate-governance
literature (Sloan, 2001). However, BMN propose a linear relation between investor
protection and earnings quality, i.e., every investor-protection proxy is expected to have a
linear effect on earnings-quality proxies.
My earlier arguments suggest that a set of linear models may not be elaborate enough to
provide an in-depth understanding of the relation between earnings quality and investor
protection. To draw up more precise models for the various relationships we need to
recognize the characteristics of each of the proxies chosen for the two variables. First, I note
that all the proxies for earnings quality are based on accounting numbers. None of these
proxies rely on market numbers, e.g., value-relevance proxy of Ali and Hwang (2000),
which is based on accounting earnings and market returns. Therefore, BMN's models are
only dealing with accounting-based earnings-quality measures. They do not give sufficient
information about the market's perceptions of earnings quality. Turning to investor-
protection proxies, the first four and the last one listed in the introduction are reflective of
protection for contractual arrangements and the remaining three are reflective of protection
for market values. Based on this very brief analysis of the features of the proxies, I feel that
fijture research should consider the features of the proxies and develop appropriate models
based on such features. This will ensure that the relationships that are discovered are
interpreted within the specific context of the proxies.
To elaborate this point further, I suggest that the earnings and investor-protection proxies
should be carefully matched based on their characteristics. So, if legal arrangements are
likely to affect contractual issues then they should be related with earnings-quality proxies
that represent earnings quality in a contracting scenario. In some cases two or more of
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investor-protection proxies may affect an earnings-quality measure. If such effects exist
then those investor-protection proxies should appear together in the same OLS model. An
example could be of ownership type and judicial system both affecting, say, accruals
quality. So, higher concentration of ownership may reduce the quality of accruals, and this
situation may be worse if the judicial system is weak. Furthermore, apart from their direct
effects, they may have interaction effects as well.
Another point to note is that some of the proxies on investor protection may not be
independent as they may be driven by more primary underlying variables (Ball et al, 2000,
2003). So, for example, the level of a country's development may affect both ownership
concentration of firms in the country and the strength of the country's judicial system. In
such circumstances the models may involve two or three stage ordinary least-square
techniques to resolve the colinearity arising from such linkages. (See Nobes (1998) for
other geopolitical, economic, and historical development issues that affect accounting
practices and a firm's financing arrangement. A firms financing, in turn, also affects
accounting practices). The models also need to recognize the direct effects and indirect/
interaction effects. This may require tests of both the main effects and interaction effects of
the variables. These intricate issues need to be exposed in ftiture studies through precise
modeling of the relationships between the variables.
6. Are the measures/proxies for the variables sufficiently representative of the variables?
The authors meticulously draw various proxies of investor protection and earnings
quality from the literature on investor protection and earnings quality. Although the proxies
may be measures of investor protection and earnings quality, as discussed earlier, each may
represent a different aspect of these two variables. Since different aspects of investor
protection may affect different aspects of earnings quality, to give a fuller and more precise
picture, the characteristics of each of the proxies should be clearly delineated.
The assessment and identification of the earnings-quality attributes is done quite
meticulously by BMN. It certainly adds to the robustness of the results. However, the
authors have not clearly mentioned why other remaining measures or concepts of earnings
quality have been left out of this study. These are measures such as the value-relevance
measures of Ali and Hwang (2000) or the timeliness concept of Basu (1997) used in Ball
et al. (2000). The authors should have tried to build a case for why they need certain proxies
of earnings quality and not the others or perhaps they could have mentioned that they were
focusing on just the accounting- based proxies to limit the scope of the paper.
A point to mention here is that some measures of investor protection that directly affect
accounting practice such as standards quality and enforcement arrangements, could have
been used as independent control variables. The measures of investor protection used in this
study are not proximate enough to accounting practice to directly affect accounting-
earnings quality. So, controls for other, more direct influences would have made the results
of the investor-protection proxies more robust.
Variables that affect accounting quality exist at the firm, country, and market levels. For
example, firm-level variables: market value, market-to-book and leverage, could be
introduced to control for firm size, performance and risk effects on accounting practices.
Morck et al. (2000) uses per capita GDP to control for the level of development of a
country. Some of the firm, country, and market variables are listed below. Many of these are
investor-protection variables, while others would be control variables.
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Firm specific:
• Ownership structure
• Corporate financing
• Auditing
• Audit committee
• Board of directors
• Managerial compensation
Country specific:
• Legal environment
• Culture environment
• Accounting standard setting
• Accounting practice
Market:
• Market for corporate control
• Level of capital market development
Source: Wulandari (2005)
7. How effective is the data processing?
Data processing methods and formulae are clearly defined in the paper. This will be
usefiil to future researchers as a reference. However, since the relationships between
earnings quality and investor-protection variables are not clearly delineated with detailed
reasoning, a broad association test is perhaps the only alternative available to test the
hypothesis. I attempt to understand the data processing of this paper within an association
arrangement rather than a causality fi'amework.
The cluster analyses conducted in this paper are bivariate analyses. With so many
variables intermingling in the accounting arena, such bivariate analyses are not very
meaningful from a causality perspective, but they do give an idea of the associations
between two variables. As already discussed, in a study such as this one, more attention
needs to be placed on the intricacies of the variables and their interrelationships in the
multivariate tests. The results speak for some of the care that needs to be taken in a
multivariate environment of the type in which this study is conducted. Some results are as
hypothesized while others have contradicted the hypotheses. The authors have made
several speculative remarks to explain the contradictions. I feel that such remarks are not
sufficient to give directions for future research. This point of course is recognized by the
authors in the last paragraph when they state "One important implication ofour study is that
conclusions about earnings quality depend critically on how earnings quality is defined." To
this statement they could have added the point that the results also depend on the way
investor protection is defined or what its proxies represent. Without a clear delineation of
the proxies, it is difficult for the reader to form any view on the causal effects of the
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independent variables on the dependent variables even when the results of the multivariate
analyses are significant.
8. Do the authors recognize the limitations of the study?
BMN seem to realize that their study provides limited insights into the relation between
earnings-quality attributes and investor protection. My review has identified what these
limitations are. The first limitation is that of limited exposure and understanding ofwhat the
proxies for the two variables represent. These proxies are primarily accounting based and
may be reflective of only some aspects of earnings quality and investor protection.
Therefore, the results, even if as hypothesized, provide limited explanations for the
relationships between the two variables. The second limitation arises fi-om the fact that the
models are partially developed in terms of portraying the relationships between the proxies
of the two variables. Such partial models may not provide appropriate results for the
relationships between the dependent and independent variables.
9. Are the contributions of the paper sufficient for future policy making?
The authors state that this study contributes to the accounting literature in two ways.
First, this study explores cross-country differences in the properties of reported earnings,
using four accounting-based earnings attributes. Second, it is supposed to extend prior
studies such as DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant (2004), Ashbaugh and LaFond (2003), Leuz
et al. (2003), Bhattacharya et al. (2003), Hung (2001), Ball et al. (2000) and Ah and Hwang
(2000) by investigating the effects of investor protection on accounting-based attributes of
earnings quality. The authors state that the findings of this study have implications for
security analysts, regulators, standard setters, and other accounting information users in
enhancing their understanding of legal institutional differences and their impact on the
properties of reported earnings.
My overall assessment is that the recognition of the relationships between earnings
quality and investor protection and the development of an initial framework for the
examination of the relationship between the proxies of the two variables are the two most
important contributions of this study. These contributions can have significant policy
implications, as they address policy issues that have not been sufficiently considered in
prior studies. Additionally, the relationship between the two variables can have implications
for understanding how investor-protection differences may affect harmonization of
accounting practice across different countries.
4. Conclusions
This paper should pave the way for future research in international accounting and
corporate governance. However, much more needs to be done in future research endeavours
to get concrete ideas and answers for public-policy improvements. Future research should
attempt to extend the work reported in this paper by providing more clarity and specificity
to the variables identified and the relationships highlighted. This would require an
understanding of the single-country variables of earnings quality within a multicountry
context that has varying investor-protection arrangements between countries.
More specifically, ftiture studies should identify what aspect of accounting quality each
proxy of eamings quality and each proxy of investor protection represent. Based on their
features, the relevant investor-protection proxies should be matched with the earnings-quality
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proxies in the multivariate models. This would allow the researcher to ascertain how
specific investor-protection mechanisms at the firm, country, or market level affect a
certain feature of earnings quality. Also, the multivariate environment of earnings needs
to be appreciated. More than one investor-protection proxy may affect an aspect of
earnings quality and there may be interaction and colinearity issues that need to be dealt
with before a model is operationalized. Nevertheless, by bringing in many different
proxies of earnings quality and investor protection, this study has highlighted the point
that there are many different facets ofboth of these variables that need to be considered for
policy making and future research.
To sum up, BMN have highlighted accounting issues involving investor protection at an
international level. They have proposed a framework for such research, and have drawn the
attention of researchers to well-tested metrics of single-country studies by demonstrating
their use in multicountry contexts. In these respects, this study has made a timely contri-
bution towards understanding accounting quality issues within the international business
context.
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1. Introduction
Professor Rahman offers a number of useftil comments and suggestions in his discussion
of our paper. His review focuses on the following major issues: the purpose of, and the
motivation for, the study; aspects of the research methodology, including the use of linear
models, the appropriateness of various proxies, and control variables; the limitations of the
study and implications for policy making. We thank Professor Rahman for his thoughtful
review and respond to his comments below.
2. The study's motivation
The discussant suggests that our objective of exploring the linkage between investor
protection and earnings attributes is quite broad. He opines that we have not adequately
justified why one should examine the relation between accounting and investor protection,
although he personally sees the need for such a study. In our introduction, we discuss the
importance of accounting quality to financial-statement users. We argue that managerial
discretion is an important determinant of accounting quality, and that the degree to which this
discretion is abused by managers depends on the extent to which investors are protected by law.
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We cite several studies (e.g., Ali & Hwang, 2000; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003) that
have examined how investor protection is associated with specific eamings-quaUty mea-
sures. The main purpose of our study is to extend this research by examining four different
earnings-quality proxies. Our results indicate that conclusions about the association between
investor protection and earnings quality critically depend on how quality is measured. The
discussant indicates that studies such as ours are important given the global convergence of
accounting standards. He calls for research examining the impediments that accountants and
analysts might face in this regard. Our research suggests that while variation in investor
protection might be one such impediment, other factors (e.g., firm-specific governance
mechanisms as suggested by the discussant) likely influence international accounting data.
Thus financial-statement users cannot exclusively rely on investor-protection measures in
assessing the reliability of international firms' accounting reports.
The discussant also rightly points out that the earnings attributes are firm-specific,
whereas the investor-protection variables are based on country, market, and firm factors. We
agree with his suggestion that future research use firm-level data to measure firm-specific
investor protection, while noting that these data are not readily available and that assembling
a cross-national dataset offirm-specific governance measures is likely a challenging endeavor.
3. Research method
The discussant believes that our empirical models presume a linear relationship between
investor protection and earnings quality, whereas the real relationship between the two
variables is likely to be nonlinear. We agree with the discussant that investor protection is
likely nonlinearly associated with earnings quality. However, since the exact nature of this
nonlinearity is not evident, our solution is to rank-transform the variables, as indicated in the
paper. Linear estimation on rank-transformed variables is effectively a nonparametric model
of, and allows for nonlinear relationships in, the original variables.
The discussant also suggests that we consider including two or more investor-protection
proxies together in the same OLS model. While we appreciate the discussant's point, as a
practical matter, we believe that given the high correlations among the investor protection
variables (in some cases, well over 0.9), models with multiple explanatory variables are
likely to suffer from a severe multi-collinearity problem. Moreover, the cluster analysis
combines the independent variables, but yields essentially the same results as the regressions.
The discussant wonders why we choose the four earnings attributes that we examine, and
not some others. We focus on variables that are accounting-based, rather than those that are
based on both accounting data and stock prices, as conjectured by the discussant. Variables
that are purely accounting-based are not overly reliant on assumptions about market
efficiency, which may vary substantially across countries. Moreover, Francis, LaFond,
Olsson, and Schipper (2004) find that the four accounting-based earnings attributes have a
greater impact on firms' costs of capital than the market-based attributes. Finally, other
researchers have examined the relationship between investor protection and market-based
earnings attributes (e.g., Ali & Hwang, 2000, on value relevance and Bushman & Piotroski,
2006, on timeliness and conservatism).
The discussant recommends that we use measures of accounting practice and enforce-
ment as controls. We include La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer's (2004) public-
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enforcement variable as a control in our regressions (Table 6), since Bushman and Piotroski
(2006) find that public enforcement impacts accounting choice. We feel that popular
country-level measures of accounting practice, such as the CIFAR disclosure index, are a
characteristic, rather than a determinant, of the accounting system, as are the earnings
attributes. Thus the disclosure index is more appropriate as an alternative dependent variable
(e.g., Hope, 2003) than as a control. Leuz et al. (2003) use accrual rules as a control, but find
that the variable does not significantly affect earnings quality. Future researchers could
develop other measures of accounting practice (e.g., proxies for audit quality) and incor-
porate them into the models.
4. Limitations of our study and implications for policy malting
The discussant suggests that we do not fully analyze the exact nature of the various
earnings attributes and investor-protection measures. We agree that these issues are not
fiilly developed in our exploratoiy study. Given the paucity of theoretical research
linking investor protection and earnings quality, we rely on the belief that strong investor
protection is likely to constrain the manipulation of accounting data by insiders.
Consistent with Leuz et al. (2003), we assume that investor-protection laws limit
insiders' ability to acquire private control benefits, thus reducing their incentives to mask
firm performance. However, our results suggest that this assumption may not be valid in
an international context.
We strongly support the discussant's call for a rigorous theoretical investigation of the
relationship between investor protection and earnings quality. Such an analysis might lead
to both precise hypotheses and appropriate empirical modeling of the association between
earnings quality and investor protection, as the discussant indicates. We also agree with the
discussant that studies like ours can significantly contribute to important accounting issues
such as harmonization.
5. Conclusion
We again thank Professor Rahman for his extensive review of our paper, and also
appreciate all his favorable comments about our contributions. We concur with him that the
relationship between earnings quality and investor protection likely remains a fruitfiil
avenue for future research. In particular, researchers can fiilly analyze the exact nature ofthis
relationship, and incorporate other firm-specific and country-level variables into their
models.
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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to identify the factors that could explain the adoption of international
accounting standards by developing countries. The following factors have been selected: economic
growth, education level, the degree of external economic openness, cultural membership in a group
of countries, and the existence of a capital market.
Our results indicate that developing countries with the highest literacy rates, that have capital
markets, and that have an Anglo-American culture are the most likely to adopt international
accounting standards.
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1. Introduction
With the growing internationalization of economic trade and the globalization of
businesses and financial markets, financial information prepared according to a national
accounting system may no longer satisfy the needs of users whose decisions are more and
more international in scope. In some ways, purely domestic information may even be a
handicap for businesses as well as investors.
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Conscious of this reality as well as the need to adapt accountancy to the new global
environment and to the new requirements of decision makers, accounting regulating
authorities have sought out solutions that allow for the improvement and advancement of
financial accounting and its principal outputs. Although several initiatives have been put
forward, harmonization of accounting standards and practices on an international scale has
been the fundamental change in recent years. This initiative's goal is to have a coherent set
of accounting standards and practices that provide national and intemational decision
makers with a relatively homogenous information product that is comparable and reliable.
To arrive at this objective, the Intemational Accounting Standards Board (lASB) has
prepared and published intemational accounting standards (IAS), which have become the
reference for the entire world (Dumontier & Raffoumier, 1998).
Over the last 15 years, most of the debate has focused on the development of
intemational accounting standards and, more recently, on the adoption ofthese standards by
large industrialized countries, such as the United States, Canada, - and members of the
European Union.
Much less discussion has focused on developing countries' opportunities to adopt these
standards. According to Richter Quinn (2004), accounting and financial information
originating from developing countries is still difficult to trust, despite the urgent need for
these countries to attract foreign investment and foreign capital, and despite the pressing
demands from individual and institutional investors, lending institutions, and multinational
agencies.
There is still no effective date when all developing countries will comply with IAS;
however, some countries have taken the initiative to adopt IAS or adapt them to their particular
reality. This process is expected to improve the quality and credibility of accounting infor-
mation and improve the flow of capital and investment, resulting in economic development.
The primary force behind the adoption of IAS in developing countries is a country or a
group of countries. Several studies have dealt with the issue of IAS adoption by a specific
country. Yet none, to our knowledge, has attempted to define the reasons that motivate the
adoption or non-adoption of lASB standards by a group of countries.
Our purpose in this study is to identify the factors that could explain the adoption ofIAS
by developing countries.
Understanding these factors is potentially usefiil for a number of organizations and
decision makers, including govemments, accounting standards setters, financial markets
regulators, intemational institutions and investors, preparers and users of accounting
information, and, finally, it may help the lASB in its efforts to promote the worldwide
adoption of intemational standards.
In what follows, we first present a review of previous studies in Section 2; we then
describe our research hypotheses in Section 3; we provide the methodology and results in
Section 4; and our conclusion is in Section 5.
2. Review of previous research
Empirical research on favorable or unfavorable conditions for the adoption of IAS is
almost non-existent. Most of the few existing studies are of a general nature and normative
or descriptive of a particular country's circumstances.
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The principles behind the adoption of IAS by different countries have always been the
subject of controversy in accounting literature. Two schools of thought exist. The first
supports the adoption of international standards, based on the following arguments:
• Harmonization of international accounting enhances the quality of financial information;
• It improves the comparability of accounting information in the intemational milieu;
• It facilitates financial operations on an intemational scale, and thus contributes to a better
globalization of capital markets (Taylor, Evans, & Joy, 1986); and
• It contributes considerably, especially for developing countries, to strengthening inte-
gration and competitiveness in financial markets (Peavy & Webster, 1990).
According to Wolk, Francis, and Teamey (1989), intemational accounting harmoniza-
tion is beneficial for developing countries because it provides them with better-prepared
standards as well as the best quality accounting framework and principles.
The second school of thought insists that consideration of each country's specific
environmental factors is necessary when establishing a national accounting system. Talaga
and Ndubizu ( 1 986) stressed that a country's accounting principles must be adapted to its local
environmental conditions. In fact, according to Perera (1989a), the accounting information
produced according to developed countries' accounting systems is not relevant to the decision
models of less-developed countries. These arguments, and others, have led some authors to
strongly oppose the adoption of IAS by developing countries (Hove, 1989; Perera, 1989b).
Several case studies have described and analyzed the adoption of accounting standards
by a developing country or a group of developing countries (Wallace, 1990). McGee (1999)
analyzed the IAS implementation process in developing countries, taking Armenia as the
analytical framework. He showed that this process poses difficulties, which can be over-
come by efforts in training and information dissemination about the new standards.
Chamisa (2000) studied the question of the usefulness of IAS for developing countries.
Using a case study in Zimbabwe, he analyzed the impact ofthe adoption oflASB standards
on the accounting practices of listed companies. He found that these standards have a
particular importance for developing countries with an emerging financial market.
Empirical research projects carried out in the context of developing countries remain
very small in number, yet some have attempted to analyze the economic consequences of
the adoption of IAS in these countries.
Larson (1993) tried to determine if there is a difference between the economic growth
rates of African countries that adopt lASB standards, with or without modification, and
those that don't adopt these standards. The results of his research confirmed the notion that
lASB standards, when they are adapted to a country's local conditions, can contribute to
better economic growth.
On the other hand, WooUey ( 1 998), while carrying out a similar study in Asian countries,
concluded that there are no significant differences in the economic growth rates of countries
grouped according to the adoption or non-adoption of IAS.
These studies have attempted to provide answers to interesting questions; however, the
question ofwhich factors are capable of influencing the adoption ofIAS remains unanswered.
The answer to this question is of major interest to various groups, primarily national and
intemational harmonization organizations, and particularly the lASB.
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3. Hypotheses to examine
International accounting literature generally argues that accounting is largely influenced by
the environment found in different countries. According to Alhashim and Arpan (1992), the
most important environmental forces influencing accounting are economic forces, social
forces, the legal system, culture, and the political system. A particular country's choice of a
specific set ofaccounting standards, policies, and practices is the result ofan interactive process
among a number of environmental factors. According to Cooke and Wallace (1990), these
factors could be intemal as well as extemal. They could include factors such as economic
growth and the level of wealth, the level of inflation, the education level, the legal system, the
country's history and geography, the financial system, the size and complexity of business
enterprises, the notoriety of the accounting profession, the development of financial markets,
sources ofinvestment and financing, and the predominant culture and language. They may also
include the existence ofa colonial link, the presence ofmultinational enterprises, the significant
importance offoreign investment and financing, the degree ofopenness to foreign markets, the
signing of intemational agreements, and the presence of international accounting firms.
Any significant change in these factors in a particular country could affect its accounting
regulations and policies. For instance, a decision to develop a stock market and attract
intemational investment could trigger the restructuring of the accounting system and
strongly motivate the adoption of intemational accounting standards.
The goal of our research is to identify major factors that could explain the adoption or
non-adoption of IAS by developing countries.
In order to develop and frame our hypotheses, we have called mainly upon literature that
analyzes the relationship and symbiosis that could be established between the planning and
evolution of a country's accounting system and the characteristics of its environment. The
relevance ofthis fi^amework is founded on the assumption that a developing country's decision
to adopt IAS is motivated by a group of specific environmental factors within that country.
The introduction of all these factors in our study has proven to be very difficult for several
reasons, including the large number ofvariables and the difficulties in determining them, the
difficulty in moving fi-om conceptualization to a practical definition of the variables, and,
finally, the difficulty in measuring the variables. In some cases, there has also been great
difficulty in finding information. For the purposes ofthis research, the following factors were
selected to explain a developing country's decision to adopt or not adopt IAS: economic
growth; education level; the degree ofextemal economic openness; cultural membership in a
group of countries; and the existence of a financial market. These factors have been selected
because of their very strategic importance in the adoption decision and because of the
information available; they will be used in the formulation of the following hypotheses.
3.1. Economic growth
Economic conditions are a major determinant in the development of a country's ac-
counting system. More specifically, it has been established that a country's level ofeconomic
growth has a positive effect on the development of accounting systems and practices
(Adhikari & Tondkar, 1992). Indeed, in countries where the level of economic growth is
relatively high, the social function of accountancy as an instrument of measurement and
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communication is of considerable importance. Business and economic activities will reach a
size and complexity that require a sophisticated, high-quality accounting system and
standards. Where information plays a critical role (Abdolmohammadi, Rhodes, & Tucker,
2002; Nobes, 1998), the accounting system will undergo significant changes in response to
demands of the changing economic conditions of a more dynamic business environment.
These arguments lead us to think that the decision by some developing countries to adopt
IAS is a response to recorded economic growth. Thus the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis no. 1. The probability that a developing country will adopt IAS increases with
economic growth.
3.2. Education level
Education is the pillar for modem complex accounting systems. It has been established
that there is a positive relationship between education level and the competence of pro-
fessional accountants (Gemon, Meek, & Mueller, 1987). The adoption of IAS is a very
strategic and critical decision; it requires a high level of education, competence, and
expertise to be able to understand, interpret, and then make use of these standards. Highly
qualified accountants and well-trained users must exercise professional judgment and
process complex information (Doupnik and Salter, 1995; Street, 2002). In fact, it is expected
that, in countries where the education level is low and expertise is weak, there is a real barrier
to the adoption of IAS. Thus the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis no. 2. The probability that a developing country will adopt IAS is positively
tied to its education level.
3.3. The degree of external economic openness
Extemal pressures could potentially affect the adoption of international accounting
standards. Foreign investors, multinational corporations, international accounting firms,
and world financial institutions are the main forces behind the development and adoption of
international standards. Cooke and Wallace (1990) introduced the relevance of including
extemal environmental factors in trying to understand accounting systems. One of these
factors is the degree of outside economic openness. According to the authors, the more a
country's economy is open to the outside world, the more the country will be exposed to
diverse international pressures. Such pressures could lead some developing countries to
adopt IAS. Thus the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis no. 3. Developing countries with a high degree ofextemal economic openness
will be more inclined to adopt IAS.
3.4. Cultural membership in a group of countries
It is generally accepted that culture is a major factor in the choice of an accounting
system. Countries belonging to a certain culture adopt the accounting system inspired by
countries of the same culture (Nobes, 1998).
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Abdelsalam and Weetman (2003) highlighted the contribution famiUarity and language
make to the process of adopting new accounting standards. In the case of adopting IAS,
they have shown that both factors, i.e., familiarity and language, seem to favor countries in
the Anglo-American group, mainly because of the predominant Anglo-American influence
in the development of IAS and also because English is the language of communication
within the lASB.
Despite translation efforts by the LASB and countries involved, those outside the Anglo-
American culture remain generally less familiar with IAS and have to commit significant
resources to overcome this situation.
Given the Anglo-American influence on the lASB's work (Chamisa, 2000; Hove,
1986), we can anticipate that adoption of IAS would be easier for developing countries of
Anglo-American culture. In fact, in these countries, several difficulties could be easily
resolved because of their cultural proximity and, more specifically, because of their use of a
common language (McGee, 1999). Thus the fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis no. 4. Developing countries with Anglo-American culture are more likely to
adopt IAS.
3.5. The existence of a capital market
The existence of a capital market is considered one of the key factors in a country's
economic development because of its role in the optimal allocation of resources among the
different economic sectors and among firms within each sector. Quality accounting infor-
mation is a major ingredient in the development and efficient ftinctioning ofa capital market.
According to Gray, McSwenney, and Shaw (1984), the pressures exerted by investors are
important; investors require quality financial information in order to be able to make optimal
choices when they analyze investment opportunities. In some cases, they can lead a country's
accounting-standards-setting body to reform its accounting system and eventually adopt IAS
(Adhikari & Tondkar, 1992).
In countries with a capital market, the standards-setting bodies tend to establish sophisticated
accounting systems in order to guarantee the production and disclosure of quality financial
information that will be potentially useful for investors in making their decisions (Adhikari &
Tondkar, 1992). More specifically, Chamisa (2000) analyzed the role of IAS in improving the
quality of financial information produced for the capital markets in developing countries.
Accounting information, and particularly financial statements, remains a major resource for
capital-market investors in developing countries because ofthe scarcity and, in many cases, the
absence ofother reliable sources ofinformation. These arguments lead us to the fifth hypothesis:
Hypothesis no. 5. Developing countries with a capital market are more likely to adopt IAS.
4. Methodology and results
4.1. Sample and data sources
Our study is based on a sample of developing countries that was selected from the 2003
lASB Web site. In a section entitled "IAS Around the World" this site provides information
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on the position of several countries' accounting systems in relation to IAS and the year of
adoption.' Thus, and in consideration of the data available, we could combine the relative
information into a group of 32 countries that had adopted IAS (with or without adjustment)
and a second group of 32 countries that in 2003 had not adopted IAS. The list of countries in
each of the two groups, divided according to continents, appears in Table 1.
Given that various developing countries' decisions to adopt IAS are spread over time,
we have proceeded in a way that will ensure comparability of the data from the two groups.
We detemiined the IAS adoption date for each country that had opted for this alternative
and found the data on the same year for a similar country that had not. The similarity of the
countries is based on the criteria of economic size measured by the GDP average during the
study period."
4.2. The study's variables
In this section, we present definitions and measurements of the dependent and inde-
pendent variables.
4.2.1. The adoption variable
Examination of information on the accounting systems of the developing countries
chosen for the study allows us to distinguish countries that have adopted IAS from those
that have not. This distinction allows us to define a dichotomous variable that takes the
value one if a country has adopted IAS (with or without modification) and zero if it hasn't.
4.2.2. Independent variables and sources of data
Before proceeding with the presentation of independent variables, we'd like to point out
that the relative values of these variables were collected mainly from publications produced
by the World Bank, as well as the specific countries in the study.
i. Economic growth (ECO): This variable is measured by the average annual growth
rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) per person during the five years that
preceded the date of adoption (source: World Development Indicators, 2003 CD-
ROM, World Bank),
ii. Education level (EDUC): The measure used for this variable is the country's general
literacy rate, as was done by Larson (1993). Because of the unavailability of specific
data on the accounting profession in developing countries, this measure represents, in
our opinion, a good indicator of the ability to deal with contemporary accounting
In the particular case of Jamaica and Croatia, the year of adoption has been found in country-specific
pubhcation.
~ The GDP average for every country on the lASB Web site has been calculated for the period beginning from
1991 (the earliest adoption date of IAS in our sample) to 2000 (the most recent date of adoption). We then ranked
the group of adoptee and the group of non-adoptee on the basis of their GDP average. We finally matched
countries in the two groups on the basis of their respective ranks. GDP data has been collected from World 2003
Development Indicators, CD-ROM, World Bank. The data for two missing countries, Iraq and Myanmar, have
been collected from the United Nations Statistics Division (The United Nations, 2005).
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Table 1
Presentation of the sample countries by region and according to their position with respect to lASB standards
(source: the lASB Web site)*
Countries that have adopted IAS Countries that have not adopted IAS
Africa Americas Asia Europe Africa Americas Asia Europe
-South -Brazil -Cambodia -Armenia -Algeria -Bolivia -Saudi -Albania
Africa (1999) (1998) (1998) Arabia
(1993)
-Egypt -Ecuador -China -Croatia -Angola -Chile -Iraq -Slovakia
(1998) (1996) (1993) (1992)
-Kenya -Haiti hidia -Estonia -Benin -Colombia -Kazakhstan
(1998) (1997) (1998) (1995)
-Tunisia -Honduras -Indonesia -Georgia -Botswana -Nicaragua -Kyrgyzstan
(1996) (1997) (1994) (1999)
-Jamaica -Malaysia -Macedonia -Burkina -Venezuela -Myanmar
(2000) (1997) (1997) Faso
-Mexico -Nepal -Moldavia -Burundi -Turkmenistan
(1995) (1996) (1998)
-Panama -Sri Lanka -Poland -Congo -Vietnam
(2000) (1995) (1997)
-Peru Thailand -Romania -Cote
(1998) (1999) (1999) d'lvoire
-Dominican -Ukraine -Libya
Republic (2000)
(2000)
-Salvador -Madagascar
(1999)
-Uruguay -Mali
(1991)
-Niger
-Uganda
-Rwanda
-Senegal
-Tanzania
-Chad
-Togo
Countries classified as non-adopters in 2003.
The year of IAS adoption for each country is indicated in brackets.
For Jamaica and Croatia the year of adoption was found in country-specific publications.
111.
systems. Literacy is a basic ingredient in the supply and demand for complex
accounting and financial data and therefore it could be used as an indicator for
business and accounting education. It may thus be interpreted as a proxy for the
strength of the accounting profession and the users of financial statements (source:
World Development Indicators, 2003 CD-ROM, World Bank).
The degree of external economic openness (FDI): This variable is measured by the
average rate of gross foreign direct investment, divided by the gross domestic product
(GDP), for the five years that preceded the date of adoption. Investors and capital
providers are, in most cases, a major source of pressure to support high-quality
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Table 2
Comparison of variables between the two groups of countries
Adoption
Average Standard deviation Median
Non-adoption
/-testVariables Average Standard deviation Median L^-test
ECO 1.840 3.171 1.772 0.369 3.227 0.470 1.839*
EDUC 81.700 15.640 84.594 61.603 22.252 61.600 4.180***
FDI 2.775 2.252 2.607 2.358 1.592 2.358 0.857
CULT 0.47 0.51 0.13 0.34 3.197*** -2.986***
ECM 0.88 0.34 1 0.31 0.47 5.500*** -4.545***
*Significant variable to 10%, ***significant variable to 1%.
Adoption: group of countries that has adopted IAS.
Non-adoption: group of countries that has not adopted IAS.
ECO: the annual average growth rate of GDP/person.
EDUC: the general literacy rate in the country.
FDI: the average of gross foreign direct investment divided by the GDP.
CULT: takes the value one if the country is a member of a group of countries with an Anglo-American culture and
zero otherwise.
ECM: takes the value one if the country has a financial market and zero otherwise.
accounting standards and information (source: World Development Indicators, 2003
CD-ROM, World Bank),
iv. Cultural membership in a group of countries (CULT): This acts as a dummy
variable. It takes a value of one if the country belongs to a group of countries with
an Anglo-American culture^ and zero otherwise (source: specific country-based
information).
V. The existence ofa capital market (ECM): This also acts as a dummy variable. It takes
a value of one if the country has a capital market in the year of adoption and zero
otherwise (source: specific country-based information).
4.3. Characteristics of the independent variables for the two groups of countries
4.3.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables for the two groups
In light of the results obtained in Table 2, we note that there is a difference between the
group of countries that adopted IAS and those that didn't, relative to the group of
explanatory variables. Indeed, across the average relative values, we note that economic
growth, education level, the degree of external economic openness, cultural membership in
a group of countries, and the existence of a financial market are more elevated in the
developing countries that decided to adopt IAS. Thus, we conclude that the relationships
are the same as anticipated in our hypotheses. We will attempt to confirm these results with
tests comparing the averages.
^ A country is classified in the Anglo-American group if its official language is English (Frank, 1979), or if its
history has been marked by a strong tie with the United Kingdom or the United States fNobes, 1 998), such as having
been a past colony, or being a member of the commonwealth or being part of a trade agreement such as NAFTA.
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4.3.2. Comparison of variables between the two groups
At this point, it should be noted that the parametric Student r-test'* was used to compare
the averages of quantitative variables (ECO, EDUC and FDI) and the non-parametric
Mann-Whitney [/-test was used for dummy explanatory variables (CULT and ECM).
Table 2, which summarizes the results obtained when comparing countries that adopt
IAS to those that do not, shows that the economic growth and education level variables are
significantly different between the two groups, at the level of 10% and 1% respectively. The
degree of external economic openness (FDI) is higher in the adoption group (2.775
compared to 2.358); however, the difference is not statistically significant. Moreover, in
light of the defined results, we found that the two qualitative variables (CULT^ and ECM^)
are significantly different between the two groups, at the level of 1 %.
Based on the univariate analysis, we could determine that developing countries that
adopt IAS register the highest economic growth, have the highest education levels, have a
capital market, and are of Anglo-American culture.
4.4. Multivariate analysis
The goal of this analysis is to investigate the combined effect ofthe variables used in this
research on the adoption ofIAS and to determine the meaning of this connection. Given that
our dependent variable is a dichotomic variable that takes the value ofone or zero, we called
on an analysis model of logistic regression, which will be determined like this:
Log[P,/(l-P,)] =ao + a, ECO, + a2EDUC/ + asFDI/ + a4CULT, + ajECM,- + e
Where:
Pi is the probability of adopting IAS;
ECO, is the annual average growth rate of GDP/person;
EDUC, is the general literacy rate in the country;
FDI, is the average rate of gross foreign direct investment, divided by the GDP;
CULT, takes the value one if the country is a member of a group of countries with an
Anglo-American culture and zero otherwise; and
ECM, takes the value one if the country has a capital market and otherwise.
£ is the margin of error.
Before assessing this model, we will proceed with an analysis of the correlations
between the different incidental variables in order to detect an eventual multicoUinearity
among them.
The normality test results (with the Kolmogorov-Smimov test) demonstrate that the normahty hypothesis is
accepted for the distribution of all the quantitative variables. Therefore, for the comparison of averages, we applied
the Student test for the variables of economic growth, education level, and degree of external economic openness.
The percentage of countries of Anglo-American culture is 46.785% in the group that has adopted IAS and
12.5% in the group that has not adopted IAS.
'' The percentage of countries that has a capital market is 87.5% in the group that has adopted IAS and 31.25%
in the group that has not adopted IAS.
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Table 3
Correlation matrix among variables
Variables Adoption ECO EDUC FDI CULT ECM
Adoption 1
ECO 0.212 1
EDUC 0.460*** 0.122 1
FDI 0.105 0.134 0.378*** 1
CULT 0.376*** 0.254** 0.193 0.031
ECM 0.573*** 0.259** 0.568*** 0.152
1
0.329***
***Significant correlation at the level of 1%, **significant correlation at the level of 5%.
Variables are defined under Table 2.
Table 4
Results of the logistic regression
Model: Log [/',/(l -P,)] = ao + o'iECO, + a2EDUC, + a3FDI, + o(4CULT, + o(5ECM, + c
Variables Expected results Coefficient Wald statistics
ECO
EDUC
FDI
CULT
ECM
Constant
-2 log probability
R- of Cox and Snell
Model Chi-square
% of correctly classification
Sample size
0.051 0.229
0.034* 2.756
0.069 0.145
1.268* 2.867
1.867** 6.260
-3.887
58.407
0.367
29.316***
79.7
64
***Significant at the 1% level, **significant variable to 5%, *significant variable to 10% level.
Variables are defined under Table 2.
Correlations between explanatory variables appear in Table 3. Three of the correlations
exceed 0.30 and all three are significantly correlated at the level of 1%: education level
(EDUC) is positively correlated both with the degree of external economic openness (FDI)
and with the existence of a capital market (ECM); and cultural membership in a group of
countries (CULT) is positively correlated with the existence of a capital market (ECM).
However, conclusions about the presence or the absence of multicollinearity that are
based solely on a simple correlation between independent variables must be made with
care. Therefore, collinearity diagnostics based on the condition indexes and the variance
inflation factor (VIF) were performed to measure the degree of collinearity. The results'' of
the condition index and VIF indicate the presence of some collinearity but it is not of large
enough magnitude to cause serious problems in the estimation of regression statistics.
Table 4 reports the results of the logistic regression, illustrating several conclusions that
can be drawn.
^ The largest condition index and VIF calculated for this study were 4.61 and 1.65, respectively.
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The education-level variable, statistically significant at the level of 10%, has a positive
effect on the adoption of IAS. Thus, the countries with the highest education levels proceed
with the adoption of IAS.
The cultural-membership variable is positively and significantly (at the level of 10%)
associated with the adoption of IAS. Therefore, we can conclude that the countries having
an Anglo-American culture are the most inclined to adopt IAS.
The existence of a capital-market variable has a positive and significant effect (at the
level of 5%) on the adoption of IAS. Because of this, countries that are developing a capital
market will proceed with the adoption of IAS.
Although they are positively associated with the adoption of IAS, the variables external
economic openness and economic growth are statistically insignificant.
Thus, in light of the defined results, we can say that developing countries that have a
high literacy rate, that belong to the Anglo-American culture, and that have capital markets
are the most likely to adopt IAS.
5. Conclusion and implications
Over the past two decades the international community has been very interested in
developing and implementing international accounting standards. But the adoption of these
standards by developing countries has not received the same level of attention. The main
objective of this study is to identify the factors that favor the adoption ofIAS by developing
countries. In this fi^amework, we seek to verify the contribution of the following factors:
economic growth, education level, the degree of external economic openness, cultural
membership in a group of countries, and the existence of a capital market.
In applying logistic regression to a sample comprising 64 developing countries, we
conclude that education level, existence of a financial market, and cultural membership
are factors that are positively and significantly tied to the adoption of IAS. No signi-
ficant relationships are found, however, for economic growth and external economic
openness.
According to our results, we conclude that developing countries that enjoy the highest
literacy rate, that have a capital market, and that belong to an Anglo-American culture
are the most motivated to adopt IAS. The strong effect of the capital-market variable on
the adoption decision seems to signal that high-quality accounting information is critical
and strategically vital to the development of publicly traded corporations and the
development of investment in the capital market. These results are in line with pre-
vious studies that have shown that the adoption of a particular accounting system is affected
by the education level (Doupnik & Salter, 1995), cultural membership in a group of
countries (Abdelsalem & Weetman, 2003) and the existence of a capital market (Adhikari &
Tondkar, 1992).
Our results are potentially important for the countries concerned and for their accounting
regulating bodies because they (our results) provide a better understanding of the factors
that may encourage and facilitate the adoption of IAS. These results are also potentially
usefiil for the lASB in its quest for a strategy to maximize and facilitate the adoption of
international standards by different countries. According to our results, countries that don't
belong to the Anglo-American culture have more difficulties in adopting IAS. The lASB
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and other concerned bodies (such as international institutions) could take a more active and
supportive role in helping these countries in their transition to international accounting
standards.
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Abstract
Recently the Dutch financial reporting standard setters have taken steps to make dirty surplus
accounting flows more visible to parties outside firms, either by eliminating their possibilities or by
requiring comprehensive income-type statements. These steps are presumably based on the idea that
dirty surplus accounting flows are relevant to investors and hence have to be visible to them.
Whether diity surplus accounting flows are indeed relevant in firm valuation is an empirical issue.
This paper, therefore, explores both the incremental and relative value relevance of dirty surplus
accounting flows for the Dutch listed firms in the period 1988-1997, when their existence was
relatively unhindered.
We find consistent evidence that both reported income and clean surplus income are relevant in
explaining stock returns, though reported income seems a more relevant measure of returns in the
period considered.
The results suggest that aggregated dirty surplus flows are not associated with stock returns with
accumulation intervals up to 10 years; however, asset revaluations and currency-translation
differences are at times incrementally relevant to returns.
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1. Introduction
The relevance of accounting information, most notably earnings, is an important topic
because of the potential use of accounting information for contracting and valuation
purposes (Beaver, 1998; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Recently, financial reporting
standard-setting bodies have come under attack for allowing potentially relevant dirty
surplus flows' to be kept out of earnings. Dirty surplus accounting flows, e.g., goodwill
write-offs, asset revaluations, etc., bypass bottom-line earnings and are taken directly to
shareholders' equity.
Two conflicting views exist about "dirty surplus accounting flows." The exclusion of
irrelevant dirty surplus flows from earnings could potentially enhance the quality of reported
earnings. Reported earnings are formed on the basis of more persistent components if noisy
flows would be taken directly to shareholders' equity. Dirty surplus flows are used, in this case,
as the means of improving reporting efficiency or, more specifically, earnings quality.
On the other hand, the exclusion of relevant dirty surplus flows could decrease the
informativeness of accounting earnings." For instance, the fact that value-relevant
information is not disclosed in firms' primary statements may hinder the investors' ability
to extract it in a timely and precise manner (O'Hanlon & Pope, 1999). Then it is likely that
reported earnings are not a good indicator of stock returns.
In more and more countries standard setters apparently accept the second view, and they
are eliminating dirty surplus accounting options to reduce managers' discretions with
regard to reported bottom-line earnings. For example, in the United Kingdom, the
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) effectively abolished extraordinary items in 1992 (FRS
3) and eliminated the dirty surplus treatment of goodwill write-offs in 1998 (FRS 10). In
The Netherlands, the Council for Annual Reporting abolished the dirty surplus treatment of
goodwill write-offs in 2000 (RJ 500.218).
The value relevance of dirty surplus items is an empirical issue. And also, given the costs
of new regulations and the costs of enforcement, the issue arises over whether or not they
deserve the recent special attention of standard-setting bodies.
The accounting research by Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and Ohlson (1995) can also
motivate the attention directed at clean surplus accounting. In their residual income-based
valuation fi-amework, firm value is directly linked to observable accounting numbers given
that the financial statements reconcile under the clean surplus relation." It implies that clean
surplus income is considered as the summary performance measure in firm valuation.
(Bernard, 1995; Dechow, Hutton, & Sloan, 1999; Walker, 1997).
' Dirty surplus accounting flows bypass income statement and are written-off directly from shareholders'
equity. The term "dirty surplus flows" is used here in the context of "clean surplus earnings," which is defined as
all changes of shareholders' equity except for the transactions between firms and their owners.
~ There are also other explanations for the existence of dirty surplus flows. For instance, current treatment of
asset revaluations is thought to be consistent with the conservatism principle. Upward asset revaluations are
recorded as revaluation reserves, while downward revaluations in excess of revaluation reserves are expensed
immediately on the income statement (Basu, 1997).
Clean surplus relation requires that ending-period book value of shareholders' equity is equal to the sum of
opening-period book value of shareholders' equity, clean surplus income, and net capital inflows after subtracting
dividend payments.
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This study looks at firms listed in The Netherlands fi-om 1988 to 1997. During that
period, quite a few dirty surplus flows were allowed there. Since their existence was
relatively unhindered. The Netherlands seems to be an interesting setting to investigate the
relevance of dirty surplus items.
Moreover, although accounting practice in The Netherlands is considered to be similar to
that in other common-law countries, such as the United Kingdom, and the United States
(van Lent, 1997), Dutch investors are not thought to have much influence in company
decision-making processes due to the Dutch policy of self-regulation for financial reporting
in the private sector (DeJong, DeJong, Mertens, & Wasley, 2004) and the relatively weak
position of its private sector regulatory body: Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving (RJ). In the
majority of Dutch listed firms, investors have little direct influence on the composition of
the management and supervisory boards (with their two-tier co-optation system) because
new board members are "self-elected" by the remaining members of that board."*
The freedom to choose financial reporting methods that the Dutch managers enjoy and
the characteristics of the governance structure (Kabir, Cantrjn, & Jeunink, 1997; van Ees,
Postma, & Sterken, 2003),^ therefore, could provide room for the existence of value-
relevant dirty surplus items being kept out of firm's primary performance report, i.e., an
income statement.
This paper investigates whether dirty surplus items are value relevant and whether clean
surplus net income is more highly associated with stock returns than currently reported
income. To the best ofour knowledge, no other study on the value relevance of dirty surplus
accounting flows has been done in The Netherlands.
To test the value relevance of dirty surplus flows empirically, we use the standard
approach of examining the statistical association between dirty surplus flows and stock
returns. We employ an incremental association method to test the informativeness of dirty
surplus accounting flows. In addition, we also conduct a relative association study to
compare the explanatory power (i.e., with respect to returns) of clean surplus income and
reported income (under the Dutch GAAP).
Due to a potential mismatch of stock market and accounting information, it is suggested
in the literature to extend the testing window over long periods (Easton, Harris, & Ohlson,
1992; O'Hanlon & Pope, 1999; Warfield & Wild, 1992). Hence, we accumulate both stock
market and accounting information in order to increase the power of the test.
Consistent with previous studies, we find that both currently reported income and clean
surplus income are always relevant in explaining stock returns. But, reported income
appears to be a better indicator of stock returns than clean surplus income.
'*
In a two-tier system, firms are governed by a management board and a supervisory board. In The Netherlands,
when firms have more than 100 employees and a common equity in excess of 13 million euros, they are classified
as structure firms. The supervisory boards of structure firms could appoint and dismiss management boards and
individual members of the supervisory boards, and the boards also have decision rights over financial statements
(van Ees et al., 2003).
Cuijpers, Moers, and Peek (2004), suggest that the co-optation system enhances efficient corporate
governance practices and they assume that the supervisory boards are able to monitor firms (also their financial
reports) efficiently. However, we choose to follow the arguments in Kabir et al. (1997), and van Ees et al. (2003),
which consider this co-optation system as an anti-takeover mechanism and it is in favor of the supervisory board.
We suggest that this system results in inefficiencies of the supervisory boards.
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The results also suggest that the aggregated dirty surplus flows are not relevant even with
accumulation intervals of up to 10 years. However, there is some evidence that both the
asset revaluations and the currency-translation differences are incrementally informative.
Our data also indicate that goodwill write-offs are not relevant and the quality of earnings
wouldn't have been enhanced in the testing period ifthe dirty surplus treatment of goodwill
write-offs were abolished at that time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss dirty
surplus accounting and provide some empirical evidence on the value relevance of dirty
surplus flows. The third section discusses dirty surplus accounting possibilities in The
Netherlands. The fourth section describes the hypothesis development and the research
design. The data analysis and the empirical results are presented in the fifth section. In the
final section, we conclude the paper and provide suggestions for future research.
2. Literature review
2.1. Dirty surplus accounting
Financial statements are stated on a clean surplus basis if ending-period book value
(BV,) is equal to the sum of opening-period book value (BV,_ i), clean surplus earnings
(NICL,), and net capital inflows (NetCap,) after subtracting dividend payments (Div,):
BV,=BV,- 1 +NICL^+NetCap,-DIV,. Dirty surplus flows arise if certain changes in
shareholders' equity bypass reported earnings.
As explained earlier, stock investors could have difficulties in extracting value-relevant
information from dirty surplus flows to a certain extent, due to the fact that they are
disclosed in secondary statements only (Brief& Peasnell, 1996; O'Hanlon & Pope, 1999).
From the equity-valuation perspective used in this paper, we consider a component of
dirty surplus accounting flows to be relevant for stock returns if it is incrementally
relevant.^ Moreover, reported earnings would be less relevant if relative transitory flows
were included (Beaver, 1998; Scott, 2003; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). So if dirty surplus
flows were less persistent than other components of reported earnings, then the clean
surplus earnings would not be more relevant than the reported earnings even if dirty surplus
accounting flows are incrementally informative.
A value relevance study ofaccounting information presumes that the market is efficient on
average, i.e., all publicly available information is reflected in prices. Sloan (1996) and Xie
(2001), for example, provide consistent evidence that the U.S. market does not price
components of earnings correctly. Unfortunately, there is little evidence on the efficiency of
the Dutch market. Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2002), however, suggest that although the
relevance of accounting numbers would be considerably lowered if it were measured in an
inefficient market, this difference is not big enough to alter the conclusions that previous value
relevance studies draw. Also it seems that the market under reacts to accounting information
only up to 3 years. Therefore, we deal with the issue of potential market inefficiency by
accumulating both stock market and accounting information over periods up to 10 years.
'' Note that, the reporting of dirty surplus flows could also serve compensation purposes and be relevant there;
see for example Biddle and Choi (2003). However, we do not address this issue in our paper.
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2.2. Evidence on the magnitude and value relevance of dirty surplus flows
There is earlier evidence on the magnitude of dirty surplus accounting flows. The
median of dirty surplus flows (deflated by market value of shareholders' equity) is -0.4%
in the United Kingdom (O'Hanlon & Pope, 1999) and 0% in the US (Dhaliwal,
Subremanyam, & Trezevant, 1 999) in the periods studied. Lo and Lys (2000) document a
considerable deviation of clean surplus accounting for the U.S. firms. '' In particular, 14% of
their observations report dirty surplus flows that are larger than 10% of the clean surplus
income. Similar results can be found in Cahan, Courtenay, GronewoUer, and Upton (2000)
with New Zealand data, Kanagaretnam, Mathieu, and Shehata (2004) for Canadian firms,
or Lo and Lys (2000), Hand and Landsman (2005), and Chambers, Linsmeier, Shakespeare,
and Sougiannis (2005) all with U.S. data.
However, U.S. research suggests that clean surplus income does not perform better than
reported income when associating both with stock returns (Dhaliwal et al., 1999). More
recent studies, however, do claim that the comprehensive income as defined in SFAS 130 is
a better measure of firm value (Biddle & Choi, 2003; Chambers et al., 2005).
Studies in other countries find little evidence that dirty surplus flows are relevant; see for
example: O'Hanlon and Pope (1999) for UK, Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) for Canada, and
Cahan et al. (2000) for New Zealand. It seems that there is no conclusive evidence on the
value relevance of dirty surplus accounting flows.
3. Dirty surplus accounting practices in The Netherlands
3.1. Accounting regulatory procedures
During the period covered in this paper (1988-1997), the following describes the
financial reporting regulation in The Netherlands (Buijink & Eken, 1999; Zeff, Buijink, &
Camfferman, 1999).
The Fourth (1978) and the Seventh (1983) EU Directives were incorporated in the Dutch
domestic-company law. The Fourth Directive regulates the format and the content of
financial reporting by companies with limited liability, and in particular the overriding "true
and fair view" principle is adopted. The Seventh Directive stipulates regulations about
consolidated financial statements.
Fundamental issues in Dutch annual reporting appear in the company law as part of the
Dutch Civil Code. The parliament is the primary source of financial reporting regulation.
The regulations are initiated by the Minister of Justice (Minister van Justitie) and evaluated
by the Social and Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad), i.e., the advisory body
of parliament in economic matters, and by the Council of State (Raad van State), i.e., the
senior advisory body of government in legal matters.
The Enterprise Chamber (Ondememingskamer) has the legal authority to evaluate
complaints from interested parties if they consider that corporate financial statements
contradict the law.
' Using data from 1962-1997.
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The Dutch auditing profession and representatives from companies participate in the
council for annual reporting (Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving, 2002 or RJ). As a private
sector regulatory body, the RJ issues guidelines that elaborate on legal stipulations. The
Netherlands Institute of Registered Accountants (NIvRA) provides technical supports to the
RJ. However, the guidelines do not have the legal position of law and the auditors do not
need to report non-compliance. Hence, it seems that the RJ is less influential than the FASB
in the U.S. (van Lent, 1997).
3.2. Dirty surplus accounting possibilities in The Netherlands
Dutch accounting law is not explicit in its choice of adopting the clean surplus concept
of income. And the Guidelines (Richtlijnen) of the RJ*^ did require "all-inclusive" income
(RJ 240.202) in the period considered but they allowed specific exceptions. The dirty
surplus items included the following in the period 1988-1997:
a) Purchased goodwill can be charged directly to equity (Dutch accounting law. Section
2:389.7);''
b) The creation of a revaluation reserve for the amount of the value increase of an asset, in
case of application of current valuation (Dutch accounting law. Section 2:390.1).
Decreases in the value of assets valued at current prices should as a rule, be booked to
reduce the revaluation reserve. Only if there is no more revaluation reserve left, should a
decrease in current value be charged as a loss to the income statement (Dutch accounting
law. Section 2:390.3);
c) Currency-translation differences can be booked directly to equity. The Dutch law merely
requires that the policies for the translation ofamounts in foreign currency be disclosed, and
that the policy for the recognition of currency-translation differences be disclosed (Dutch
accounting law. Section 2:384.5). The RJ requires currency-translation differences with
respect to activities in foreign entities to be reflected directly in equity (RJ 120.916-922);
d) The cumulative effect of changes in accounting policies (RJ 140.113-117) and the
correction of fundamental errors (RJ 150.106) are preferably reflected directly in equity;
e) Expenses and capital tax in respect of an issue of shares are allowed to be charged to the
share premium, although it is preferred to capitalize and amortize these items or to
charge them directly to income (RJ 240.213);
f) The following items of a non-recurring or exceptional nature, if material, may be shown
directly as movements in equity (RJ 240.211):
- "Adjustments" to the provision for deferred tax liabilities due to changes in the tax rate,
but only to the extent that the deferred liability relates to revaluation of assets;
- Effects of a financial reorganization whereby creditors and shareholders relinquish all or
part of their rights in connection with the write-off of a loss;
It stands for the Council for Annual Reporting, which is the Dutch private sector regulatory body.
'^ Note that the Council for Annual Reporting abolished dirty surplus treatment of goodwill write-offs in 2000
(RJ 500.218), and the Dutch government proposed to Parliament a bill to the same effect in 2002 (Kamerstukken
Eerste en Tweede Kamer, publication number 28220).
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— Losses due to the destruction of capital (for example as the result of a natural disaster) for
which it is not possible or not customary to take out insurance cover; adverse effects of
nationalizations, one-off capital levies or similar forms of expropriation.
Hence, the RJ in The Netherlands allowed quite a few exceptions to the all-inclusive
income in the period 1988-1997. There was no requirement to include a comprehensive
income figure in the primary financial statements. There was, however, a legal requirement
to provide a statement of movements in equity in the notes to financial statements (Section
2:378.1). For each item in equity, i.e., the issued capital and the various separate reserves
(Section 2:373.1), this statement should show the opening balance, additions and
reductions during the financial year (classified according to their nature), and the closing
balance.
Five categories of dirty surplus accounting flows that existed in The Netherlands in the
period covered in this paper will be considered: goodwill write-offs (GW), asset
revaluations (REV), currency-translation differences (CUR), sundry items (OTH)
including the "events" described under d. and e. above, and extraordinary dirty surplus
items (EDSI), which are the effects of the "events" described under f above.
The reporting ofpurchased goodwill write-offs, sundry items, and extraordinary items as
dirty surplus accounting flows is under a firm's discretion. A firm also has some influence
on the timing and valuation of asset revaluations, however, it has few discretions on the
reporting of currency-translation differences.
4. Research question development and research design
4. J. Incremental value relevance of dirty surplus accounting flows
The value relevance of accounting flows is conventionally defined as their statistically
significant association with stock returns. Hence, we regress returns on dirty surplus
items and on reported net income to test the incremental value relevance of dirty surplus
accounting flows. The purpose of this test is to discover the variations in returns that can be
explained by dirty surplus items, i.e., incremental to reported net income. It enables us to
examine whether or not value-relevant accounting flows are excluded from income statement.
Our first research question therefore is:
Are dirty surplus flows incrementally value relevant over reported net income?
We extend our testing windows to up to 10 years to deal with the timing problem of
accounting information. The market incorporates contemporary events in a timely fashion,
whereas earnings or components of earnings may reflect value-relevant events of previous
periods but may not record other events of a corresponding interval (Easton et al., 1992).
Due to this timing difference in the recognition of economic events in stock returns and in
accounting systems, the returns-earnings association should be stronger over longer testing
windows, i.e., accumulating both returns and accounting information over more than 1 year
(Easton et al, 1992). Warfield and Wild (1992) also show that the long-interval approach is
capable of reducing the measurement errors inherent in accounting systems, which is due
largely to their incapability of incorporating sufficient information to estimate a firm's
future growth opportunities or goodwill.
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Dirty surplus items are not disclosed in a firm's primary financial statements, and they
are presented in the footnotes only in The Netherlands as explained earlier. Due to this
hidden nature, it is necessary to accumulate dirty surplus flows especially over longer
testing windows (O'Hanlon & Pope, 1999). Hence, we use the long-interval methods in the
context of dirty surplus accounting flows to be able to perform a more powerful test (Easton
et al., 1992; O'Hanlon & Pope, 1999; Warfield & Wild, 1992).
Investors are assumed to pursue a "hold and invest" strategy, i.e., dividends are assumed
to be reinvested to earn the equity cost of capital in the subsequent periods. The cum-
dividends stock returns at time / is accumulated over a T-period interval. The return (r^)
used in this paper, therefore, equals
t=T
Z = Il{\+r,)-\ (El)
t=\
Our period t return lags behind the corresponding accounting period by six months.
According to the Dutch Civil Code, article 210, firms are obliged to publish financial
statements five months after the fiscal year-end. However, they could get a one-month
extension for the release of the statements. Hence our choice of return period allows the
market to fully assimilate accounting information.
All accounting flows are accumulated according to the method developed by Easton
et al. (1992) and are scaled by a firm's market value of shareholders' equity six months after
the beginning of the interval. We report the results based on the third model of Easton et al.
(1992, pi 28, M3) since the conclusions are not sensitive to alternative specifications; see
for example: Ohlson and Penman (1992, p562), and Louis (2003, pi 032).
t=T t=T i=T
EnI' Eds. Egw,
NI^ = i^^^ ; DS^=^^^
;
GW^ = ^^^
MVo MVo MVo
t=T t=T t=T
^REV, ^CUR, ^OTH,
REV^ = -^ ; CUR^ = -^ ; OTH^ = ^^
MVo MVo MVo
l=T i=T
(E2)
^EDSI, ^NICL,
EDSI^ =^ ; NICL^ =^
MVo MVo
NI : net income (i.e., income after extraordinary items), DS : total dirty surplus
accounting flows, GW^: goodwill write-offs, REV^: asset revaluations, CUR^: foreign
currency-translation differences, OTH^: sundries, EDSI^: extraordinary dirty surplus items,
and NICL^: clean surplus net income (i.e., the sum of the dirty surplus flows and the net
income).
We report results based on accumulation intervals of one, two, five, and ten years.
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The first model (Ml) is a cross-sectional univariate regression of stock returns on net
income. It is the benchmark model for this study.
r,^ = a, +/?,NI,^ + e„v, (Ml)
T is the inter\'al length, and / and t refer to company / and period t respectively.
The second model (M2) tests the incremental value relevance ofaggregated dirty surplus
flows.
rl = a. + /?2NI[ + i^.DSj + eju (M2)
Dirty surplus flows are relevant in explaining returns in the presence of net income \i fii,
is statistically significant.
The third model (M3) examines the incremental value relevance of three components of
dirty surplus flows.
'
"
rl = a, + P,ml + P.GWl + P.REVj, + PjCURJ, + e,„ (M3)
If the dirty surplus flows are incrementally relevant, the coefllcients on components of
dirty surplus flow {fis, Pf,^ and ^y) should be significantly different from zero. F-statistics
are taken as the criteria for the joint significance of three components of dirty surplus
flows.
4.2. Relative value relevance of clean surplus net income
We also examine the consequence of the inclusion of dirty surplus items in currently
reported income by comparing two income measures: pro forma clean surplus income and
reported income. The income measure, which can explain more variances in returns, is
considered a better choice for equity-valuation purposes, ceteris paribus. This test could
help users of accounting information choose among alternative measures of income.
Our second research question therefore is:
Is clean surplus net income more highly associated with returns than reported net
income?
The fourth model (M4) measures the relative value relevance of clean surplus income.
rl = 0(4 + AsNICL,^ + e,„ (M4)
NICL,7 is defined as the sum of net income and dirty surplus flows of a T-period interval
of company / in period t. Again, we accumulate both stock market and accounting flows
using the long-interval method explained earlier. In order to assess the quality of various
income measures, (M4) is compared with (Ml) and the J-test for non-nested models is
taken as the criterion for model selection.
'" We exclude sundries and extraordinary dirty surplus items from the regression analysis due to the presence of
large numbers of zero observations.
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5. Data selection and empirical results
5.1. Data selection and descriptive statistics
We gather share prices from Datastream for the whole population ofDutch listed firms in the
period of 1988-1997 and we hand-collect accounting information from firm's financial state-
ments. After excluding financial firms, the final sample is refined using the following criteria:
i. Annual price, dividends, and market value of shareholders' equity information are
available on the 2004 Datastream research files;
ii. Relevant accounting information is disclosed in financial reports and the firm's fiscal
year ends in December;
iii. Information concerning returns, net income, components of dirty surplus flows, and
market value of shareholders' equity are available across the whole research period
(1988-1997).
This selection procedure yields 82 Dutch firms. We list their names in Appendix 1 . For each
of them we have 10 observations, i.e., 820 firm-year observations in total. Employing these
selection criteria may lead to survivor bias. However, it does enable us to control for the
negative effects of extreme values, which are often reported by financially distressed firms.
Table 1 shows the distribution of observations by industry.
Table 1
Sample distribution by industry sector' ^
Industrial sector Number of companies
Brewers 2
Chemicals, commodity 4
Other construction 4
Distrib. ind. Comps 9
Diversified industry 5
Electronic equipment 12
Engineering, general 8
Food + drug retailers 4
Food processors 3
Paper 2
Household 1
1
Information technology 1
Leisure 1
Media 6
Personal products 1
Retailers, multi dept. 1
Computer services 4
Steel I
Transportation 3
Med equip + supplies 1
Total 82
'" Based on FTSE industrial classification.
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Table 2
Descriptive data for variables used to estimate models of the association ofnet income and dirty surplus flows with
returns
T N Mean Std. dev. 25% 50% 75% %<0 % = %>0
r= 1 year 820
RETU 0.214 0.404 -0.062 0.147 0.395 32 67
NI 0,077 0.115 0.056 0.089 0.118 7 93
DS -0.029 0.082 -0.042 -0.007 62 13 25
GW -0.031 0.061 -0.036 -0.002 53 44 3
REV 0.001 0.030 14 65 21
CUR -0.001 0.011 -0.001 30 47 24
OTH 0.011 10 79 11
EDSI 100
NICL 0.048 0.141 0.017 0.062 0.106 19 81
r = 2 years 410
RETU 0.467 0.697 -0.024 0.291 0.744 26 74
Nl 0.184 0.209 0.116 0.185 0.261 9 91
DS -0.067 0.138 -0.111 -0.030 69 9 22
GW -0.072 0.117 -0.095 -0.023 63 34 2
REV 0.004 0.043 17 58 25
CUR -0.002 0.019 -0.001 35 43 22
NICL 0.114 0.247 0.024 0.130 0.216 20 80
T= 5 years 164
RETU 1.697 2.271 0.333 1.008 1.987 15 85
NI 0.737 0.685 0.404 0.680 1.002 7 93
DS -0.307 0.476 -0.489 -0.168 -0.019 82 5 13
GW -0.304 0.468 -0.467 -0.135 -0.002 76 21 3
REV 0.013 0.121 0.008 20 48 32
CUR -0.005 0.033 -0.005 39 38 23
NICL 0.446 0.656 0.169 0.407 0.701 18 82
r= 10 years 82
RETU 4.883 4.652 1.580 3.824 6.784 5 95
NI 2.083 1.867 1.062 1.712 2.705 7 93
DS -0.898 1.311 -1.157 -0.509 -0.085 88 2 10
GW -0.880 1.274 -1.072 -0.428 -0.061 84 12 4
REV 0.032 0.160 0.028 24 35 40
CUR -0.001 0.053 -0.010 0.003 39 30 30
NICL 1.109 1.335 0.339 0.859 1.791 13 87
Notes: The sample consists of all 1988-1997 listed non-financial Dutch firms that have required financial data
from Datastream and accounting data in their financial reports. The fums also have complete information available
across the period 1988-1 997 and their fiscal years end in December Observations are winsorized at 0.005 each tail
over a one-year interval, 0.01 over a two-year interval, 0.015 over a five-year interval, and 0.025 over a 10-year
interval.
Variable definition: T: accumulation interval of Tyears. N: the number of firm-year observations. NI: reported net
income. DS: total dirty surplus flows. GW: goodwill write-offs. REV: asset revaluations. CUR: currency-
translation differences. OTH: sundries. EDSI: extraordinary dirty surplus items. NICL: clean surplus net income.
All accounting flows are scaled by the market value of shareholders' equity six months after the beginning of the
interval and are accumulated as described in Section 4. 1 . We present the descriptive data ofEDSI and OTH on an
annual basis only, because of the presence of large numbers of zero observations.
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Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables. ' ' We winsorize the variables at
0.005 each tail over a one-year interval, 0.01 over a two-year interval, 0.015 over a five-
year interval, and 0.025 over a 10-year interval to deal with influential observations.
Table 2 reveals that (scaled) goodwill write-offs are by far the most important dirty
surplus items. For instance, goodwill write-offs are -3.1% on average over a one-year
interval, whilst the asset revaluations and the currency-translation differences are both
about 0.1% of the market value of shareholders' equity. Our non-tabulated statistics show
that 60% (61%) of firms report dirty surplus flows larger than 10% of reported net income
(clean surplus net income) in absolute terms. Extraordinary dirty surplus items (EDSI) are
not significantly different fi-om zero and 79% of firms don't report sundries.
And it seems that firms are more likely to write-off dirty surplus flows as net expenses.
Clean surplus net income is only about 50% of the reported income. Taken together, the
descriptive statistics suggest that dirty surplus flows reduce reported net income substantially.
Table 3 provides the correlation matrix. There is a significant positive correlation among
net income, clean surplus net income, and returns. However, dirty surplus flows are not
always associated with any of them.
5.2. Regression results
In Table 4, we present the estimation results for models (l)-(4) over various intervals.
Panel A shows the statistics for the retums-(reported) income model (Ml) of up to
10 years, and Panel B for the retums-(reported) income, and total dirty surplus flows model
(M2) of up to 10 years, and so on.
The coefficients on reported net income are always positive at 1% significance level in
the retums-(reported) income model (Panel A). The results thus provide consistent
evidence that the reported income is value relevant.
Panel B shows that in the presence of reported income, the aggregated dirty surplus
flows are insignificantly different from zero, even with accumulation intervals of up to
10 years. Overall, our evidence implies that the aggregated dirty surplus flows are not value
relevant, although they are large in magnitude.
However, asset revaluations and currency-translation differences are significant in
explaining returns on a yearly basis at less than 5% significance level (Panel C). Over longer
time periods, the results are mixed and it suggests that asset revaluations are relevant over a
two-year interval; and currency-translation differences are relevant over a five-year interval.
The F-test of joint significance of components of dirty surplus flows rejects the null
hypothesis that none of them is able to explain variations in returns at less than 5% level.
Both the coefficients and the /^-squares are higher in the retums-(reported) income
model (0.938 and 0.071, respectively. Panel A, one-year interval) than in the returns-clean
surplus-income model (0.719 and 0.063 respectively. Panel D, one-year interval).
We include the summary statistics of all five components of dirty surplus flows on a yearly basis. However,
we do not accumulate sundries or extraordinary dirty surplus items because the long-term pattern of these flows is
expected to be the same as their yearly summary statistics, i.e., these two variables contain zero observations,
mainly. The presence of large numbers of zero observations may also bias our estimation results; therefore, we run
the incremental association model (M3) with three main components of dirty surplus flows: goodwill write-offs,
asset revaluations, and currency-translation differences.
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Table 3
Correlation matrix for variables used to estimate models of the association of net income and dirty surplus flows
with returns
RETU NI DS NICL
T= 1 year
RETU 1
NI 0.270***
(0.000)
1
DS 0.066* 0.014 1
(0.059) (0.684)
NICL 0.251*** 0.802*** 0.577***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
T= 2 years
RETU 1
NI 0.393***
(0.000)
1
DS -0.041 -0.084* 1
(0.405) (0.090)
NICL 0.307*** 0.791*** 0.525***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
T= 5 years
RETU 1
NI 0.428***
(0.000)
1
DS -0.239*** -0.468*** 1
(0.002) (0.000)
NICL 0.304*** 0.723*** 0.231***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
r = 1 years
RETU 1
NI 0.376***
(0.001)
1
DS -0.394*** -0.710*** 1
(0.000) (0.000)
NICL 0.174 0.465*** 0.178
(0.119) (0.000) (0.109)
Note: The sample consists of all 1988 1997 listed non-financial Dutch firms that have required financial data from
Datastream and accounting data in their financial reports. The firms also have complete information available across
the period 1988-1 997 and their fiscal years end in December. Observations are winsorized at 0.005 each tail over a
one-year interval, 0.01 over a two-year interval, 0.015 over a five-year interval, and 0.025 over a 10-year interval.
Variable definition: T: accumulation interval of F years. NI: reported net income. DS: total dirty surplus flows.
NICL: clean surplus net income. All accounting flows are scaled by the market value of shareholders' equity six
months after the beginning of the interval and are accumulated as described in Section 4. 1
.
The significance level of each correlation coefficient is reported in parentheses below the reported correlation
coefficients. ***Significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, and *significant at 10% level.
The J-test ofnon-nested models always prefers reported income to clean surplus income
over various testing windows because the statistics suggest that clean surplus income
doesn't encompass reported income in explaining returns (Panel D, the last column). The
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Table 4
Results of the estimation ofmodels that test the incremental (relative) value relevance of dirty surplus flows (clean
surplus income) over reported net income in explaining returns
Panel A: Model 1
A^ Int. Nl R-Sq.
1
2
5
10
820
410
164
82
0.142
(0.017)***
0.226
(0.041)***
0.652
(0.176)***
2.933
(0.699)***
0.938
(0.145)***
1.309
(0.188)***
1.419
(0.219)***
0.936
(0.291)***
0.071
0.155
0.183
0.141
Panel B: Model 2
N hit. Nl DS R-Sq.
1 820 0.151 0.935 0.306 0.075
(0.018)*** (0.145)*** (0.192)
2 410 0.224 1.306 -0.042 0.155
(0.047)*** (0.187)*** (0.332)
5 164 0.636 1.343 -0.233 0.185
(0.199)*** (0.230)*** (0.665)
10 82 3.060 0.484 -0.907 0.174
(0.810)*** (0.371) (0.666)
Panel C: Model 3
A' hit. Nl GW REV CUR ^-Sq. f-test
10
820
HO
164
82
0.148 0.922 0.049 1.241 4.835 0.096 3.59**
(0.019)*** (0.150)*** (0.208) (0.582)** (1.822)***
0.207 1.205 -0.517 1.658 2.112 0.175 2.98**
(0.046)*** (0.183)*** (0.328) (0.991)* (1.643)
0.608 1.321 -0.500 0.541 8.586 0.212 4.08***
(0.230)*** (0.225)*** (0.604) (2.400) (2.669)***
2.690 0.483 -1.273 1.740 -10.445 0.227 1.98**
(0.688)*** (0.264)* (0.570)** (3.189) (8.169)
Panel D: Model 4
A^ Int. NICL R-Sq. Nn. (Ml) Nn. (M4)
1 820 0.180 0.719 0.063 0.411 0.690
(0.014)*** (0.113)*** (0.254) (0.242)***
2 410 0.368 0.867 0.094 -0.035 1.022
(0.036)*** (0.165)*** (0.382) (0.281)***
5 164 1.227 1.053 0.093 -0.034 1.018
(0.235)*** (0.328)*** (0.678) (0.435)**
10 82 4.213 0.605 0.030 -0.008 1.002
(0.785)*** (0.435) (1.032) (0.391)**
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reported income seems to be more persistent than the clean surplus income, and they are the
preferred measure of economic income.
We observe a trend of increasing returns-income associations as the accumulation
intervals are lengthened: the /^-squares increase from 6-10% to more than 10%. Though,
there is a decrease over the 10-year window in models (1), (2), and (4). This decrease may
be owing to the effects of outliers, and may also be because the number of observations is
reduced substantially in that period.
5.3. Robustness tests
In addition, we perform a number of robustness tests. First, since our data are pooled
across time, it is likely that autocorrelation appears in our sample. We, therefore, re-run all
our models with the fixed-effect panel-estimation procedure along the time dimension.
Second, the models are estimated on an annual basis to examine the variations in the value
relevance of dirty surplus flows across time. Third, we accumulate our data with the three
other long-interval methods developed by Easton et al. (1992) and O'Hanlon and Pope
( 1 999) respectively to check if the results are influenced by different accumulation proce-
dures. Fourth, we winsorize our one-year data at 0.0025 each tail, two-year data at 0.005,
five-year data at 0.0 1 , and ten-year data at 0.02 each tail to verify the results with alternative
definitions of outliers. Our conclusions are supported with these robustness tests.
6. Conclusions and suggestions for future research
This paper tests the value relevance of dirty surplus flows with both an incremental and a
relative association study. We find that aggregated dirty surplus items are not value relevant
Notes to Table:
The sample consists of all 1988-1997 listed non-financial Dutch firms that have required financial data from
Datastream and accounting data in their financial reports. The firms also have complete information available
across the period 1988-1997 and their fiscal years end in December. Observations are winsorized at 0.005 each
tail over a one-year interval, 0.01 over a two-year interval, 0.015 over a five-year interval, and 0.025 over a 10-
year interval.Variable definition: T: accumulation interval of T years. A^: the number of firm-year observations.
Int.: intercepts of the model. NI: reported net income. DS: total dirty surplus flows. GW: goodwill write-offs.
REV: asset revaluations. CUR: currency-translation differences. NICL: clean surplus net income. All accounting
flows are scaled by the market value of shareholders' equity six months after the beginning of the interval and are
accumulated as described in Section 4.1.
Models Ml rf, = ai+liiNlf,+ ei„
M2 rf, = a:+ pjNlf, + jijOSf,+ e.,,
M3 rl = a,+p,Nll + p,,GWj,+PJiEVj',+PyCURj,+ ej,i,
M4 rl=a_,+PsNICLl + e4„
The panels labeled Ml, M2, M3, and M4 report the estimated coefficients of the respective models. The sub-
columns labeled by the variables' names report the estimated coefficients ofthe relevant variables. /?-Sq.: i?-squares
ofthe estimated models. J(M 1 ) /J(M4) represents the non-nested J-test assuming that M 1 /M4 is the true model and
it reports the coefficients of the predicted value from M4/M1 in the artificial nesting model. Huber-White standard
errors are reported in parentheses below the reported coefficient. ***Significant at 1% level, **significant at 5%
level, and *significant at 10% level.
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over one, two, five, and ten-year intervals. However, there is some evidence that asset
revaluations and currency-translation differences have explanatory power for stock returns.
Reported income appears to be a more relevant measure of firm value than clean surplus
income in the period considered in The Netherlands, although both of them are associated
with returns.
However, the conclusions have to be interpreted with caution when drawing standard-
setting inferences because they are only from an equity-valuation perspective. Other
empirical studies could investigate the influence of accounting information on contracting
costs, for instance. It should be noted that by providing more reliable information the
political and auditors' liability costs (Kothari, Lys, Smith, & Watts, 1988) could be reduced
even if the information is not relevant for security valuation.
Appendix A. The firms in the final sample
Number Name of the firms
1 Aalberts Industries
2 ACF Holding N.V. (97: Brocacef)
3 Ahrend Groep
4 AIR (Automobiel Industrie Rotterdam)
5 Akzo
6 Alanheri
7 Amsterdam Rubber Cultuur Maatschappij (RCMA)
8 Arag Holding
9 BAM Holding
10 Batenburg Beheer
11 Beer's Zonen
12 Blydestein — Willink
13 Boer, de, Winkelbedrijf (97: De Boer Unigro)
14 Boer, de, Drukkerij (Boekhoven) (93: Roto Smeets de Boer)
15 Boskalis Westminster
16 Burgman Heybroek
17 Cate, ten, Nijverdal
18 Cindu-Key and Kramer (CKK) / Cindu Int.
19 CVG (Crown v. Gelder c )
20 Dico International
21 Dorp Groep
22 Drie Electronics
23 Econosto
24 Elsevier
25 Eriks Holding
26 Frans Maas Beheer
27 Gamma Holding
28 Gelderse Papier Groep
29 Getronics
30 Geveke Electr. Int./Geveke
3
1
Gouda Vuurvast
32 Grolsch Bierbr.
33 Groothandelsgebouwen
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Appendix A (continued)
Number Name of the firms
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
GTI-Holding
Hagemeyer
HBG (Hollandse Beton Groep)
Heineken
Hoek Loos ('s Machine and Zuurstoffabriek)
Hoogovens
Hunter Douglas
Intematio Muller
Klene's
Koppelpoort Holding
Krasnapolsky
Kuhne + Heitz
Landre and Gilderman
Macintosh Confectie
Melle, van
Mulder Boskoop
Naeff
NAGRON (Nat. Grondbezit)
NBM Bouw/NBM Amstelland
NEDAP
Nedlloyd
Nedschroef Holding
Neways Electroniscs
NKF Holding
Norit
Nutricia Gem. BezitA^er. Bedr.
Oce van der Grinten
Ordina Beheer
OTRA
Pakhoed
Philips
Polynorm
Porceleyne Fles
Reesink
Rood Testhouse
Stork
Schuitema
Schuttersveld
Simac Techniek
Telegraaf de. Holding
Textielgroep Twenthe
Tulip Computers
Twent. Kabel Holding
Ubbink
VNU verz. Bez.
Vredestein
Wolters Kluwer
Wegener Arcade (Wegener Tijl)
Weweler
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate factors that potentially influence earnings-management
policy with reference to the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental accounting models. Canada and
France, respectively, belong to those different socio-economic environments. Earnings-management
practices detected in those countries are expected to be affected by specific socio-economic features
of the Anglo-American and the Euro-Continental environments. We explain earnings-management
practices by incentives suggested in the literature to reveal which motives are prominent within each
envirormient.
We tested our earnings-management motives (EMM) model using appropriate panel-estimation
techniques over 1674 Canadian and 1470 French firm-year observations. Our results provide
evidence that incentives for earnings management for French firms are specifically linked to
contractual debt costs and effective tax rate. However, Canadian firms show specific incentives
matched with a dynamic capital market. Issuing equity is a strong motive for earnings management
in Canadian firms.
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1. Introduction
Earnings management has often been considered as the alteration of a firm's reported
economic performance by insiders to either mislead some stakeholders or to influence
contractual outcomes (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). In effect, a wide literature has addressed
the issue of earnings management. Most studies in this area have concentrated on the
Anglo-American world. These studies have tried to examine earnings management in
particular contexts. They investigated incentives provided by management-compensation
plans (Guidry, Leone, & Rock, 1999; Healy, 1985; Holthausen, Larker, & Sloan, 1995),
debt contracts (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 1994; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994;
Healy & Palepu, 1990; Sweeney, 1994), regulatory cases (Cahan, 1992; Jones, 1991; Key,
1997), and stock price motives such as stock offering (Erickson & Wang, 1999;
Shivakumar, 2000; Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998), avoiding decreases and losses
(Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Burgstahler & Eames, 2003) and meeting thresholds such
as analysts' and management's forecasts (Burgstahle & Eames, 1998; Degeorge, Patel, &
Zeckhauser, 1999).
However, little attention has been focused on earnings-management motives in countries
from the Euro-Continental accounting model. French managers operate within an
accounting system which is contingent upon specific socio-economic features. Although
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) documented intemational differences in eamings-
management behavior for a large number of countries (including Canada and France), they
did not examine specific determinants of eamings management for these countries.
Considering 31 countries in their study has confined them to using broad, institutional
factors to explain eamings management (outside investor rights, legal enforcement, private
control benefits, etc.) as well as descriptive and aggregate measures ofeamings management
(median ratio of the firm level standard deviation of operating income and operation cash
flow, country's Speannan correlation between the change in total accmals and the change in
cash flow from operations, country's median ratio ofthe absolute value of total accmals and
the absolute value of the cash flow from operations, etc.). Their results may suffer from an
endogeneity bias (Leuz et al., 2003, p. 521). They also recognize that "theoretical relations
among institutional factors are not well understood and hence difficult to disentangle" (Leuz
et al., 2003, p 526).
This paper sheds light on the importance of certain specific motives for eamings
management within different socio-economic environments. We investigate specific factors
which potentially influence eamings-management policy with reference to the Anglo-
American and Euro-Continental accounting models. Canada and France, respectively,
belong to those different socio-economic environments.
The accounting system in Canada is marked by a conceptual framework that safeguards
shareholder interests. Accounting values of flexibility and professionalism prevail as in
Anglo-American accounting traditions (Gray, 1988). Financial reporting is independent of
the tax system. The capital market has a major role in enhancing financing through equity.
Pressures from a dynamic capital market (shareholders, financial analysts, and the financial
press) are prominent.
On the other hand, the accounting system in France, as in most Continental European
countries, relies upon the "Plan Comptable" and codified mles that have the purpose of
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satisfying stakeholders' information needs. The French accounting system is characterized
by values of uniformity and statutory control (Gray, 1988). Accounting earnings are linked
to fiscal rules (Frydlender & Pham, 1996). The finance mode of French companies is based
to a large extent on bank loans.
Hence, earnings-management practices detected in these two countries are expected to be
affected by specific socio-economic features of the Anglo-American and the Euro-
Continental environments. We attempt to explain eamings-management practices by
incentives suggested in the literature to reveal which motives are prominent within each
environment. We notice that initial and subsequent equity offerings are more fi^equent for
Canadian firms than for French firms. Financing through the capital market is likely to have
more influence on earnings management for Canadian firms. In contrast, pervasive debt-to-
equity ratios and effective tax rates in French firms are more likely to affect eamings-
management behavior.
To test for the importance of specific motives for eamings management within Canadian
and French environments, we develop an Earnings-Management Motives (EMM)
regression model that takes into consideration differences in motives between Canada and
France. Earlier studies on eamings management widely used either time-series data
(Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeny, 1995; Guay, Kothari, & Watts, 1996; Jones, 1991) or cross-
section data (Bartov, Gul, & Tsui, 2001; Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam,
1998; DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2000; Subramanyam,
1996). Both approaches have limitations. The time-series approach assumes temporal
stationarity of parameter estimates, whereas the cross-sectional approach assumes
homogeneity across firms in the same industry (Larker & Richardson, 2004, p 633).
Other research studies, confined to data limitation, used pooled-across-sample firms (Cahan,
1992; Erickson & Wang, 1999; Han & Wang, 1998; Leuz et al., 2003) to maximize their
sample size. However, their approach uses cross-sectional techniques for the same sample of
firms introduced many times along with the time-period of analysis. A prime advantage of
our statistical approach is that it uses appropriate panel-estimation techniques to take into
account both the time and year dimensions of each Canadian and French observation. We
used panel data of 1470 Canadian and 1 674 French firm-year observations during the period
1996-2000. Based on directional and non-directional measures of eamings management
(signed discretionary accruals and absolute value of discretionary accmals), we tested our
EMM panel-regression model.
Collectively, results suggest that incentives for eamings management for French firms
are specifically linked to contractual debt costs and the effective tax rate. However,
Canadian firms show specific incentives matched with a dynamic capital market. Issuing
equity is a strong motive for eamings management in Canadian firms.
Our study considers the interests of intemational investors, standard setters, market
authorities, and auditors. Considering specific motivations for eamings management within
each socio-economic environment may help intemational investors distinguish their
different impacts on accounting eamings for evaluation purposes. Standard setters and
regulators should be conscious of the specific determinants of eamings management to
provide appropriate standards/mles limiting discretionary behavior of managers. Auditors
have to be able to understand differences in eamings-management motives in order to
detect specific manipulations of accounting eamings.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the backgrounds
and develops the hypotheses for the study. Section 3 describes our sample, details the
earnings-management proxy-estimation method, and presents our research design. Section
4 provides descriptive statistics of earnings-management motives and reports results of our
analysis based on our EMM panel-regression model. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Backgrounds and hypotheses development
2.1. Differences between Canadian and French accounting models and their implications
for earnings-management behavior: main hypotheses
Despite the growing acceptance of International Accounting Standards (IAS, denoted as
International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS, since 2001) by Canada and France,
Gray and Street (2001) still find differences between Euro-Continental and Anglo-
American countries in terms of lAS/IFRS implementation. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki
(2000) argue, "lASC standards possess no enforcement rules and rely on local auditors and
country-specific legal remedies to enforce standards. Therefore, it is unclear whether lASC
rules will limit earnings-management practices around the world."
Indeed, Canadian and French firms utilize different accounting systems and operate
within socio-economic environments which have many distinguishing features that may
influence accounting earnings. As with all human activities, accounting rules and
practices as well as capital markets are affected by culture (Douglas, 1989; Wildavsky,
1989). Accounting is a socio-technical activity involving an interaction between both
human and non-human resources and, because the two interact, accounting cannot be
culture-free.
As Hussein (1996) asserted, there is already awareness among many accounting
researchers and standard setters of the social and cultural influences on accounting
(Beresford, 1990; Gray, 1988). Gray (1988) relied upon cultural differences proposed by
Hofstede (1984) to explain international differences in the behavior of accountants and,
therefore, in accounting practices. He developed four distinguishable accounting values
which are linked to cultural values: professionalism versus statutory control; uniformity
versus flexibility; conservatism versus flexibility; and secrecy versus transparency. Then,
he extended his analysis by demonstrating that the first two contrasting values relate to
authority and enforcement while the second two relate to measurement and disclosure. In
this respect, it is commonly accepted that Canada, as an Anglo-American country, has
higher professionalism, flexibility, and transparency; while France, as a Euro-Continental
country, is characterized by higher statutory control, uniformity, conservatism, and
uncertainty avoidance. Moreover, Gray (1988) pointed out that these societal values (i. e.,
cultural values) have institutional consequences in the form of the nature of capital markets
and patterns of corporate ownership, legal systems, etc. More specifically, accounting
values of professionalism, flexibility, and transparency have shaped the finance mode and
shareholder corporate-governance model as well as the latitude permitted to professionals
and the lack of interaction between financial reporting and tax systems. In contrast, the
accounting plan, credit-based system, stakeholder corporate-governance model, and the
strong influence of government in accounting regulation emerged from values of statutory
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control, uniformity, conservatism, and uncertainty avoidance. Hence, earnings management
is a function of the institutional contexts in which accounting earnings are used.
2.7.7. Finance pattern and corporate governance: shareholder versus stakeholder model
Companies are financed in a variety of ways. Both debt and equity can take different
forms and be provided by many different types of individuals or institutions. The finance
pattern of a firm affects accounting earnings in a number of ways. In fact, the way in which
a firm is financed is linked to the corporate-governance model prevailing in a country.
Within Anglo-American countries, the shareholders corporate-govemance model
prevails. Shareholders are the main partners of the firm. Shareholders elect the governing
board and they monitor directors through audit, nomination, and remuneration committees.
Compared to Euro-Continental countries, there is greater monitoring of managers by
external board members and by financial analysts as well as by the financial press.
The demand for accounting eamings in Anglo-American countries presents special
features by comparison with accounting demands in Euro-Continental countries. Financial
reporting is based on a conceptual framework that has the priority of satisfying
shareholders' needs for accounting information. The capital market has a vital role in
providing finance. Consequently, the financing pattern of Anglo-American companies is
dominated by equity and there is more separation of owners and managers. Companies are
characterized by a diffuse ownership structure and as such are more likely than owner-
controlled firms to manage eamings, and to do so more fi"equently (Dempsey, Hunt, &
Schroeder, 1993). Shareholders, financial analysts, and the financial press impose greater
pressures on Canadian managers. Canadian managers use a discretionary attitude to
circumvent pressure from a dynamic capital market.
'
Unlike Anglo-American countries, in Continental European countries, stakeholder
corporate governance tends to be implemented by a number of firm partners such as banks,
pension plans, and employee groups or labor unions, and by major customers and suppliers.
Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) point out that the stakeholder views accounting eamings as
a common "pie" to be divided among groups by such means as bonuses to employees and
managers, dividends to shareholders, and taxes to governments. This is in contrast to
common-law countries, where the demand for accounting eamings under code law is
influenced more by the payout preferences of agents for creditors, govemment, and labor
and less by the demand for public disclosure. Within the stakeholders' corporate-
govemance model, we notice the prominence of banks as the main providers of capital.
Because capital provided by banks is very significant, managers pay little attention to the
relatively small number of individual and minority shareholders. Accounting mles,
therefore, should be more conservative, being designed to protect creditors.
In this regard, France has a stakeholder corporate-govemance model, which is
dominated by banks, govemment, or families. As a code-law country, there is a demand for
a low volatility income variable (Ball et al., 2000). The French govemment has long
protected large firms from stock market operations (Berlin, Jaussaud, & Kanie, 2002). After
' The volatility of the Toronto Stock Exchange Index TSX300 is higher than the volatiHty of the "Bourse de
Paris" Stock Exchange Index CAC40. Over the period 1995-2000, the standard deviation of the TSX3000 index
is 1728.02 whilst the standard deviation of the CAC40 index is 1558.43.
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the nationalizations in 1981, the privatization process started in 1986 and has contributed to
a "hard stone" of shareholders and cross-participations stabilizing the finn equity (Blancel,
1997; Morin & Dupuy, 1993). In the same vein, the OECD report (1995) documents that, in
France, cross-participation is wide spread. O'SuUivan (2002) outlines the existence of an
important system of cross-participation among large French firnis which creates an obstacle
to the move to an Anglo-American model of capitalism. Stakeholder corporate governance
in France mitigates the need for public disclosure. The need for disclosure is limited to legal
requirements. Main stakeholders like creditors and tax authorities, considered by Ball et al.
(2000) as insiders, have private access to financial information through personal contacts
and direct visits. Insider communication reduces the infomiation asymmetry between
managers and stakeholders. Moreover, the large majority of French firms are family- or
state-owned. Equity is not diffused among the public and the capital market has a less
important role in providing finance " compared to banks that finance firms through loans.
Accordingly, prior studies have shown that managers increase earnings when the
company is first introduced to the stock market (Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al., 1998; Teoh,
Wong, & Rao, 1998) or when it proceeds, subsequently, to equity offerings (Ragan, 1998;
Teoh et al., 1998). Hence the first hypothesis:
The more frequent are initial and subsequent equity offerings, the more likely managers
are to use accruals to increase earnings. However, we expect that initial public and equity
offerings, such as those prevailing in Anglo-American countries, are more likely to
influence income-increasing accruals in Canadian firms than in French firms.
We consider EQUISSUE as a dummy variable that takes one if the firm has proceeded
to equity offerings either to be initially introduced to the capital market or to, subsequently,
increase its equity by issuing securities, zero otherwise.
Furthermore, bankers and lenders rely extensively on financial statements for the
evaluation of a firm's financial standing and credit rating. Therefore, managers of firms that
need the continuous support of their lenders and in order to avoid an increase in the cost of
capital, have incentives to opt for income-increasing accruals that enhance their firm's level
of profitability (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). This is the second hypothesis we test. The
higher the debt-to-equity ratio, the more likely managers are to choose income-increasing
accruals. However, we expect that the influence of debt-to-equity ratio on income-
increasing accruals is more likely to be significant in French firms than in Canadian ones.
" Fewer than 969 French companies are listed in 2000 as compared to 3767 Canadian listed companies. Further,
the ratio market capitalization to GDP in France ranges only from 38.40 in 1996 to 111.80 in 2000, whereas it
ranges in Canada from 83.90 in 1996 to 122.30 in 2000. (See table below).
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Listed firms on local capital markets
France
Canada
Market capitalization/GDP in %
France
Canada
578 686 683 711 968
1444 1265 1362 1384 3767
38.4 48.4 69.5 103.0 111.8
83.9 93.4 93.6 126.1 122.3
source: The World Bank : "World development indicators"
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2.1.2. Legal system: relationship between tax rules and financial reporting rules
The legal system in most countries can be classified as either common law (non-
legalistic) or code law (legalistic).
The development of common law is attributed to individual action in the private sector,
rather than to collective or govemment planning in the public sector. This naturally
influences company law, which traditionally does not prescribe rules to cover the behavior
of companies and how they should prepare their financial statements to produce
accounting earnings. Canada, as an Anglo-American country, has a common-law
accounting system which includes the accounting standards used to prepare financial
information. These standards evolve by becoming commonly accepted in practice.
Accordingly, accounting rules and tax rules are kept separate in Canada. Financial reports
are drawn up according to accounting standards while tax reports are drawn up outside of
the accounting fi-amework. The measures used in financial reporting which determine
accounting earnings are generally not binding for tax purposes. For example, expenses do
not have to be accounted for in order to be allowed for tax purposes (Cooke & Wallace,
1990; McCourt & Radcliffe, 1995). Taxable income is calculated according to case law
and, to a lesser extent, according to codified tax law. It is not determined by company law
(Walton, 1995). Therefore, in Canada, accounting earnings and taxable earnings do not
interact.
On the other hand, France, along with most Continental European countries, has a code-
law accounting system. Company accounting is, to a large extent, a branch ofcompany law.
Regulations are designed to ensure orderly business conduct and to protect all the firm's
stakeholders (creditors, tax authorities, unions, etc.). The code-law accounting system in
France prescribes regulations that range from abstract principles (e.g.: "prudence") to
detailed procedures (e.g.: the format of financial statements provided in the "Plan
comptable general"). Govemmental requirements imposed on the profession through the
"Plan comptable general" have strongly influenced accounting practices in France (Perera,
1989). This General Accounting Plan is typically prescriptive, detailed, and procedural.
Financial accounting is very much a public-sector activity, administered by govemmental
(or quasi-governmental) bodies. A primary role of fmancial accounting in France is to
determine how much income tax a company owes to the govemment.
Indeed, the tax and fmancial reporting systems are very closely related in France. The
historic development of the relationship between taxation and accounting is characterized
by a long absence of specific accounting legislation until the 1 960s (Frydlender & Pham,
1996). Tax law intervened without regard to either accounting theory or existing accounting
practices (Fortin, 1991; Frydlender & Pham, 1996; McCourt & Radcliffe, 1995; Sheid &
Walton, 1995). As a consequence ofthe strong influence oftaxation on accounting, many of
the tax rules are being used for financial-reporting purposes. In particular, depreciation is
largely determined by tax rules and has to be written into accounts to be deducted for tax
income. Also, according to tax law, "provisions reglementees," and research expenditures
have to be recorded in fmancial statements in order to be tax deductible (Code general des
impots. Art. 39-1, Art. 236-1). Further, tax authorities may exclude certain expenditures
fi-om being deductible, even when they have been reported in the financial statements.
Hence, it is relevant in France that taxation regulations determine accounting
measurements. Conversely, many of the financial-reporting rules are being used by tax
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authorities. All entries in the books are relevant for taxation. When tax rules differ from
accounting rules, the taxable profit has to be computed, starting from the accounting profit,
on forms ("tableaux de passage") attached to financial statements. Therefore, in France,
taxable earnings and accounting earnings are linked.
In this regard, taxes may represent a means used by political agents to impose costs upon
firms. Both Canadian and French managers would be incited to reduce accounting earnings
in order to pay lower taxes.
This is the third hypothesis of our study. The higher the effective tax rate, the more
beneficial income-decreasing accruals would be. However, because of the tight relationship
between the French tax and financial reporting systems, we expect that the effective tax rate
is more likely to be significant in French firms than in Canadian firms with respect to
influencing income-decreasing accruals. We measure the effective tax rate as income taxes
paid and accrued divided by income before taxes.
2.2. Control variables
As reported in the literature, a variety of factors influence earnings-management
behavior. With this in mind, we have selected a number of control variables organized under
the following three broad headings: firm characteristics, contextual factors, and conjectural
factors.
2.2.1. Firm characteristics
2.2.1.1. Firm size. This is often used as a proxy for political sensitivity. Large firms with
large profits, fearing government action, may try to manage earnings downwards (Liberty
& Zimmerman, 1986; Zimmerman, 1983). We expect a negative relationship between firm
size and accruals for both Canadian and French samples. The larger the firm, the more
likely managers are to choose income-decreasing accruals.
2.2.1.2. Industry. Firm industry is seen as an important variable in determining
accounting choices (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). A firm operating within one industry
may be more tempted to manage accounting earnings than one operating in another. We use
the dummy variable (IND) in our EMM model to summarize dummy variables for each
industry in our sample.
2.2.1.3. Managers' ownership. Managers have at least two incentives to choose income-
increasing accruals. First, income increasing gives a positive image to the firm and may
help managers avoid management buyouts and hostile takeovers (Williamson, 1985).
Second, bonus plans are usually widespread within firms with diffuse equity (Holthausen
et al., 1995), especially for Canadian firms. A high concentration of equity for managers
may lessen the incentives for them to increase income excessively. To control for the
influence of managers' ownership on earnings management, we retain the corporate-
govemance variable measured by the sum of equity percentage detained by managers
having more than 5% ownership. The higher the managers' ownership percentage, the less
managers are inclined to choose income-increasing accruals.
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2.2.1.4. Audit quality. Auditors typically exert a constraining influence on earnings
management. It is reported in the literature that a high quality audit frequently translates into
lower accruals (Becker et al, 1998; Davidson & Neu, 1993; DeFond & Subramanyam,
1998; Francis, Maydew, & Sparks, 1999). Big Six auditors are perceived as more
competent and more independent and, therefore, provide higher quality services than
smaller, non-Big Six auditors (DeFond, 1992; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991, 1993; Francis &
Wilson, 1988; Nichols & Smith, 1983; Palmrose, 1988; Simunic «& Stein, 1987). If a firm is
audited by Big Six auditors (now Big Four), managers are less likely to choose income-
increasing or-decreasing accruals. However, in light of recent accounting scandals, this may
no longer be a valid conclusion.
2.2.1.5. Foreign stock exchange listing. Investors have a positive perception of
companies listed on a foreign stock exchange. Furthermore, being listed on a foreign
stock exchange implies a higher level of transparency, and, therefore, a lower level of
earnings management is observed for these firms. If firms are listed on a foreign stock
exchange, managers are less inclined to choose income-increasing and income-decreasing
accruals.
2.2.2. Contextual factors
2.2.2.1. Small loss avoidance. Several recent studies have focused on thresholds as an
incentive for earnings management. Specifically, these studies provided evidence that
managers try to avoid small losses (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Burgstahler & Fames,
2003; Degeorge et al., 1999). For example, Leuz et al. (2003) claim that "while one may
argue that managers have incentives to avoid losses at any size, they have only limited
reporting discretion and hence are unable to report profits in the presence of large losses.
Small losses, however, are more likely to lie within bounds of insiders' reporting discretion
and consequently can be avoided through earnings management." Therefore, in both
Canada and France, small losses are often translated to small profits in order to avoid
negative reactions from the capital market. We used a dummy variable (SMLOSS) with the
value of one if a company reports small profits, i.e., the company is located in the range of
[0.00; 0.01] of companies ranked by the ratio (Net Earnings/Total Assets); zero otherwise.
The more frequent are small losses, the more likely managers are to choose income-
increasing accruals.
2.2.3. Conjectural factors
2.2.3.1. Smoothing reported operating earnings. Prior studies have shown that another
reason to manage earnings is income smoothing (Chancy, Jeter, & Lewis, 1998; Chancy &
Lewis, 1995; DeFond & Park, 1997; Ronen & Sadan, 1981). To control for the motivation
of managers of either Canadian or French firms, to smooth earnings, we consider the
variable (POTSMTH) that measures the potential to smooth in each sample of the firms. At
a firm-level, (POTSMTH) is computed as standard deviation of operating income between
two consecutive years divided by the mean of operating income between the same two
consecutive years. We expect that the higher the potential to smooth earnings upwards
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Table 1
Sample selection
Descriptions" Number of firm-year observations during the
period 1996-2000
French firms Canadian firms
Initial search for firm-year 1996-2000 available 4450 2855
on Disclosure Disks 2001
Less
Additional data requirements
Firms in finance industry'^ (850) (380)
3600 2475
Firms with missing data in the empirical tests (1926) (1005)
Final sample 1674 1470
"Original accounting data base taken from "Disclosure Disks 2001" consists of4450 (French) and 2855 (Canadian)
firm-year observations during the period 1996-2000. Financial firms in Division H (two-digit SIC codes 60-67)
were excluded because the types of accruals found in financial firms differ substantially from accruals in other
industries. Of 3600 (French) and 2475 (Canadian) non-financial firm-year observations, 1926 of the French and
1 ,005 of the Canadian firms had insufficient data on "Disclosure Disks" to enable us to estimate the earnings-
management motives (EMM) model, leaving us with a final sample of 1674 (French) and 1470 (Canadian) firm-
year observations.
'^Firms in the finance industry are firms within Division H: Finance, insurance and real estate matched with the
following two-digit SIC codes industries: # 60 Depository institutions; #61 Non-depository credit institutions; #62
Security and commodity brokers, dealers, exchanges, and service; # 63 Insurance carriers; # 64 Insurance agents,
brokers and service; # 65 Real estate; # 67 Holding and other investment offices.
(downwards), the more likely the managers are to choose income-increasing (-decreasing)
accruals.
3. Methodological approach
3.1. Sample selection
We consider a global sample of French and Canadian firms from eight non-financial
industry divisions. We discarded the financial industry division because it has specific
characteristics which are endowed with the industry's own accounting and financial rules.
The type of accruals found in financial institutions differs substantially from accruals in
other industries.
Table 1 presents the sample selection. The original accounting database taken from
"Disclosure Disks 2001" consists of 4450 French and 2855 Canadian firm-year
observafions over the period 1996-2000. As indicated, financial firms in Division H
(two-digit SIC codes 60-67) were excluded. This led to 850 French firms and 380
Canadian firms being excluded. Of 3600 French non-financial firm-year observations, 1926
were excluded because there was insufficient data on "Disclosure" to enable us to estimate
the earnings management motives model. Similarly, out of 2475 Canadian observations,
' Divisions (A, B, C,..., I) include, respectively (01-09; 10-14; 15-17; 20-39; ...; 70-89) two digit codes. See
Table 2.
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Table 2
Industry distribution of sample firms
Industry division Industry French sample Canadian ssample Entire French/
distribution" two-digit
SIC code
Canadian sample
Number of Frequency Number of Frequency Number of Frequency
firms in in sample firms in in sample firms in in sample
sample
% of total
sample
N % of total
sample
N % of total
Panel A: Agriculture, 01-09 13 0.78 13 0.88 26 0.83
forestry, and fishing
Panel B: Mining 10-14 28 1.67 454 30.88 482 15.33
Panel C: Construction 15-17 47 2.81 20 1.36 67 2.13
Panel D: Manufacturing 20-39 998 59.62 495 33.67 1493 47.49
Panel E: Transportation, 40-49 100 5.97 220 14.97 320 10.18
communication.
electric, gas, and
sanitary services
Panel F: Wholesale 50-51 124 7.41 58 3.95 182 5.79
trade
Panel G: Retail trade 52-59 126 7.53 72 4.90 198 6.30
Panel I: Services 70-89 238 14.21 138 9.39 384 11.95
Total 1674 100 1470 100 3144 100
"In our selected sample, industry divisions consist of Division A: Agriculture, forestry, and fishing (two-digit SIC
codes 01-09); Division B: Mining (two-digit codes 10-14); Division C: construction (two-digit codes 15-17);
Division D: Manufacturing (two-digit codes 20-39); Division E: Transportation, communication, electric, gas, and
sanitary services (two-digit codes 40-49); Division F: Wholesale trade (two-digit codes 50-5 1); Division G: Retail
trade (two-digit codes 52-59); Division I: Services (two-digit codes 70-89).
1005 were excluded. This left us with a final sample of 1674 French and 1470 Canadian
firm-year observations.
Table 2 exhibits the distribution of the French and Canadian selected samples by
industry group.
3.2. The estimation method of discretionary accruals
We focus on discretionary accruals as the proxy of earnings management. Our accrual
model builds on an extended version of the modified Jones {m-J) model. Basically, we
adjust the changes in revenues for the change in accounts receivable to correct for the
possibility that managers could have manipulated revenues by changing credit terms.
Following Larker and Richardson (2004), we include two additional independent variables
that are shown to be correlated with measures of discretionary accruals. First, we include
current operating cash flows (CFO) to control for firm performance. Prior work shows that
measures of discretionary accruals are more likely to be misspecified for firms with extreme
levels of performance (Dechow et al., 1995). Second, we include the book-to-market ratio
(BM). BM is measured as the ratio of the book value of common equity to the market
capitalization. We expect to see large accruals for growing firms (McNihols, 2000, 2002).
BM is included as a proxy for growth opportunities in the firm's operations.
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In contrast to most prior empirical studies on earnings management (e. g., Guidry et al.,
1999; Leuz et al., 2003; Sloan, 1996), we follow Collins and Hribar (2000) and Hribar and
Collins (2002) and directly compute total accruals as the difference between earnings and
cash flow from operations taken from the statement ofcash flow/ Moreover, we used panel
data over the period 1996-2000 for each sample of French and Canadian firms matched by
two-digit SIC code. Each observation of our Canadian and French samples has two
dimensions (firm, year). The estimation method of the modified Jones model using panel-
regression techniques is appropriate."^ Further, the number of Canadian and French firms
changes during the period of analysis. At the firm level, some data are missing for one or
several years. Therefore, the use of non-balanced panel-data techniques is adequate.
Specific regression estimates are made individually for each industry division sub-sample
taken from the 1 674 French and 1470 Canadian firm-year observations. Firms within the same
industry division usually have a similar pattern of assets and generally have similar financial
and legal incentives to manipulate accounting earnings. Considering sub-samples offinn-year
observations that correspond to each industry division may reduce heteroscedasticity.
The advanced extended version of the modified Jones model is the following:
TAC ij\ t = aOy + a\j PPEG /y, / + alj AREVC //", t + al>j CFO y, t
+ aAj BM ij, t + e ij\ t
TAC//",/ is total accruals for firm / in industry 7 in year /, computed as the difference
between net income before extraordinary items and cash flow from operations; PPEG//,/ is
gross property, plant, and equipment for firm / in industry 7 in year /; AREVC//,/ is the
change in revenues less the change in accounts receivable for firm / in industry 7 between
year /- 1 and /; CFOzy,/ is cash flow from operation; BM//',/ is book-to-market ratio
computed as the book value of common equity divided by market capitalization at the end
of the fiscal year. / denotes firm index for the number of firms within portfolio /=1996,
1997, ..., 2000; andy denotes firm index for the number of firnis within industryy=A, B, C,
D, E, F, G, and I. All variables, except BM//,/, are deflated by lagged total assets.
Discretionary accruals (DAC) are residuals obtained from the extended version of the
modified Jones model. The estimates of aO/', a\j, alj, a3>j and a4/' are those obtained from
the extended version of the Jones model. First, we estimate the extended version of the
Jones model:
TAC //, / = aOj + a\j PPEG 77, / + ^27 AREV //", / + a?>j CFO 77, /
+ a47 BM //,/ + e //', / (1)
Where, REV77,/ is the change in revenues for firm / in industry7 between year /- 1 and /.
"* Most research studies on earnings management estimate cash flows as the period-to-period change in current
asset and current liabilities, adjusted for changes in cash and reclassification of currently maturing portions of
long-term debt. Total accruals include changes in the non-cash working-capital accounts plus depreciation
expense. Hribar and Collins (2002), Revsine, Collins, and Johnson (2002), and Drtina and Largay (1985)
demonstrate that this balance-sheet approach to computing accruals can lead to serious errors.
"^ The Breush and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test statistic for homogeneity is significant at a level of 0.01 for
all industry division subsamples. Homogeneity is rejected. Therefore, the use of appropriate panel-estimation
techniques is necessary.
In addition, the Hausman specification test is used to choose between fixed-effects or random-effects models
along with industry-divisions regressions.
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Table 3
Panel regression fit statistics using the extended version of w-7 model and distributional properties of measures of
discretional accurals"
Panel A: Mean coefficient estimates for the extended version of J-m model based on eight industry divisions'*
Variable French sample Canadian sample
Coefficient estimate (p-vahie) Coefficient estimate (p-value)
France 0.000 0.055 -0.019 0.000 0.025
Canada 0.002 0.127 -0.027 0.014 0.049
France 0.035 0.042 0.010 0.022 0.044
Canada 0.068 0.107 0.017 0.038 0.079
Intercept 0.023 (0.000)*** -0.025 (O.OOOf**
PPEG -0.032 (0.298) -0.043 (0.009)***
AREVC 0.021(0.000)*** 0.011(0.021)**
CFO -0.112(0.000)*** -0.681(0.000)***
BM -0.004(0.024)** -0.035(0.098)*
N 1674 1470
;? square overall 0.6700 0.5321
Panel B: Distributional statistics for 1674 French and 1470 Canadian firm-year observations
Variable Mean SD Ql Median Q3
DAC
|DAC|
"Coefficient estimates are averages from the respective 8 industry division's panel regression. The p-vahies are
reported in parenthesis. The estimates of aO, a\, a2, ai, aA are those obtained fi-om the following original Jones
model CFO and BM.
TAC ij. t = aOj + rtl PPEG ij. t + a2 AREV ij. t + a3 CFO//'. / + ^4 BM ij. t + e ij. t
(Eq. (D)
TAC,y , is total accruals for firm / in industry j in year /, computed as the difference between net income before
extraordinary items and cash flow from operations; PPEG,, , is gross property, plant, and equipment for firm / in
industry 7 in year t\ AREV,,, is the change in revenues for firm / in industry 7 between year t- 1 and f. CFO,,,, is
cash from operation; BM„ , is book-to-market ratio computed as the book value of common equity divide by
market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year. / denotes firm index for the number of firm within portfolio
?=1996, 1997,..., 2000 andy denotes firm index for the number of firms within industry /=A, B, C, D, E, F, G,
and I. All variables, except BM„„ are deflated by lagged total assets.
The assumption that all the sample observations are homogeneous with respect to the relation between PPEG,
AREV, CFO, BM and TAC is rejected. The Breush and Pagan Lagrangian muhiplier test statistics is significant at
the 0.01 level for all industry regressions. Therefore, the use of panel-estimation techniques is appropriate.
Hausman specification test is used for each industry regression to indicate the estimation of the extended version of
m-J model to be under the fixed-effects hypothesis or random-effects hypothesis.
DAC is discretionary accruals. Discretional accruals are residuals obtained from the extended version of the m-J
model. The only modification relative to Eq. { 1 ) is that the change in revenues is adjusted for the change in
accounts receivable (AREVC).
|DAC| is absolute value of discretionary accruals.
'"In our selected sample, industry divisions consist of Division A: Agriculture, forestry, and fishing (two-digit SIC
codes 01-09); Division B: Mining (two digit codes 20-39); Division C: construction (two-digit codes 15-17);
Division D: Manufacturing (two-digit codes 20-39); Division E: Transportation, communication, electric, gas. and
sanitary services (two-digit codes 40-49); Division F: Wholesale trade (two-digit codes 50-5 1 ); Division G: Retail
trade (two-digit codes 53-59); Division 1 (two-digit SIC codes 70-89). The complete French sample comprises
1674 firm-year observations during 1996-2000. The complete Canadian sample comprises 1470 firm-year
observations during the same period. See Table 2 for industry distribution of French and Canadian sample firms.
* Significant at the 0.10 level (p-\cilue<0.\0). ** Significant at the 0.05 level (p-value <0. 05). *** Significant at the
0.01 level (p-Yahie <0.0\).
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Table 3 (Panel A) summarizes mean coefficient estimates for the extended version ofthe
modified Jones model based on panel regressions over eight industry divisions.
Consistent with prior research we fmd a negative coefficient on PPEG and a positive
coefficient on REVC. We also find that CFO and BM are both negatively associated with
total accruals. The explanatory power is high, with the mean R~ overall 67% for the French
sample and 53.21% for the Canadian sample.
Secondly, using the estimated coefficients {dOj, d\J, d2j, d3j\ d4j) from industry
division regressions (Eq. (1)), we evaluate the non-discretionary component of total
accruals, NDAC, for each sample of French and Canadian firm-year observation (//,/)
NDAC //, t = dOJ + a \J PPEG ij, t + dlj AREVC /y, / (2)
+ dl>j CFO ij. t + dA BM ij, t
Finally, the proxy for discretionary accruals consists of the accruals prediction error. The
discretionary accruals proxy is obtained by calculating the difference between total accruals
and estimated non-discretionary accruals.
DAC//\ / = TAC/y. /-NDAC/y, t (3^)
Therefore,
DAC//-, / = TAC/y, t- {dOj + d lyPPEG//', / + d2j^RE\Cij, t (3^)
+ fByCFOzy, t + dABMij. t)
In the tests that follow, we examine both directional values for discretionary accruals
DAC and their absolute values |DAC|. Following Larker and Richardson (2004), if the
earnings management is directional, the research design should focus on signed measures of
discretionary accruals. For example, issuing equity creates an incentive to engage in
income-increasing earnings management. However, if the earnings management is non-
directional, the absolute value of discretionary accruals is appropriate. For example, being
listed on a foreign stock market creates less incentive to engage in both income-increasing
and income-decreasing behavior. The research design should focus on the absolute value of
discretionary accruals.
For the 1674 French and 1470 Canadian firm-year observations used to generate our
measures of discretionary accruals (Table 3, Panel B), the mean value of discretionary
accruals is zero by construction (discretionary accruals are residuals from a regression
model).
3.3. Earnings-Management Motives model (EMM)
To test for the importance of specific motives for earnings management within Canadian
and French environments, we develop an Earnings-Management Motives (EMM) model
that takes into consideration differences in motives between Canada and France. Our EMM
model builds on panel regressions with interactive variables for each country. We regress the
test and control variables against directional and non-directional measures of earnings
management. The first measure, signed DAC, denotes the direction ofearnings management.
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The second measure, |DAC|, represents the magnitude ofdiscretionary accruals regardless of
the direction of earnings-management activity. The earnings-management motives model
(EMM) is presented as follows:
EARNMAN i,t = aO+ a\ EQUISSUE_COUNTRY /, t
+ al DEBT_COUNTRY /, t + aS TAX_COUNTRY /, t
+ aA EQUISSUE /, t + a5 DEBT /, t + fl6 TAX/, t
+ aTLOGTA/, t + aSDIR/, / + a9AUDIT/, t + alOCOT/, t
+ fll ISMLOSS/, t + fll2P0TSMTH/, t + al3IND/, t + ei, t;
Where
EARNMAN denotes eamings-management measures: DAC is discretionary accruals
and |DAC| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals.
EQUISSUE_COUNTRY Interactive variable EQUISSUE*COUNTRY, where COUN-
TRY is a dummy variable that takes the value of one ifthe firm-year observation is
Canadian, zero otherwise.
DEBT_COUNTRY Interactive variable DEBT*COUNTRY.
TAX_COUNTRY Interactive variable TAX* COUNTRY.
EQUISSUE i,t Issuing equity, dummy. One if firm / in year t has proceeded to equity
offerings either to be initially introduced to the stock market or to be used sub-
sequently to increase its equity by public offerings, zero otherwise.
DEBT /,/ Leverage of firm / in year t, proxied by the ratio of debt over equity
STDebt&CurrentPortionLTDebt(#3051)+LTDebt(#3251)
.
CommonEquity(#722
1
)
'
TAX i,t Effective tax rate of firm /' in year t, proxied by the ratio
p"ef«^nc(#i40i)
^'
LOGTA /,/ Size of firm / in year t, proxied by natural logarithm of total assets.
DIR i,t Sum of equity percentage detained by managers having more than 5% ownership.
AUDIT i,t Audit quality for firm / in year t, dummy. One if firm / in year / has a Big Six
auditor, zero otherwise;
COT i,t Foreign stock exchange listing, dummy. One if firm / in year / is listed on a foreign
stock exchange, zero otherwise;
SMLOSS /,/ Small losses avoidance, dummy. One if firm / in year t reports small profits,
i.e., the company is located in the range of [0.00; 0.01] of companies ranked by
the ratio (Net earnings/Total assets), zero otherwise;
POTSMTH ij Potential to smooth earnings for firm / in year t, computed as standard
deviation of operating income between two consecutive years /- 1 and / scaled
by the mean of operating income between the same two consecutive years /-
1
and ^ with ^=1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000.
IND i,t^ Summarizes dummies that represent industry divisions included in the EMM
model. For each industry division (e. g. AGR: Agriculture) the dummy variable
takes the value of one if the firm belong to that industry (AGR), zero otherwise;
Cf. "Disclosure" data base.
^ See Table 6 Footnotes for more detailed description of dummies that represent industry divisions in the EMM
model.
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Because earnings-management motives can drive directional and/or non-directional
discretionary accruals, we provide additional separate analyses for French and Canadian
samples including positive and negative discretionary accruals to determine whether
incentives for earnings management vary depending on the sign of discretionary accruals.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics of earnings-management motives
Correlations among quantitative independent variables related to our EMM model are
provided in Table 4. Pearson correlations are very weak, suggesting the absence of
multicolinearity between the independent variables of our EMM model.
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the test and control variables for the French and
Canadian samples. Descriptive statistics of continued variables are provided in Panel A,
whereas descriptive statistics of discrete variables are shown in Panel B. Most entries in the
table are descriptive and self-evident. As expected, the mean of debt-to-equity ratio, DEBT,
for French firms is statistically higher than for Canadian firms (Panel A). This confirms that
the finance pattern of French firms relies to a large extent on bank loans compared to
Canadian firms. Conversely, Panel B reports that the mean proportion of issuing equity,
EQUISSUE, for Canadian firms is substantially higher than for French firms. This
corroborates our predictions that capital markets are the primary source of capital for
Canadian companies. However, the mean and median of effective tax rates, TAX, for
French firms and for Canadian firms are very similar (Panel A). This may, apparently,
reflect a lack of any particular impact of the effective tax rate on eamings-management
behavior for French firms compared to Canadian firms.
Managers' ownership, DIR, for French companies tends to be concentrated. The mean of
managers' ownership is evidently significantly more important for French companies than
for Canadian companies (Panel B). Managers' ownership may also reveal ownership
characteristics. It indicates the extent to which managers and owners are separated. French
companies rely less than Canadian companies on the capital market as a source of finance.
Panel A exhibits that the Big Six auditors, AUDIT, mean proportion is consistently higher
for Canadian firms than for French firms. The vast majority of Canadian companies hire
Big Six auditors while fewer French companies do. This reflects a specific characteristic of
the French environment. French firms still resort to local auditors. Further, there is a
substantially higher mean proportion of Canadian firms, COT, listed on a foreign capital
market in Panel B. Moreover, Panel B shows that the potential to smooth eamings,
POTSMTH, is higher for Canadian firms than for French ones. However, Panel A outlines a
significantly higher mean proportion of small-losses avoidance, SMLOSS, for French firms
compared to Canadian firms.
4.2. Panel regressions analysis
Table 6 presents regression results of the EMM model we tested over the entire sample
of 3144 French and Canadian firm-year observations. Panel A uses DAC as a directional
measure of eamings-management behavior while Panel B uses |DAC| as a non-directional
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Table 4
Pearson correlations for quantitative independent variables related to earnings-management motives model
DEBT TAX LOGTA DIR POTSMTH
Panel A: Global French and Canadian sample of3 144 firm-year observations
DEBT 1.000
TAX -0.002
(0.899)
1.000
LOGTA 0.008
(0.619)
-0.021
(0.228)
1.000
DIR 0.025 -0.023 0.026 .1.000
(0.206) (0.234) (0.182)
POTSMTH -0.004 -0.003 -0.023 0.013
(0.811) (0.856) (0.197) (0.521)
Panel B: French sample of 1674 firm-year obsen>ations
DEBT 1.000
TAX -0.002
(0.942)
1.000
LOGTA 0.001
(0.9528)
-0.005
(0.8211)
1.000
DIR -0.007 -0.037 -0.032 1.000
(0.770) (0.129) (0.103)
POTSMTH -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 0.026
(0. 766) (0.878) (0.864) (0.281)
Panel C: Canadian sample of 1470 firm--year obsen'ations
DEBT 1.000
TAX -0.015
(0.515)
1.000
LOGTA 0.005
(0.841)
0.014
(0.555)
1.000
DIR 0.007 -0.034 0.025 1.000
(0.779) (0.293) (0.513)
POTSMTH -0.002 -0.016 -0.010 0.012
(0.931) (0.508) (0.670) (0.713)
1.000
1.000
1.000
This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients (first line) and the p-values in parentheses (second line).
DEBT: Debt-to-equity ratio. TAX: Effective tax rate. LOGTA: Firm size. DIR: Sum of equity percentage detained
by director's having more than 5%. POTSMTH: Potential to smooth earnings.
measure of earnings-management behavior. Table 7 provides additional results from
separate analyses for 1674 French and 1470 Canadian firm-year observations including
positive (Panel C) and negative (Panel D) discretionary accruals.
The Breush and Pagan Lagrange multiplier-test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level in
Table 6 (Panels A and B) and Table 7 (Panels A, B, C, and D). The assumption that all the
sample observations are homogenous with respect to the relation between earnings-
management motives and discretionary-accruals activity is rejected. Therefore, we use
appropriate panel-estimation techniques. The Hausman specification test is used to choose
between the fixed-effects or random-effects model along with the entire sample (Table 6)
and separate samples (Table 7) of French and Canadian firm-year observations. The
Hausman specification test statistic is not statistically significant at the level of 0.05 in
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Table 5
Descriptive statistics on the test and control variables related to earnings management motives (EMM) model
Panel A: Distributional statistics and univariate difference of continued variables for 1674 French and 1470
Canadian firm-year observations
Variable Mean SD Qi Median 03 /-statistic (p-value)
DEBT France 0.977 2.590 0.245 0.581 1.162 3.639
Canada 0.609 3.064 0.125 0.477 0.975 (0.000)***
TAX France 0.305 0.464 0.178 0.344 0.408 0.501
Canada 0.293 0.408 0.096 0.342 0.428 (0.6164)
LOGTA France 12.829 1.996 11.395 12.435 14.159 1.877
Canada 12.669 1.692 11.511 12.584 13.856 (0.061)*
DIR France 0.594 0.227 0.450 0.620 0.760 28.271
Canada 0.3102 0.251 0,110 0.254 0.487 (0.000)***
POTSMTH France 0.207 29.877 0.032 0.153 0.425 -1.292
Canada 2.220 54.824 0.038 0.162 0.399 (0.196)
Panel B: Proportion and univariate difference of discrete variables for 1674 French and 1470 Canadian firm-year
observations
Variable Mean proportion r-statistic (p-value)
EQUISSUE France
Canada
AUDIT France
Canada
COT France
Canada
SMLOSS France
Canada
0.073
0.161
0.537
0.967
0.266
0.347
0.082
0.056
-7.682
(0.000)***
-27.376
(0.000)***
-4.741
(0.000)***
2.801
(0.005)***
DEBT: Debt-to-equity ratio. TAX: Effective tax rate. LOGTA: Firm size. DIR: Sum of equity percentage detained
by directors having more than 5%. POTSMTH: Potential to smooth earnings.
EOUISSUE: Dummy variable one if the firm proceeds to equity offerings either to be initially introduced to the
stock market or subsequently to increase its equity by public offerings, zero otherwise. AUDIT: Dummy variable
one if the auditor is Big Six auditor, zero otherwise. COT: Dummy variable one if firm is listed on a foreign stock
exchange, zero otherwise. SMLOSS: Dummy variable one if firm reports small profits, zero otherwise.
In Panel A, univariate difference ofcontinued variables between the French and Canadian samples is tested through
the mean comparison test of independent samples.
In Panel B, univariate difference of discrete variables between the French and Canadian samples is tested through
the proportion comparison test of independent samples.
* Significant at the 0.10 level (p-value<0.10).
** Significant at the 0.05 level (p-vahie<0.05).
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (p-vahie<0.01).
Table 6 (Panels A and B) and Table 7 (Panels A, B, C, and D). Hence, we estimate our
EMM model using the random-effects hypothesis.
Tables 6 and 7 show that variables of our EMM regression model are globally
significant. The Wald Chi" test statistic is significant at a 0.05 level for both directional and
non-directional measures of earnings management (Table 6, Panels A and B; Table 7,
Panels A, B, C and D).
R" overall ranges from 0.056 to 0.1881 for directional discretionary accruals and is about
0.20 for non-directional discretionary accruals.
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Consistent with our predictions. Table 6 (Panels A and B) exhibits a significantly higher
influence of debt-to-equity ratio and effective tax rate on both signed and absolute value of
discretionary accruals for Canadian firms compared to French firms. The respective
interactive variables DEBT_COLINTRY and TAX_COUNTRY show a negative and
significant coefficient (Panels A and B). Conversely, the coefficient of the interactive
variable EQUISSUE_COUNTRY is positive and significant (Panels A and B). As expected,
issuing equity to be initially introduced to the stock market or subsequently to increase its
equity by public offerings has a more substantial influence on both the signed and absolute
value of discretionary accruals for Canadian firms than it does for French firms.
More specifically, Table 7 reports that the debt-to-equity ratio, DEBT, is positively
associated with positive directional DAC (Panel C) and negatively associated with negative
directional DAC (Panel D) for French firms. However, DEBT shows no significant
association with earnings-management measures for Canadian firms (Panels A, B, C, D).
Within the French environment, bank loans contribute heavily to an upward earnings
management in order to avoid the violation of debt covenants. Further, managing earnings
upwards represents a positive signal to lenders, particularly financial institutions, to
Table 6
Panel regressions of earnings-management measures on test and control variables based on the entire sample of
3144 French and Canadian firm-year observations"
Variable Panel A: EARNMAN = DAC
Coefficient estimate (p-value)
Panel B: EARNMAN = |DAC|
Coefficient estimate (p-value)
INTERCEPT
EQUISSUE_COUNTRY
DEBT_COUNTRY
TAX_COUNTRY
EQUISSUE
DEBT
TAX
LOGTA
DIR
AUDIT .
COT
SMLOSS
POTSMTH
AGR
MINING
CONST
TRANS
WHLES
TRADE
SERV
B-P Lagrange Multiplier test:
Chi" statistic
Hausman specification test:
Chi" statistic
Wald Chi" statistic
R' overall
-0.056 (0.004)***
0.016 (0.001)***
-0.002 (0.000)***
0.012 (0.019)**
0.031 (0.047)**
0.000 (0.000)***
-0.001 (0.039)**
0.004 (0.081)*
0.000(0.817)
-0.005 (0.373)
-0.007 (0.132)
-0.010 (0.054)*
-0.000 (0.872)
-0.005 (0.865)
-0.019 (0.816)
-0.009 (0.566)
0.001 (0.946)
0.005 (0.607)
-0.001 (0.937)
-0.004 (0.622)
258.900 (0.000)***
12.450(0.132)
96.31 (0.000)***
0.1098
0.158 (0.000)***
0.014 (0.040)**
-0.002 (0.000)***
-0.009 (0.063)*
0.011 (0.087)*
0.000 (0.000)***
-0.001 (0.048)*
-0.008 (0.000)***
-0.000 (0.222)
-0.006 (0.262)
-0.001 (0.745)
-0.011 (0.008)***
0.000 (0.873)
0.000(0.992)
0.038 (0.000)***
-0.007 (0.547)
0.004 (0.529)
-0.000(0.973)
0.003 (0.708)
0.183 (0.002)***
241.520 (0.000)***
7.480 (0.380)
265.10 (0.000)***
0.2132
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continue providing firms with funds at favorable conditions. Moreover, the coefficient of
DEBT is negative and significant in the case ofdownward earnings management (Panel D).
Clearly, the debt-to-equity ratio does contribute to the management of earnings upwards.
Contrary to the findings for French firms, the debt-to-equity ratio is found to have no major
impact on earnings-management behavior for Canadian firms. The French environment
seems to give more credit to the debt hypothesis than does the Canadian environment.
Although the effective tax rate is not statistically different between Canadian and French
firms (Table 5, Panel A), Table 6 (Panels A and B) exhibits, as expected, a substantially
higher impact of effective tax rate on earnings management direction and magnitude for
French firms than for Canadian firms. The influence of the interactive variable
Notes to Table 6;
"The earnings-management motives (EMM) model tested over the entire French and Canadian sample is presented
as follows:
EARNMAN/,/ = aO + a\ EQUISSUE_COUTNRY ;, / + fl2 DEBT-COUNTRY /, r
+ fl3 TAX_COUNTRY i, t + aA EQUISSUE z, t + aS DEBT /, /
+ a6 TAX /, t + al LOGTA /, / + fl8 DIR /, / + a9 AUDIT /, /
+ fllOCOT;,/ + a\\ SMLOSSz,/ + al2 POTSMTH /./
+ aU AGR /,^ aMMINING iJ + a\5 CONST ij + a\6 TRANS i,t
+ alVWHLES/,? + al8 TRADE/,? + al9SERV/,/ + e i,t;
EARNMAN represents earnings management measures: DAC is discretionary accruals and |DAC| is absolute
value of discretionary accruals.
EQUISSUE_COUNTRY is the interactive variable EQUISSUE* COUNTRY DEBT_COUNTRY is the
interactive variable DEBT* COUNTRY TAX_COUNTRY is the interactive variable TAX* COUNTRY; where
COUNTRY is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm-year observation is Canadian, zero
otherwise. EQUISSUE: dummy variable, one if the firm proceeds to equity offerings either to be initially
introduced to the stock market or subsequently to increase its equity by public offerings, zero otherwise. DEBT:
debt to equity ratio. TAX: effective tax rate. LOGTA: firm size. DIR: sum of equity percentage detained by
directors having more than 5%. AUDIT: dummy variable, one if the auditor is Big Six auditor, zero otherwise.
COT: dummy variable, one if firm is listed on a foreign stock exchange, zero otherwise. SMLOSS: dummy variable,
one if firm reports small profits, zero otherwise. POTSMTH: potential to smooth earnings. AGR: dummy variable,
one if the firm belongs to Agriculture, forestry, and fishing industry division, zero otherwise. MfNING: dummy
variable one, ifthe firm belongs to Mining industry division, zero otherwise. CONST: dummy variable, one if the firm
belongs to Construction industry division, zero otherwise. TRANS: dummy variable, one if the firm belongs to
Transportation, communication, electric, gas, and sanitary services industry division, zero otherwise. WHLES:
dummy variable, one if the firm belongs to Wholesale trade industry division, zero otherwise. TRADE: dummy
variable, one if the firm belongs to Retail trade industry division, zero otherwise. SERV: dummy variable, one if the
firm belongs to Services industry division, zero otherwise.
Breush and Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test is used to test for homogeneity of the entire sample of French and
Canadian 3 144 firm-year observations with respect to the relation between earnings management motives and both
directional and non-directional measures of earnings management. B-P Lagrange Multiplier test statistic is
significant at the 0.01 level in Panels A and B. Consequently, homogeneity is rejected and the use of Panel
estimation techniques is appropriate.
Hausman specification test is used for the entire sample of French and Canadian 3144 firm-year observations to
indicate the estimation of the Earnings-management Motives (EMM) model to be under the fixed effects
hypothesis or random effects hypothesis. Hausman specification test statistic is not significant at the 0.10 level in
Panels A and B. Consequently, we use random-effects estimation of the EMM model in Panels A and B.
The p-values are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
*Significant at the 0.10 level (p-value<0.10).
**Significant at the 0.05 level (p-vahie<0.05).
***Significant at the 0.01 level (p-value<0.01).
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TAX_COUNTRY is negative and significant on both DAC and |DAC| over the entire
sample of 3144 French and Canadian firm-year observations (Table 6). In addition. Table 7
reports a positive significant impact of TAX on both negative DAC (Panel D) and |DAC|
(Panel B) over the 1 674 French firm-year observations. There is, also, a negative association
between the effective tax rate and (directional) positive discretionary accruals (Panel C).
Hence, the effective tax rate drives more income-decreasing accruals and accruals for French
firms. Because of the tight relationship between the French tax and financial-reporting
systems, the effective tax rate is more significant for French firms than for Canadian firms in
influencing income-decreasing accmals. However, Canadian managers are free from tax
pressure. They are encouraged to increase income to presei"ve their human capital from
management buyouts and hostile takeovers and to give a positive image of the firm, rather
than to circumvent tax pressure through income-decreasing accruals.
In contrast to French firms, the influence of the interactive variable EQUISSUE_-
COUNTRY is positive and significant on both DAC and |DAC| over the entire sample of
3144 French-Canadian firm-year observations (Table 6, Panels A and B). Additionally,
Table 7 outlines a positive, significant impact of EQUISSUE on both positive DAC (Panel
C) and |DAC| (Panel B) over 1470 Canadian firm-year observations. There is also negative
association between EQUISSUE and negative DAC (Panel D). Therefore, issuing equity to
be initially introduced to the stock market or subsequently to increase its equity by public
offerings has a more significant influence on earnings management direction and
magnitude for Canadian firms than for French firms. EQUISSUE drives more income-
increasing accruals and accruals of more important size for Canadian firms. The substantial
association between EQUISSUE and earnings-management behavior corroborates the
results obtained by Chtourou, Bedard, and Courteau (2001) for American firms. This may
be due to the prominence of the role of the capital market, in Anglo-American countries, in
enhancing financing through equity. Companies characterized by a diffuse ownership
structure are more likely than owner-controlled firms to manage earnings, and do so
fi-equently (Dempsey et al., 1993, p 481). Issuing equity to be initially introduced to the
stock market or subsequently to increase its equity by public offerings, however, has no
substantial influence on managing earnings upwards for French firms. Since bank loans are
the major source of finance in this code-law country, there is demand to preserve a low-
volatility income variable (Ball et al., 2000).
In Table 7, we find for both French and Canadian samples that the LOGTA coefficient is
statistically negative when discretionary accruals are restricted to values greater than zero
(Panel C) and statistically positive when discretionary accruals are restricted to values less
than or equal to zero (Panel D). As expected, firm size contributes substantially to managing
earnings downwards for French and Canadian firms. However, consistent with the Chtourou
et al. (2001) study conducted for a sample of American firms, Panel B shows that the
LOGTA coefficient is consistently negative for Canadian and French firms. In both samples,
the firm size is linked to a lower magnitude of earnings-management behavior. This result
may be due to supplementary controls available within large firms to reduce agency costs
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These supplementary controls may reduce the extent of
managers' discretionary behavior. Further, the contribution of firm size in reducing earnings-
management magnitude may be due to the selection ofour Canadian and French samples. Our
study does not focus on a specific context of political costs where firms are subject to anti-
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dumping investigations (Magnan, Nadeau, & Cormier, 1 999), anti-trust investigations (Makar
&. Alam, 1998), environmental crises (Labelle & Thibault, 1998), the Gulf crisis (Han &
Wang, 1998), or international trade-commission investigations (Jones, 1991). The firm-size
effect on earnings-management magnitude is more often seen within similar contexts.
To the extent that managers may be restrained from manipulating discretionary accruals
upwards if they maintain a high concentration of equity, Table 7 (Panel C) shows the
managers' ownership coefficient is negative for both Canadian and French samples.
However, the DIR coefficient is significant only for Canadian firms. A high concentration
of equity may reduce agency costs between managers and owners (Berle & Means, 1932;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mork, Shleifer & Vishney, 1998) and, consequently, may
constrain upwards eamings management. This finding confirms our expectation that in the
Canadian environment the higher the managers' ownership, the less managers are inclined
to choose income-increasing accruals.
Panel D reports that the DIR coefficient is positive for both Canadian and French firms.
However, it is only significant for Canadian firms. This reveals that the higher managers'
equity becomes, the more likely they are to choose income-decreasing accruals. This
finding obtained for Canadian firms, may be due, at least in part, to the following reasons.
First, as the percentage of equity detained by managers becomes larger, their interests are
more likely to be aligned with those of the owners. In such case, firms are more inclined to
manage eamings downwards. Dempsey et al. (1993) suggest that firms managed by owners
resort to extraordinary expenses to understate eamings. Second, stock-option incentive
mechanisms are widespread among Canadian firms. Canadian managers' compensation
depends to a large extent on stock options. In a study of American managers. Backer,
Denton, and Reitenga (2003) confirmed that high compensation based on stock options is
significantly associated with downwards eamings management using discretionary
accruals. In particular, managers understate eamings in periods leading up to the option-
award date in order to minimize the exercise price of options. Moreover, Backer et al.
(2003) find that this association is stronger when managers are able to publicly announce
eamings prior to the option-award date. This result also confirms, for Canadian firms, that
the higher the managers' ownership, the less managers are inclined to choose income-
increasing accmals. Overall, DIR is significantly associated with directional eamings
management for Canadian firms (Panel A). However, Panel B indicates that the DIR
coefficient is not correlated with non-directional eamings management. Unlike Wartfield,
Wild, and Wild (1995), we find no significant, positive relation between the managers'
ownership concentration and the absolute value of discretionary accmals.
In contrast to the Canadian sample, Table 7 exhibits that the DIR coefficient for the
French sample is not significant for Panels A, B, C, and D. This indicates that in the French
environment managers' ownership concentration has only a weak impact on reducing
eamings management upward. In France, equity is not diffused among public investors as
in Canada. The capital market's role in providing finance is less important than banks which
finance firms through loans. Agency problems, other than between managers and
shareholders, are relevant in French firms, namely, between bankers and the firm.
As for audit quality, AUDIT represents a monitoring mechanism that may dissuade
managers against earnings-management activities. However, the AUDIT coefficient is not
significant for either Canadian or French samples (Table 7). Contrary to the Becker et al.
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(1998) Study of American firms and the Vander Bauwhede, Willekens, and Gaeremynk
(2003) study of Belgium firms, but consistent with the Chtourou et al. (2001) study of
American firnis, there is a weak statistical and substantive relation between AUDIT and
both directional and non-directional earnings-management measures. Our findings reveal
that, within Canadian and French environments, Big Six (now Big Four) auditors have no
substantial influence on constraining upwards (Panel C) and downwards (Panel D) earnings
management. Panel B, also reveals that Big Six (now Big Four) auditors have no substantial
influence to reduce the magnitude of earnings management. Recent scandals that affected
many international audit firms (Arthur Anderson, Ernst and Young, KPMG, etc.) cast doubt
on the assumed quality of Big Six (now Big Four) auditors.
In Table 7, we find that although the COT coefficient is negative for both Canadian and
French samples, it is not significant for either directional or non-directional measures of
earnings management. This indicates a very weak influence of foreign stock exchange
listing in restraining upwards (Panel C), downwards (Panel D), or the intensity (Panel B) of
earnings management for Canadian and French firms.
Table 7 exhibits that, for French firms, SMLOSS has a statistically negative relation with
non-directional discretionary accruals (Panel B), a positive relation when discretionary
accruals are restricted to values greater than zero (Panel C), and a negative relation when
discretionary accruals are restricted to values less than or equal to zero (Panel D). Small-losses
avoidance contributes to restraining earnings-management magnitude for French firms. The
more small losses there are for French firms the less managers are inclined to choose income-
decreasing accmals. However, small-losses avoidance has no substantial impact on earnings-
management behavior for Canadian firms even though the SMLOSS coefficient is negative in
Panel D and positive in Panel C. The tendency to manage earnings upwards in the presence of
small losses is more pronounced for French firms than for Canadian firms.
Finally, the POTSMTH coefficient is not significant for either Canadian or French
samples (Table 7). During the period ofanalysis, the potential for smoothing does not appear
to contribute to earnings-management activity for any of Canadian or French samples.
An additional Chow test is used in Table 7 to test for global change in coefficients of the
Earnings-Management Motives (EMM) model between the French (1674 firm-year
observations) and the Canadian (1470 firm-year observations) samples. The Chow test
statistic is significant at the 0.01 level in Panels A, B, C and D. Consequently, coefficients of
the EMM model diff'er substantially between the French sample and the Canadian sample.
5. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to investigate factors that have the potential of influencing
earnings-management activity with reference to the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental
accounting models. This study outlines major differences between Canadian and French
socio-economic environments and assesses their implications for earnings-management
behavior. Our work presents evidence regarding the determinants ofmanagerial-accounting
discretion for global samples of Canadian and French firms. We used panel data of 1470
Canadian and 1 674 French firm-year observations. Using alternate measure of earnings-
management activity that capture the direction and extent of discretionary behavior, we
performed an analysis based on a panel-regression model.
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Findings provide evidence that initial public and subsequent equity offerings are strong
motives for earnings management in Canadian firms. Hence, Canadian firms show specific
incentives matched with a dynamic capital market. However, incentives for earnings
management for French firms are specifically linked to contractual debt costs and the
effective tax rate. We believe the results to be of interest to international investors, standard
setters, regulators, and auditors.
A major concern regarding the interpretation of these results relates to the reliance
placed on accrual-based measures of accounting choice. Despite the use of an extended
version of the m-J model, the possibility remains that misspecification of the accounting-
choice proxy may underlie some of the observed relations.
Finally, although we attempt to reveal the opportunity for accounting discretion within
two different socio-economic environments, i. e., Canada and France, some important
determinants of managerial discretion have not been considered. In particular, no attempt
has been made to control for the impact of differential corporate-governance mechanisms
(outside directors, audit committees structure, etc.) on earnings-management practices.
Future research could further develop contractual, agency, and governance problems in
other countries. Research on earnings-management determinants in different environments
can only stand to enrich researchers' understanding of accounting-policy choice in their
own environment.
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Accounting standards: True or false?, R.A. Rayman. Routledge, (2006). 230 pages,
£19.99, $35.82, ISBN: 0-415-37780-3
This interesting book considers whether the introduction of International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRSs) will close the expectation gap between what accounts are
thought to represent and reality. However, the book considers issues much wider than that
and is certainly thought provoking.
The Foreword is written by the Head of International Financial Reporting in Ernst and
Young UK, Allister Wilson. His opening paragraph states that "close to 100 countries
worldwide, including the entire European Union, (EU) now require the use of IFRSs by at
least all listed companies" (p. 9). Further, he argues, a stark choice exists between IFRSs and
U.S. GAAR I am not necessarily convinced that the choice is so stark and certainly in the
short-run I expect a great deal more variety than this dichotomy. First, the EU requirement is
for IFRSs to be used in consolidated accounts only from 2005. Thus, each member state can
decide whether to extend the use of IFRSs to individual accounts and to unlisted companies.
For some states, local GAAP may be required in individual company accounts, especially
where the financial accounts form the basis for tax assessment. Second, the United States and
the EU are undertaking a convergence project to reduce diversity. This may lead the United
States to move more towards principles-based standards than rules-based standards. It is
possible, however, for IFRSs to be interpreted differently in the United States than in the EU.
Third, the introduction of IFRSs in different countries around the world is not uniformly
adopted, rather a variety ofapproaches is taken depending on a particular country or even on
a particular standard. Thus, IFRSs have been adopted or adapted or a combination of both.
Back to the main body ofthe book. The author argues that "conventional accounting has a
major flaw that has to be corrected. Instead of being based on undisclosed assumptions
known to be false, accounting information needs to be based on disclosed assumptions
believed to be true" (p. 9). The problem, he argues, is that accountants try to incorporate
aspects of stewardship as well as efficiency and as such the book covers the concept of
income and the theory of value and what the author believes to be the blind alley in which
accounting-standards bodies are now trapped.
The author adopts a historical approach to the development of accounting to explain how
we have got to where we are now and the arguments are in the context of the United
Kingdom environment. For example, chapter one explains the stewardship aspect of
accounting and the following chapter covers business accounting to explain how the
industrial revolution led to the reporting of performance. So, for example, the author states
(p. 19) that "the primary object [ofaccounting] was the detection and prevention offraud and
438 Book reviews
error. Financial accounting therefore developed as a branch of applied law rather than as a
branch of applied economics." For some countries, accounting did indeed develop as a
branch of applied law but in others (for example, The Netherlands) accounting developed as
a form of applied economics.
The problem that accounting faces is trying to assign measures ofvalue to assets based on
some sort ofcode (principles) rather than the transaction approach required for stewardship.
Principles may necessitate retrospective adjustment because the validity of asset valuations
often depends on the outcome of fiiture events and because they are drawn up on a monetary
unit that is unstable in terms of purchasing power. Of course, the latter criticism can also be
levied against accounting for stewardship since currency is unstable over the normal
arbitrary period of assessment of 12 months. The author argues that the blame for failures in
the system rests with those who employ nonstandard techniques that may be described as
"creative" or on business uncertainty or economic instability.
Part II of the book considers the measurement of income and value. If accounts are in
some way to measure economic performance then measurement ofincome is vital. However,
the author believes that consideration of the nature of income is distinctly missing from the
work ofthe Accounting Standards Board in the United Kingdom, the FASB and the lASB. If
income is to be the measure of economic performance then it must relate in some way to
consumption, consumption being the object of economic activity. Chapter 4 discusses
income and accounting profit and considers the contributions of Hicks (1939) and Fisher
(1906). The chapter concludes by stating that the good news is that one ofHick's definitions
of income corresponds with the traditional definition of accounting profit ". . . namely, the
change in a firm's balance sheet value after allowing for contributions from and distributions
to its owners. The bad news is that conventional balance sheet values are normally based on
historical cost" (p. 44). This avoids the reality that for many years the United Kingdom
has adopted a modified historical cost approach incorporating periodic revaluations of fixed
assets.
The following chapter discusses the inflation-accounting debate although it is argued that
attempts were made to stifle debate (p. 52). Rayman (p. 50) argues that inflation accounting
received a mixed reception: "academics, presented with an endless supply of calculations to
set for their students, were ecstatic. Professionals, responsible for doing the calculations
themselves, were less enthusiastic." Frankly, I cannot remember the ecstasy I must have felt!
The case against inflation accounting is summed up: "for stewardship reporting it is un-
necessary; for performance reporting it is inadequate" (p. 51).
The discussion in chapter 6 is of historical cost and current cost and the concept of
deprival value is that of Bonbright (1937), although the author correctly points out that this
idea is based on work of Austrians, particularly Menger (1871), Bohm-Bawer (1888), and
Wieser (1889). Given the concept of deprival value in terms of the relationship between
NRV, PV, and RC, there are six possibilities for valuation and, therefore, the rules were
arranged to accommodate these eventualities. However, what is pointed out by the author is
that "deprival value," even if it can be measured accurately, has not been demonstrated to be
an information requirement for financial reporting by any user group (see, for example,
Whittington, 1983; Kay, 1977). This was a fundamental problem of the inflation-accounting
debate. Once revised figures had been calculated, what meaning could be attached to such
information? The contribution of Edwards and Bell (1961) is recognized as influencing the
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FASB's Conceptual Framework Project towards a balance-sheet approach to recognition
rather than performance. But the nature of income in terms of value change is dependent on
measurement. Given that any definition of the economic concept of income relies on
subjective assessments, the alternative provided by Edwards and Bell has some appeal.
However, since value depends on the subjectivity of fiiture dividend streams the correctness
of estimations depends on the market and performance is measured by changes in market
value. As a resuh, the lASB and the FASB have increasingly been interested in fair-value
reporting. The author believes that fair-value accounting is a blind alley and illustrates this in
the context of financial instruments. He is not intrinsically opposed to the use of fair values
but rather that changes in fair values should be regarded as gains or losses. I have some
sympathy with this. Given volatility in commodity and futures markets, how useful is it to
measure them at a point in time at the balance-sheet date and then determine gains and losses
and report them as such? Is the change in value between purchase and/or the signing of a
futures contract an appropriate measure of gain? Is a company better or worse off as a result
of the measurement of hypothetical transactions which do not in any way represent the
economic significance of the realized transaction? For successful measurement, actual
results should be close to expected results (Kaldor, 1955) and asset valuations based on
fiiture events makes the usefulness of accounts dependent on the fiiture. An ancilliary
problem is that with subjective valuations it becomes difficult to be consistent and may lead
to auditor-opinion shopping.
Rayman attacks investment theory for its reliance on unrealistic assumptions such as
perfect markets and argues that there cannot be a single cost of capital that embraces the
investment opportunities, tax position, and dividend expectations of a multitude of share-
holders. Given the many different economic outcomes, accounting standards must have
great difficulty in establishing balance-sheet values. Even if these were possible, then the
problem ofmeasuring the return on capital employed is insurmountable. As such, he argues,
"the system" needs to change so that the backward-looking measures of stewardship are
clearly separated from the forward-looking measures of performance reporting. This
requires a distinction between funds and value. And, fijrther, that monetary figures in the
accounts are symbols ofvolume and not measures ofperformance or value (p. 153). "Funds
accounting remains the basis of the segregated system of record keeping and resource
accounting for reporting on stewardship. The major innovation is the introduction of
separate value accounts for reporting on performance" (p. 158). Rayman argues that the
segregated system he advocates will close the expectation gap between what accounts
actually mean and what the public believes them to mean. In addition, managers of public
companies will be more accountable through the market than through additional regulation.
This can be achieved through public disclosure ofthe rate ofreturn managers are planning to
achieve.
Segregation will lead to a transactions-based system based on historical costs whose
purpose is to report on stewardship and whose transactions can be verified by auditors to
assist the process of minimizing fraud and error. The balance sheet would show assets and
liabilities at historical costs based on facts and alongside those values should be shown
current values, either exit or entry, that are considered relevant for understanding.
In summary, it is my view that this book is worthy of reading since it is well-written,
thought-provoking and timely, given moves to adopt and adapt IFRSs. The author not only
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provides a critique of extant literatures but also advances possible solutions based on the
distinction between funds and value.
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Accounting ethics, Ronald F. Duska, Brenda Duska, Blackwell Publishing, Maiden,
Massachusetts, USA (2003), U + 277 pages, £21.99, $34.95 (pbk), ISBN: 0-631-21651-0
This book is a volume in Blackwell's Foundations ofBusiness Ethics series. Books in this
series, are authored by business ethicists and are intended to provide text materials for
courses in business. Because of its major focus on official ethics pronouncements of
regulatory and professional bodies, it would appear that this book is aimed at courses in
accounting (rather than in, say, business ethics). Volumes in this series are designed to be
used by themselves or in combination with readings and case studies. Because the authors
are not accounting academics (one is a prominent business ethicist and the other is a
practicing accountant), it is understandable that the book contains few references to the
accounting ethics literature, and to that extent fails to engage the subject as it has developed
over the last couple of decades. Nevertheless, this book is a welcome and valuable addition
to the literature on accounting ethics, as it provides a fresh perspective on this important area
of accounting. Since the field of accounting ethics is still at an early stage of development,
book-length treatments, which are intended to provide wide-ranging examinations of the
field, are welcome.
This book consists of two introductory chronologies of events relating to the Enron and
WorldCom scandals, 1 text chapters, and five appendices containing various professional
standards governing the practice of accounting in the United States. The chapters may be
usefiilly divided into six groups, based on their usefiilness in teaching accounting courses, as
follows.
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Chapter 1 ("The Nature ofAccounting and the ChiefEthical Difficulty: True Disclosure")
is designed to describe the basic ethical issues in accounting.
2. Chapters 2 ("Ethical Behavior in Accounting: What Is Ethics?") and 3 ("Ethical Behavior
in Accounting: Ethical Theory") deal with the nature ofethics and ethical theory, and their
relation to ethical behavior.
3. Chapter 4 ("Accounting as a Profession"), which examines the nature of professions and
the accounting profession.
4. Chapters 5 ("Accounting Codes of Ethics: The Principles") and 6 ("Accounting Codes of
Ethics: The Rules") focus on the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct.
5. Chapters 7 ("Ethics in Auditing: The Auditing Function"), 8 ("The Ethics of Managerial
and Financial Accounting"), and 9 ("The Ethics of Tax Accounting") divide the practice
accounting into three parts, and examine a number of issues relating to each aspect.
6. The last chapter ("The Ethics of the Accounting Firm: The Accounting Profession in
Crisis") is an examination of the current crisis in public accounting.
Some confiision relating to the purpose of accounting is expressed early in the book. On
page 10, for example, it is stated that "... the accountant's role is to furnish various entities
who have a legitimate right to know about an organization's affairs with useful information
about those economic affairs. Wliat is owed to those various entities, and an accountant has
an obligation to provide, is a true picture of those affairs." Again, on page 22, the authors
state, "In summary, the accounting profession was developed to give a true and accurate
picture of the financial affairs of organizations." Accountants will note immediately the
difficulty. While the primary purpose of accounting is to provide useful information to
people who have an interest in the entity being reported on, the concept of truth in
accounting is problematic, to say the least. Likewise, their characterizations of auditing and
tax accounting (page 20) have significant shortcomings.
However, readers should not be put offby the vague, and not entirely correct, account of
the nature of accounting. The book in fact emphasizes the importance of deception and
lying, and not truth. This is, of course, a good thing, since the concept of truth in accounting
is extremely complex and (to some) an ill-defined, if not useless, concept. The important
things here - lying and deception - rightly provide the focus for later chapters.
Chapter 1 (and Chapter 7) provides a solid, ifsomewhat brief, discussion ofthe concepts
of lying and the centrality of truthfulness (as opposed to truth or falsity) for assessing the
ethics of information. Thus, the authors state, "If the use of information is benign and the
information is truthful, no ethical problems arise. But if the information persuades people to
act in one way or other, and their action either benefits or harms the persons giving or
getting the information, such information-giving takes on ethical importance" (page 13).
The authors make a brief but suggestive observation that when management discloses
information to outsiders, their actions are in some ways similar to selling and trying to
influence the behavior of market participants: "The CEO is selling the board or the
stockholders on the soundness of the company's financial situation" (p. 13). This suggests
that looking more closely at the connection between accounting and sales may be a fruitfial
course to pursue.
Chapters 2 and 3 provide clear and worthwhile discussions of the basic ideas underlying
ethics and ethical theory. In Chapter 2, some important concepts are that being ethical
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involves determining what actions one ought to perform, and that ethics involves the ability
to justify our actions based on our moral beliefs. Another fundamental concept that plays a
major role later in the book is to regard accounting ethics as an instance of role morality.
That is, what accountants should and should not do must be determined by reference to the
role or roles accountants play. Chapter 3 presents the major ethical theories clearly and
concisely.
In Chapter 4, "Accounting as a Profession," the authors adopt what may be termed an
idealistic definition of professions. According to this point of view, professions are char-
acterized by a number of factors, such as possession of a specialized body of knowledge,
higher education, high social status, a code of ethics, and acceptance of social re-
sponsibilities that advance the public interest (page 65). The primary purpose of the chapter
is to establish that accountants are in fact members of a profession.
This largely conventional way of characterizing professions provides a basis for
focusing the examination of professional ethics on codes of ethics (the subject ofChapters 5
and 6). Considering the continuing crisis in accounting that accountants need to confi^ont,
and that motivates this book, it would have been helpfiil to supplement this chapter with a
presentation of an alternative socio-political account of professions. According to this point
of view a profession is simply an occupation that has been granted the legal power to
regulate itself in return for a commitment to acting in a socially responsible fashion. Thus, a
profession is characterized as having entered into a kind of social contract with society that
is supposed to benefit everyone.
This concept of a profession is a valuable alternative to the conventional view because it
provides a clear basis for examining the nature of this contract and, in particular, the ethical
demands it places on the profession. It also provides a basis for examining the current
situation facing the profession (especially in the United States); it is clear to many that the
profession (including the professional associations, accounting firms, and individual
professionals) has not fialfilled its side of the bargain. This concept of professions would
have been helpfiil in Chapter 10.
The Code of Professional Conduct of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants is divided into two parts: a set ofbasic principles and a set ofrelatively detailed
rules (and interpretafions of the rules). Chapters 5 and 6 present these two aspects of the
Code in turn. The main value ofthese chapters is to explain the theoretical foundations ofthis
structure and to provide a theorefical rationale for the contents ofthe Code. Thus, they serve
to elucidate the current structure of the Code, rather than to analyze it critically.
The auditing fianction is the focus of Chapter 7. The chapter is divided into sections on
trust, the auditor's responsibility to the public and the basic responsibilities attendant on that
responsibility, and auditor independence. The discussion is based on the role of auditors in
attesting to the fair presentation of fiiiancial statement information.
In order to fiilfill that role, the authors emphasize the central importance ofcharacter traits
that support their judgments and actions. Specifically, auditors must have "as much honesty
and integrity as possible" (page 111). Auditor independence is critical, according to the
authors, because it "bolsters" honesty and integrity. This is a fair enough statement if it is
interpreted as a statement about the rules for auditor independence contained in professional
pronouncements. However, the relation between independence itself and these character
traits (virtues) would appear to go the other way. That is, the more honest an auditor is and the
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more integrity he or she has, the more he or she will be able to possess the primary character
trait required for the performance of their role, i.e., to be able to act independently of client
management. Similar to the approach taken in Chapters 5 and 6, the section on independence
focuses on the written standards governing independence, including a discussion of the
attempts ofthe late Independence Standards Board to take a more judgment-based approach
to independence.
Chapter 8 ('The Ethics of Managerial and Financial Accounting") suggests that ethical
issues relating to internal management focuses more on external financial reporting than
managerial accounting. Although attention to the problems of management accountants is
thus limited, the authors concentrate their attention in this chapter on the standards of
ethical conduct of the Institute of Management Accountants which they claim
(erroneously) is '"the code of ethics for management accountants" (p. 141). (This is not
correct because large proportions of CPAs are employees of reporting entities and are
subject to the Code of Professional Conduct of the AICPA.) Nevertheless, attention to
non-CPAs is welcome.
After an examination of the important concept of objectivity, the authors present a
somewhat lengthy discussion of whistle-blowing by accountants. This is an important, but
neglected, topic. The IMA Code provides for, at most, internal whistle-blowing, and implies
that external whistle-blowing is always a violation of the Code (Appendix ii, page 216). The
codes governing accountants differ from almost all other professions, such as engineers,
physicians, nurses, social workers, and others whose codes of conduct provide for the
disclosure of confidential information under some conditions. In fact, most ofthem mandate
breaking confidentiality in certain situations. In contrast, accountants have a strong
responsibility to protect confidential information from disclosure. This much-neglected
topic deserves more attention.
Chapter 9 ("The Ethics ofTax Accounting") is also a worthwhile departure from much of
the accounting literature since the ethical issues relating to tax accounting and tax planning
have also been neglected. The authors begin with what many may regard as a controversial
claim about the role of tax accountants, i.e., that tax accountants (like auditors) have a dual
role, as both advisers to their clients and attestors to the government. Although many
accountants may reject this characterization of the role of tax accountants, (and the
responsibilities implied by it), it is an issue that deserves further debate and analysis.
Building on this claim, the authors address two ethical questions: whether there is an
obligation to pay taxes that we might regard as unfair and whether taxpayers have an ethical
obligation to pay more than the minimal amount of taxes due (i.e., to pay their fair share for
the provision of government services)?
This leads into an examination of the ethics of tax shelters. Although much attention has
been paid recently to illegal tax shelters offered by major accounting and law firms, ethical
issues have been neglected. The authors make an interesting claim: "Taxation, as much as
one does not like it, is the human invention that centralizes the sharing of the expense of
performing government functions in a fair and equitable manner. To view accounting as a
profession best employed in dodging those expenses is a distortion of the role of the
accountant" (page 162). Similarly, on page 164, they claim that, "implicit in all of this
[discussion of tax shelters] is a recognition of the responsibility of the accountant and firms
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to uphold the soundness of our tax system—to draw the dehcate balance between intended
tax advantages and loopholes which undermine the system."
In discussing the ethical issues of accounting firms and the accounting profession (the
subject of Chapter 10), the book begins well, by mentioning the name of Abraham Briloff
Professor Briloff has been a thom in the side of the accounting profession (the authors
unfairly call him the profession's "perennial scold" (page 186)), criticizing it sharply over a
number of years for its ethical shortcomings.
There are two reasons for bringing this up. One is that Briloff s views are not described
or addressed by the authors. This is surprising in a way because, like the authors, he
thinks that members of the accounting profession have important roles to play in
organizations and that they must adhere to high standards of ethics and professionalism -
including honesty and acting with integrity, bideed, the lack of courage and integrity in
the profession are Briloff s main criticisms. Second, and on the other hand, the authors are
not particularly critical of accounting firms or the profession as a whole. They do
recognize that these "stories of inappropriate behavior by accounting firms lead us to ask
what is going on in the accounting establishment today and whether the general tenor of
what is going on in those firms is ethically acceptable. What seems to be going on, at least
from the point of view of those critical of the direction the accounting profession is taking
today, is that the profession has ceased to be a profession and succumbed to the pressures
endemic to being a business driven by the profit motive" (page 174). However, they do
not draw much from the vast literature going back decades (including Briloff) on these
issues.
The authors take an interesting tack on these issues, by regarding accounting firms as
businesses and then addressing two important and fundamental questions relating to the
practice of public accounting: Whether accounting ethics is an oxymoron, i.e., a self-
contradiction; and (having rejected that view) what are the social responsibilities of ac-
counting firms? Regarding the latter, the question becomes for them the question of what
responsibilities accounting firms have in addition to the pursuit of profits. This particular
approach to the problems of public accounting has been given little or no attention in the
accounting literature.
In summary, this book is a usefiil addition to the textbook market in accounting ethics.
It would be most useful if used selectively in accounting courses, depending on the
content and approach an individual instructor adopts. Especially in a free-standing ethics
course, it would have to be supplemented liberally with additional readings, in order to
provide a more complete picture of the field and the issues. It is at its weakest when it
scratches the surface of long-discussed areas of accounting (such as the importance of
true disclosure (primarily in Chapter 1)) and the ethics of accounting firms and the
profession (primarily in Chapter 10). It is at its strongest when it builds on the authors'
expertise in business ethics to introduce new and valuable ideas from the perspective of
outsiders to the literature. The chronologies at the beginning of the book are by now
(with the apparent closing of the Enron/Andersen/WorldCom episodes) out of date, and
are a distraction from a focus on ethics (as opposed to legal and regulatory issues). Its
focus on the U.S. accounting profession is an understandable choice for the textbook
publishing business. For this reason, instructors outside the United States will find the U.
S.-centric chapters (mostly Chapters 5 and 6) of limited use; on the other hand, there are
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many issues and sections of the book (e.g., much of Chapters 8, 9, and 10) that cross
national boundaries.
James C. Gaa
Department ofAccounting and Management Information Systems, School of Business,
University ofAlberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
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Accounting irregularities in financial statements: A definitive guide for litigators,
auditors and fraud investigators, Benny K.B. Kwok. Gower Publishing Limited,
Aldershot, Hampshire, England (2005). xix + 209 pages, £75.00, US$144.95,
ISBN: 0-566-08621 2
High profile accounting scandals in recent years have heightened the demand for information
about accounting irregularities. This book represents a good effort to satisfy this thirst. Chapter 1
begins with an explanation of various financial statements and what constitutes generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). It then offers details on the fmancial-reporting
requirements for companies situated in Hong Kong and in the United Kingdom. This provides a
good overview even for those who are familiar with the financial-reporting environments in
Hong Kong and the United Kingdom. The chapter concludes by discussing practices which in
these two countries are considered to be theft, false accounting, and various other offenses.
The first portion of Chapter 2 focuses on the nature of accounting irregularities, which
includes unintentional ones (errors) as well as intentional ones (fraudulent financial reporting
and misappropriation of assets). This approach seems to be at odds with the use of the term
"irregularities" in the United States, where it refers to intentional acts only. Furthermore, the
author suggests a very broad interpretation of irregularities by including acts of manipulating
the choice and application ofaccounting policies within the boundaries ofGAAP ifthe results
are not consistent with a true and fair view ofthe financial statements. The major portion ofthe
chapter discusses characteristics of financial information (e.g., relevance), financial reporting
principles (e.g., going concem), and the basics of double-entry bookkeeping and transaction
cycles. It would have seemed more natural, however, to place this material before the
discussion of accounting irregularities.
Chapters 3 through 8 cover various types of accounting irregularities. In each of these
chapters, cases are presented to illustrate how the irregularities can be perpetrated and recorded
in the company's accounts, as well as how they might be detected. Each ofthese chapters also
concludes with an excellent list of warning signs.
In Chapter 3, the focus is on irregularities involving the overstatement of sales revenue. After
reviewing the relevant GAAP, the author discusses three types ofsales overstatement: permanent
overstatements arising from fictitious sales, temporary overstatements resulting from shifting
sales to an earlier time period, and overstatements involving conditional sales which may be
permanent or temporary. It is not clear why the author categorizes the latter two types as
revocable sales, as it would seem that only the conditional sales can be described as revocable.
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Chapter 4 covers the perpetration of accounting irregularities by understating expenses and
losses. These irregularities are categorized into ones dealing with unrecorded expenditures,
aggressive capitalization, and delays in expense/loss recognition.
Accounting irregularities caused by overstating assets is the subject of Chapter 5.
Specifically, three types of assets are discussed: fixed assets, inventories, and trade
receivables. Regarding fixed assets and inventories, separate discussions are provided for
irregularities due to inflating physical counts and inflating unit cost/value. For inventories,
there is also a discussion about delaying write-offs. This topic could just as easily have been
covered in Chapter 4 as part of the section on delays in expense/loss recognition. As for
trade receivables, two types of irregularities are described: fictitious receivables and failure
to establish an adequate allowance for bad debts. Regarding the latter, the author notes that
the provision for bad debts is sometimes used as a profit-smoothing device. Income
smoothing is a real phenomenon and should have been introduced when describing the
nature of irregularities in Chapter 2. Curiously, Chapter 5 does not discuss irregularities
resulting from overstatements in assets such as intangibles, non-trade receivables, or
investments.
In Chapter 6, the author explains how irregularities may occur from understatement of
four types of liabilities: trade payables, accruals/provisions, contingent liabilities, and off-
balance-sheet financing. There is potentially a fair amount of overlap with the
understatement of expenses covered in Chapter 4, but the author repeats very little about
the irregularities already mentioned in the prior chapter. Chapter 6 would have benefited
from more illustrative cases. Only three were presented, in contrast to 13 in Chapter 3, nine
in Chapter 4, and five in Chapter 5.
While Chapters 3 through 6 discuss irregularities involving overstatements and un-
derstatements of financial-statement items. Chapter 7 deals with irregularities involving
manipulations of classification, presentation style, and disclosure. The manipulations that are
described revolve largely around the income statement. It would have been useful to have
provided more illustrations of irregularities involving the balance sheet as well as the notes to
the financial statements.
Unlike the previous chapters, which are organized around descriptions of various types
of inegularities, the discussion in Chapter 8 centers around various motives for perpetrating
accounting irregularities. The motives relate to tax evasion, theft, commercial disputes, and
matrimonial breakdown. These irregularities also differ from those in previous chapters in that
their primary objectives are not to distort financial-statement items, though this often occurs as by-
products of the irregularities. Furthermore, while virtually all irregularities covered in prior
chapters serve to inflate profits or net assets, most ofthe in-egularities depicted in Chapter 8 aim to
understate profits or net assets.
Chapter 9 provides closure by discussing deterrents to accounting irregularities. The author
begins by describing how audits serve to deter irregularities, as well as the limitations of audits.
The bulk of the chapter distinguishes between two types of deterrents labeled as micro-deterrents
and macro-deterrents. The former relate to what can be done within the company or organization
and include internal controls as well as people and culture. The macro-deterrents go beyond the
company or organization and consist ofaccounting and auditing standards as well as mechanisms
for corporate governance. The latter include strong regulatoiy bodies which enforce regulations
and penalize non-compliance. These are clearly external to the organization, but other measures
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discussed, such as audit committees, can arguably be considered as more micro-deterrents than
macro-deterrents
.
All in all, the book does a good job ofexplaining and illustrating accounting irregularities
to its target audience of litigators, auditors, and fraud investigators. While the author focuses
on accounting and auditing standards in Hong Kong and the United Kingdom, readers from
the United States as well as other countries can certainly benefit from this book. One of its
greatest strengths is its organization and classification of accounting irregularities. This
enables the reader to better digest the particulars of the irregularities in addition to how they
may relate to one another.
Another positive feature of the book is its wealth of cases to illustrate the irregularities.
Although some of the cases are quite complex, they are generally presented clearly and help to
crystallize the explanations of how irregularities may occur. I did wonder, though, whether the
cases that were presented represent the most common types of accounting irregularities.
Relevance would certainly have been enhanced had the author provided such evidence. I also
wondered whether the cases were taken from actual situations. The author mentions in the preface
(page xvi) that the cases include fictitious names, but are they completely made-up or based on
real events? It would have been appealing to at least supplement these cases with ones from actual
companies like Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, etc. (and using the actual company names too).
Certainly there have been many publicly available examples in recent years.
Arnold Schneider
Georgia Institute of Technology,
Atlanta, GA, USA
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Erratum to "Book review: Ethics, governance and
accountability: A professional perspective"
[The International Journal of Accountancy
41 (2006) 321-325]
In TIJA 41-3, September 2006, the name of the author of the Book Review "Ethics,
governance and accountability: A professional perspective," by Dellaportas S., Gibson, K.,
Alagiah, R., Hutchinson, M., Leung, R, Van Homrigh, D. John Wiley and Sons, Australia,
Milton (Qld.), 2005 was inadvertently omitted.
The author of the book review is
Charles Piot
Montpellier Business School *CEROM, Montpellier, France
E-mail address: CPiot@supco-montpellier.fr.
We regret having omitted this identification.
DOI of original article: 10.1016/j.intacc.2006.07.007.
0020-7063/$30.00 © 2006 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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Call for papers
The 2007 annual symposium of The International Journal of Accounting will be held
in Honolulu, Oahu, Hawai'i on June 7-9, 2007. The theme of the 2007 symposium is
"Measurement, Disclosure and Governance." Papers in all areas of international accounting,
taxation, auditing, and ethics are welcome. Authors are invited to submit research papers for
presentation. Submitted papers will be anonymously reviewed. The Program Committee will
select papers for presentation based on the comments of the reviewers, quality of the work
and potential contribution to the literature. There is limited space for other participants who
would like to attend.
The registration fee of $300.00 will cover copies of the conference materials and meals.
Registration fees are waived for authors, co-authors, and discussants appearing on
the program. A stipend of up to US$1,600.00 to cover the travel and lodging cost will be
provided for one author for each accepted paper and for each discussant. Accepted papers
will be published in The International Journal ofAccounting, a publication of Elsevier,
after satisfying the refereeing process. The deadline for submission is January 31, 2007.
Papers are to be submitted in an electronic form to ciera@uiuc.edu
Please visit: www.business.uiuc.edu/ciera/conferences/ for conference updates.
Questions about the conference may be addressed to Susan Sutherland at sesuther@uiuc.edu
or:
A. Rashad Abdel-khalik Shirley Daniel
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Henry A. Walker Jr. Professor of Business
College of Business Enterprise
1206 S. Sixth Street School of Accountancy
320 Wohlers Hall College of Business Administration
Champaign, IL 61820 University of Hawai'i at Manoa
rashad@uiuc.edu 2404 Maile Way,
Honolulu, HI 96822
sdaniel@hawaii.edu
The symposium is co-sponsored by the School of Accountancy and the Center for
International Business Education and Research in the College of Business Administration at
the University of Hawai'i at Manoa (www.cba.hawaii.edu ), the Zimmerman Center of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Elsevier, the publisher of the Journal. The
symposium will be held at the East-West Center on the campus of the University. A special
feature of the symposium will be a guided visit to Shangri La, the Honolulu home of Doris
Duke. Built in 1937, Shangri La houses an impressive collection of Islamic art and is con-
sidered one of Hawai'i's most architecturally significant homes (www.shangrilahawaii.org).
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